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'Prima arrivano i loro soldi, 
poi arrivano loro con i loro metodi'. 
(Falcone, 1991, p. 18)1 
 
 
Questioning the effectiveness of the money laundering offence is not only the outcome 
of a research on a controversial piece of legislation, but also the narration of a personal 
discovery about patterns of the relations between economic, financial and criminal 
policies in contemporary western societies.2 While I have not expressed any personal 
opinions in order to safeguard the scientificity of the publication, I have tried to present 
all critical the aspects and arguments surrounding the matter, so that the reader is left 
free to interpret the research outcomes and to reach his or her own conclusion. 
 
Money laundering is the process of giving profits originated illegally an appearance of 
having been made lawfully.3 Often this process is conducted by offenders who operate 
across national borders, thanks to the cooperation of professionals, such as attorneys, 
financial services' providers, estate agents, whose reputation is rarely suspicious (known 
as white-collars). The flow of ill-gotten gains is facilitated by the existence of offshore 
                                                          
1 English translation: First their monies -the Mafiosi's- come, then they arrive with their methods. 
2 This research, being focussed on a European domestic legal system, is embedded in the so-called 
'Western world', and thus does not aspire to be globally representative. 
3 Typically the phenomenon is described as a three-stage process which starts with the money 
coming from the crime first being placed somewhere to hide its link to the crime (placement). After it has 
been placed it is layered, which means its connection to the crime and the criminal is further disguised. 
This can be done, for example, by a series of transactions, a process that often involves the money being 
transferred through several banks abroad or being used to set up shell companies in tax havens (layering). 
After it has been layered successfully, the money (which can also be in the form of property) is then 
integrated into the lawful economy (integration). These three phases are not always clearly separated; 
sometimes the placement and the integration overlap. What is essential, is that the offender must have the 
intention to conceal the provenance of the ill-gotten assets from the criminal justice authorities. 
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financial jurisdictions, financial secrecy, the liquidity of the current financial system and 
the availability of financial vehicles, and other means that were typically designed for 
legitimate purposes, but that can be easily abused.4 For instance, big corporations might 
need to integrate monies derived from mispricing in the legitimate economic circle 
through money laundering schemes, or wealthy individuals may adopt the same 
methods to stash away capital deriving from aggressive tax planning or tax evasion.5 In 
the last two situations, when the monies laundered are not proceeds of serious crimes 
such as human trafficking or drug trafficking, the society may perceive them as less 
dangerous than the laundering committed by organised crime; especially if the 
subterfuges adopted imply the accomplishment of apparently innocent financial 
transactions or other common economic activities.6  Due to the borderline nature of 
money laundering, which happens between the so-called 'legitimate economy' and the 
'dirty economy', and thus involves different actors such as banks, the financial sector, 
certain professions and businesses, offenders, victims and law enforcement agencies, 
the legal response needs to compromise with all the various economic, political, social 
and financial interests at play. Furthermore, where legitimate business intermingles with 
illegal business and legitimate funds with illicit funds, it is very difficult to distinguish 
what is legal from what is not. The criminalisation of money laundering was specifically 
supposed to tackle this fine line. The goal of this research is to assess from a sociolegal7 
perspective whether the choice of criminalising money laundering has been effective or 
not in eliminating the targeted practice. In order to assess the impact of the domestic 
implementation of the existing legal framework, the research uses a case study that 
                                                          
4 The combination of false documentation, mispricing, transfer pricing, tax havens, dummy 
corporations, shielded foundations, secrecy jurisdictions, shell banks, tax havens, offshore, flee clauses, 
collusion, kickbacks, numbered accounts, wire transfers that disguise transactions, 'the whole gamut of 
techniques and structures that support dirty money, affords a quasi-legal veneer over a system that revels 
in its ability to walk on the edge and get away with subterfuge, disguise, and theft'. Becker, 2005, p. 136. 
'Whether it’s moving drug money or tax-evading money, whether it’s a thug or tyrant or terrorist or 
corporate titan, all use the same bag of tricks. And the truth is, western business and banking sectors have 
developed and promoted the mechanisms for bringing in dirty money from other countries for more than 
a century'. Becker, 2005, p. 24. 
5 An estimated 50 % of all global commerce passes through tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions at 
some point between seller and buyer. This serves to eliminate taxes, avoid regulations, and accumulate 
wealth secretly. Becker, 2005, p. 134. Methods used by money launders and tax evaders are often the 
same. See Zoppei, 2013, p. 36. 
6 'There is no place in international financial statistics where you can find “dirty money” or 
“laundered proceeds” or “flight capital” or “trade mispricing” or any account remotely suggesting such 
figures. Most illicit flows are either disguised or invisible'. Becker, 2005, p. 106 
7 The Black's Law Dictionary refers to 'sociolegal' as an adjective that means: 'of, relating to, or 
involving the field of study known as law and society'. Garner (ed.), 2014, p. 1605. 
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specifically questions the effectiveness of the money laundering offence in the German 
national criminal legal system. 
 
The discovery process originated from the assumption that money laundering is bad for 
the society, because it is an enabler of transnational organised criminal activities and 
corrupted practices, it distorts fair competition among economic actors and it 
contributes to the detriment of democratic societies,8 and therefore the laundering of 
money needs to be effectively contrasted through an appropriate legal framework, in 
particular through the criminalisation of the conduct. Yet, the in-depth analysis 
conducted for this research has revealed that the phenomenon is more complex than it 
may seem. Scholarly literature about the impact of money laundering on the economy is 
for instance controversial: On one hand money laundering is said to distort both fair 
competition and the market, on the other hand the investment of illicit monies can foster 
the economy by increasing the availability of credit. In addition, it has been estimated 
that money laundering contributes to national GDPs.9 In fact, money laundering has 
become 'one of the great morals panic of our day', perceived at the same time as bad, but 
also very interesting, and slightly daring. 10  The anti-money laundering discourse 
highlights its huge dimension -the total volume of money laundered is estimated to 
amount to between 2,5 and 5, 5 % of the world GDP,11 indeed the panic and the interest 
in the phenomenon has spread quite rapidly, so that currently most jurisdictions in the 
world have endorsed anti-money laundering laws.12 Especially in recent times there has 
been a growing interest in it. To use Dalla Chiesa's words, a mythology surrounding the 
economic side of organised crime, in relation to the volume of profits deriving from 
                                                          
8 The literature on the 'bad' impact of money laundering is abundant, see for example 
Masciandaro, 2000; 1999. 
9 In the literature there is also the idea that money laundering increases the availability of credits 
and the profits and therefore is good for the economy, see Unger et al., 2014, pp. 217, 218. A popular 
anecdote tells that a Russian consultant, while drafting the new criminal code, after having heard the 
explanation of what money laundering is, said: ‘Why should I be against it?’. See Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 
446. 
10 Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 437. 
11 UNODC, 2011, p. 5. 
12 The money laundering panic would have occurred in a different shape without globalisation; the 
coincidence in time of the two has created mechanisms of amplification. See Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 
437. The two main documents that set the international regime against money laundering are the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna 
Convention) and the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (FATF Recommendations). The 
Vienna Convention has 189 parties and 87 States signatories. Over 180 jurisdictions around the world 
have committed to the FATF Recommendations, according to the FATF. See http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/, last accessed on 22/11/2015. 
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illegal businesses reinvested in the legal economic circle. 13  The literature describes 
money laundering as the 'darker side of globalisation',14 or the 'illicit side of the global 
economy'; commonly money launderers are perceived as defying borders, increasingly 
agile, and technologically savvy.15 However, while containing many truths, this picture 
of money laundering strictly connected to globalisation obscures as much as it reveals.16 
The temptation to blame globalisation is much too easy and convenient and can lead to 
a further escalation of flawed strategies and policies.17 On the assumption that the term 
'globalisation' refers to 'an increased awareness of the variety of the world's 
interconnectedness of the diverse interacting societies, states and legal systems', the 
transnational legal framework set to tackle money laundering should be re-evaluated on 
the basis of reflections on eventually conflicting national and supranational interests. It 
is not completely true that globalisation has reduced the states’ power; in fact states 
have a power to define the content of illicit globalisation.18 Illicit globalisation has 
challenged the State but State engagement with illicit economic flows has ranged from 
consideration and discouragement to toleration and complicity'.19 
 
While the legal concept of money laundering is relatively recent, the motives for 
engaging in this practice date back a long time: Throughout history, people have 
deployed a variety of tactics to ensure the enjoyment of the proceeds from their criminal 
activities, for instance a villager who had stolen his neighbour’s cow most likely led it 
out of the village to sell it or to exchange it for some other livestock in order to 
disassociate himself from the theft.20 When criminal gain is not re-invested in illegal 
businesses and the offenders want to purchase goods for their own private enjoyment or 
create further profit, they need to integrate the ill-gotten gains in the 'surface economy' 
through a laundering process, and re-invest them for example in buying shares, real 
estate products, or already existing businesses, which produce clean gains. Due to the 
tightening of economic criminal policies that limit the possibility of integrating ill-
                                                          
13 Dalla Chiesa, 2012, p. 11. The author highlights the importance of discerning grounded studies 
on the economic dimension of the Mafia from exaggerated theories that empathise the volume of the 
Mafia business. 
14 Levi and Reuter, 2006, (289) 367. 
15 Andreas, 2015, pp. 45, 46. 
16 Andreas, 2015, p. 46. 
17 Andreas, 2015, p. 46. 
18 Andreas, 2015, p. 53. 
19 Andreas, 2015, p. 63. 
20 Jojahrt, 2013, p. 18. 
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gotten gains in the legitimate economy, offenders have developed more and more 
complex methods and subterfuges to launder proceeds of crime, so the rise of a proper 
'money laundering industry' (industria del riciclaggio) is mentioned 21   This 
phenomenon, while fostering the economic circle in the short-term may actually be very 
harmful in the long-term. In fact, the spread of companies, businesses and financial 
vehicles funded through illicit money may allow organised criminal groups to acquire 
ever-stronger positions. This, besides distorting fair competition among legitimate 
businesses and corporations, can lead to the successful creation of a growing economic 
power that can be used to influence the political scene. Moreover, the leading economic 
position acquired through the management of industrial structures and businesses allows 
criminal organisations to conquer social control on a local level. Mafia organisations, 
for example, have acquired control of entire communities through the distribution of job 
positions both in the private and public sectors, by manipulating public tenders and by 
managing private companies. These processes can finally lead to the detriment of social 
structures. On the other hand, given that money laundering links the underground world 
to the clean one, the practice has been considered organised crime's Achilles’ heel in the 
sense that it represents a risky situation for offenders who try to escape law enforcement 
repression. 
 
To question something implies to approach critically a certain subject. This criticality is 
rooted in the literature that has exposed challenges, inconsistencies and ineffectiveness 
of the anti-money laundering policies from its early days until now.22 With regards to 
international legislation, scholars have often criticized the ineffectiveness of the anti-
money laundering regime to not be able to achieve its goals and thus to be only 
appearance of public action.23 While there is theoretical support for the perception that 
policies have contributed to a decrease in the incidence of money laundering, there is no 
                                                          
21 See, among others, Mainieri, 2012, p. 230; Levi and Reuter argue that money laundering can be 
studied as a market model, in which there is a demand and an offer of money laundering services 
influenced by the intensity of law enforcement action. Levi and Reuter, 2006, pp. (289) 350 ss. 
22 See, among others, Alldridge, 2008, pp. (437) 462, 462; Arzt, 2013, pp. 1134 ss; Becker, 2005, p. 
91; Bosworth-Davies, 2008, p. 180; 2006, pp. (346) 363, 364; van Duyne et al., 2005, pp. 143 ss; Gathii, 
2010, p. (197) 203; Mitsilegas, 2003, pp. 16 ss; Naylor, 2002, pp. 133 ss; Nelen, 2004, p. (517) 521 ss; 
GwG-Nestler, 2014, § 261 mn. 15; Pieth, 2004, pp. (3) 7 ss; Sharman, 2011, p. 55; Zagaris, 2007, p. (157) 
167; Yeandle et al., 2005, pp. 34 ss; Wang, 2011, pp. (210) 220 ss. Levi and Reuter admit that they cannot 
dismiss the possibility that the regime’s many critics are correct, since the controls in practice may do 
little to accomplish crime-fighting goals; yet, they undertake an assessment of US regime that generously 
supports its effectiveness. See Levi and Reuter, 2006, pp. (289) 294, 363 ss. 
23 See, for instance Tsingou, 2010, p. 630. 
 13 
evidence that this goal has actually been achieved.24 The official discourse describes the 
regime as a crucial tool to prevent and combat money laundering, and lawmakers have 
been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering laws. This work 
however takes a critical approach towards the existing legal framework and presents the 
view that questioning the effectiveness of the money laundering offence is essential 
before expanding the scope of the existing legal framework.25 The term 'effectiveness' 
will be the object of deep reflection exposed in chapter one; the word derives from the 
Latin efficěre, which means to accomplish something. A recently published work on the 
effectiveness of European anti-money laundering policies concludes that while it is 
possible to estimate what the policies cost, it is almost impossible to quantify their 
benefits. 26  While most of the existing literature has quantitatively assessed the 
effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes on the basis of statistical data and 
other quantitative indexes and has tried to reduce the complexity of the issue by 
measuring it numerically, this research adopts a qualitative methodology, which instead 
highlights the entanglement and the different perspectives on the question. The work 
takes a sociolegal perspective. Through this approach, the hypotheses built on the basis 
of theoretical reflections on the legal effectiveness are empirically verified through a 
case study. The study is a macro-sociological assessment of the effectiveness of a 
criminal legislation through the analysis of the motives that have triggered lawmakers to 
enact the current legal framework and the practical effects of the 'law in action'27 and of 
the 'law inaction'.28 Thanks to the use of sociological conceptual tools, as the ones of 
function, symbolic effectiveness, power, labelling, and legal culture, the research 
critically approaches the legal framework. In addition, the sociolegal perspective allows 
us to take into account the multidisciplinary nature of the phenomenon of money 
laundering and of its countermeasures and the diverse conflicting interests at play. 
 
The thesis focuses primarily on the criminal legal part, which is the money laundering 
offence itself. The money laundering offence is a derivative offence, which means that 
it is built on the commission of previous breaches of the law, from which the offender 
                                                          
24 Unger et al., 2014, p. 217. 
25 See also Levi and Reuter on the necessity of empirical research on the effectiveness of the anti-
money laundering regime.  Levi and Reuter, 2006, pp. (289) 294, 365. 
26 Unger et al., 2014, p. 218. 
27 The phrase refers to the applied law, in opposition with the 'law in books'. For more details, see 
chapter one, paragraph 1.1. 
28 The phrase is used by Pontell and Geis to define legal inactivity especially with regards to 
white-collar and corporate criminality. See Pontell and Geis, 2007, p. xv. 
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derives the money object of the laundering conduct. Money laundering is typically 
considered an economic crime.29 Yet, the anti-money laundering regime entails a vast 
regulatory body directed at preventing the infiltration of ill-gotten gains in the so-called 
'legitimate economy', whose deterrent effect is tightly connected to the criminal legal 
menace provided by the money laundering offence. 30  Therefore the research also 
examines the cooperation between prohibitory and preventive rules. Specifically, as 
regards to the case study of Germany, the study primarily deals with Article 261 of the 
German criminal code (Gcc), but also with the anti-money laundering act 
(Geldwäschegesetz, GwG), and their relative amendments. The choice of focussing on 
the criminal legal part serves the methodological necessity of restraining the scope of 
the current research, given that in the last twenty years the anti-money laundering 
regime has evolved very quickly to the point that currently the legal framework is rather 
complex and entails regulations in various different sectors. This work does not only 
aim to debate the technical suitability of the existing legal framework in tackling money 
laundering, but it questions the criminal policy choice of criminalising the conduct, also 
by looking at the practical effects of such criminalisation. 
 
The interest in the German case derives from the fact that, according to the IMF, the 
OECD and the FATF, Germany might have 'a higher risk profile for large scale money 
laundering than many other countries'.31 There are some factors identified as enablers of 
money laundering activities, such as the large economy and financial centre, the 
                                                          
29 A definition of economic crime can be taken by the 1981 Council of Europe Recommendation 
on Economic Crime, which lists sixteen specific and non-specific offences, such as different types of 
fraud, cartel offences, fiscal offences, offences related to currency regulations, bogus firms, stock 
exchange and bank offences, unfair competition and others. According to the Recommendation economic 
crime has an adverse impact beyond individual victims and the material damage in that: It affects a large 
number of persons, society and the state in general, it damages the functioning of the national or 
international economy, and it causes a loss of trust and confidence in the economic system. See 
Recommendation R (81) 12 on Economic Crime adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 25 June 1981. 
However, European countries continue to use different definitions or enumerate different types of crimes 
as economic crimes.  Council of Europe, Organised Crime Situation Report 2005, pp. 9, 10. 'In Germany, 
economic crimes account for only 1.4% of all crimes recorded but for more than 55% of the material 
damage. However, immaterial damages are considered to be even more important, in particular in terms 
of distortion of market competition, the impact on other companies linked or depended on those 
committing crimes, the damage for society by offences against environmental, food, labour security and 
other laws, and the possible loss of confidence in the functioning of the economic and social order 
altogether'. See Council of Europe, Organised Crime Situation Report 2005, p. 12. 
30 A considerable part of the international anti-money laundering legal framework addresses also 
the financing of terrorism. However this thesis deals only marginally with terrorism, to the extent that the 
topic is relevant for the assessment of the money laundering offence's effectiveness.   
31 FATF/OECD and IMF, Mutual Evaluation Report of Germany (FATF, MER Germany), 2010, p. 
28. 
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strategical location in the middle of Europe, with strong international links, the 
substantial proceeds of the crime environment involving organised crime operating in 
most profit generating criminal spheres, the open borders, the large informal sector and 
a high use of cash, the large and sophisticated economy and financial sector, the 
important role in world trade, and finally the involvement in large volumes of cross-
border trade and financial flows. 'The media have kept on reporting the fact that 
Germany is an ideal country, or even a paradise for money launderers.32 According to 
most recent media reports, corruption is increasing in Germany along with money 
laundering and organised crime,33 and illicit financial flows are estimated to amount to 
50 Billion Euros annually.34 Renowned banks such as Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, 
and Hypovereinsbank have been the focus of recent scandals due to their involvement in 
large tax evasion and money laundering schemes, investigated mostly by US law 
enforcement agencies.35 The issue has been already tackled from a satiric perspective, 
by the magazine Capital in 2012, which uses the following picture to represent the 
money laundering situation in Germany:36 
 
 
                                                          
32 The latest news at the time of writing concern the fact that Germany is second only to 
Luxembourg in money laundering risk, according to a report published by Eurodad 'Fifty Shades of Tax 
Dodging: the EU's role in supporting an unjust global tax system' on November 3, 2015. The report is 
available at http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/56378e84d0fac.pdf, last accessed on 16/11/2015. See Crisp 
J, Deutschland belegt bei Geldwäsche Platz zwei hinter Luxemburg. Viel getan hat sich nach der 
Luxleaks-Steueraffäre nicht bei den EU-Ländern, so das Ergebnis einer Analyse des Netwerks Eurodad. 
Der Tagesspiegel, 04/11/2015; OECD: Deutschland ist Geldwäsche-Paradies. Deutsche Wirtschafts 
Nachrichten, 18/01/2013; Dick W, Germany, a safe haven for money laundering. Deutsche Welle, 
30/10/2012; Rimpel K, Geldwäsche-Paradies Deutschland. Nummer acht unter den Steueroasen. Tz-
online, 07/11/2013.; Ramthum C, OECD: Deutschland versagt im Kampf gegen Geldwäsche. 
Wirtschaftswoche, 26/04/2014; 'Steueroase Deutschland ist Eldorado für Geldwäsche'. In Handelsblatt, 
07/11/2013; Deutschland ein "Eldorado für Geldwäsche"? Deutsche Welle, 07/11/2013; Netzwerk 
Steuergerechtigkeit, Deutschland ist ein Eldorado für Geldwäsche. Frankfurter Allgemein, 07/11/2013. 
33 See 'Dirty Money. The Rise of Organized Crime in Europe'. In Deutsche Welle, 15/11/2015, 
19.15, available at http://www.dw.com/en/documentaries-and-reports-dirty-money-2015-11-15/e-
18795402-9798, last accessed on 16/11/2015; Schnaust R, Korruption in Deutschland steigt unaufhörlich 
an. Neopresse, 12/11/2015. 
34 Grabitz M, Geldwäsche floriert in Deutschland. 50 Milliarden Euro illegale Zahlungen. General 
Anzeiger Bonn, 01/06/2015. The FATF/OECD and IMF estimated the amount of proceeds of crime that 
could be potentially laundered in the country to be between 43 and 57 billion Euros. FATF/OECD and 
IMF, 2010, Mutual Evaluation Report of Germany, p. 24. Yet, it is not possible to establish an objective 
number since profits criminally originated in Germany might be laundered in other countries, as much as 
gains produced elsewhere may be washed in Germany. 
35 Crisp J, Deutschland belegt bei Geldwäsche Platz zwei hinter Luxemburg. Viel getan hat sich 
nach der Luxleaks-Steueraffäre nicht bei den EU-Ländern, so das Ergebnis einer Analyse des Netwerks 
Eurodad. Der Tagesspiegel, 04/11/2015; Rosbasch J, Deutschlands Problem mit der Geldwäsche-
Bekämpfung. Deutschlandfunk, 06/08/2015; Geldwäsche Affäre in Russland. Deutscher Bank drohen 
Milliarden Bußgelder. In Spiegelonline, 14/08/2015. 









The legal framework has been considered as not 
being sufficient to tackle the estimated volume of 
money laundering. In 2007 and 2010 the European 
Commission initiated two proceedings against the German government for having 
contravened the European treaty by not having effectively transposed into national law 
the European framework to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.37 Schäuble, 
who in 2011 was the German Minister of Finance, taking part in an official conference 
at the Ministry of Finance on money laundering, was seen to be seeking confirmation 
from a colleague as to whether his Ministry was responsible for money laundering 
control or not; when he received a positive answer he then made sure that the 
implementation of such legislations was attributed to the states.38 Schäuble was actually 
already in charge of the anti-money laundering regime in the years between 2005 and 
2009, while he was also the Head of the Ministry of the Interior, because at that time 
                                                          
37 On 14th October 2004, Frank addressed the European Commission with a complaint against the 
German government with reference to a report published by the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic and Commercial Development), and the FATF (Financial Action 
Task Force) to argue that Germany was contravening the second European anti-money laundering 
directive (Directive 2001/97/EC). Frank's complaint was particularly focussed on the lack of regulations 
in the field of casinos, which were not sanctioned pursuant to the German legal system in case they did 
not report a suspicious transaction. Frank is an expert in the field of anti-money laundering. See 
http://www.frank-cs.org/cms/modules/welcome/index.php, last accessed on 27/11/2015. The EU 
Commission Secretary general confirmed the receiving of the complaint on 13 June 2005, with the file 
number 2005/4572, SG(2005) A/5553. In the meanwhile the EU adopted a new Directive (Directive 
2005/60/EU) and on 21st march 2007 the European Commission, on the basis of Frank's complaint, 
initiated a proceeding against Germany for the violation of the EU treaty. On 16 July 2007 the Ministry of 
justice declared that there was an ongoing legislative process in order to close the legal loopholes, which 
eventually concluded with the adoption of the 'law to fight money laundering and terrorist financing' 
(Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung, 
Geldwäschebekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz, GwBerkErgG) on 13th August 2008, which discharged the 
complaint, according to the EU Commission. Yet, Frank was not satisfied by the transposition of the third 
anti-money laundering directive into German law and filed another complaint in 2009, after the Ministry 
of Finance declared that implementation at state level of international standards against money laundering 
and terrorist financing was considered as very critical (Communication GZ VII A 3-WK 7031/08/10014). 
For more details on the proceeding, see Roth et al., 2007, pp. 287 ss. 
38 Schütz, 2012, p. 250. 
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that Ministry was competent for money laundering control. 39  According to the 
government's draft law to optimise money laundering prevention of 17 August 2011, the 
anti-money laundering act of 1993 has never been effectively enforced,40 and this means 
that the 'Schwerstsverbreche in Deutschland belohnt werden'.41 Frank and Fiedler sent 
several letters to the Minister, in order to offer their help as consultants to tackle money 
laundering more effectively, given that for many years Germany had not implemented 
the European Anti-Money Laundering Directives and thus had deceived the guardian of 
such policies, the European Commission.42 It is the time, declares Frank, that he should 
admit that his Ministry is overburdened by the money laundering control task or but his 
Ministry does accept a certain amount of money laundering.43 With regards to the FATF 
report of 2010 that strongly criticised the implementation of anti-money laundering 
regulations in the non-financial sector, such as real estate agents, insurance providers, 
and jewellers, the author observes that for instance a piece of jewellery sold by a 
jeweller paid for with 500 Euros notes not only represents a great deal for the jeweller 
but also for the state, due to the relating revenues. Yet, it also represents a great 
opportunity for a potential money launderer who has easily transformed the illegal 
monies into legitimate jewellery. According to Frank the states profit directly or 
indirectly from money laundering activities and therefore the supervisory agencies do 
not look at them that carefully.44 Also in 2010 the IMF, the OECD and the FATF hardly 
criticised the legal system for not being fully in line with international anti-money 
laundering standards. In response to this wave of criticism, some important changes 
have been made.45 With specific regards to penal law, the legislature has amplified the 
scope of the money laundering offence and the sphere of criminal liability in order to 
improve the effectiveness of the existing legislation. 46  Yet the continual expansion 
process has raised legal challenges that could constitute an obstacle for the effective 
enforcement of the measure. The underlying hypothesis is that the offence plays a 
symbolic role. 
                                                          
39 Schütz, 2012, p. 248. 
40 Schütz, 2012, p. 251. 
41 English translation: 'the most serious crimes are rewarded in Germany'. 
42 Schütz, 2012, p. 250. 
43 Schütz, 2012, p. 247. 
44 Schütz, 2012, p. 252. 
45 See the FATF Mutual Evaluation of Germany: 3rd Follow-up Report of 2014. 
46 The main amendments to the money laundering offence recently approved consist of the 
introduction of the elimination of the exemption of punishment for those who participated in the predicate 
offence and of the introduction of the newly created offence of terrorist financing as a predicate offence 
for money laundering. For a more detailed overview, see chapter two. 
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This thesis contributes to the existing literature about criminal legal measures in 
tackling white collar-criminality, economic and organised crime, and more generally to 
the scholarly production dealing with legal responses to the globalisation era in which 
there has been an explosion in the volume of illegitimate commercial and financial 
transactions.47 The thesis aims at contributing specifically to the literature that analyses 
the effectiveness of the current legal framework in tackling illicit financial flows, 
regardless as to whether they have a criminal, corrupt, or commercial origin.48 The 
methodology adopted is qualitative. The research consists of a case study that includes a 
documental research, a qualitative analysis of statistical data and the conduction of 
interviews with privileged observers and legal actors. The work has been conducted by 
a single person and not by a team of researchers; this has imposed a limit on the 
interviewing sample and the impossibility of undertaking, along with the qualitative 
analysis of the provision, a qualitative analysis of the jurisprudence and a quantitative 
analysis of the case law. In addition, criminal provisions have a deterrent purpose, yet in 
certain cases it is almost impossible to quantify the deterrence effect of those provisions, 
as in the case of the money laundering offence, and this represents a shortcoming of the 
current research. Yet the assessment undertaken is rather qualitative and thus is not 
affected by the lack of such quantification. Another shortcoming is due to the fact that 
illicit financial flows are inherently difficult to measure because their actors are trying 
to avoid being caught.49 Official numbers are highly problematic, this element, despite 
impeding an objective quantification of the phenomenon, can represent a partial result 
for the qualitative analysis, because it highlights the complexity of the matter. The anti-
money laundering regime is constantly evolving, and this would require continuously 
updating the assessment, instead the research provides a picture of the current situation. 
Yet the work offers the reader an instrument to critically interpret also possible changes 
in the wording of the money laundering offence that may be made following the 
                                                          
47 In particular 'North American and European banking and investment institutions have been 
flooded with laundered and ill-gotten gains'. Becker, 2005, p. 22. According to the author there are two 
key factors that underpin the rapid growth in international crime: '(1) alliances and agreements spanning 
national, regional, and ethnic divisions assure enormous profits for criminal syndicates choosing to 
cooperate rather than compete, and (2) the ease with which money is shifted among groups, laundered 
across borders, and transferred into the legitimate financial system is the primary facilitating mechanism 
that makes such operations so successful. Global crime is out of control and will remain so as long as 
dirty money flows effortlessly into respectable -particularly western- accounts'. Becker, 2005, p. 100. 
48 Becker, 2005, p. 23. 
49 The author particularly criticises estimates related to money laundering. Andreas, 2015, pp. 49-
51. 
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publication of this work. The outcomes of the critical study on the reasons and effects of 
the current legislation can be used as a starting point for further research; the 
methodology set for the empirical analysis can be applied to assess the effectiveness of 
following developments. 
 
The structure of the thesis is the following: The first chapter presents the theoretical 
sociolegal framework and provides an operational definition of the concept of 
effectiveness that directs the empirical research. At the end the chapter describes the 
methodology of the qualitative research. Chapter two traces the genesis of the money 
laundering offence, as well on an internal, European and domestic level. The chapter 
analyses legislative intents, parliamentarian debates and other external contributions as 
declarations of intents and opinions through a desktop-study. The third chapter is 
dedicated to the doctrinal debate about the money laundering offence regulated in the 
German penal code. In particular the chapter highlights the controversial issues that 
have emerged through the abundant legal scholarship production, which might affect the 
effectiveness of the money laundering offence. Chapters four and chapter five present 
the empirical research. The fourth chapter analyses the quantitative data of the 
implementation of the money laundering offence from a qualitative perspective. The last 














 1 CHAPTER 
'An elastic concept of legal effectiveness: 





‘[...] Quelle gride, ripubblicate e rinforzate di governo in governo, non servivano ad 
altro che ad attestare ampollosamente l’impotenza de’ loro autori; o, se producevan 
qualche effetto immediato, era principalmente d’aggiunger molte vessazioni a quelle 
che i pacifici e i deboli già soffrivano dà perturbatori, e d’accrescer le violenze e 
l’astuzia di questi. L’impunità era organizzata, e aveva radici che le gride non toccavano, 
o non potevano smovere.'50 





 1.1  Foreword: The concept of legal effectiveness 
Embarking on a study of the effectiveness of a legal act is a complex task. Firstly, it is a 
multidisciplinary question: The effectiveness of a legal act can be measured using 
different methodologies, it can be observed and studied from different perspectives, and 
it might both rely on and impact areas of human life exceeding the legal sphere. 
Defining the concept of legal effectiveness itself, has been an issue and the object of 
particularly vivid discussions among legal sociologists as well as among legal 
philosophers, legal theorists, political scientists and political sociologists, administrative 
scientists, and economists. Secondly, even within the sociology of law there are 
different perspectives on what legal effectiveness is. 51  Despite this complexity it is 
                                                          
50 Translation: 'Notwithstanding this, or, it may be, in consequence of this, these proclamations 
[grida], reiterated and reinforced from time to time, served only to proclaim in pompous language the 
impotence of those who issued them; or, if they produced any immediate effect, it was that of adding to 
the vexations which the peaceful and feeble suffered from the disturbers of society. Impunity was 
organised and effected in so many ways as to render the proclamations powerless'. (Manzoni, 1834, p. 10). 
51 Ferrari, 1992, p. 146. Blankenburg takes the example of the effectiveness question to show the 
complexity of an external study, as a sociological-political study, on the law. Blankenburg, 1995, p. 4. 
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extremely necessary, especially in recent times of excessive legal production, to verify 
the effectiveness of legal acts before introducing new ones.52 The definition of legal 
effectiveness conceived in this chapter and adopted for the case-study draws upon 
mostly sociolegal theories on legal effectiveness, but also upon some of the definitions 
provided by the other disciplines. In addition, the nuances of varying meanings 
furnished by different disciplines which are used to interpret the perceived concepts of 
effectiveness emerging from the interviews. The work thus joins the vibrant discussion 
on the concept of legal effectiveness by proposing a methodological definition which is 
then applied to the empirical research. 
 
Commonly a rule can be defined as effective if it achieves the goals for which it was 
adopted. As already mentioned several disciplines have showed an interest in the topic 
of legal effectiveness. Sometimes the terms used are different, such as efficiency, 
validity, effectivity, efficaciousness, efficacy, yet their definitions can provide relevant 
elements for the construction of the concept of effectiveness applied in this research.53 
This work adopts the term 'effectiveness', referring to the 'power to make an intended 
result occur, or the capacity to produce effects', on the basis of Friedman's milestone 
'The Legal System: A social science perspective'.54 
 
Firstly, the sociological definition of legal effectiveness can be distinguished from the 
one given by legal dogmatic,55 which defines effectiveness as the potential capacity of a 
legal act to produce its 'natural effects'. 56  For example from a legal perspective a 
contract is effective if it is validly stipulated, disregarding the actual capacity of the 
                                                          
52 Ferrari, 1992, pp. 146, 197, 261. Rottleuthner, 1983, pp. 56, 73. Treves, 2002, pp. 236, 289. 
53 The term effectiveness is translated in different ways. Piovani, for example uses the term 
'effectivity' (effettività) to refer to legal orders and effectiveness (efficacia) to mention legal acts, Piovani, 
1953, pp. 5-8. Kelsen instead uses the word Effektivität (effectiveness) to refer to legal orders and 
Wirksamkeit to talk about single legal acts. Kelsen, 1952, pp. 2, 24. 
54 Friedman, 1975. Also Allott, in his popular book 'The limits of law' speaks of 'effectiveness of 
law' to indicate whether a particular provision fulfils its purposes. See Allott, 1980, pp. 28 ss; 1981, p. 
(229) 233. Often it is referred to the same sociological concept of effectiveness by using the word 
'efficacy'. See for instance the 'Black's Law Dictionary', Garner (ed.), 2014, pp. 628, 629; Villegas, 2003, 
p. (137) 151. 
55 In the German language such a dichotomy is expressed by the terms 'Wirksamkeit' - 'faktische 
Geltung' (effectiveness - factual validity) or 'normative Rechtsgeltung - faktische Geltung' (legal 
normative validity - factual validity). See Paliero, 1992, p. (430) 487. 
56 The 'natural effects' of a legal act are those effects that Pino defines as a legal automatism, 
namely of effects that are automatically produced or through the compliant behaviour with the legal 
content. Pino, 2013, p. (181) 184. 
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contract to produce the consequences for which it was concluded.57 According to the 
Black's Law Dictionary, a legal act is effective in a normative sense, if 'it is in operation 
at a given time'; 58 for instance a statute, order, or contract is often said to be effective 
beginning at a designated time. More specifically the Black's Law Dictionary defines 
legal efficacy as 'the quality of having significance or force under law to produce certain 
effects'.59 The Burton's legal Thesaurus uses the adjective 'effective', as operative, to 
indicate something 'having legal force'.60 Using Ferrari's words, the legal definition 
moves from a factual prius (the existence of the legal act) to a deontological posterius 
(the capacity of producing natural effects), on the contrary the sociological notion 
moves from a deontological prius (the goals of the legislator) to a factual posterius (the 
concrete effects of the legal act).61 The main difference is between a potential attribute 
verifiable theoretically that is the legal notion and the sociological factual notion, which 
is verifiable empirically. Another diversity highlighted  by jurist Noll is that while the 
legal definition shall be solely applied to a determined legal act, the sociological one is 
scalable, which means that a legal act can be either legally effective or not, but it can 
also be partially sociologically effective.62 
 
In the context of legal theory the concept of effectiveness is studied in opposition to the 
concept of validity.63 A legal act is valid if the authority that produced it had the power 
to do so, if the act has not been abrogated by and is not inconsistent with another one, 
and if, by using a Kelsenian terminology, that legal act is legitimated by the 
fundamental law.64 The legal theory notion of validity is different from the common 
definition of effectiveness because it does not look at the effects of the legal act, but 
rather focuses on intrinsic elements. Yet, when a law is valid but is not applied and is 
thus non effective, it loses its validity. Taking a valid constitution as an example, Kelsen 
states that if its provisions are not applied and not respected and thus are not effective 
                                                          
57 Falzea, 1965, p. 432. 
58 The Black's Law Dictionary definition provides also two other meanings that are closer to the 
sociological concept: ist (2) Performing within the range of normal and expected standards, (3) productive, 
achieving a result. Garner (ed.), 2014, pp. 628, 629. 
59 Garner (ed.), 2014, pp. 628, 629. 
60 Burton (ed.), 2007, p. 206. 
61 Ferrari, 1992, p. 146. 
62 Noll, 1972, p. (259) 260. 
63 This distinction has been highlighted also by Weber, who stressed the difference between an 
ideal validity, deductible systemically by legal theorists, and an empirical validity of a norm, which ought 
to be the subject of empirical observation. Weber, 1972, p. 31. 
64 Kelsen, 1952, p. 217. 
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such constitution loses its validity. 65  The measure in which dis-application and 
disobedience amount to ineffectiveness and thus invalidity is a political matter.66 On the 
background of these reflections, the concept of validity cannot be kept completely 
detached from the concept of effectiveness.67 As much as Kelsen could not prescient 
from the concept of legal effectiveness in order to define the validity, so legal 
sociologists actually often assume the validity of legal acts whose effectiveness they 
investigate.68 Having said that, this research does not verify the validity of legislations 
studied, in fact it assumes that they are valid. However, it takes into account the 
possibility that eventual ineffectiveness might affect the legislation's validity. 
 
In legal philosophy a norm is said to be valid if it has legal effects.69 In legal philosophy 
there has been the approach to separate the concepts of validity and efficacy by stating 
that 'efficacy does not affect the validity and existence of laws'.70 Yet, in the view of this 
research it is useful to recall another concept used by legal philosophers, which relates 
effectiveness and validity, that is the concept of applicability. 71  According to this 
perspective, a norm can be said to be valid if it is applicable, and it can be defined 
effective if it is observed by those to whom it is applicable or it applies.72 The potential 
applicability determines the validity, while the actual application defines the 
effectiveness. Finally, another concept used in legal philosophy that could be relevant 
for this research is the one of effectuality73 (effettualità), which indicates the potentiality 
of a legal act to be verified in one of its own alternatives.74 Taking behavioural norms as 
example, the alternatives that would verify the norms are compliance or punished 
                                                          
65 Yet, neither the Kelsenian definition of validity is applicable to common law systems in which 
the disuse does not have a negative validity. See Losano, 1981, p. 16. 
66 Rottleuthner, 1983, p. 76. 
67 Therefore the two spheres of Kelsen's theory, the be (Sein) and the should (Sollen) overlap. The 
scholar has been criticised because he was not able to provide a definition of validity without recurring to 
the Sein. See Losano, 1981, p. 10. Yet, the collision between the Sein and the Sollen could also be 
interpreted as the border between legal theory and sociology of law. 
68 It is also true that a sociologist may be interested in verifying social consuetudinary obedience to 
an invalid legislation that is perceived as still being in force. This because validity needs effectiveness but 
effectiveness does not need validity'. Losano, 1981, p. 23. Also, by unmasking the structures of power 
underlying the creation of the legal act, a sociological research can generate a loss of legitimation that can 
impact on the validity of the legal act. Blankenburg, 1995, p. 5. 
69 Raz, 1979, p. 149. 
70 Raz, 1979, p. 87. 
71 Comanducci and Guastini, 1996, pp. 32, 33. 'To avoid circularity, the criterion for attributing 
applicability to legal norms cannot presuppose their effectiveness'; Moreso and Navarro, 1996, p. 21. 
72 See Bodenheimer, 1974, p. 260; Sumner, 1987, p. 65. 
73 Effectual, according to the Burton's legal Thesaurus, is synonym with achieved, authoritative, 
binding, effective, efficacious, efficient and worthwhile. Burton (ed.), 2007, p. 206. 
74 Visalberghi, 1975, p. 63. 
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deviance. Especially these last two approaches, which describe the sphere of legal 
effectiveness as a potential attribution that still needs to be verified empirically by 
looking at the behaviour of norms' addresses are useful to conceive a sociolegal concept 
of effectiveness. 
 
Administrative science uses the concept of efficiency75  in opposition to the one of 
effectiveness. While effectiveness looks at the outcome of the legal act's application, 
efficiency refers to the optimal relationship between the achieved goals and the 
employed means.76 The concept of efficiency refers to the means used to implement a 
legal act and in particular to the administrative apparatus directed at enforcing the legal 
provision. An administrative apparatus is defined efficient if it manages to fulfil its 
purpose while rationally employing its means. Bettini believes that the two notions 
should contribute to each other, since any opinion on the efficiency of a legal act is also 
an opinion on its effectiveness because it contributes to the wider sociological concept 
of effectiveness.77 A peculiar type of efficiency is the 'efficiency regardless the purpose' 
(zielunabhängige Effizienz),78 which refers to entire legal frameworks and not to single 
provisions. According to this view an apparatus is efficient if it functions optimally 
notwithstanding what effects it achieves, because its purpose consists with its mere 
existence.79 
 
From a political science point of view the analysis on legal effectiveness belongs to the 
broader category of policy-analysis. In this field legal acts are part of a policy and their 
effectiveness is studied to the extent that it affects the impact of the policy.80 While 
certain typologies of policy-analyses typically assume that legislative intent is capable 
                                                          
75 According to the Burton's legal Thesaurus 'efficiency' is a synonym of ability, ableness, 
adeptness, capability, excellence, productiveness, but also efficacy, and effectiveness. Burton (ed.), 2007, 
p. 206. 
76 This definition of efficiency is taken in particular from Leisner. The scholar describes a specific 
type of efficiency, the 'Zweck-Mittel Effizienz', which consists of the optima relation between the goal 
(Zweck) and the means (Mittel). See Leisner, 1971, pp. 7 ss. 
77 Bettini, 1983, p. 107. 
78 Leisner, 1971, pp. 7 ss. See also Paliero, 1992, p. (430) 494. 
79 Hierro, 2010, p. 180; Villegas, 2014, p. 96. 
80 The Black's Law Dictionary defines a policy as 'a standard course of action that has been 
officially established by an organisation, business, political party, etc.'; and a public policy as 'the 
collective rules, principles, or approaches to problems that affects the commonwealth or (esp.) promote 
the general good; specific, principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the court as being of 
fundamental concern to the state and to the whole society'. Black's Law Dictionary, 2014, pp. 1345, 1426. 
In this work it is referred to policy to indicate the whole system of legislations adopted to prevent and 
repress money laundering. 
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of being made clear and known and that language itself is transparent, and that the 
policy process is rational and oriented towards stipulated goals, others shift the focus to 
meaning-making, in order to take into account that policies may also be avenues or 
vehicles for human expressiveness. The latter typologies of policy-analyses are directed 
at revealing and interpreting conflicts between legislators, implementers, and other 
publics, triggered by the multiplicities of interpretation across policy-relevant groups, 
also considering that ambiguity in policy matters can be purposeful. Given that the main 
source of policy meanings is in the language, the methodology adopted for policy 
analysis is the discourse analysis.81 The present research focuses on the effectiveness of 
a single provision, which is the money laundering offence, yet, given the fact that the 
provision is part of a broader policy, its effectiveness cannot be completely detached 
from the effectiveness of the whole policy. 
 
Finally, it seems useful to recall the definition of effectiveness provided by the 
economic analysis of law. In this field legal efficiency is measured in relation to 
undertaken costs; the type of analysis implies a costs-benefits method that compares the 
expenditures with the results in economic terms. 82  The sociological perspective is 
different from the economic one: While in economic theory the individual is a rational 
actor that disregards his or her social ties in the market situation, the sociological 
individual is embedded in a network of social relations, and is thus influenced by social 
ties.83 Not only, a rational analysis of crime control processes assumes that different 
actors, from the law-making phase to the enforcement phase, have a rational attitude, for 
instance, implementers respect the legislature's orders. Also, the economic analysis will 
disregard the personal motives of law enforcement agents. This difference approach has 
an impact on the meaning attributed to the concept of legal effectiveness in a market 
context: A legal act could be defined as effective according to the economic theory if it 
would take into account the rationality of the actors, while in a sociological perspective 
it would be necessary to tailor some different variables, such as political and social 
                                                          
81 Yanow, 2014, p. 142. For a complete overview, see also Pal, 1995, p. 185; Swaffield, 1998, p. 
199. 
82 A cost-benefit analysis is 'a method of setting put the factors that need to be taken into account in 
making choices about major investments in public sector projects. The objective is to assign all costs and 
all benefits, social and economic, so that one can see clearly whether the benefits exceed the costs of a 
venture […]'. Scott (ed.), 2014, p. 130. 
83 For example a consumer might not buy from a seller, despite she or he having the best prices for 
personal reasons, as for instance the retailer belonging to a stigmatised group. Borgatta (ed.), 2010, pp. 
725 ss. 
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elements. 84  Yet, the economic approach can offer interesting ideas, especially with 
regards to criminal law. In particular, according to an economic perspective, the 
criminal justice system shapes the legal response to a crime on the basis of a cost-
analysis.85 A study conducted by German scholars has highlighted that the compliance 
rate of a certain crime will be inversely proportional to the costs of preliminary 
investigations.86 The economic approach assumes that the goal of law enforcement is the 
maximisation of compliance rates, and that agencies act in a rational way according to 
this goal. The economic calculation can also be applied in the initial phase in order to 
decide whether to punish behaviour under criminal or administrative law according to 
convenience. Despite the diversities between the sociological and the economic 
approaches, this work takes into consideration the outcomes of some cost-benefit 
analyses undertaken by other researchers on the anti-money laundering regime in order 
to contribute to the general sociolegal assessment on the effectiveness.87 
 
All things considered, the sociology of law's approach, differentiates itself from the 
legal dogmatic that looks at formal aspects of the law, and from the philosophy of law 
and legal theory because it empirically assesses the legal effectiveness. It also 
differentiates from other approaches (e.g. the economic), which assume rational 
behaviour of the actors involved, because it has a rather critical approach, which allows 
taking into account actual and unintended effects and non-rational behaviours. The 
sociolegal approach imposes going beyond considerations of technical qualities and 
                                                          
84 In fact, the objection most often raised against the economic approach is that it gives a spurious 
air of economic rationality and objectivity to decisions that are necessarily social and political in nature. 
Scott (ed.), 2014, p. 130. 
85 With regards to criminal law, Amelung describes the efficiency as the optimal relation between 
the means adopted and the goals achieved through a cost-benefit analysis. According to the scholar such 
analysis should take into account as costs also non-economic costs, such as social or individual costs and 
the collateral effects, which are those non-intended consequences. See Amelung, 1980, pp. (19) 30, 31. 
86 In addition, law enforcement will try to collect as much information as possible during 
preliminary investigations if this results to be more convenient. Prosecutors will prefer to indict for 
crimes that require the lowest degree of evidence. When prosecutors decide whether to indict a person 
they calculate ex ante the potentiality that the information gathered proves the fact in which the aim of 
conviction. With this regard, information revealed by the suspect in the appeal can be essential. 
Furthermore, public prosecutors will never try not to close a proceeding if they possess enough evidence 
to indict the offender, in the opposite situation they will always accept the proposed offer of closing the 
proceedings. According to the economic approach, the discretion granted in these situations does not 
frustrate the effectiveness of the law, because law enforcement has the liberty to choose whether to 
continue or to close a proceeding, and therefore could also always choose to continue it. See Jost, 1998, 
pp. 268 ss. 
87 The economic approach is similar to the one proposed by the legal realism's method of reasoning. 
Legal realism determines the meaning of a legal act by weighting the costs, benefits, probable 
consequences, and underlying values and purposes of the law. In addition, it also considers whether the 
interpretative result will be fair and just. Black's Law Dictionary, 2014, p. 1456. 
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deficiencies of a legal act, in order to assess its concrete impact. In fact what legal acts 
prescribe, despite being technically perfect, can be different from what those acts' 
impact. One of the scholars who has highlighted this gap is Pound, who stressed the 
importance of recognising the difference between the 'law in books' and the 'law in 
action'.88 An analysis of the technical appropriateness of the 'law in books' may provide 
relevant information about the effectiveness,89 yet it is not sufficient to assess the legal 
effectiveness of the 'law in action'. Therefore, a sociolegal study on legal effectiveness 
also empirically investigates the effects of the law in real situations, besides looking at 
its formal potential adequateness. The empirical method, despite leading to contingent 
outcomes based on facts, opinions and perceptions embedded in a certain place and time, 
has the advantage of taking into account aspects of the substantial application of the law 
that would not otherwise result from a study limited to technical considerations on the 
'law in the books'. In addition, a sociolegal research on legal effectiveness does not 
presume the rationality of those that produce, implement and enforce the law; therefore 
it also looks at the perceptions, expectations, and opinions of those actors, on the 
assumption that these factors could also affect legal effectiveness. 
 
As previously mentioned legal sociologists have several provided different definitions 
of legal effectiveness. One of the most common is the one that defines a legal act 
effective if the addressees comply with it, and ineffective when the addresses deviate 
from the prescribed conduct.90 An example of this typology of definitions is the one 
provided by Geiger in his ground breaking work 'Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des 
Rechts'. The scholar expresses the concept through the mathematic formula 'e = (s→bg) 
+ [(s→cǧ)→r]' that indicates that the coefficient (e) of effectiveness corresponds to the 
sum of compliant behaviours (g) and of deviant behaviour (ǧ) to which a sanction 
follows (r). Dividing the coefficient of effectiveness (e) by the number of cases in which 
the addresses are in typical situations (s), it equals the level of obligatory (v) of a legal 
                                                          
88 Pound, 1910, p. (12) 12 ss. 
89 For example Evan in the essay 'Law as an instrument of social change' lists some technical 
conditions of legal effectiveness, such as the prestige of the legal source, the appropriateness of the 
purpose, the publication of violations, whether legal actors are convinced about the legislation and the 
adequateness of the sanctions. Evan, 1965, p. 558. 
90 Generally there is the tendency to define the law's effectiveness by having in mind behavioural 
rules. These thoughts are not yet completely applicable to private law. For a detailed analysis of the 
differences existing between an effectiveness assessment of criminal law and of private law, see 
Rottleuthner, 1983, p. 85 ss. 
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act: '(v): v = e / s'.91 The formula has been criticised because of the reduced applicability 
and because of the incapability of taking into account other factors.92 
 
By examining some of the critical issues challenging Geiger's formula, important 
elements will emerge that will help conceive a more suitable definition of legal 
effectiveness for this research. As regards to the obligatory relation, Geiger does not 
define a 'typical situation', thus making it difficult to apply the formula in those cases in 
which it is not easy to calculate the number of typical situations.93 Taking the crime of 
murder as an example, for which the obedience consists in the abstention from killing, it 
is impossible to calculate how many times individuals have been in a 'typical situation' 
and have not committed a murder as a consequence of the deterrent effect of the 
criminal provision.94 In the case of a high number of deviant behaviours sanctioned, the 
level of effectiveness of the legal act increases according to the formula. This might 
frustrate the deterrent potential and thus actually diminishes its effectiveness. 95  On 
another note, Geiger's formula has been contested because it does not provide 
information on other variables that can influence the addressees' behaviour. 
Delavecuras suggests that it would be interesting to acquire information on other 
variables, for example in a study of the effectiveness of fiscal acts it would be of great 
relevance to collect information on compliant individuals. 96  For example, if only 
subjects with high salaries complied this would reveal an important element to assess 
the effectiveness of the fiscal provision. Also investigating the reasons of deviance can 
contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of the law, to the extent that for 
example a voluntarily disobedience that aims at expressing a refusal of a certain legal 
act is different than a deviant behaviour caused by a mistake; while the first takes into 
consideration the legal act but is a negative message in relation to its effectiveness, the 
                                                          
91 Geiger, 1987, p. 182. 
92 Geiger gives more indications on the other variables relevant to an assessment of legal 
effectiveness in its work; see Geiger, 1987, pp. 182 ss, 204 ss. Yet according to Rottleuthner its formula 
has not been very successful in the sociology of law. Rottleuthner 1983, p. 82. Blankenburg on the 
contrary believes that Geiger has specifically provided such a formula in order to show that most rules 
regulating daily life are violated without that such deviant behaviours are followed by a sanction and are 
thus ineffective. Blankenburg 1995, p. 3. 
93 Blankenburg, 1995, p. 5. 
94 Rottleuthner, 1983, p. 80. 
95 The same critics could be raised against the philosophical definition of effectuality. An even 
more extreme critics is brought forward from scholars who believe that laws are effective if they do not 
need to be enforced by legal authorities. Kelsen, 1952, p. 20. See also Rehbinder and Schelsky, 1972, p. 
558. 
96 Delavecuras, 2007, p. 158. 
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second might be part of a foreseeable impact.97 Moreover, the mathematical formula is 
not able to take into account cases in which a high deviance rate does not nullify the 
effectiveness of the legal act, nor cases in which, on the contrary, a high compliance 
frustrates the goal of the legal act. On one hand 'frequent violations of a legal act are not 
evidence of the fact that that act has not had any influence'.98 On the other hand full 
compliance with legal order might not lead to the intended goal,99 or even frustrate its 
purpose. the addresses could fall short of the social target of a legal act when they  do 
not obey to the content of the provision in the case such obedience actually provokes 
non-foreseen collateral effects, or in case of a mistaken formulation of the provisions or 
of an explicit will in this sense of the rule-makers.100 Ferrari provides the example of 
Article 57 of the Italian code of civil procedure that, if substantially respected, would 
actually paralyse the civil judiciary system, because it imposes very strict obligations on 
registrars that, if followed, would block the work of the judiciary.101 In other words, 
partial non-compliance might lead to fulfilling the functions of a legal act better than 
full compliance.102  Furthermore some rules do not achieve their social goals only 
through compliance. Rottleuthner gives the example of rules that impose speed limits 
that are aimed at reducing or eliminating car accidents.103 If all drivers respected the 
limits and thus complied with the rule but yet caused many more car accidents, those 
rules would not be effective because they would be unable to display their social 
function. There are also rules that are respected not because they are perceived as right 
but because there is no other alternative or due to passiveness; in these cases a high 
compliance rate might not mean that the rules are very effective. Given all these 
situations in which a calculation based on compliance and deviance rates does not 
correspond to the effectiveness of a law, it can be inferred that the effectiveness 
assessment cannot be limited to Geiger's formula. There is furthermore a 
methodological issue: Given that the field of money laundering is characterised by a 
high level of uncertainty about the volume of obedience and disobedience because 
                                                          
97 Friedman, 1975, p. 45. 
98 Aubert, 1965, p. (313) 316. 
99 Blankenburg, 1985, p. (205) 209. 
100 Noll, 1972, p. (259) 261. 
101 See article 57 of the Italian civil procedural code: ‘Attività del cancelliere. Il cancelliere 
documenta a tutti gli effetti, nei casi e nei modi previsti dalla legge, le attività proprie e quelle degli 
organi giudiziari e delle parti. [...]’. English translation: 'The registrar reports thorough in the cases and 
under the conditions provided by the law, the activities of the judiciary and of the parties'. 
102 Blankenburg, 1985, p. (205) 214. 
103 Rottleuthner, 1983, p. 90. 
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statistics are often inconsistent. The data provided by the criminal justice system on 
deviance and compliance rates cannot offer a reliable basis for calculation. In addition 
the concepts of compliance and deviance are controversial concepts. Friedman defines 
them 'two poles of a continuum'.104 Different people can interpret the same behaviour in 
different ways in different circumstances. In fact the two concepts are attributes 
deriving from sequences of decisions-definitions that emerge in the course of the 
interaction.105 'Deviance and compliance do not exist, only social definitions of what is 
compliant and what is deviant'.106 As regards in particular to criminal law, there might 
be different definitions of deviance for the same fact: From the victims’ perspective, one 
from the police’s perspective, and finally one according to the public prosecutors. None 
of them is the correct one, only a view that would take into account all of them could 
get closer to the effective fact.107 Most studies on deviance and compliance have been 
looking at the causes of deviant behaviour or at the processes through which, and the 
conditions under which, a criminal sanction is applied to particular deviance categories. 
The dominant problem relating to criminalisation is whether criminalisation is a neutral 
process or it serves the interests of the powerful. In this context the labelling theory has 
turned the traditional question around, 'Why do they deviate?' and asked 'Why do they 
label it as deviant?'108 Besides being a socially relevant topic, the labelling of deviance 
has a marked political aspect, namely the fact that policy-makers can have an interest in 
defining certain behaviour as deviant.109 The labelling theory is used in this research to 
interpret the reasons behind the criminalisation or the non-criminalisation of certain 
behaviours.110 The criminalisation of white collar crimes could also prove the theories 
wrong that describe the power of labelling as a political tool to strengthen most 
                                                          
104 Friedman, 1975, p. 47. 
105 Ferrari, 1992, p. 143. 
106 Gallino, 2012 p. 217. A definition given is ‘the violation of a norm that would, if discovered, 
result in the punishment or condemnation of the violator'. Yet not all deviant behaviours result in the 
punishment or condemnation of the deviant. Ritzer and Ryan (ed.), 2011, pp. 139, 140. 
107 Blankenburg, 1995, p. 13 ss. 
108 The labelling perspective has been influenced by the thought of Tannenbaum who believed that 
the social definition of delinquency was attached to people, who would be more prone to take on a 
deviant role. In particular the author stated that 'the process of making the criminal, […], is a process of 
tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, making conscious and self-conscious; 
[…]'. Tannenbaum, 1938, p. 20. Moderate reactivists belonging to the functionalist school of thought, 
such as Becker and Erickson believed that the labelling process is crucial to understand deviance as a 
social phenomenon, by taking into consideration problems such as the selectivity issue, the role and 
consequences of stigmatisation, the difference between known and secret deviants. See Becker, 1963, pp. 
3 ss; Erickson, 1962, p. (307), 311 ss. 
109 Gallino gives the example of the strike, once perceived as a deviant act and nowadays as a 
fundamental right of workers. Gallino, 2012, p. 218. 
110 The work does not seek to explain the motives of deviance. 
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powerful social groups while punishing the weakest. However, an empirical approach 
that looks at the 'law in action' besides the 'law in books' might show that in legal 
practice, white collar crimes are actually punished less than blue collar crimes, although 
deviance rates are estimated to be higher. Labelling theories have been adopted to 
explain the causes of deviance, as individuals would deviate because labelled as deviant. 
Yet this approach should not be seen as exclusive.111 There are, indeed, also other 
factors influencing people's behaviour.112 
 
With the goal of providing a definition of effectiveness that also embraces the cases in 
which the relation compliance-effectiveness is not proven, and that also allows  other 
variables to be considered along with the possibility that the criminal label has a 
political nature, without denying that a certain level of compliance to a rule may 
coincide with a certain level of effectiveness of that rule, here it seems useful to recall 
Friedman's concepts of 'legal effectiveness' and 'legal impact'. The impact of the law 
encompasses all consequences somehow linkable to its application.113 In the notion of 
impact the scholar includes also those collateral effects that Boudon would define 'effet 
pervers', namely those consequence that are unexpected and contrary to the will of the 
legislator.114 The impact of a legal act can also be defined as all the consequences that 
would have not taken place if the legal act would have not been enacted. In fact, even 
though not all scholars agree on the fact that new laws create new customs, it cannot be 
denied that a new piece of law creates a different situation, even despite it is often 
violated.115 The concept of legal effectiveness falls into the broader category of legal 
impact, to the extent that it corresponds to the positive impact of a legal act, namely to 
those consequences, even collateral and unexpected, which are in line with the intents of 
                                                          
111 For a more detailed discussion on the opportunity of not taking the labelling approach in a 
paradigmatic way, see Ferrari, 1992, p. 143 ss. 
112 The Marxist criminological approach to law explains the reasons of deviance by looking at crime 
as the result of structural inequalities that are inherently associated with capitalist economic systems. Yet, 
this approach apparently does not furnish sufficient explanations for white collar crimes, which are 
mainly committed by individuals who are rather advantaged by the capitalist system. However, 
Blankenburg observes that individuals belonging to privileged classes tend to commit more sophisticated 
crimes that are harder to be detected or to be proved at court, because they have obtained a better 
education. Blankenburg, 1995, p. 22. 
113 A legal act is according to Friedman's definition any act adopted by a public institution. For the 
purpose of this work the term 'legal act' is used as a synonym of legal provision or legislation. Friedman, 
1975, p. 45. 
114 Boudon, 1981, p. 24. The classical example are laws that criminalise abortion with the declared 
goal of safeguarding women's health, which actually have had the opposite effect of increasing the risk 
for women's health due to the conditions of illegality in which abortion was practiced. 
115 Aubert, 1965, p. (85) 89. 
 32 
the rule-makers.116 The indicator that distinguished the impact from the effectiveness is 
thus, the conformity with rule-makers' intentions. Friedman's definition of legal 
effectiveness allows situations to be considered in which compliance does not coincide 
with effectiveness, by looking at all consequences triggered by the legal act, and the 
eventual cases in which the labelling of a conduct is politically motivated, by looking at 
rule-makers' intentions. 
 
 1.2  An 'elastic concept': Variables for the assessment of legal effectiveness 
An even more fitting definition is given by Ferrari in his essay 'Le funzioni del diritto', 
the functions of law.117 The scholar adopts an elastic notion and defines a legal act 
effective when 'there is correspondence between the political plan and the effects of 
such act'.118 The political plan (disegno politico) is a wider concept than the purposes of 
the rule-makers and also includes those intentions that are not explicitly expressed by 
the rule-makers. The 'elastic' notion allows the fictio of the legislator to be overcome, 
because it allows all actors that have an influence in the process of rule-making to be 
taken into account.119 The legislator is a collective organ, constituted of different social 
groups that pursue their interests; political parties are composed of various individuals 
that might have diverse expectations and might interpret signs and messages differently. 
Besides the political legislator, in addition, legislations are often influenced by external 
factors, such as lobbies, economic actors, and international institutions. A political plan 
is always a compromise among different opinions rather than the expression of the 
unanimous will of the lawmakers. By using the word 'effects' and not compliance or 
deviance, the sociologist consents the researcher to consider not only those effects 
foreseen by lawmakers, but also those that were not planned and the so-called 'collateral 
effects', and the costs of enforcement. It is thus a variable definition, referring to 
variable finalities. In addition, the elasticity of the notion has the advantage of providing 
a scalable outcome: By taking into account elements that influence the formulation, the 
application and the reception of the legal act in a certain lapse of time and avenue, the 
assessment of the effectiveness is not a static piece of information but rather a revisable 
and modifiable outcome. The elasticity thus permits the limits of a contingent and 
relative assessment to be overcome. 
                                                          
116 Friedman, 1975, p. 48. 
117 Ferrari, 1992, p. 148. 
118 Ferrari, 1992, p. 148. 
119 Ferrari, 1992, p. 133. 
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On the basis of Ferrari's elastic notion this work assesses the effectiveness of the 
German anti-money laundering legislation on the basis of the following variables: The 
expressed and latent intentions of lawmakers and of other actors that influence the law-
making process (the political plan), the reception of such legislation by the doctrine and 
the legal actors and the implementation, including all the consequences attributable to 
the legislation (the effects). In particular this research will focus on the role of 
lawmakers as architects of the political plan and of its implementation and as 
communicators of the legal message to its public. In addition, given that 'the impact of 
the law cannot be studied in isolation from the impact of other factors',120 other external 
factors are taken into account while studying a legislation that is indeed embedded in a 
particular historical-economic and political context and that is strongly influenced by it. 
Especially the political variable plays a very relevant role in the assessment of certain 
legal acts, in fact Ferrari states that 'every question regarding the effectiveness of the 
law sheds light on the intimate political nature of the law itself, it reveals the law's 
nature of macro-variable', influenced and influencing material and symbolic patterns of 
power.121 In this context it is important to focus not only on formal decision-making 
processes but also on non-decision making processes, which involve the mobilisation of 
the political agenda by powerful groups, taking decisions that prevent issues from 
becoming and emerging subject of formal decision-making. 
 
Ferrari observes that a critical social theory cannot deal with legal actions without 
taking in to be taken into account consideration their functions, namely how such 
actions function, should function or do not function. 122  The elastic definition of 
effectiveness is particularly useful under the perspective of a functional approach,123 
because it allows the researcher to take into account all different functions and effects 
attributed and displayed by the legal act.124 This work does not take a functionalist 
                                                          
120 Aubert, 1965, p. (85) 88. 
121 Ferrari, 1997, p. 269. 
122 Ferrari, 1992, p. 4. 
123 Some sociologists particularly focus on the functions of law, like Geiger, Popitz, and 
Blankenburg. See Geiger, 1987, p. 65; Blankenburg, 1980, p. 805; Popitz, 1968, p. 10. 
124 This work uses the word 'function' as a synonym of purpose, goal and aim. See Merton, 1983, p. 
129. 
 34 
approach that justifies the social order on the basis of its functions;125 it rather adopts a 
functional approach that looks critically at the functions attributed by different actors 
and at various effects provoked. We look at law as 'a goal-oriented program, asking 
whether initial intentions are realized or not'.126 This serves the goal of analysing the 
law without 'indulging in a priori patterns of knowledge'.127 Through the study of the 
intentions and thus of the interests brought forward by the different actors taking part in 
the formulation of the legislation, the work aims at highlighting the controversial 
aspects of the law. The work in fact assumes the law as an instrument of conflict 
between social groups. Looking at the legislative process by using the concept of 
function can lead to the disclosure of conflicting interests and diverging expectations 
existing between the different actors taking part in the law-making process. The 
conflicting dimension of law also emerges in the implementation phase, when a piece of 
legislation can display eu-functions 128  for certain addresses and dys-functions for 
others.129 The concept of function is particularly relevant for this research because it 
allows the taking of a critical approach to the study of legislative intents. Lawmakers 
can attribute direct and indirect functions to a legal act: The first corresponds to the 
required behaviour and thus to compliance, the second are the purposes that lawmakers 
aim at achieving through the direct functions. The intentions of lawmakers may vary 
with time, so that the same provision can be interpreted differently in time and if such 
differences are not translated into an amendment, the intent of the legislator cannot be 
predicted in relation to those provisions.130 The purposes of lawmakers can result in 
being inapplicable so that the implementation of a legal act can be directed to a different 
aim. Moreover, the legislator can consider emanating a legislation that does not have a 
clear goal in order to allow contradictory and alternative applications. Finally, intentions 
can be declared or not. Those that are declared might not coincide with the real will of 
                                                          
125 Functionalists consider the effectiveness of the law as the adequateness of the legal production 
methods to the necessary rational and control that the level of complexity reached by the social order. See 
Treves, 2002, p. 310. According to Habermas the functionalist philosophy justifies a priori the social 
order. Habermas, 1986, pp. 811 ss. 
126 Blankenburg, 1985, p. (205) 209. 
127 Ferrari, 1992, p. 4. 
128 A eu-function is 'one which contributes to the maintenance or survival of a social activity or of 
the social system as a whole'. Scott (ed.), 2014, p. 226. 
129 Aubert, 1965, p. (85) 88. Something 'is dysfunctional if it inhibits or disrupts the working of the 
system as a whole or in part; for example, if teenage anomie disrupts the labour market or education 
system, it can be dysfunctional for the society'. Scott (ed.), 2014, p. 194. 
130 It has to be noted that the legislator is not the only actor that can interpret the law, in fact in 
common law systems, the judiciary has the same duty. The reflections undergone for the legislator can be 
applied mutatis mutandis for the Supreme Court. See Ferrari, 1992, p. 135. 
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lawmakers. They might have been expressed in order to make the new piece of 
legislation more acceptable for the public, while the real intents have been kept latent.131 
Non-declared intents may be kept secret due to stylistic reasons or due to opportunistic 
reasons, for example to avoid a loss of popularity.132 Sometimes declared intentions can 
be misleading, as Friedman observes 'lawmakers may say one thing and mean 
another'.133 What lawmakers say is the manifest function, what lawmakers mean is the 
latent function of a legal act. There is abundant literature relating to the dichotomy 
manifest and latent functions, especially sociologists with a functionalist approach 
consider the research on the latent functions essential: For ‘what does the sociologist's 
work serve if she or he studies only manifest functions?' 134  The concept of latent 
functions has been introduced in the western sociology of law by Merton, in opposition 
to that of manifest functions. The latter are the objective consequences of an act that 
contributes to the adaptation and adjustment of the system. Latent functions are instead 
those consequences that are neither wanted nor expected by those who acted.135 The 
sociological research has given its major contribution when it analysed the latent 
functions of social actions, because it has allowed the revelation of patterns that go 
beyond the moral naive judgements based on manifest functions and consequences.136 
For the purpose of this work the term 'latent functions' is used with the meaning 
attributed by Aubert, who, by referring to legal acts, includes in the category also those 
functions that are wanted but not expressed by rule-makers.137 In particular, the scholar 
states that, if one wants to understand the reasons why a legislation that does not 
achieve the goals for which it was enacted, yet still remains in force, it is necessary to 
look at that legislation's latent functions. The scholar, in a study on a social policy 
regulating housewives' working conditions, observed that the policy was not effective to 
pursue the declared goals, asked himself: 'Why was such a legislation not effective and 
why did parliament overvalue the provisions' capacity of achieving its purposes [..]?'138 
The scholar raised the hypothesis that Parliament consciously formulated an 'empty 
                                                          
131 Ferrari, 1992, p. 134. 
132 Villegas, 2014, p. 55. 
133 Friedman, 1975, p. 55. 
134 Merton, 1983, p. 195. 
135 Merton takes as an example the indigenous propitiatory rituals, as for instance the rain dance or 
the fertility ritual, which do not cause any rain nor pregnancy but have the latent goal of fostering the 
collectiveness of a community Merton, 1983, pp. 173, 191, 193. 
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legislation'.139 The most important element revealed by the research was the political 
element, namely the reasons triggering by the legislator. The scholar concluded that the 
legislation, while appearing ineffective, had the latent function of reconciling internal 
parliamentarian conflicts by offering at the same time the satisfaction given by the 
promulgation to the political parties supporting the cause of the policy, and the certainty 
of its effectiveness to those opposing the legislative novelty.140 The concept of latent 
functions is fundamental for this work. In order to analyse an act by using this concept, 
it is not necessary that the latent functions are only playing a role, yet it is sufficient that 
without those functions it would be impossible to explain the act.141 The avenues where 
a researcher can observe latent functions are on one hand the parliamentarian debate and 
the travaux préparatoires, which 'constitute the privileged place of a study about the 
relations between social science and law',142 on the other hand the real effects of the law 
in reality. 
 
Legislations whose latent functions prevail over the manifest ones are also critically 
defined as symbolic legislations.143 It is important to stress that only those legislations 
whose symbolic dimension was intended by the legislature are actually considered 
symbolic legislations. 144  There is abundant literature on the concept of 'symbolic 
legislations'; 145  the German constitutional court has recognised the existence of a 
typology of legislations with a symbolic effectiveness, as 'permanent expressions of a 
social-ethical, and thus legal evaluation of human actions'.146 Also in 2006 the Supreme 
Court described the anti-corruption act 'Antikorruptionsgesetz' as 'symbolische 
                                                          
139 From the empirical research conducted on the effective implementation and on the legislative 
process, Aubert, highlighted diverse factors that influence the legislation's effectiveness, among others the 
historical context, the level of implementation, the level of knowledge and the opinions of the addresses 
about the provisions. See Aubert, 1965, pp. 317 ss. 
140 Aubert, 1965, p. (313) 329. 
141 Merton, 1983, p. 201. 
142 Treves, 2002, p. 234. 
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speaks about legislations that are not able to produce change, but only to fulfil symbolic functions; Ryffel 
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purposes. See Hegenbarth, ZRP, 1981, p. (201) 202; Hill, 1982, p. 37; Ryffel, 1974, pp. 255 ss; Amelung, 
ZStW, 1980, p. (19) 54; Neves, IfS-Nachrichten 16, 1999, p. 9. 
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Gesetzgebung', symbolic legislation. 147  Legal scholarship too has confirmed the 
symbolic dimension of constitutional provisions in the field of criminal, environmental 
or labour law.148 Constitutions often contain principles that are purely symbolic, whose 
vague formulation might be filled with a different content according to social 
progress. 149  Principles such as human dignity, freedom and equality have been 
interpreted very differently over the course of history; they have thus a rather symbolic 
nature, yet they are accepted as expressions and confirmations of shared values. Hence 
the symbolic effectiveness of the law can be a positive thing.150 Indeed the adjective 
symbolic derives from the word 'symbol', which stems from the ancient Greek sun-
ballein that means 'to meet', and thus in this context can be referred to legal acts that 
connect the public with the legal system. Yet, not all scholars have interpreted symbolic 
constitutional provisions as positive; for instance according to Villegas, principles 
declared in constitutional bodies often deceive people with the idea of democracy;151 
according to Bryde in a legal system that respects the rule of law symbolic legislations 
should not be accepted, because the legislator ought to produce only legal acts that can 
be enforced.152   
 
By assuming that the law has an intrinsic communicative nature one can also say that all 
legal acts have a symbolic effectiveness that aim at delivering normative messages to 
the public.153 Symbols used by the law can communicate cohesion, in order to unify a 
society and legitimise institutions, or differentiation, to glorify or degrade a specific 
social group.154 Villegas identifies three main points of view on the general symbolic 
dimension of the law, which are the liberal, the Marxist and the constructivist 
approaches.155 Scholars belonging to the first consider the law as the main instrument 
that can transform the use of force into a legitimate exercise of authority and thus 
interpret the symbolic dimension of the law as a tool that legitimises the modern state. 
One of the main exponents of this philosophy is Bourdieu, who speaks about the 
                                                          
147 BGH 9/5/2006, 5 StR 453/05. 
148 Especially in America there is quite abundant literature about the symbolic nature of 
constitutions. See Brigham, 1987; Lerner, 1973; Scheingold, 1974; Villegas, 1993; Neves, 1994. 
149 Noll, 1972, p. (259) 262. 
150 See Bryde, 1993, p. 16 ss. 
151 Villegas, 2014, p. 2. 
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153 See among others Arnold, 1962; Edelman, 1985. 
154 A symbol is most generally 'any act or thing that represents something else'. Scott (ed.), 2014, p. 
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'symbolic violence of law', by referring to the violence practised by the legal system on 
the social actors through a certain consensus, that is the acceptance by the latter of the 
existing structures of power.156 Bourdieu especially recognised the symbolic strength of 
law in the legal language, as power of naming and categorising certain actions as valid, 
illicit or illegitimate. The scholar describes such power as an inherently violent practice, 
because it imposes determined meanings on social relations on the basis of which the 
political and economic powers lose their original arbitrariness and acquire a normal and 
acceptable appearance. According to this view the law is hence an instrument directed at 
normalising the political power through the universalisation of rules and thus a symbolic 
domination. In particular, one can speak here of legitimation, which refers to 'the 
process by which power is not only institutionalised but more importantly is given the 
moral grounding […]'.157 This view of the law as a dominating tool is considered to be 
similar to the Marxist approach, which, in a Weberian perspective, sees the law as the 
most important instrument of symbolic domination.158 In particular Weber, by looking 
at patterns of domination, emphasises the role of perceived legitimacy as linked to the 
validity of a legal order, and thus to a social action: 'Action, especially social action 
which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a 
legitimate order'.159 Yet, when the 'the myth of positive privilege' is no longer accepted 
unquestionably by the masses and the 'class situation' becomes visible, than legitimacy, 
in a Weberian sense, can be said to have broken down. The Marxist philosophy 
considers the law as an institution used by the stronger classes to protect their economic 
interests. Its symbolic dimension gives power an appearance of legality and justice. It is 
precisely the symbolic dimension of the law that creates a fake consciousness that 
impedes the recognition of the dominant power that acts behind the law. In this way 
people comply with legal regimes in an apparently natural way, as if they were part of a 
pre-constituted order.160 This interpretation of the symbolic dimension of law has been 
used especially by critical movements in societies dominated by privileged classes, in 
which the symbols of unity, justice and equality were used by the most powerful to 
legitimise their status.161 According to the constructivist theory, the law represents a 
place of symbolic construction of social conflicts of interests, often in which if the most 
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158 Bourdieu, 1986, p. (3) 16; Scott (ed.) 2014, pp. 413, 414; Weber, 1972, p. 31. 
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powerful are advantaged, as theorised by Marxists, sometimes also disadvantaged 
classes can make use of the symbolic dimension of the law in order to fight for their 
rights.162 The constructivist approach mediates between the pessimist Marxist theories 
and the optimistic liberal philosophy, because it leaves an open door to the possibility 
that the symbolic effectiveness of law turns to be advantageous both for the 
maintenance of the status quo and for its criticism, thus both in a conservative and in a 
progressive sense. 
 
All these approaches look at the law as having a general symbolic nature and take into 
consideration the possibility that the symbolic dimension of the law might be used to 
conceal issues that would otherwise not be accepted by society. In addition to these 
theories on the general symbolic dimension of law, some scholars that take the view that 
the law is rather generally instrumental. Therefore they focus on the study of specific 
symbolic legislations, which, while not being completely ineffective, do not trigger 
instrumental effects. 163  Also with regards to specific legislations, the symbolic 
effectiveness can be interpreted as positive or negative. Newig, for instance developed 
the idea that symbolic legislations have an effectiveness that is not substantial but rather 
strategic-political, which can be even achieved before the entry into force of a legal act, 
due to public declarations about its legislative process.164 Symbolic legislations can be 
interpreted positively to the extent that they are able to communicate certain messages 
to the public. According to Lévi-Strauss symbolic legislations communicate messages to 
the public mainly by using a psychological language. 165  According to this view, 
symbolic provisions reach their effectiveness not through their implementation but 
rather through their communication. Examples in the German legal system are criminal 
provisions that ban conducts, which are anyway never committed, as for instance 
                                                          
162 Villegas, 2014, p. 7. 
163 Various scholars have stressed the difference between instrumental and symbolic legislations. 
See, among others, Schmel, ZRP, 1991, p. (251) 251; Kindermann, JRR 100, 1988, p. (222) 229; 
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Article 233 (1) of the German criminal code, which prohibits slavery,166 or the ban of 
genocide, introduced in 1954, whose goal was not the instrumental realisation of the 
normative wording, but rather the elaboration of the Nazi period, also from an external 
policy perspective.167 In the essay 'Symbolische Umweltgesetzgebung' Newig proposes 
a categorisation of symbolic legislations into four groups in relation to their functions: 
Alibi-legislations (Alibi-Gesetzgebung), compromise-legislations (Kompromiss-
Gesetzgebung), appellative-legislations (Appellative Gesetzgebung), legislations with a 
planned executive deficit (Programmiertes Vollzugsdefizit).168 The first are introduced 
to give the appearance that something has been done and that the polity is taking care of 
the regulated matter. These types of legislations gather consensus through their mere 
existence: The effective content of the legal act has no importance, what counts in these 
situations is the appearance of justice. 169  In a cost-effectiveness analysis such 
legislations might represent a perfect solution for a legislator who is dealing with a 
complex phenomenon, subject to time pressure and does not want to add more voices of 
public expenditures in order not to lose popularity.170 A symbolic alibi-legislation will 
not require any implementation costs because it is ineffective. Moreover, it will be 
perceived by the public as an efficient solution, because those that do not possess 
enough information to recognise the ineffectiveness of the legal acts will be satisfied by 
the mere adoption. In fact these types of legislation can serve propagandistic functions. 
Yet, if that satisfaction remains empty and the legal act does not have any instrumental 
effectiveness, individuals may eventually be deceived by the legislator. The second 
category that is the compromise-legislations is directed at mediating conflicting 
opinions and interests within the parliament and is usually formulated vaguely in order 
to allow various interpretations that would then satisfy all parties. The typology is also 
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known as 'gesetzgeberischer double talk' 171or trade-off legislations. An example is the 
legislation studied by Aubert. 172  Appellative legislations are typically constitutional 
provisions that recall and codify fundamental values, but can also be other sorts of rules, 
as for example the US Prohibition Act studied by Gusfield.173 The effectiveness of such 
legislations derives not from what they prescribe but rather from what they express; 
their content is directed to the addresses of the message and not to the addresses of the 
rule.174 The last type are legislations that need the adoption of administrative regulations 
in order to be implemented, but such regulations are not enacted or enforced. The 
question that arises is whether such ineffectiveness is to be ascribed to the parliament or 
rather to the administrative apparatus. According to Bettini the enforcement deficit can 
be explained within the administrative structure without recurring to the legislator;175 
Blankenburg instead asserts that especially political and legislative decisions taken 
under controversial circumstances are planned as not enforceable by policy-makers. Yet 
the scholar also recognises the hypothesis that 'under enforcement is a way of adapting 
laws with high symbolic importance to controversial social standards', that means that 
implementers can decide not to enforce a legal act in order to avoid social conflicts.176 
 
When not all that the law promises becomes true, and if in fact only a minimal part of 
the promises is maintained, the law is an empty promise that deceives its addresses.177 
The problem concerning symbolic legislations rises when these, while seeming to be  
pure declarations of values, deceive citizens making them think that the law is 
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172 Aubert, 1965, pp. (313) 321 ss. 
173 The scholar in particular reached the conclusion that the adoption of the legislation had a 
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Italy in the essay 'Il circolo vizioso legislativo', in which the scholar criticises the approach adopted by 
sociologists about implementation problems. Yet, the scholar's theories find again a common point with 
those focussing on the legislative process when he declares that the assessment on the administrative 
implementation of rules should direct the production of new legal acts. See Bettini, 1983, p. 117. 
176 Blankenburg, 1985, p. (205) 210. 
177 The term 'promise' was used in a sociology of law conference held in Berlin in September 2015, 
'the promises of law' ('Die Versprechungen des Rechts'). See http://www.lsi-
berlin.org/projekte/berlin2015, last visited on 12/09/2015. 
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regulating a specific issue, while the legislations actually have the purpose (and the 
latent effect) of maintaining the status quo thanks to their ineffectiveness. Those 
legislations have a symbolic manifest function but at the same time an instrumental 
latent function, that is to keep the situation as it was before the introduction of the legal 
act. While the declared goal will not be achieved, the latent one will have a practical 
impact on society. Hence, while giving the appearance of a legal change, mutatis 
mutandis the status quo will not be modified. Especially provisions whose declared goal 
is to protect weaker social groups by changing certain patterns of power that 
disadvantage them, can cause real harm if they are merely symbolic. In fact, not only 
weak actors will remain without legal protection, but also social claims towards the law 
will be symbolically neutralised by the rule.178 At the same time those who did not want 
to change the status quo remain untouched. These legislations are definitely not 
ineffective, they are rather mis-effective. In addition, those legislations would as being 
non-proportional because they are not appropriate to achieve the declared finalities. 
Even the attempt to implement them would require a useless effort that might cause 
ulterior damages and costs. In addition the ineffectiveness would lead to a public loss of 
confidence in the legal order. As Beccaria observed in the 18th century 'useless 
provisions, disregarded by people communicate their humiliation also to the healthiest 
rules'.179 The concept of the symbolic dimension of the law is therefore necessary to 
reveal patterns of power underlying the law.180 The relationship between the symbolic 
dimension of law and the effectiveness of law still represents a controversial topic. In 
reality it is not possible to clearly distinguish such categories, in fact often those 
attributes are rather scalable in different measures for the same provision.181 Yet it is 
possible to list some indexes of the possible existence of a symbolic legislation: The 
seriousness of the sanctions or of the legal response to a violation, the hierarchical 
position in the legal order, the time of adoption (if for instance closed to political 
elections), an external pressure on the legislator, the complexity and the social 
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importance of the matter, existing conflicts of interest regarding the object of the 
matter.182 
 
While symbolic laws can display their functions through their mere existence, it is quite 
common to believe that instrumental legal acts need to be enforced in order to trigger 
substantial effects.183 ‘Eine Rechtsnorm ist wirksam, wenn sie befolgt oder durchgesetzt 
wird’.184 The implementation research185 is particularly relevant with regards to policy-
making, both ex-post because it provides information on unanticipated consequences, 
goal displacements and a change of original conceptions, and on vested interests of 
implementers that have influenced the legislative process, and ex-ante because it 
anticipates problems, and thus helps policy makers to foresee solutions and shifts. For 
these reasons Blankenburg believes that the study of policy making and policy 
implementation ought not to be divided. 186  The scholar adds that implementation 
research is necessary in order to complete research on the impact because it explains 
what the latter measures, which is the unintended and intended outcome. The question 
whether a failed enforcement has to be ascribed to the legislative process or rather to an 
administrative deficit can be answered on a case-basis. In fact implementation agencies 
can have an undeniable impact on policy making too. They can influence policy-makers 
about which policies might be more feasible to be implemented in relation for example 
to their competences. On the other hand, political decisions can impact on 
implementation by providing or not implementation agencies with the necessary 
resources and instruments such as incentives, control capacities, information. Where 
implementation depends on different third parties than policy-makers, these parties shall 
be granted an effective ability to mobilise the law. For example in federal states local 
authorities shall be given the necessary power, structure and resources in order to 
                                                          
182 Newig, 2003, pp. (276) 280, 281. 
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implement a state legislation. In the context of private law or labour law, in which the 
law is not mobilised by public power, private actors should be able to access justice, 
which means that a range of substantial rights should be guaranteed.187 In all these cases 
the way the legislature formulates the act may substantially influence its effectiveness. 
Indeed, the objective adequateness of the norm to fulfil its purposes and its suitability to 
be implemented can play an important role. Yet, the potential suitability does not 
guarantee an effective implementation. Although the enforcement of policies highly 
depends on implementation agencies, and thus the effectiveness of a legal act can be 
influenced by an administration in default,188 it cannot be expected that policy-makers 
are always interested in programmes that can be effectively implemented. In fact often 
legislators may deliberately take into account implementation hindrances, as in the case 
of rules with a programmiertes Vollzugsdefizit. Yet, in such situations, when lawmakers 
intentionally adopt legal acts that are not supposed to be enforced, the judiciary cannot 
refuse to apply the law. In fact, in order to respect the rule of law, judges are actually 
supposed to apply the law.189 This, in the end, can lead to a certain level of arbitrariness 
of the judiciary that is required to decide both how and whether to define the 
circumstances in which a legislation is applied. 
 
After having taken into consideration two variables that are related to those actors that 
actively formulate or implement a legal act, the chapter is now going to focus on two 
factors linked with legal reception. On the assumption that the integration of a provision 
in the legal system can influence the effectiveness of a legal act, the research looks at 
the doctrinal debate surrounding the money laundering offence and at practitioners and 
privileged observes' opinions. In order to investigate the relationship between the level 
of acceptance of the law and its effectiveness means to understand to what extent the 
legal community of scholars, experts and practitioners have integrated the piece of 
legislation in their theoretical frameworks or in their daily practice. This is again a 
rather scalable variable: Legal actors might consider a policy effective and adequate for 
certain aspects or to fulfil certain functions and at the same time totally ineffective to 
pursue other goals or in relation to determined situations. The formulation of a legal 
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programme that needs to be integrated in the legal system requires the programme not to 
be inconsistent with such a system. Those who produce the official doctrine and thus 
express the still diverging but official opinions on legal acts, have the advantage of 
looking at legislations from an external point of view. A legal act can be accepted and 
integrated in an existing legal framework if it is considered legitimate by those who are 
entitled to judge it. In this sense, the perceived legitimation affects legal effectiveness. 
Many factors can affect the perceived legitimation of a legal novelty, as for instance the 
way that news is communicated to the public by the media. 190  Yet, given that the 
analysed law is very complex, the research does not aim at assessing the public's 
perception of legitimacy, but rather focuses on the opinions of legal scholars who have a 
deep understanding of the law. Moreover the analysis of the doctrinal debate aims at 
revealing manifest and latent functions and effects of doctrinal interpretation, and in 
particular at showing the conflict of opinions on the law (Meinungsstreit) among the 
doctrinal monopoles (Kommentarmonopole) and the interpretations cartels 
(Interpretationskartelle) from an external critical perspective. According to 
Blankenburg the external critical approach allows sociologists to spot patterns of power 
that lead to the predominance of the dominant opinion (herrschende Meinung).191 The 
second element is researched through interviews that allow getting to know perceptions, 
opinions and practices otherwise not emerging from the documental research. From this 
perspective the concept of legal culture and particularly of internal legal culture is a 
very useful tool. Legal culture is part of a culture that refers to uses, customs, opinions, 
and practices that channel social forces towards or against the law.192 At the same time, 
according to Friedman, legal culture leads the conversion of social interests into legal 
claims.193 It is thus a fundamental element in the process of legal production. Some 
events, such as technological invention, may require the introduction of new 
regulations.194 In addition, legal culture shapes the reception of legislative news. As for 
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culture in general, within the main collective legal culture, there may be different sub-
legal cultures, those being more or less dominant. These sub-cultures can try to 
influence the main legal culture, as for instance economic lobbies.195 Furthermore, at 
present, while studying a domestic legislation it is not possible not to take into account 
the existence of supranational legal cultures. Especially in the field of money laundering 
control law, national laws are very much influenced by transnational bodies. For the 
purpose of this research a subcategory of the legal culture is particularly relevant, that is 
the internal legal culture. Friedman defines the internal legal culture as the legal culture 
created by legal actors in opposition to the external legal culture that is the one available 
to the society as a whole. Only complex societies that have a class of legal professionals 
have an internal legal culture, which is the values, the ideas and the principles of those 
that work 'within the magic circle of the legal system'.196 Legal professionals are the 
means between society and law; they have a privileged position because they can 
influence the information flow between the public and the institutions by influencing the 
application of legal acts. Given the supranational dimension, the role of legal actors is 
also that of interpreting and adapting transnational rules to domestic legal systems. In 
addition the opinions and perceptions of practitioners can offer an important insight into 
law enforcement practices and thus on the effects of the 'law in action', on the 
background of the previous assumptions about the importance of revealing the latent 
functions and effects of law. The variable of the acceptance of the law is also interpreted 
as being potentially influenced by political decisions. In fact, as previously noted, policy 
makers can influence the reception of legal acts for example by choosing a certain type 
of language in relation to the addressees, therefore it is important to adopt a critical 
perspective. This work assumes that legal actors are familiar with the content of the 
legislation given the fact that they are selected on the basis of their expertise in the field, 
hence the empirical research is not directed at investigating the addressees' level of 
knowledge. 197  When legal scholarship or practitioners eventually highlight issues 
concerning a vague or mistaken legal formulation, the research takes a critical approach 
and considers the possibility that such 'bad formulation' has to be ascribed to a political 
decision. In the case-study analysed by Aubert in the sixties, one of the variables that 
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influenced the legislation's ineffectiveness was the addressees' lack of knowledge.198 
The scholar, however, interpreted this issue as part of a political plan of enacting an 
ineffective piece of legislation by adopting complex legal vocabulary that was not 
appropriate for the addressees. In this sense Aubert hypothesised that the legislator was 
not interested in letting housewives understand the content of the legal news. The use of 
complex language, while at first sight may seem like a guarantee of impartiality, 
precision and credibility, and thus legitimise the legislator's action, can be used to 
achieve latent functions.199 A 'bad formulation' may be a technical issue linked to the 
appropriateness of the legislation, but it can also be a part of a planned ineffectiveness. 
By recalling the symbolic dimension of law, the use of complex language can serve the 
symbolic function of legitimation while concealing other latent functions.200 
 
 1.3  The effectiveness of criminal law 
It is of great importance to mention the effectiveness of criminal law in a moment when 
criminal policy-makers seem to produce random legal acts that are ineffective, symbolic 
or even criminogenic.201 Despite several definitions of legal effectiveness provided by 
the sociology of law being tailored to behavioural legal acts and are thus applicable to 
penal law, criminal law has some peculiarities that need to be taken in consideration.202 
Firstly, penal law has a double nature of prevention (deterrence) and repression. The 
level of deterrence achieved by a provision is part of that provision's effectiveness. The 
underlying idea of deterrence is that people will commit crimes to the extent they 
become more pleasurable than painful.203 Yet, this variable can only be verified through 
a behavioural research on potential offenders. This work infers the deterrent potential of 
the provision from interviewees' opinions and from criminal statistics on sanctions 
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applied to offenders.204 A research on the effectiveness of criminal law has to take into 
account the so-called 'dark number', namely a quote of cases that do not emerge through 
the activity of the criminal justice system. Especially in the field of organised crime and 
money laundering, the dark area is considered to be rather large, given the fact that 
those offenders aim at remaining unknown and unperceived. 205  This, as already 
observed, impedes the assessment of the effectiveness of a criminal provision on the 
basis of a calculation of deviance and compliance or deterrence rates. 
 
Another premise is necessary to introduce the topic: Assessing the effectiveness of 
criminal law means finding the right balance between the repressive claim and the 
necessity of respecting fundamental legal principles and thus limiting the scope and use 
of criminal law.206 If on one hand there is public interest in the persecution of crime, on 
the other hand the effectiveness of criminal law cannot be guaranteed at any cost. While 
persecuting crimes a state needs not to violate other fundamental principles. Paliero 
speaks of a prohibition of iper-effectiveness and recalls the extreme special-prevention 
effectiveness showed in the movie 'A Clockwork-Orange'207, and the Orwellian system 
of general-prevention described in ' big brother'. An example taken from reality is 
provided by the instigator agent created to tackle particularly dangerous situations such 
as organised crime; this tool seems to violate the rights of the defendant in order to grant 
an effective persecution of crime.208 According to Hassemer the legislature, especially 
in the field of organised crime, is more interested in achieving an effective criminal law 
rather than balancing it with fundamental rights.209 Also criminal law shall only be 
adopted as ultima ratio and only if effectively able to achieve the declared goals. Given 
that penal law has a harmful nature, it shall reach a certain determined purpose.210 In 
particular it needs to protect superior legal interests. This limit should be respected not 
only in the enforcement phase but also during the law-making process: The resort to 
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criminal law ought to be restricted to situations in which no other means are applicable 
and only if the repressive instrument is suitable for the purpose.211 Not all purposes and 
not all interests legitimise the resort to penal law. It is thus necessary, while assessing 
the effectiveness of a criminal policy, to look at the attributed functions and thus at the 
law-making process. A criminal act that cannot be applied or that it is not able to 
produce the consequences for which it was enacted creates victims. Indeed, such an act 
will not guarantee the protection of the legal interests, and, by being applied on an 
arbitrary basis, could generate injustice and alienation. Such legislations may be applied 
discretionally for instance only on socially disadvantaged groups, while the middle class 
would remain in the impunity. This use of ineffective criminal law results in having an 
oppressive effect. The more ineffective criminal legislations are the more they can be 
iper-selective. 212  Also from a mere legal point of view criminal laws that are not 
effective because they violate the principle 'in dubio pro libertate' and the right to be 
treated equally. In addition, legal acts that are not effective lead to a public mistrust in 
law enforcement. The ineffectiveness of certain pieces of legislation discredits the 
whole criminal justice system in the eyes of the people who perceive it as leading to 
social injustice. In few words, on one hand the complete effectiveness of the criminal 
system cannot be guaranteed in disregard of fundamental rights, on the other hand the 
resort to penal law should be limited to situations in which this tool is effective in 
achieving the desired goals. An effective criminal provision is a provision that balances 
these two aspects. The effectiveness of a criminal act is defined by Paliero as 'the 
suitability of the repressive act, scientifically prognosticated ex ante and empirically 
verified ex post, to inhibit socially dysfunctional behaviours by achieving a social 
benefit significantly higher than the provoked social harm'.213 The scholar suggests a 
way of how to assess it, by calculating the sum of compliant behaviours, validity of the 
sanctions, achievement of the general protective goal, in which both legislative intents 
and social purposes, dysfunctional and unwanted effects are included; such sums are 
then further relativized with a cost-effectiveness calculation.214 The research will look at 
the real achievement of those purposes and will consider the possibility that a legal act's 
incoherence with determined core principles of the legal system can negatively affect 
the effectiveness of the legal act. The assessment of a criminal provision's effectiveness 
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has to take into consideration, besides factors such as the legislative intents, the 
implementation of the provision, its acceptance and its effects, also whether the criminal 
legal act is proportional and whether its enforcement does not violate other fundamental 
rights. In order to seize the inspiring criteria and the intimate political-economic 
rationale behind the adoption of the criminal policy it is necessary to study the political 
debate that has developed during and after the policy, which can also reveal possible 
latent functions and the underlying patterns of power; this is again the heart of the 
sociology of law.215 In addition, the analysis of a criminal law’s effectiveness should be 
performed in light of social costs. According to Baratta, laws that violate other 
constitutional norms, which set the limits of penal intervention, have an efficiency result 
of zero.216 In a cost-effectiveness analysis of criminal law, costs are also understood as 
the social costs of punishment and exclusion. If these are higher than the benefits, the 
law infringes the principle of proportionality.217 Among the costs deriving from the 
implementation of criminal policies one needs to include what Hierro defines as 'legal 
costs', namely the collateral effects eventually conflicting with the core principles of the 
legal system.218 In addition, the research also takes into account what Pino defines as 
'collateral social costs' with reference to a peculiar definition of effectiveness as 
'happiness' (felicità). In the specific case of a criminal act these costs also consist of the 
eventual harm caused by repression.219 
 
Criminal law has a strong symbolic component that explicates the general-preventive 
function.220 This symbolic dimension does not yet exhaust the purpose of criminal law, 
which is usually directed at an instrumental functional of solving social conflicts 
through the protection of determined interests.221 Criminal provisions that are purely 
symbolic instead do not aim at concretely changing a given situation, but rather at 
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providing an image of efficiency. 222  By applying Hassemer definition of symbolic 
legislations that refers to the supremacy of latent functions over the manifest ones, and 
by taking the scholar's view about a criminal law that should be limited to the protection 
of certain qualified goods, penal symbolic provisions are those that declare to protect a 
certain 'Rechtsgut' (legally protected interest), but instead are directed at other latent 
functions, such as pacifying the public, or fulfilling a need for action.223 On the basis of 
this assumption it is therefore necessary to clearly identify those qualified goods that 
legitimise the resort to criminal law.224 From this perspective, the scholar observes that 
criminal policy has developed the idea of universal goods, Universalrechtsgüter, such 
as the administration of justice, or the economic order. This has amplified the scope of 
action of the criminal legislature, to the extent that criminal law is then used to minimise 
insecurity and to control global complex issues.225 Yet, these purposes do not serve the 
general preventive goal of protecting Rechtsgüter, but will rather generate an image of 
the legislature as a 'successful moral entrepreneur'.226 Baratta speaks about the criminal 
policy's tendency to achieve 'efficient symbolism', which, contrary to a symbolic 
efficiency would direct social behaviour thanks to its strong communicative power, does 
not affect the reality substantially. 227  In particular the scholar addresses legal acts 
adopted in an emergency context, enacted under strong pressure and therefore vaguely 
formulated; their goals are to express an appearance of efficiency, yet such efficiency is 
rather symbolic, because they cannot guarantee what they promise. Their aim is 
galvanising public consensus around public actions and the governing party; in fact the 
scholar uses the term 'theatrical polity'. Yet, by enhancing the government’s political 
commitment in the eyes of the public, they are not deemed to actually be applied. In 
other words, these laws promise more than they can actually achieve. With specific 
regards to the  Italian criminal law in the field of organised crime, Moccia has dedicated 
an essay to analyse the 'emergency rationale' ('La perenne emergenza'); the scholar 
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believes that the tendency of regulating urgent issues with the use of symbolic criminal 
law is not exceptional but rather the usual way. 228  According to him the issue of 
organised crime should be tackled firstly with social policies that aim at preventing the 
phenomenon, while repression should only intervene as ultima ratio. On the contrary 
the Italian legislator has been resorting to the penal law in order to address the problem 
of the Mafia by adopting symbolic provisions. In this context criminal procedural law 
has acquired a particularly relevant position and has substituted substantial law in the 
role of punishing misbehaviours. Given the abundant and chaotic number of regulations 
in this field, the judiciary acquires the role, which is usually otherwise reserved to the 
legislature, of determining which rule to apply. In fact, penal proceedings are 
considered an anticipated punishment, especially thanks to the modern media, which 
can spread news quickly about criminal trials. Considering this Moccia emphasises the 
fact that prosecutors' work is also influenced by the media to the extent that the external 
consensus can affect the action of law enforcement agencies, for example in relation to 
indictments.229 In this field, the increasing number of criminalised conducts actually 
serves for further sanctioning behaviours already regulated by private law. While this 
phenomenon can be partially explained with a general tendency in Europe to also 
regulate the private sector through criminal law, it testifies a regression towards an 
authoritarian state that abuses its monopoly of violence.230 
 
Along with this debate, scholars has also stressed the role of the securitisation rhetoric 
that influences the social perception of crime and thus legitimising the political 
intervention. For instance, in the field of terrorism there has been a vast production of 
policies directed at eliminating or controlling the risks. The social perception of risk can 
be influenced in order to create a fertile environment for the adoption of particular 
legislations that would otherwise be not easily accepted as for example regulations 
limiting personal liberties or invading individuals' privacy. Through this rhetoric policy-
makers have anticipated their intervention to the neutralisation of potential risks, thus 
missing the link between criminal law and the existence of concrete dangers for legal 
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interests. 231  This has been driven by what Baratta calls a 'renouncement of the 
subsidiarity principle of penal law', which takes criminal law from being an instrument 
to protect society to being an instrument that controls society.232 In particular the scholar 
connects this switch to the failure of the penal law’s goal of re-socialisation and thus a 
general loss of legitimation, which has been substituted with the function of general 
prevention. This phenomenon has been extensively studied with regards to modern 
societies, and especially advanced capitalist countries that are living in a post-scarcity 
age where the major dilemmas are the side-effects of success. In this context 'a new 
politics of risk emerges, a politics that is concerned with the distribution not of “goods” 
but of “bad” […]'. 233  In fact criminal provisions continue to punish hypothesised 
damages and presumed dangers and not acts causing real harm. The anti-money 
laundering legislation can be an example of such a mechanism, because it is supposed to 
intervene to neutralise the risks of money laundering. In fact the policy, by imposing 
heavy duties on both the public and private sector, it infringes on certain privacy rights. 
Yet, law-makers have legitimised it on the basis of the serious threat posed by money 
laundering on the security of the economic sector, and thus of the whole society. 
 
Against the flaunted rigorousness, the effects of criminal policies in the field of 
economic crimes are scarce. In this way the adopted acts symbolically neutralise social 
claims for justice but leave legal interests without protection. Therefore these 
mechanisms create victims without protection and at the same time privileged people de 
facto immune from the criminal justice system. These provisions deceive citizens that 
their social claims for justice are satisfied, but actually they do not provide the effective 
legal protection needed by society. These laws create situations of actual impunity 
covered by the appearance of symbolic punishment.234 Scholars have interpreted this 
impunity as a planned impunity, as a desired effect of the practice of decriminalising 
certain social groups in order for the perpetrators of such crime to avoid being 
punished.235 On this background Cottino interprets Aubert's research outcomes with an 
even more critical approach. The scholar believes that the housewives' legislation which 
Aubert proved to be ineffective in improving  housewives' working condition but 
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effective in solving a parliamentarian conflict, actually perpetuated power relations 
between 'workers' and 'bosses'. This was ultimately a defeat for the workers, according 
to Cottino. In fact the legislation confirmed and even legitimised the status quo. The 
instrument of the ineffective piece of legislation belongs to a social control strategy. The 
scholar theorises the practice of 'decriminalisation', which envisages different ways of 
avoiding punishment through a blockage of the criminalisation process, which starts 
with the adoption of a law and ends with the action of law enforcement agencies. The 
adoption of a planned, ineffective norm is one of the possible ways of blocking such a 
process.236 If class struggle nowadays is conducted through laws which are intended to 
entrench the position and the interests of the dominant class, while impeding the fight of 
the lower classes for their rights,237 it can be argued that the money laundering offence 
has been designed as non-effective in order not to harm the interests of money 
launderers. Laws against economic crimes have always been, after all, very harsh on 
paper, but in practice have not been widely applied. In fact, 'statistics unequivocally 
show that crime, as popularly conceived an officially measured, has a high incidence in 
the lower class and a low incidence in the upper class'. 238  It returns again to the 
difference between the law in action and law in the books. 
 
Looking at the implementation of a criminal policy means observing the activity of law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary. The effectiveness of those agencies is referred 
to as efficiency, which is measured in relation to their primary functions through 
criminal statistics on the number of (preliminary) investigations, proceedings, 
convictions, typologies of sanctions inflicted. This data is not only representative of the 
implementation outcome but also expresses the level of efficiency from the perspective 
of the different repressive authorities. In particular, according to police forces the 
efficiency of a criminal legal act can be calculated by looking at clearance rates, 
according to prosecutors it is related to indictments, and from the perspective of judges 
what count is the number of convictions for a certain offence. Yet those statistics do not 
provide information on the reasons of law enforcement agencies activity. Given that, as 
observed for the law in general, implementers may be biased, the outcome of law 
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enforcement action is not always neutral. Therefore the selectivity of the criminal 
justice system cannot be assumed as primarily neutral, although it should be. 'Non 
enforcement is common in the law, perhaps as common as enforcement' 239 . Non 
enforcement may seem normal, or as even being necessary to balance the seriousness of 
repressive action. Friedman states that 'the police does not arrest and cannot arrest 
everyone that commits a crime, they do not try'. 240  Besides conducts that are not 
detected, whose number could somehow be registered by police statistics, the 
organisational strategy of detecting some crimes is biased. Blankenburg explicitly states 
that for instance blue collar crimes or theft and personal injury are detected more than 
white collar crimes or fraud or embezzlement.241 This biased implementation is often 
driven by political decisions to the extent that the substantive law does not furnish the 
means of implementing the provisions efficiently, and hence it does not resemble an 
automatic natural one, but rather as the result of a political strategy. In fact Blankenburg 
theorises that non enforcement ('Nicht-Kriminalisierung') is mostly linked to public 
action of law enforcement agencies and not to deficiencies of the criminal justice 
system.242 A study conducted by the scholar pictures the criminal procedure as a funnel: 
The area of deviance including the dark number fills the bottom and becomes smaller 
and smaller along with the criminal proceeding due to the selectivity of criminal action. 
Therefore only 50 % of the bottom cases is dealt with, only 15 % is clarified and only 
10 % receives a conviction, while even smaller parts are then actually sanctioned.243 
Modern criminology has shown that the discretional exercise of criminal action is a 
filter of punishment. From the research of offence notices, investigators can play an 
important role in labelling criminality. Also in a subsequent procedural phase 
prosecutors may label certain conducts and may prioritise certain cases over others; 
finally magistrates interpret legal provisions on the basis of their personal attitudes in 
the limits of judicial discretionary. Cottino's theories on intended decriminalisation can 
be useful to explain also a scarce implementation as one of the stages of the 
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decriminalisation process. 244  In short, the dys-functionality of the criminal justice 
system can be the result of a precise political plan. 
 
A subcategory of the implementation of legal acts is the sanctioning system. The 
application of sanctions can influence the effectiveness of the substantial rule either by 
promising a price or by threatening with punishment.245  Yet, the research does not 
assess the Sanktionsgeltung,246 the validity of the sanction, it looks at the sanctioning 
provision only to obtain important information relating to the effectiveness of the 
substantial provision, on the assumption that the menace of punishment can foster the 
deterrent effect of criminal law. However, sanctions cannot be deterrent if not applied. 
Therefore, even though it is not possible to measure the deterrent effect of the studied 
legislation, the information collected about its enforcement can also be used to 
potentially assess it. What prevents a potential offender from violating the law is the 
perceived risk of a concretely applicable sanction and not a vague of menace of 
punishment; thus the certainty of punishment is of great importance besides being one 
of the fundamental principles of penal law. In order to influence people's perception of 
the risk of sanctions, the criminal justice system can accentuate its role through 
surveillance methods.247 As much as police cars parked along a street have a deterrent 
effect to the extent that drivers will think to be under surveillance while driving, other 
surveillance systems have a similar effect. With particular regards to the anti-money 
laundering regime, a complex system of surveillance has been created in order to 
prevent the laundering of illicit funds through the financial and economic system. Such 
regulations impact people's daily life because they regulate, for instance, the opening of 
bank accounts, transactions with real estate agents and therefore increase social 
awareness of state-control. Yet, if such mechanisms would result to be ineffective in 
preventing the laundering of ill-gotten monies, their deterrent effect would also diminish 
despite their publicity. Additionally, sanctions can be applied with a certain level of 
discretion by law enforcement agencies. It has been proven that police forces action 
may influence the implementation of a legal act to the extent that for example 
investigative efforts can be directed towards the prosecution of certain conducts rather 
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than others. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that often in the criminal field a 
successful persecution of violations does not eliminate crime but it might just transfer it 
to a different sector. This phenomenon, known as 'spill-over effect' or 
'Verlagerungseffekt' can frustrate the efforts to counteract criminality of a particular 
legal branch or region or state or group of states when one actor does not effectively 
implement counter-regulations, thus creating an avenue of impunity. 248  It is thus 
fundamental, particularly in relation to money laundering, to remember the globalised 
dimension of the phenomenon and thus the importance of international cooperation. 
 
Besides being part of a strategic plan, law enforcement may be the result of a distorted 
perception about the seriousness of crime. Despite criminal law’s general preventive 
function being direct to the whole society, the monopoly of penal action is in the hand 
of the state and thus of the authorities that on its behalf put it into practice. Therefore 
legal actors have the chance to interpret criminal provisions in the limits of the allowed 
discretionary, and thus to influence the effectiveness of a criminal act. In this context it 
is important to keep in mind that certain offences are perceived as less serious than 
others. Notoriously white collar crimes and other economic crimes are perceived as less 
serious than, for example, bodily injury or offences linked to organised crime. 249 
Economic crimes such as money laundering are characterised by a high level of 
technicality that hinders the public from fully understanding their seriousness. Moreover 
they are usually 'victimless' offences that do not directly harm specific individuals or 
goods. The infiltration of illicit financial flows into the economy has an impact on 
abstract collective goods such as the integrity of the financial system, the soundness of 
the EU Internal Market, free competition. Certain crimes receive a lot of attention from 
journalists, and are therefore named as 'reato massmediatico', mass-media offences.250 
Money laundering is one of them, yet this research does not aim at analysing the impact 
of media on the social perception of money laundering.251 Since criminal law is applied 
by legal actors, the research focuses on their legal culture and their perceptions about 
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the seriousness of money laundering. In cannot be forgotten that the mass media plays 
an important role in shaping social perception. 
 
 1.4  Considerations 
On the background of the reflections based on the sociolegal framework that sets the 
definition of legal effectiveness with specific respect to criminal law, and on the critical 
literature on the inadequateness of the international anti-money laundering system to 
eliminate the targeted activity recalled in the introduction, the hypothesis underlying the 
case study is the following: Article 261 Gcc may be an example of a symbolic 
legislation, whose latent functions prevail on its declared functions. In particular, it is 
hypothesised that the law is an example of a 'compromise-law' that satisfy all parties 
taking part in the law-making process, thanks to the vagueness of the wording that 
allows a broad range of possible interpretations, and also thanks to the actual 
ineffectiveness, which pleases those who were contrary to the introduction of the 
provision. It is here necessary to recall the considerations on the 'legislator' being an 
heterogeneous group of parties not only constituted of members of the Parliament but 
often also by external actors, who can influence more or less transparently the law 
making-process. While the manifested function of tackling money laundering has in fact 
remained in the background, the thesis hypothesises that other latent goals have been 
pursued. It is further hypothesised that the 'law inaction' is part of a process of 
decriminalisation that intentionally grants impunity to a certain group of actors, in this 
case those laundering money, while giving the appearance that the practice is not 
accepted by law by labelling it as criminal. By using the concept of function, the study 
focuses on eventual conflicting interests emerging throughout the policy-making 
process and/or being displayed through the implementation of the provisions. In order to 
verify these hypotheses the research proceeds with a case study that aims at empirically 
assessing the sociolegal effectiveness of Article 261 Gcc. In particular, by applying the 
'elastic' definition of effectiveness, the following chapters analyse the law-making 
process, the level of acceptance by legal scholars, the implementation, and the opinions 
of legal experts and professionals. 
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 1.5  The methodology of the research 
The research does not aim at objectively evaluating the law's effectiveness but rather at 
highlighting nuances and controversies of such a topic. Therefore, a qualitative 
approach is adopted.252 The work combines different techniques: A process tracing, a 
study of the doctrinal debate, a qualitative analysis of quantitative data and an empirical 
research with semi-structured interviews. In the first chapter a methodological definition 
of effectiveness as the varying result of a combination of factors and not of a 
mathematic calculation has been given, which serves as a hint for the case study. The 
following chapters, are built on the set of variables suggested in chapter one: the second 
deals with the legislative intents and the attributed functions, the third chapter addresses 
legal culture with specific focus on legal scholarship, the fourth chapter tackles the 
implementation of the law by looking at statistics on law enforcement, while the fifth 
chapter investigates legal actors’ opinions and practices. 
 
The study of the German law-making process together with the analysis of the doctrinal 
debate and the assessment of law enforcement outcomes and the research on the 
opinions of legal actors form the case study on the effectiveness of the German anti-
money laundering regime. A case study is an in-depth investigation of a problem. This 
case study combines a positivist and an interpretive approach: It seeks to test the 
hypothesis but it also aims at building a more general theory that could be valid for 
other legal systems. This research method allows the discovery of a wide variety of 
social, cultural, and political factors related to the matter of interest that may not be 
known in advance. The field research captures a snapshot of practices, opinions and 
situations, by measuring independent and dependent variables at the same point in time 
and place; this process is conducted with the goal of testing a certain construct. With 
reference to this research, the construct is the theoretical assumption of the effectiveness 
of the offence of money laundering; the variables identified in chapter one are a 
combination of indicators at the empirical level representing a given construction. 
 
Case studies tend to be qualitative in nature, they are contextualized and nuanced 
according to the time and avenue of the empirical research; thanks to the possibility of 
                                                          
252 Corbetta highlights that the qualitative researcher is not interested in a statistically representative 
sample, but rather in substantial representativeness, which aims at covering all social situations linked to 
the area of research. Corbetta, 2003, p. 75. 
 60 
capturing a rich array of contextual data through diverse methods, the case study derives 
from a contextualised and authentic interpretation of the phenomenon.253 With specific 
reference to this research, the contextualisation, the diversification of sources and the 
critical approach are considered fundamental. On the other hand, due to the string 
contextualisation, it is difficult to generalise outcomes of other contexts. Also findings 
may be criticised for being subjective, since the interpretation of the researcher is per se 
biased. The limitation of this type of research is also that the interpretation of findings 
may depend both on ability and attitudes of the researcher. 
 
The second chapter analyses the law-making process by tracing legislative intents. The 
hypothesis is that behind the expressed intents, latent goals triggered lawmakers to 
introduce the offence of money laundering. Therefore, through the discourse analysis 
the aim is to reveal manifest functions communicated to the public and to unveil latent 
intentions that underpinned the foundation of the anti-money laundering initiative and 
its subsequent developments. The discourse-analysis is conducted through a documental 
research. Sources utilised are of primary type, such as official documents, 
recommendations and declarations of intents, UN-Resolutions and Conventions, official 
Commentaries, statements and fact-sheets, European directives and decisions, 
explanatory and evaluation reports, action plans and official records of the German 
Parliament (Drucksachen). The historical and political context has also been inferred 
through secondary sources, such as books, articles, and NGOs works. This is a pure 
desktop study, based on primary sources such as legal and parliamentarian documents, 
and secondary sources, namely legal scholarship. A research conducted on institutional 
documents has advantages and disadvantages. The Italian author Corbetta summarises 
them as, among the positive aspects, the non-responsiveness, the possibility of a 
diachronic analysis and the reduced costs thanks to the availability. Disadvantages are, 
according to the scholar, the incompleteness of the information contained and the 
official character. 254  It is however possible, to integrate and contextualise notions 
contained in the documents with other related sources. It is, on the other hand, true, that 
official documents often provide a distorted image of the reality, in accordance to the 
will of the authority that produced them. This is the technical perspective on the already 
debated issue of the manifest and latent functions. From official parliamentarian 
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documents, for example, the manifest intents are inferred, while from the political 
discussions that preceded the approval of the final draft of the law, latent goals are 
deducted. The analysis of the law-making process will be closely aligned to the 
theoretical assumptions spelt out above, and this will include looking at both the 
sociological, political and economic factors that play a role in obtaining a more 
balanced understanding of the issues at play here. 
 
The third chapter analyses the legal doctrine about challenges posed by the article 261 
of the German criminal code. The research takes into consideration the doctrinal debate 
because it is particularly vivid and controversial. Legal scholars have been involved in 
strongly criticising certain provisions, due to the difficulty of integrating them in the 
domestic legal system. The level of acceptance investigated through the documental 
research on legal scholarship aims at shedding light on the potential adequateness of the 
legal acts, while the empirical research with the practitioners is directed at verifying 
such potential in the concrete application. Since its enactment, legal scholars have 
interrogated themselves about the compatibility of the provisions with domestic legal 
fundamental principles and about potential incoherencies that could have hindered an 
effective application. The potential conflicts and issues highlighted by the doctrine are 
verified through the empirical research on the 'law in action'. The level of acceptance of 
a legal act impacts its effectiveness to the extent that it can shape its application. Also 
this variable is investigated through documental research, and specifically on legal 
commentaries and legal scholarship. 
 
The empirical research on the legal praxis aims at revealing the real effects of the law. 
The fourth chapter undertakes a qualitative interpretative analysis of quantitative 
secondary data. In particular, the chapter makes use of criminal statistics published by 
the federal police, by the ministries of justice and of the ministries of finance and by the 
federal bureau for statistics. Moreover, data is inferred through reports compiled by 
transnational bodies such as the FATF. Secondary data is data that has been previously 
collected and tabulated by other sources. Due to the external origin, this type of data 
may be not 100 % reliable, however, thanks to the qualitative approach, a critical 
perspective on the outcome of the statistics is maintained. The use of a qualitative 
technique to analyse quantitative data serves the goal of keeping a critical approach 
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towards criminal statistics on money laundering. Moreover, the joint use of qualitative 
and quantitative generates a unique insight into the complexity of social phenomena, 
which would not be available from either type of data alone. Deeper considerations on 
the collection of data are conducted in the fourth chapter. Given that the underlying 
hypothesis is that the offence of money laundering does not address the phenomenon of 
money laundering in its complexity, the official numbers are seen as being 
representative of the functioning of the criminal justice system and thus as only one of 
the factors constituting to the variable of the implementation of the law. 
 
Finally, the fifth chapter presents the outcome of the empirical qualitative research. 
Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts about the effectiveness 
of anti-money laundering law in Germany, between January 2014 and July 2015. The 
chapter aims at providing an insight on the experts and legal actors' opinions and 
perception about the law. In particular, interviews focus on respondents' perception on 
the money laundering phenomenon in Germany, on the technical appropriateness of the 
legislation, on perceived conflicts of interest related to the introduction or the 
implementation of the policy and finally on the interviewees' perceived regime's 
efficacy. Along with the interviews, official declarations of intents and opinions 
released by representing organisations and other official documents will be used in 
order to get an insight into the legal practice. The interview sampling, constructed on 
the basis of the theoretical study, was composed of privileged actors and legal actors 
and was limited geographically to the Berlin area.255 A pilot-interview was conducted 
with Meinzer from the NGO Tax Justice Network Germany, in order to acquire an 
initial view on the topic. In particular, Meinzer was one of the authors of the report 
'Schattenfinanzentrum Deutschland. Deutschlands Rolle bei globaler Geldwäsche, 
Kapitalflucht und Steuervermeidung' 256  published in November 2013 by WEED 
(Weltwirtschaft, Ökologie & Entwicklung), GPF (Global Policy Forum), Tax Justice 
Network Deutschland, and Misereor. The decision was particularly profitable because 
that report was one of the publications that in that period contributed to raising public 
awareness about the issue and because it was the first report published by the non-
governmental sector about money laundering in Germany. Also, the authors made use 
                                                          
255 Two interviews have been conducted via telephone with interviewees living out of the Berlin 
area. 
256 Available at http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/schattenfinanzzentrum_deutschland.pdf, last 
visited on 10/05/2015. 
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of personal interviews and could already give insight about which partners would have 
been more open to be contacted and which instead would have responded in a 
superficial way. The eight experts interviewed are, in chronological order, Uecker, the 
policy advisor of the German Parliament for the socialist social democratic party (SPD); 
Korte and Busch, former and current deputy director generals, heads of division 
economic, computer, corruption related and environmental crime of the Ministry of 
Justice (BMJ), Findeisen, head of section 'VII A 3 payment, transactions, money 
laundering prevention' of the Ministry of Finance (BMF), an anonymous interview 
partner of the Ministry of Interior (BMI), Schneider and Rech, civil servants from the 
division 'I 18, public security and order' of the State department of Hessen, and policy 
officer Henn of the NGO WEED (World Economy, Ecology & Development). The 
twenty-two legal actors are composed of ten attorneys, among them some defence 
attorneys and some lawyers specialised in commercial law and compliance, six police 
officers, two public accountants and four public prosecutors. Those who accepted to be 
named are, among the legal actors, attorneys Lubitz, Gutman, and Diergarten, the 
representatives of the Chamber of public accountants Reiher and Goltz, the prosecutor 
Hagemann, Finger the former head of department three on organised crime of the 
Berlin criminal Police, and Pietsch and Kunitsch the Berlin State criminal Police chief 
superintendents. All interviews besides one were conducted face-to-face, either where 
the respondent was working or in the interviewer’s university room; since respondents 
were mother tongue Germans, interviews were conducted in German, in order to 
facilitate respondents and to allow spontaneity. The objective of a qualitative interview 
is indeed to provide a frame within which the respondents can express their own way of 
thinking in their own words.257 If allowed, interviews were recorded in order to keep 
records. When requested the list of questions was provided to the respondents before the 
interview. This was only the case only three times. During initial conversations, the 
nature and purpose of the project, how the collected data would be used, the people 
involved and desired interviewees, were communicated to the respondent. However, 
during the interview, respondents were left free to express their own opinions, without 
being influenced by the perspective of the interviewer. Also, if required, anonymity was 
assured. Yet, despite suggested in methodology manuals,258 respondents were not left 
completely free to talk. The role of the interviewer was, in the opposite, an active one. 
                                                          
257 Corbetta, 2003, p. 72. 
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This tactic was adopted because of the specificity of the sample and of the object of the 
research. The risk dealing with political people and with public servants, the risk was 
that, in order to avoid 'hot potatoes', they would talk without interruption about a more 
desired topic. Since the goal was, instead, to stimulate conversation and specifically on 
problematic issues and bothersome questions, respondents were often interrupted or 
urged not to divert from the discussion. Even when interviews were recorded, notes 
were taken to capture important comments or critical observations, behavioural 
responses (e.g., respondent’s body language), and the researcher’s personal impressions 
about the respondent and his or her comments. Once interviews have been transcribed, 
the texts were sent electronically to the respondents for their authorisation. Contact with 
respondents was gained thanks to contacts provided by an anti-Mafia civil society 
association ('Mafia? Nein Danke! e V.'), and through the intermediation of professor 
Heinrich. Other respondents also provided some contacts. While some of the issues 
dealt with in the last chapter were expressively asked to respondents, such as the impact 
of money laundering on German economy and society, others were inferred from the 
arguments. Also, interviewees raised topics that were not part of the questions' list, such 
as the role of media in social perception on money laundering and countermeasures; 
relevant issues are included in the final analysis. Despite being time-consuming and at 
risk of bias, the choice of using personal interviews was informed by the several 
advantages: he opportunity to clarify any issues raised by the respondent, the possibility 
of asking probing or follow-up questions, the improvement of response rates through 
persuasion, the inferring of information thanks to body language, to pauses, to the voice, 
and to dynamics between respondents.259 Given that the goal of the empirical research 
was understanding the opinions, the perceptions, the interpretations and the motives of 
the actions of legal actors, the interview was considered the best tool in order to access 
the respondents’ perspective on the issue, in order to get as closer as possible to their 
way of thinking. The sample was created by selecting a subset of the whole population, 
by choosing a sampling frame. The sampling design chosen was the so-called 'expert 
sampling'. Respondents were chosen in a non-random manner based on their expertise 
in the phenomenon being studied. The advantage of this approach is that experts tend to 
be more familiar with the subject matter than non-experts, thus opinions from a sample 
of experts are more credible. Yet, findings are still not generalizable to the overall 
                                                          
259 Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 78. 
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population at large. Interviews were semi-structured: A track of question was set, but 
the order in which topics were addressed and the way of formulating questions was left 
free. A protocol was set on the basis of the study conducted on legal scholarship, the 
law-making process and the quantitative data collection. Some questions were set for all 
interviews, while others were designed corresponding to the group of experts. This 
semi-structured technique grants great freedom to the interviewer, who can also 
introduce new questions arose in the course of the interview, but at the same time it 







 2 CHAPTER 





'It is vital to place the debate in its historical context  
if we are to understand how we got to the present ludicrous state of affairs!' 







 2.1  Foreword 
This chapter introduces the case study on the effectiveness of the money laundering 
offence by describing the genesis of the offence and the following developments. 
Given that the offence was introduced in the German Penal Code in fulfilment of 
international duties, the chapter traces firstly the international law-making process. 
The chapter specifically sheds light on which motives triggered the introduction of 
the offence as a transnational crime. 260  The money laundering offence has been 
amended often with the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against 
money laundering. In particular, given that money laundering is a derivative crime, 
the scope of the offence has been expanded mainly by adding ever-new emergencies 
                                                          
260The offence is not considered as one of the core crimes under international criminal law, which are 
listed in the statute of the international criminal courts. Yet, it is regarded as a serious crime (or list 
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African Union under the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Rights. See 
article 28 A (1) 9 (International jurisdiction of the court) of the 'Draft Protocol on amendments to the 
protocol on the statute of the African court of justice and human rights' available at 







in the list of the designated predicate offences. Among European Member States, 
mostly the European directives have further triggered the development of anti-money 
laundering laws. Therefore, the chapter focuses on the European legal framework, 
and on the motives that drove European policymakers to adopt the current 
legislations. Secondly, it analyses the German legislative process and the specific 
national legislature’s motivations for the criminalisation of money laundering and for 
the widening of the reach of the offence. The emphasis will be on the ever-new 
functions attributed by lawmakers, both at international and national level, to the 
anti-money laundering regime, in order to reveal eventual latent or symbolic 
functions. The chapter takes an historical perspective that traces the law-making 
process from its dawn to the current days. Yet, the aim is not purely descriptive, but 
rather critical as well. In fact, the goal is investigating whether intents other than 
those officially manifested have driven the creation and the consequent development 
of the legal framework. The chapter makes use of legislatures’ official declarations of 
intent, travaux préparatoires, opinions and contributions of non-legislative actors to 
the decision-making process, transcriptions of parliamentarian debates, and 
secondary sources that allow to placing the analysis in its political context.  
 
Although nowadays it is not uncommon to view money laundering, either in terms of 
a crime typically linked to organised crime, or with reference to procedures 
connected to banking services, forty years ago it was not criminalised. Prior to 1988 
some national legislatures criminalised under their penal codes the conduct of 
laundering the proceeds of crime in order to disguise their criminal nature and to 
integrate them in the legitimate economy before. However, the genesis of the offence 
of money laundering in international arena is considered to have occurred in 1988 
with adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention of 1988).261 If the UN treaty 
marks the creation of anti-money laundering criminal law at transnational level, the 
Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) 'Forty Recommendations' that were issued 
                                                          
261  The money laundering offence, in the three-fold definition that has remained in force so far, was 
conceived in the Vienna Convention of 1988 under Article 3 (1) b i and ii and c. Although this instrument 
does not use the term 'money laundering', the conducts described have been defined as money laundering 






shortly thereafter in 1990, introduced the prudential approach to combating money 
laundering by emphasising the role of financial institutions in the prevention of 
money laundering.262 These two aspects, the repressive and the preventive one, still 
characterise the current anti-money laundering policy. In order to understand the 
continuous expansion of the reach of the money laundering offence, the chapter 
refers to the parallel development of the preventive regime. 
  
 2.2  Tracing the international law-making process 
From the very beginning, the money laundering offence was drafted broadly to allow 
for it to be interpreted in such a way as to satisfy the various wills and interests of the 
actors that took part in the law-making process. Very different, indeed, were the 
motives that triggered the respective legislatures to introduce the offence of money 
laundering. For example, Italy criminalised money laundering in 1978 to tackle 
armed robbery and crimes cognate to organised crime, such as extortion and 
kidnapping for the purposes of extortion. 263  The UK was concerned with Irish 
terrorism; yet, influenced by the US, it developed initially money laundering control 
as part of an anti-drug trafficking policy264. The Australian government sought to 
tackle tax evasion when it established anti-money laundering law. In particular, the 
money laundering offence was introduced in Australia by the Proceeds of Crime Act 
(POCA) of 1987 that aimed at preventing individuals hiding assets that might be 
subject to confiscation. 265  Likewise, in the US money, laundering control was 
introduced initially to combat tax evasion through the use of international banks: The 
US 'Bank Secrecy Act' of 1970 aimed primarily at preventing the use of foreign 
banks to launder criminal proceeds or to conceal money from American fiscal 
authorities. 266  Thus, the focus of the US legislature was 'black money' (monies 
                                                          
262  See the FATF 'Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering' (1990). 
263 Italian law d.l. 591/1978, which, under Article 3, introduced Article 648 bis of the Italian 
criminal code; despite the conduct was not labelled as money laundering, the law criminalised acts of 
laundering proceeds of crime. 
264 Levi & Reuter, 2006, p. (289) 305. 
265 FATF, MER Australia, 2005, p. 27.  
266 The law 'Financial Record-keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act' -
known as Bank Secrecy Act- set regulations requiring various reports and record-keeping of financial 






deriving from tax evasion) and not 'dirty money' (monies deriving from other serious 
crimes, such as crimes linked to organised crime).267 Yet, the first 'Money Laundering 
Control Act' passed in 1986 was part of the 'Anti-Drug Abuse Act'. 268  France's 
President Mitterand exposed the expectation of putting an end to the abuse of 
offshore jurisdictions for the purpose of evading taxes, while taking part in the 
negotiations for the FATF Recommendations.269 Oppositely, Switzerland, given that 
money deriving from tax evasion was not perceived as harmful as money deriving 
from other serious crimes such as drug trafficking. Put differently, it was not 
interested in adding tax-related crimes to the anti-money laundering regime. As a 
jurisdiction profiting from financial in-flows, the state was interested in cleaning its 
reputation as offshore centre laundering profits of organised criminal activities, while 
maintaining its financial services.270 Indeed, the country accepted to join the FATF 
decision-making process with the condition that tax offences were not listed as 
predicate offences for money laundering.271  
 
What initially triggered the European legislature to adopt anti-money laundering 
measures was the need to respond to extremist terrorism in Europe. In particular, it 
was an attempt to counter the threat of the Rote Armee Fraktion and the Brigate 
Rosse, in Germany and Italy, respectively.272 In the beginning of the eighties of the 
last century, the Council of Europe started looking with suspicion at illicit transfers of 
funds with a criminal origin that were used frequently by terrorist and political 
extremist groups to perpetrate further crimes. As a consequence of 'public anxiety' 
about 'acts of criminal violence, such as hold-ups and kidnappings', the Committee of 
Ministers of the European Community adopted in 1980 Recommendation 10 to 
'define an overall policy' to tackle the serious problems generated by the laundering 
of funds of criminal origin. Aiming at preventing the spread of further criminal acts 
by terrorist organisations that injected illicit funds into the economic system, the 
Committee called upon banks to participate in a common effort with law enforcement 
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agencies to prevent and to repress such acts.273 However, Member States, that were 
probably not yet ready to endorse such rules in their respective national legal orders, 
did not implement the Recommendation.274  
 
The private sector took initiative to combat the laundering of proceeds of crime too, 
the motives being, once again, different. Swiss banks, after having been involved in 
'dubious practices', as for example the Chiasso banking scandal of 1977, worried 
about public confidence in the banking system. With the purpose of providing an 
image of integrity to their clients, banks got involved in the prevention of money 
laundering. In addition, banks decided to adopt internal regulations in order to avoid 
the imposition of external regulations that could have been stricter and more 
demanding. The Swiss Bankers Association adopted in 1977 a code of conduct that 
contained rules on internal risk management which were going to become the core 
principles of preventive anti-money laundering law. 275  Furthermore, ten leading 
banking supervisors founded in 1974 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), which adopted in 1988 a text where for the first time 'bank supervisors 
agreed internationally, in such prominent way' 276  that 'Banks and other financial 
institutions may be unwittingly used as intermediaries for the transfer or deposit of 
funds derived from criminal activity'.277 Also, they referred to the use of the financial 
system to make payments and transfers of funds to hide the source and beneficial 
ownership of money as 'money laundering'. As the previous Recommendation of the 
Council of Europe already stressed, also the Basel Committee’s Statement of 
Principles of 1988 recognised the significant role of the preventive strategy in the 
field of anti-money laundering and encouraged banks to ensure that the banking 
sector would not be 'associated with criminals or being used as a channel for money-
laundering'.278 In this context, according to the Statement of Principles, the primary 
function is 'to maintain the overall financial stability and soundness of banks rather 
                                                          
273 CoE Committee of Ministers 'Recommendation No. R (80) 10' (1980). 
274 Nilsson, 1991, p. (419) 423. 
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than to ensure that individual transactions conducted by bank customers are 
legitimate. Nevertheless, […] supervisors cannot be indifferent to the use made of 
banks by criminals'. 279  Thus, while adopting anti-money laundering declarations, 
banks committed primarily to the protection of the financial and the banking sector.  
 
 2.2.1 The genesis of the money laundering offence in the Vienna Convention 
Given the different and contrasting expectations, the consensus had to be found on a 
topic on which all parties could agree upon.280 In this context, the need to wage the 
'war on drugs' accommodated all parties, under a strong influence of the US.281 The 
'war on drugs' held more success than the EU’s commitment to combat terrorism and 
political extremism or the desire to curb tax evasion. The Vienna Convention 
emphasised the universal agreement on the necessity of tackling the cancers of drug 
trafficking and drug consumption. According to the Commentary on the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (hereafter the Commentary on the Vienna Convention), there was already 
a worldwide consensus on the threats posed by the magnitude of the drug problem 
since  the beginning of the twentieth century. 282  This was testified by several 
international initiatives that were being taken to control the use of drugs, and various 
multilateral conventions were adopted with regard to the regulation of drugs, as for 
instance the 'Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs' of 1961, and the Protocol 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances' of 1971.283 The UN was even demanded to declare drug 
                                                          
279 BCBS (1988), 'Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money-
laundering', 6. 
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laundering policy-making process. Yet, the expansion of the anti-money laundering system will be 
justified afterwards with regard to the harm caused by money laundering to developing economies, see 
Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 446 ss. 
281 For a complete overview on the war on drugs, see Duke and Gross, 1993. 
282 Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic 
Substances, 1998. 
283 The main purpose of the first two treaties was to codify internationally applicable control 
measures in order to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and 
scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. The Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 established an international control system for psychotropic substances. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=t






trafficking a crime against humanity.284 This proposal, despite having been included 
in the preliminary elaboration of the draft, was not attached in the final version, 
because of strong governmental opposition from many countries. In the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War, in the wake of the US’s interest in tackling the 'drug problem', also 
the fifteenth Conference of the European Ministers of Justice of 1986 'discussed the 
need to combat drug abuse (…), for example, by freezing and confiscating the 
proceeds from drug trafficking'.285 A consensus was, thus, found also at European 
level on the topic of drug trafficking. In 1984, the UN General Assembly demanded 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to initiate the preparation of 
a draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.286 Based on the comments 
made by Governments on the text drafted by the Secretary-General, and on the 
deliberations of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on that draft, in 1987, the 
Secretary-General prepared a consolidated working document. The Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs reviewed the text in Vienna in 1988. In the same year, the Economic 
and Social Council convened a conference of plenipotentiaries for the adoption of a 
convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.287 At 
the UN Conference that preceded the Convention, the legitimation for resorting to 
criminal law was based on of the extreme danger that illicit trafficking and 
consumption of narcotics posed to national security and public health. The 
Convention was adopted in the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
held at Vienna from 25 November to 20 December 1988. The treaty was signed on 19 
December 1988 and entered into force on 11 November 1990. The 'Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances' (Vienna 
Convention) set the basis for the criminalisation of money laundering within the 
context of the fight against drug trafficking.  
 
Given the declared consensus expressed for the UN treaty by the signatories parties 
                                                          
284 See UN Resolution A/RES/40/121 that recalled the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs of ll August 1984 and the New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of 
Drugs of l October 1984 in which drug traffic was considered a crime against humanity.  
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on the necessity of stopping drug-related criminality, the criminalisation of money 
laundering acquired the appearance of an instrument universally recognised as useful 
to wage the 'war on drugs'. Yet, the urgency of tackling drugs was more of concern of 
the US, which indeed introduced the 'Money Laundering Control Act' explicitly as 
part of the federal 'war on drugs', 288  and regarded it since then as a significant 
component of the US fight against drug trafficking and drug consumption.289  The 
drafters of the Commentary of 1998 stated that the Convention’s definition of money 
laundering owed much to the then US formulation of the offence; however, the 
provisions have been formulated in such a way to be acceptable to and compatible 
with the largest number of legal systems.290 Indeed, the offence was designed broadly 
to allow different interpretations that would have accommodated the various parties.  
 
The definition provided in the UN treaty under Article 3 (1) b and c has been 
nevertheless accepted globally. In particular, the offence was designed in a three-
folds definition, which criminalised different conducts: 'i) The conversion or transfer 
of property, knowing that such property is derived from any offence or offences 
established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of 
participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions; ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that 
such property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence or 
offences'. 291  Subparagraph (c) requires states to criminalise, 'subject to its 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system: i) The acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, ii) That such property 
was derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph 
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290  Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic 
Substances, 1998, p. 10. 






a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or offences'. 292 
Accordingly the criminalised conducts are the following: (a) Conversion or transfer 
of property for the purposes of disguising the illicit origin of it. (b) Knowingly 
assisting in disguising the source of proceeds of crime. This means persons ranging 
from family members to friends who allow criminal proceeds to be laundered 
through the opening of bank accounts or the purchasing of immovable property in 
their names, to gatekeepers such as accountants, lawyers and financial advisers who 
are aware of the actual source of their client’s income. (c) A further conduct included 
is the concealment of the true nature, source, location, disposition or ownership of or 
rights with respect to property with knowledge that the property is the proceeds of 
crime. This would cover situations where, for instance, anonymous shell companies 
are founded with the ultimate goal of hiding the true ownership of the sums of money 
invested in such company. The elements of the crime determining the actus reus are: 
The commission of a predicate offence and the presence of the proceeds of crime. 
The mens rea required is the intent to conceal the proceeds and the knowledge of 
unlawfulness of the illegitimate origin. In the UN Conventions, the law requires that 
predicate offences must be established, but there is no requirement of a previous 
conviction. Thus, according to the wording of the UN treaty, the commission of the 
antecedent crime does not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
The UN treaty shaped the money laundering offence as a derivative crime, whose 
existence is linked to a predicate offence. Having built the provision on the fact that 
the handled objects derive from another offence, the wording of Article 3, paragraph 
1, and subparagraph (b) and (c) has allowed lawmakers to fill the definition of the 
offence by taking into account continuingly unfurling emergencies. In particular, the 
expansion of the scope of the money laundering offence can be triggered in different 
ways, through an automatic process, in cases in which national legislatures adopt an 
'all-crimes approach', every time a new offence is introduced in the penal code, this 
will automatically belong to the catalogue of the predicate offences; or through a 
specific process, in cases in which national legislatures set a limited catalogue of 
predicate offences, the introduction of new offences needs to be provided explicitly 
                                                          






by new provisions that modify the money laundering offence. Finally, given that 
predicate offences can be committed abroad, there can be an indirect expansion as a 
consequence of the criminalisation of new conducts in foreign jurisdictions. The 
result has been that anti-money laundering laws have assumed, for example, the 
additional functions of combating non-drug related organised crime, the financing of 
terrorism, the funding of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tax 
evasion, and other types of conduct arising out of the recent financial crisis, as it will 
be showed in the next paragraphs. 
 
While allowing different interpretations, a certain degree of harmonisation among 
national jurisdictions ought to have served the cooperation between Member States. 
Given the transnational dimension of the phenomenon of money laundering, the 
Convention aimed at providing a common minimum standard for the implementation 
of the criminalisation of money laundering. One of the purposes of the Convention, 
set in Article two, was in fact to address more effectively the international illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through the promotion of 
cooperation among states. The then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated: 'If 
crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement'. 293  Hence, improving the 
effectiveness of domestic criminal justice systems in relation to drug trafficking was 
considered a precondition for such enhanced international cooperation.294  
 
 2.2.2 The money laundering offence: A tool to tackle organised crime 
How did lawmakers legitimise the introduction of this new offence in relation to the 
fight against the trade of psychotropic substances? The criminalisation of money 
laundering was legitimised to defeat drug abuse and drug trafficking by depriving 
drug traffickers of their ill-gotten gains in order to eliminate the incentive for 
engaging in these crimes.295 The fifth and sixth paragraphs of the Preamble of the 
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Vienna Convention stressed the greatness and the danger of the economic profit 
deriving from drug trafficking and highlighted the necessity to eliminate the incentive 
for criminal activities, by depriving criminals of such illicit gains. These paragraphs 
should be read, according to the Commentary, as the introduction to Article three, as 
it relates to the offence of money laundering.296 Given the huge amount of drug sale 
in the late 1980s, which was estimated to be around US Dollars 124 billion,297 the 
solution identified in the Preamble of the UN treaty for the drug issue was to 
eliminate 'the root causes of the drug abuse problem, namely the enormous profits 
derived from illicit traffic'. One of the principal elements of an effective strategy to 
combat drug trafficking was considered undermining organised crime's financial 
power, by providing law enforcement agencies with the necessary tools.298 In this 
context, the offence of money laundering emerged as one of those necessary tools. 
The money laundering offence was, thus, introduced in the UN treaty as a tool to 
effectively counteract drug trafficking by making it less attractive, due to the risk of 
confiscation of criminal proceeds. In this way, the forfeiture of criminal assets, 
besides its repressive function, acquired the purpose of criminal deterrence. In 
particular, the introduction of a duty to confiscate and to cooperate internationally to 
implement forfeiture orders was justified as the only way to deprive offenders of their 
ill-gotten gains, given the fact that money laundering was a victimless crime, 
especially in those situations where confiscation might otherwise not be possible.299 
Thus the underlying motivation was providing law enforcement with the necessary 
tools to undermine the financial power of criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking. 
Given that the imprisonment of even top-ranking criminals was not effective, because 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Vienna Convention, many threats were recognised being linked with illegal drug traffic besides the 
health and well-being of individuals, such as the spreading of corruption, criminal conspiracy and the 
subversion of public order, threats for sovereignty and security, disruption of the economy and the society. 
Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic Substances, 
1998, p. 2. In addition to social and health concerns, the Preamble highlighted the 'links between illicit 
traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and 
threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States', see the Preamble of the Vienna Convention. 
296 Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic 
Substances, 1998, p. 18. 
297 International Monetary Fund Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering- 
Background Paper (2001), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.htm, last 
accessed on 16/10/2012. 
298 Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic 
Substances, 1998, p. 65.  






while public sectors devote more criminal justice system resources to incarcerating 
increasing numbers of organised crime members, criminals would expand their rings 
of violence and of corruption to higher levels of the public sectors in order to protect 
themselves from punishment. Therefore the focus was switched, rightly so, to 
attacking organised crime's economic power through the confiscation of assets. 
Indeed, it was observed that even when 'oligarchs of crime' were serving 
imprisonment, they could continue to manage the criminal networks and to profit 
from their crimes.300 Specifically in the context of the 'war on drugs,' the prosecution 
of dealers and consumers did not yield much success. It was, therefore, decided to 
tackle organised crime's economic power.301 This strategy, which was initially related 
to the proceeds of drug trafficking, has been afterwards adapted to tackle any other 
type of organised criminal activity; in fact, it was considered also advantageous in 
terms of source of funding for law enforcement activity.302 
 
Moreover, resorting to the criminalisation of money laundering and to the adoption of 
such an invasive sanction, as the confiscation, was justified based on the 'follow the 
money' strategy.303 Criminals, while enjoying the proceeds of crime, by purchasing 
                                                          
300 Bosworth-Davies, 2006, p. (346) 350. 
301 In support of this philosophy, a study conducted between 2000 and 2007 on 107 countries about 
the most effective policies to counteract organised crime, showed that criminal groups react to higher 
expected punishments by re-assigning resources to expanding the scope and scale of violence and of 
corruption to higher levels of the public sectors in order to protect themselves from prosecution. As a 
result, when the expected punishment increases, but financial assets remain relatively untouched, there is 
a parallel paradoxical grow of organised crime too. 'This constitutes the paradox of criminal sanctions 
where more frequent and stiffer punishments applied to physical persons lead to higher levels of 
organized crime and to higher levels of corruption'. See Buscaglia, 2008, pp. (1)  2, 11. 
302 Nadelmann, 1986, pp. (27) 33, 34. 
303 Stessens, 2000, p. 86. The 'follow the money' strategy and the rationale linked to the confiscation 
of criminal assets that justified anti-money laundering law as a tool to fight organised crime have been 
criticised. First of all, following the money might not always bring investigators to the criminals, since 
cash that is further invested in criminal markets is not subject to anti-money laundering checks, because it 
remains out of the reach of anti-money laundering control. In addition, the confiscation of assets, due to 
its strong potential, should not only be attached to money laundering cases. In fact Alldridge argues that 
once there is enough evidence to prove the serious predicate offence, states could attach a duty to proceed 
with assets forfeiture to the main offence, without needing the money laundering conviction. Alldridge, 
2008, p. (437) 450. Yet, confiscation of assets is according to Italian scholars and practitioners, together 
with the subsequent assignment of such assets to the State which then devotes them to social purposes has 
a particularly symbolic effect in territories where organised criminal groups exercise territorial control. 
Such system gives credibility to the State that can re-establish public power over private illegal control. A 
good-practice example, is the work of the Italian association Libera Terra, which manage several 
confiscated lands and farms and produce organic products in a sustainable and socially responsible way. 






items, services and properties, enter in contact with the legitimate economy. This, 
which has been called the 'integration phase' of the money laundering process, has 
been considered the weakest part of the whole process of money laundering, namely 
'organised crime’s Achilles’ heel'. Since most high-level criminals usually stay aloof 
from the commission of crimes, while enjoying the financial profits, the offence of 
money laundering could serve the purpose of gathering evidence against top-ranking 
criminals by tracking the movement of money. By following the 'paper trail', law 
enforcement agencies should be able to trace the illicit money and thus find the 
criminal network acting behind the 'small soldiers' engaged in the frontline of illicit 
activities. Thus, the criminalisation of money laundering as set in the Vienna 
Convention, by allowing the confiscation of the proceeds of crime under Article 5 (1) 
a should have served the purposes of attacking criminal organisations economic 
power, and of facilitating investigations in criminal networks thanks to possibility of 
following the paper-trail. 
 
 2.2.3 Expanding the reach of the money laundering offence  
On the assumption that the polluting capacity of money laundering derived not only 
from the proceeds of drug trafficking, but also from other crimes, international and 
national legislatures by endorsing the UN treaty, amplified the reach of the money 
laundering offence. Since, as shown before, the 'war on drugs' was a priority mainly 
of the US, other legislatures took advantage of the flexibility of the money laundering 
offence definition contained in the Vienna Convention, and expanded its scope to 
include proceeds of crimes other than drug-related offences. The focus was then on 
the risks posed by the laundering of proceeds of any crime in terms of adverse effect 
                                                                                                                                                                          
being seized have a high risk to go bankrupt and thus cause unemployment. Such firms, indeed, could 
compete on the market thanks to the illicit managing and the illicit funding. Furthermore, financial 
institutions, customers and commissioners may not want to prolong their relations with the new managed 
company, which therefore is economically isolated in an often already socially adverse context. Solutions 
are being currently discussed in relation to the possibility of placing side by side the judicial administrator 
to the entrepreneur already during the seizure phase; allocating part of the confiscated sums to the 
reintegration in the market of such firms; training judicial administrators with entrepreneurship skills. The 
European Economic and Social Committee awarded the association with a prize for civil society in 2009, 
see http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.organised-civil-society-prize-2009, last accessed on 
16/10/2012. The Eu Directive 2014/42/EU 'on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and 
proceeds of crime in the European Union' introduced the social reuse of confiscated property under article 






for the legitimate economy. Lawmakers justified the need to 'spreading the gospel'304 
with the argument that this step was necessary to protect the lawful economy from 
being infiltrated by capital of criminal provenance. The ultimate goal, so the 
argument went, was to prevent the financial system from being destabilised. 
Moreover, the anti-money laundering discourse pointed the fact that the laundering of 
proceeds of any crime was causing harm to society since it fostered the commission 
of further crimes. None of these arguments were based on any legal grounds. The 
expansion of the scope of the money laundering offence was, thus, based on two 
premises: First, the idea that money laundering was a very serious crime and; second 
that a concerted action was needed to reduce its incidence or at least to make it more 
complex and expensive.305 The Council of Europe, for example, two years after the 
Vienna Convention adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention), which did not 
limit the scope of the money laundering offence to drug-related proceeds of crime. 
The Convention was aiming at pursuing a common policy directed at the protection 
of society from any serious crime.306 Having noted that Member States had very 
different and often inadequate national legal systems to counteract organised crime, 
the drafters of the Strasbourg Convention sought to lay down the minimum standards 
for facilitating international cooperation as regards investigative assistance, search, 
seizure and confiscation-measures, which were considered essential for the 
suppression of money laundering. According to Commentary on the Vienna 
Convention the trend of extending the scope of the money laundering offence, by 
way of expanding the list of predicate offences, was promoted by the Council of 
Europe with the Convention of 1990 and by the FATF and by some national legal 
systems.307  The underlying motive for such a development was identified in the 
difficulty encountered by law enforcement in 'proving that particular proceeds are 
                                                          
304 The expression is used by Pieth. Pieth, 2004, p. 12. 
305 Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 439. 
306 See the Preamble of the CoE 'Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime' (1990). 
307 The idea of expanding the definition of money laundering beyond its traditional link with 
proceeds of drug-related criminality was not a complete novelty. In fact other national legislations did not 
link the offence of money laundering to drug- trafficking, as the case of article 305 of the Swiss penal 
code enacted in 1990, which considers any crime as a possible predicate crime for money laundering. 






attributable to drug trafficking activities especially when the persons in question are 
involved in a broad range of criminal activities'.308  
 
Concurrently with the adoption of criminal instruments to counteract the 
phenomenon of money laundering, the necessity of a preventive regime emerged in 
the debate of the G7 and other industrialised countries. This led to the creation of the 
Financial Action Task Force in 1989. FATF is a body that had the goal to set 
international standards to promote the Vienna Convention.309 In 1990, the task force 
issued Forty Recommendations, which went beyond the scope of the UN treaty, by  
leaving up each country  to decide whether to extend the offence of money 
laundering to proceeds generated by any serious offence or not.310 The standards are 
the 'result of a patchwork of elements thrown together in complex negotiations by 
various contributing parties'.311 Due to the fact that those negotiations took place 
behind closed doors, the exact circumstances that brought to the approval of such 
Recommendations remain unclear.312 Since its creation, the FATF had a multifaceted 
nature: On one hand, the US Republican President Reagan fighting his war on drugs, 
on the other hand, the French Socialist President Mitterrand wanting to appear tough 
on economic crime and tax havens. 313  The FATF Recommendations have been 
particularly relevant in the evolution of the international anti-money laundering 
regime, because they introduced the preventive approach and they managed to trigger 
                                                          
308 Commentary on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic 
Substances, 1998.  
309 The FATF is an 'inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the 
global financial system against money laundering [...]'. Currently the FATF consists of 36 member 
countries, eight associate members, the so-called FATF-Styled Regional Bodies, and 26 observers. The 
FATF is housed within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in Paris. 
The group had in the beginning an 'ad hoc' mandate that has been extended to the point that the FATF is 
currently a permanent body with a much broader competence.  
310 The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1990). 
The FATF standards are a broad framework for preventing and combating money laundering. These 
standards lay down the criteria for criminalising particular types of conduct as conduct falling within the 
meaning of money laundering. In addition, they provide a framework that governments can implement to 
recover the proceeds of money laundering offences (assets recovery), and they set out how countries can 
go about preventing the misuse of financial institutions and non-financial designated businesses and 
professions (e.g. law firms) for money laundering purposes. The standards are made up of the 
Recommendations themselves as well as the Interpretive Notes to each Recommendation and the 
applicable definitions in the Glossary. 
311 Pieth, 2004, p. 9. 
312 Pieth, 2004, p. 8. 






compliance at almost global level.314 The FATF’s declared goal was the protection of 
the soundness of the global financial system from the infiltration of proceeds of 
crime or other illicit financial flows (e.g. terrorists’ funds) in the legitimate 
economy.315 In order to stop ill-gotten gains before entering in the licit system, the 
Recommendations required the commitment of the private sector. In particular, 
financial institutions and other businesses and professions at risk of being abused by 
launderers, should undertake specific due diligence in order to detect money 
laundering activities. The FATF standards imposed a set of duties, such as the 
identification of customers’ identity, the collection of information, the reporting of 
suspicious transactions, which were supposed to, on one the one hand, prevent the 
penetration of dirty money, on the other support law enforcement with access to 
information to use in money laundering investigations. 
 
A common tactic to enlarge anti-money laundering law has been to identify 'soft 
targets', that is conducts to the criminalisation of which few would object, and then 
expand the reach of the offence. The catalogue of predicate offences for money 
laundering was expanded, so that the money laundering offence became detached 
from its original declared function of combating drug traffickers. This expansion 
resulted in a corresponding expansion of acts criminalised by national laws. If this 
development has been welcomed positively because of the refusal of many countries 
to pursue the 'war on drugs', it has also raised questions relating to the adequacy of 
the measure to tackle the new phenomena. In fact, often the grounds given to 
                                                          
314 The Recommendations are a source of soft law, which means that governments are not legally 
bounded to implement these measures. Yet, given the fact that soft law can be very influential, to the 
point that it can be very forceful, just like hard law, the FATF wields tremendous political binding power. 
The implementation of the Recommendations is, in fact, rigorously assessed through Mutual Evaluation 
processes, and through the assessments conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB). In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that, when assessing compliance with 
FATF standards,' the word should has the same meaning as must'. The FATF’s persuasiveness stems from 
the fact that it has the enormous ability to influence whether or not a country can be seen as a viable 
business partner or an investment destination. The FATF, thanks to its informal structure and procedures 
and to its flexible mandate, manages to impose compliance with the ever-updated standards in an easier 
way that a UN treaty-based organisation, bound to formal decision-making procedures and to a legal 
mandate, could do. 
315 FATF, The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering, 
1990, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.pdf, last 






legitimise such developments did not satisfy many scholars.316 The then European 
Economic Community (EEC) committed itself to the international fight against drugs 
and money laundering by concluding? The Vienna Convention, despite lacking 
competence in criminal matters.317 The EEC justified such initiative on the basis of 
its competence in commercial policy.318 Subsequently the EU legislature incorporated 
anti-money laundering law as part of an economic preventive policy through the 
adoption of four Directives finalised at the protection of the financial system. The 
first three EU Directives in the field of money-laundering have been, indeed, 
generated within the Directorate General 'Internal Market and Financial Services'.319 
In 1991, in order to synchronise the EU’s anti-money laundering policy with the 
FATF’s Forty Recommendations, the European Legislature adopted the first Anti-
Money Laundering Directive.320 Since the Community did not have an expressive 
competence in criminal law, 321  the European legislature's approach was a rather 
preventive, more than repressive one. Article 2, which requires Member States to 
prohibit money laundering was, in fact, initially rejected by the German parliament, 
due to the lack of competence in criminal matters of the ECC. 322  The wording 
'prohibition' was used to avoid requiring an explicit criminalisation of such conducts 
since that would plainly fall outside the ECC’s competence. However, the imposition 
of such criminalisation was included in a statement annexed by the end of 1992.323 
Although the legislature acknowledged in the preamble that money laundering 'must 
be combated mainly by penal means and within the framework of international 
cooperation', 324  and highlighted the link between organised crime and drug 
trafficking, the Directive, as a matter of fact, focussed on the preventive strategy. In 
                                                          
316 See, among others, Artz et al., 2015, § 29, mn. 8; Dyonnisopoulou, 1999, pp. 118 ss; Mitsilegas, 
2003, p. 14 ss; Moccia, 1995, p. (728) 730ss. 
317 For a complete debate about the issue, see Mitsilegas, 2003, pp. 62 ss; 2014, pp 155 ss. 
318 Council Decision of 22 October 1990 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the EEC, of the 
UN Vienna Convention (1990) OJ L326/56. 
319 In particular the first three Directives (91/308/EEC; 2001/97/EC; 2005/60/EC) are categorised 
under the following subjects: Internal Market; free movement of capital and approximation of laws and 
are put under the Directories Taxation and Prevention of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (09.50.00.00), 
and the Directory Economic and monetary policy and free movement of capital (10.40.00.00).  
320 Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
321 For a complete debate about the issue, see Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 62 ss; 2014, p. 155 ss. 
322 BR-Drucks. 288/1/90, p. 2.  
323 Mitsilegas, 2014, p. 155. 






order to legitimise such approach, the drafters resorted in the preamble to the 
'emotionally charged concept of public trust',325  underlying that 'when credit and 
financial institutions are used to launder proceeds from criminal activities [...], the 
soundness and stability of the institution concerned and confidence in the financial 
system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised'.326 In this way money laundering 
was described as a threat to individuals, institutions and to the whole financial system. 
The European Community declared its particular concern about money launderers 
taking special advantage of the freedom of capital movement and of the freedom of 
supplying financial services in the single market.327 This justified the necessity of 
providing a preventive policy, besides the repressive one set out in the Strasbourg 
Convention, aimed at requesting the participation of private actors in defence of the 
free market. It was, indeed, signalled 'preventing the financial system from being 
used for money laundering is a task which cannot be carried out by the authorities 
responsible for combating this phenomenon without the cooperation of credit and 
financial institutions and their supervisory authorities'.328 For the first time, through 
the adoption of such Directive, the intention of protecting the cleanliness and 
integrity of the financial system, 'in the light of moves towards the creation of a 
single financial market'329 was coupled, at least in the declared legislative intents, 
with the goals of penal deterrence.330   
 
 2.2.4 The EU's motivation for criminalising money laundering 
By looking at text of the first Directive, it can be observed that the common criminal 
policy was introduced by the EC, despite the lack of competence in criminal matters, 
in order to prevent that 'Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial 
systems, [...] adopt measures which could be inconsistent with completion of the 
single market'. Thus the community was particularly afraid that 'launderers could try 
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326 Preamble, Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
327 Preamble, Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
328 Council Directive 91/308/EEC. Also the wording of the title stressed the need to protect the 
integrity of the financial system: 'Council Directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering'. 
329 Gilmore, 1992, p. xvi. 






to take advantage of the freedom of capital movement'. It was also afraid that 
Member States would have adopted restrictive measures to impede the entrance of 
illicit financial flows, which would have hampered the creation of the internal free 
market in which the free movement of capitals should have been guaranteed. Like the 
Strasbourg Convention, the Directive, despite taking the definition of money 
laundering from the Vienna Convention, acknowledged that money laundering 
'occurs also in relation to other criminal activities'331 and therefore did not limit the 
scope of its application to drug offences.  
 
The following developments of EU anti-money laundering regime have been 
triggered, as already mentioned, by the continuously updating process of the FATF 
standards. In particular, the adoption of the second directive was considered a 'top 
priority', 332  giving the fact that the Recommendations were revised in 1996. 
Moreover, the EU felt the call from the whole international community to find 
solutions to the global problem of serious and organised crime. The Second Directive, 
adopted in 2001, contributed to the further expansion of  the scope of anti-money 
laundering law by recognising the 'trend in recent years towards a much wider 
definition of money laundering based on a broader range of predicate or underlying 
offences'.333 In particular, the legislature underlined the necessity of ensuring a wider 
range of predicate offences in order to facilitate the reporting of suspicious 
transactions. 334  The Civil Liberties Committee rejected the proposal to extend 
definition of predicate offence to include any serious offence because it was 
considered too broad, yet the Parliament plenary reinstated the wording.335 The final 
text, under Article 1 (E) included in the list, besides, drug trafficking as defined in the 
first Directive, also activities of criminal organisations, fraud, corruption, and any 
other offence that may 'generate substantial proceeds' and is punishable by a severe 
custodial sentence according to the domestic criminal law. In addition, disagreement 
raised with regard to the degree of the exemption granted to the legal profession: 
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While the Parliament advocated for a broader exemption, the Council and the 
Commission accepted to exclude the legal profession from the duty to report only 
under certain conditions, and not, for instance, while giving legal advice.336  
 
In September 1997, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe established 
the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
and the Financing of Terrorism, MONEYVAL (formerly PC-R-EV) to conduct self 
and mutual assessment exercises of the anti-money laundering measures that the 
Council of Europe member states, which are not members of the Financial Action 
Task Force, put in place.337 Since 2011, the Committee of experts has a new statute 
that elevates it to an independent monitoring mechanism within the Council of 
Europe, 338  parallel to the FATF, the WB and the IMF. Indeed, the common 
methodology 'enables the mutual recognition of evaluations, and thus avoid repeating 
evaluations in the same countries and overloading national authorities with these 
exercises'.339 
 
In order to comply with international standards and thus to extend the scope of the 
framework to cover terrorist finance, a key political priority in the post 9/11 world, 
and to update the regulations in the field of customers identification, the European 
legislature adopted in 2005 the Third Money Laundering Directive.340 In particular, 
the Directive updated the existing framework in consonant to the FATF revised 
Recommendations of 2003, which endorsed nine new standards in the field of 
terrorist financing. 
 
                                                          
336 Article 6 (3) of the Directive 2001/97/EC.  
337 Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing 
of Terrorism, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/About/MONEYVAL_in_brief_en.asp, last accessed on 
23/09/14. 
338 Resolution CM/Res (2010)12 on the Statute of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism. 
339 Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing 
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http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/About/MONEYVAL_in_brief_en.asp, last accessed on 
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 2.2.5 The fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
In 2013, the European Commission drafted a proposal for a new Directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing in order to update the European legal framework to the new FATF 
Recommendations released in 2012.341 The Directive is the result of a compromise 
between conflicting concerns and interests; some of them emerge from the study of 
the law-making process. The main novelties introduced by the proposal were the 
inclusion of tax crimes in the list of predicate offences, a greater focus on the risk-
based approach, and thus the obligation for Member States to conduct national risk 
assessments. Besides the proposal encompassed a more detailed definitions 
concerning PEPs and BOs, the introduction of simplified due diligence and the 
expansion of the scope of the obliged institutions. 342  The Proposal was then 
submitted to the Council and the Parliament for amendments, and it was addressed to 
the European Data Protection Supervisor, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
European Investment Bank for consultation.343 The opinions expressed by the three 
stakeholders are particularly relevant because they highlighted different perspectives 
and interests surrounding the proposed anti-money laundering Directive. The ECB 
welcomed the proposal but contested the fact that, due to the freedom of member 
states to further lower or increase thresholds imposed by EU Directives according to 
Article 114 of the Treaty,344 stricter measures could have been applied to obliged 
institutions. The bank warned that 'any such measures should be carefully weighed 
against the expected public benefits'. 345  Furthermore, the ECB stressed the 
importance of ensuring the 'continued smooth functioning of payment systems in 
Europe and warned that certain burden imposed on obliged entities 'could lead to 
significant difficulties and delays in processing payments between the banks and 
                                                          
341 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (2013/0025/COD). 
342 A critical overview on the novelties introduced by the Commission Proposal can be found in 
Unger et al., 2014, pp. 43, 44.  
343 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 May 2013 on a proposal for a directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing 
and on a proposal for a regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds. OJ C 166, 12.6.2013, 
p. 2-5. 
344 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47-390. 






other entities providing payment services. This in turn would potentially have a 
severe impact on the banks’ liquidity planning and ultimately on the smooth 
functioning of the financial markets'.346 The European Data Protection Supervisor 
opposed the inclusion of fighting tax evasion among the purposes of the data 
processing contained in the Proposal, on the basis of the purpose limitation principle 
pursuant to Article 7(e) of the Directive 95/46/EC. 347  In addition, the authority 
recommended the Commission to 'respect the proportionality principle when limiting 
data subjects' rights and, as a consequence, add a specific provision to specify the 
conditions under which the data subjects' rights may be limited'.348 The European 
Economic and Social Committee recognised the necessity to balance data protection 
and the fight against money laundering.349 In particular, the Committee advocated 
that the obligation set out in Article 39 of the proposed Directive to destroy 
documents and information collected after a period of five or ten years from the time 
of the end of the business relationship, should not apply in specific cases, such as 
criminal proceedings, bankruptcies or successions, so as to prevent it from running 
counter to the general interest. 350  The Committee, thus, recognised the general 
interest as prevailing over the interest of data protection in specific circumstances of 
serious economic crimes.  
 
In March 2013, the European Parliament voted351 on the Economic Affairs and the 
Justice and Home Affairs committees' amendments, which inserted an important 
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347 Executive summary of the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on a proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial 
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change, namely the introduction of a European public register of ultimate owners of 
trusts and companies under Article 29 of the proposed text. The outcome of the 
European Parliament' vote was considered a big step forward in the fight against tax 
evasion, according to the Civil Liberties Committee rapporteur Sargentini 
(Greens/European Free Alliance, Netherland). The European-wide register of 
Beneficial Owners (BOs) 'will help to lift the veil of secrecy from offshore 
accountants and greatly aid the fight against money laundering and blatant tax 
evasion', added the other Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee rapporteur 
Krišjānis Kariņš (European People's Party, Latvia). 352  The introduction of more 
transparency in the financial sector was welcomed by most members of the 
Parliament as a benefit for the fight against tax evasion and money laundering. Yet, 
according to the official opinion expressed by a commercial litigation associate at 
law firm 'Stephenson Harwood', specialised in corporate crime and financial services 
regulation, the provision would have triggered the emersion of more complex 
corporate structures, making due diligence correspondingly more complex, time 
consuming and expensive. 'As such, it is arguable and conceivable that the additional 
compliance burden that a public register may create will - somewhat ironically - 
come to outweigh any benefit associated with transparency'.353 Again, the different 
opinions expressed reveal the complexity of the issue and the conflicting interests at 
play.  
 
The Parliament tried to focus the Directive on the fight against tax havens and illicit 
financial flows.354 In particular, when the Commission used the term 'dirty money', 
which in the common sense refers to money typically deriving from organised 
criminal activities, The Parliament substituted it with 'massive flows of illicit money', 
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which encompasses also monies deriving from fiscal crimes, and listed facilitators 
such as 'secretive corporate structures operating in and through secrecy jurisdiction, 
often also referred to as tax havens'. As regards the duties imposed on the private 
sector to comply with due diligence, the Parliament warned that 'the preventive 
approach should be targeted and proportional, and should not result in the 
establishment of a comprehensive system for controlling the entire population'.355 
Moreover, recital two stated that 'any requirement imposed on obliged entities to 
fight money laundering and terrorist financing should therefore be justified and 
proportionate'.356 The MPs recognised the potentiality of a clash of interests between 
the goals of the Directive to tackle tax evasion and the interests of the private sector 
involved in the prevention of money laundering, therefore added under recital 9 that 
'[a]greeing on a definition of tax crimes is an important step in detecting those crimes 
[tax evasion, fraud, money laundering], as too is public the disclosure of certain 
financial information by large companies operating in the Union on a country-by-
country basis. It is also important to ensure that obliged entities and legal 
professionals, as defined by Member States, do not seek to frustrate the intent of this 
Directive or to facilitate or to engage in aggressive tax planning'. The text was then 
passed to the Council and the Commission for further opinions and agreement, and 
then it was passed to the newly elected Parliament in May 2014. The members of the 
Parliament finally approved the text on 20th May 2015; the final Directive was 
adopted on the same day, with the signatures of the Presidents of the Parliament and 
of the Council. The Directive entered into force twenty days after its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union.357  
 
In the final text, most of the significant changes introduced by the Parliament in 2013 
were endorsed. For the first time a central European register has been created, in 
which beneficial owners ought to be listed. The Directive uses the term 'flows of 
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illicit money' instead of 'dirty money' and keeps the mentioning of the harm to 
international development. While not mentioning the risk that the policy would 
become a tool to control the entire population, the new Directive mentions that 'the 
objectives of protecting society from crime and protecting the stability and integrity 
of the Union's financial system should be balanced against the need to create a 
regulatory environment that allows companies to grow their businesses without 
incurring disproportionate compliance costs'.358 The fourth Directive introduces tax 
crimes within the scope of the money laundering offence and thus allows the 
exchange of tax-related information among FIUs. In this regard, the Directive utilises 
the term tax crimes and not tax offences as proposed antecedent by the Parliament. 
While not imposing a definition of tax crimes at European level, the legislation 
requires that Member States 'should allow, to the greatest extent possible under their 
national law, the exchange of information or the provision of assistance between EU 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)'.359 Due to all these novelties, the final text of the 
Directive is considered a tool to counteract tax evasion. 
 
The final text contains a further significant element, which was already present in the 
Commission Proposal, namely the legitimation of the Union of taking action in the 
field of money laundering, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity set out in 
Article 5 TFEU.360 In particular, the Union shall adopt common measures to tackle 
money laundering 'since the objective of this Directive [...] cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, as individual measures adopted by Member States to 
protect their financial systems could be inconsistent with the functioning of the 
internal market [...]'.361 Again, the European legislator needs to balance between the 
purpose of avoiding that perpetrators could abuse the freedom of movement of 
capitals within the Union and the possibility that Member States could enact anti-
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money laundering policies inconsistent with the free movement of capitals. In fact, 
the Directive, while imposing limitations on the market through the control of 
transactions, the criminalisation of gatekeepers, and the recording of users’ data, it is 
endorsed as an instrument to foster the creation of the single market. Given the fact 
that the internal market is based on the principle of the free movement of capitals and 
that the anti-money laundering legislation imposes, as a matter of fact, restrictions on 
the movement of capitals, there is a clash if interests.  
 
 2.2.6 New developments: Organised crime, terrorism, corruption and economic 
lawbreakings 
The following years were marked by a shift in the policy agenda from the 'war on 
drugs' to the fight against transnational organised crime and, by a quite large 
consensus, in favour of the extension of the offence of money laundering to tackle 
further crimes.362 In June 1997, the European Council, while approving an Action 
Plan on Organised Crime, recognised that the major driving force behind organised 
crime was the pursuit of financial gain.363  The Action Plan called for a rigorous 
implementation of the existing international instruments in the field of anti-money 
laundering that can in turn require adjustments in national procedures and specialized 
training for law enforcement and judicial authorities.364  The Council stressed the 
significance of the harmonisation and widening of the scope of the money laundering 
offence in order to effectively combat money laundering.365 In 2000, the UN adopted 
the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention). In the 
Foreword, Kofi Annan underlined the ability of the so called 'uncivil society' to take 
advantage of 'the open borders, free markets and technological advances [...]' and 
identified globalisation as organised crime, by underlying that 'the enemies of 
progress and human rights seek to exploit the openness and opportunities of 
globalization for their purposes'.366  The Convention, which was 'the most impressive 
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contribution of a UN multilateral treaty towards the globalisation of criminal law',367 
broadly criminalised money laundering. In fact, the treaty was expected to be 'an 
effective tool and the necessary legal framework for international cooperation in 
combating, inter alia, such criminal activities as money laundering'.368 The wording 
referred to the property derived from any offence established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of the paragraph, namely with the drug-related offences described 
under Article 3,1, a) of the Vienna Convention, was substituted in the Palermo 
Convention by 'proceeds of crime', referred to 'any property derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence'.369 According to Article 
6, paragraph 2 (b) of this Convention, states are required to include as predicate 
offences all serious crimes punishable with up to four years’ imprisonment,370 and 
offences associated with organised crime, such as Article 5, the participation in an 
organized criminal group, Article 8 corruption, and Article 23, the obstruction of 
justice. The Palermo Convention went beyond the Vienna Convention and regulated 
also the private sector, by setting a supervisory regime for designated bodies 
particularly susceptible to money laundering. In particular, Article 7, paragraph 1 (b) 
and paragraph 2 called for exchange of information, establishment of a financial 
intelligence unit and the implementation of measure to detect the movement of cash.  
 
After the 9/11 events in America, the anti-money laundering principles were extended 
to the financing of terrorism on the background of the idea that in order to crack 
down terrorists, pursuing the money trail and confiscating assets were two 
fundamental tools. Since then, the securitisation discourse that referred to organised 
crime threats was partially overcome by the rhetoric of the fight against terrorism 
generated post-September 11.371 The EU diverted the attention to terrorism too and in 
2005 amended the second Directive and included already in the tile the financing of 
terrorism, on the basis that 'terrorist financiers could try to take advantage of the 
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freedom of capital movements and the freedom to supply financial services which the 
integrated financial area entails'. 372  'From that date on the money laundering 
Directive was widely considered as part of the fight against terrorism'.373 In addition, 
the Council of Europe committed to the fight against terrorism and in 2005 updated 
the Strasbourg Convention of 1990 by including terrorism and the financing of 
terrorism among the predicate offences whose proceeds should be subject to 
forfeiture.374 The Convention justified such amendment by recalling the 'threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist'. 
 
On the background of the observation that methods of stashing away undue monetary 
advantages are the same used by organised criminals to conceal proceeds of other 
serious crimes, anti-money laundering law emerged as a tool to curb corruption, too. 
Several international and transnational documents expressed, in fact, the necessity of 
tackling the two phenomena together. On one side, instruments to tackle corruption 
included money laundering as an offence constituting corruption, on the other side, 
anti-money laundering regulations started to being used to contrast corruption too, by 
expanding the scope of the money laundering offence. The UN Convention Against 
Corruption adopted in Merida in 2003 (UNCAC) listed the offence of money 
laundering as one of the eight offences constituting corruption.375 The definition of 
money laundering adopted in UNCAC is adopted by the previous Palermo 
Convention and thus is not limited to drug offences. UNCAC is said to have a great 
potential for tackling illicit financial flows 376  with specific respect to the legal 
framework set for the confiscation of assets and for asset recovery mechanism and 
international cooperation for such purposes.377 Also the Council of Europe Criminal 
law Convention on Corruption of 2002, under Article 13, required signatory parties to 
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criminalise the laundering of proceeds from corruption offences. 378  The FATF in 
2003 introduced corruption and bribery in the list of designated categories of 
offences that states should include as predicate offence for money laundering.  This 
further widening of the competence of the FATF has been justified because 'the G20 
called upon the FATF to address the problem of corruption in the framework of its 
work on combating money laundering and terrorist financing', on the background that 
'corruption and money laundering are intrinsically linked,' because 'corruption 
offences, such as bribery or theft of public funds, are generally committed for the 
purpose of obtaining private gain', while 'money laundering is the process of 
concealing illicit gains that were generated from criminal activity'. 379  More 
specifically, the FATF described corruption as a phenomenon negatively impacting 
on transnational crimes, poverty, disease, and political instability and on the economy, 
recalling the fact that empirical evidence suggested that the negative effects of 
corruption are stronger than any possible positive effects.380 
 
 
The European Community adopted instruments of signature and conclusion of the 
Palermo Convention on the basis of its competence with regard to 'progressively 
establishing the internal market'. 381  In particular, the EC explicitly linked the 
adoption of measures to combat money laundering with the purpose of establishing 
an area 'without frontiers in which the free movement of goods and services is 
ensured'. Once again, the European legislature, while further adopting anti-money 
laundering laws, expressed the intention of supporting the internal free market. The 
interest of tackling tax evasion through the anti-money laundering regime was 
manifested already in the initial phase of the anti-money laundering law making 
process and re-emerged in a more mature phase of the policy, yet there was no 
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consensus on this. 382  On the background of the acceleration of economic 
globalisation, which multiplied the opportunities for economic crime in Europe, a 
new consciousness emerged that perpetrators of serious crime can be also firms. 
'Following the multi-billion Euro financial fraud and misconduct schemes such as 
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco International [...] the Parmalat scandal at the end of 
2003 […]demonstrated the importance of avoiding a frame of mind in which one 
looks only towards the organised crime underworld for serious economic crime 
threats'.383 In particular, in the wake of the growing awareness about the negative 
effects of offshore jurisdictions and tax evasion, questions relating to money 
laundering and tax matters have come to be linked, since money laundering was 
considered an effective measure to counteract tax offences, too. 384  This further 
amplified the scope of anti-money laundering policy in the direction of the protection 
of the financial system. The debate on the urgency of tackling large scale tax evasion 
through anti-money laundering policy was prompted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the G20, the FATF and other regional organisations. In 1998, 
the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC) presented the 
results of its report called Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-laundering. 
The report concluded, among other things, 'one of the key remaining facilitators of 
crime has been the tax avoidance/evasion exemption in the laundering regulations of 
                                                          
382 There are some practical hindrances that need to be highlighted with regard to making tax 
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many countries'.385 The UNODC warned about the fact that the secrecy veil on tax 
matters would hamper the combating of money laundering by leaving open the 
opportunity of evading conviction by representing transactions as tax-related.386 The 
G7 Finance Ministers, in May of the same year, encouraged the tackling of tax-
related crimes through the international anti-money laundering system.387 A dialogue 
between the FATF and the OECD came into being to examine ways of improving co-
operation between tax and anti-money laundering authorities, and as a result, 
workshops for experts were organised to share expertise in both fields.388 In 1999, the 
G8 expressed deep concern about the growth in illicit international financial 
transactions, including money laundering, as well as wide-scale tax evasion, 
emphasizing how the two phenomena were related to each other.389 Since 2000, IMF 
made the fight against money laundering a priority of its agenda to 'protect the 
integrity of markets and of the global financial framework'.390At the IMF meeting in 
Washington, in April 2000, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer called for a strong 
response to offshore tax havens and to financial crimes, and raised the need to link 
money laundering to tax matters. 391  In 2003, the FATF Recommendations were 
revised, and Recommendation 1 left it open to states to choose between the 
'thresholds' or the 'all offences' approach. Tax related offences were not explicitly 
included, however, the interpretative note to Recommendation 13 (Reporting of 
suspicious transactions and compliance) stated that 'suspicious transactions should be 
reported by financial institutions regardless of whether they are also thought to 
involve tax matters'. Serious tax crimes were finally listed within the range of 
designated categories of offences that each state should at a minimum include in the 
FATF revised standards published on 16 February 2012.  
 
Whether the use of anti-money laundering law for the purpose of protecting the 
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soundness of the global financial system represents a recent shift of paradigm or it 
has always been part of its double nature is debatable. As a matter of fact, the current 
discourse about anti-money laundering reflects the supremacy of this rationale over 
the necessity of tackling drug consumption or organised crime. The IMF for example 
on its website expresses the concern 'about the possible consequences money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and related crimes have on the integrity and stability 
of the financial sector and the broader economy' and further adds that 'these activities 
can undermine the integrity and stability of financial institutions and systems, 
discourage foreign investment, and distort international capital flows'.392 They may 
have negative consequences for a country’s financial stability and macroeconomic 
performance, resulting in welfare losses, draining resources from more productive 
economic activities, and even have destabilizing spill over effects on the economies 
of other countries'. 393  Min Zhu, IMF Deputy Managing Director, has declared 
'[a]ction to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing [...] 
responds not only to a moral imperative, but also to an economic need '.394  
 
The rhetoric of the protection of the global financial system is used also in the 
European discourse on money laundering control. MONEYVAL, for instance, is said 
to contribute to the protection of the global financial system from abuse.395  The 
Third Directive of 2005 highlighted the damages caused by massive flows of money 
to the stability of the financial sector and to the single market, and it stressed that 'the 
soundness, integrity and stability of credit and financial institutions and confidence in 
the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of 
criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to 
channel lawful or unlawful money for terrorist purposes'.396 The last EU Directive, 
confirmed the necessity of protecting the 'integrity, stability and reputation of the 
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financial sector, and [...] the internal market of the Union',397 especially from the fact 
that money launderers 'could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital 
movements and the freedom to supply financial services which the Union's integrated 
financial area entails'.398 
 
 2.2.7 Considerations 
From the outcomes of the analysis of the process that has led to the formulation of the 
international and European current anti-money laundering criminal legal framework 
it can be observed that very different justifications were given for the criminalisation 
of money laundering at different stages. Often the declared motives did not 
correspond to the real goals of the actors taking part in the law-making process. In 
the beginning, for instance, the introduction of the offence of money laundering was 
presented to the public as a tool to counteract drug trafficking, and the resort to 
criminal law was justified on the background of the seriousness of the drug issue. 
Other actors were triggered by different motives when they agreed to criminalise 
money laundering conducts. The rhetoric connected to the seriousness of the drug 
issue was, therefore, the manifest function of the new criminalisation of money 
laundering. However, other latent goals, for instance, the desire of financial 
institutions to clean their reputation and gain customs confidentiality or the interest of 
some governments to curb tax evasion were already present during this initial phase. 
Yet, given that no agreement could be found on the other aspects, the offence was 
legitimised as an instrument to tackle drug trafficking. On the other hand, the 
international 'war on drugs', in the critical interpretation of scholars, was used by the 
US to impose its criminal policies at global level,399 to the point that Nadelmann 
defines the process of universalisation of these policies as 'the Americanization of 
international law enforcement'.400 In order to justify this strategy and to legitimise 
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additional budgets and legal measures in front of the public, the US created a 'new 
moral panic', namely a phenomenon that needed to be addressed with special urgent 
measures.401 Practically, this had the consequence that countries around the world had 
to actively contribute to the defeat of the common enemy, identified with drug 
producers, traffickers and abusers, by implementing the policies set under the US 
influence, the criminalisation of money laundering being one of them. Some of the 
interests expressed more or less manifestly from the actors taking part in the initial 
phase of the creation of the anti-money laundering regime were strongly conflicting 
with each other. One representative example is the question whether to use the policy 
also to tackle large scale tax evasion or to leave proceeds deriving from fiscal crimes 
outside of the regime: While some actors were strongly supporting this in order to 
protect their economies, others were firmly opposing it on the basis of the assumed 
difference between 'dirty money' and 'black money'.  
 
Another controversial issue concerns the fact national states have adopted anti-money 
laundering measures under the pressure of the FATF, which has been defined as a 
'rich countries club', 402  because it has been created and is still led by most 
industrialised countries.403 The 'club' is criticised due to the absence of transparency 
and accountability 404  and a (deliberately) unrepresentativeness. 405  Since the 
beginning, indeed, the body expressively stated, 'the FATF membership should not be 
                                                          
401  Bosworth-Davies, 2006, p. (346) 349; Naylor, 2002, p. 'Drugs, like terrorism today, obtained the 
position of a suitable enemy. By stressing the necessity of a global effort to prevent the danger of the drug 
issue, the US has imposed 'global governance' built around the framework established by the UN and 
other international initiatives. See also Aas, 2014, pp. 130, 131. On an even more critical note, the crime-
control policy model of the 'war on drugs' has been interpreted as an example of the 'blurred line between 
crime control and warfare, both in discursive and practical terms'. Aas, 2014, p. 130. A known example is 
the American 'Plan Colombia', a US military intervention launched in the 90is of the last century in 
South-American, with the official goal of contrasting drug cartels, which was actually directed at 
controlling economically, politically and military an area rich of natural resources. Becucci and Massari, 
2003, p. 63. 
402 See Mitsilegas, 2014, p. 174.  
403 Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 443; Bosworth-Davies, 2006, p. (346) 358; Levi and Reuter, 2006, p. 
(289) 304; Pieth, 2004, pp. 8, 9. More specifically, from the definition of the social problem to the 
shaping of the policies and of the methods of monitoring compliance and punishing non-compliance the 
FATF owes a lot to the US. See Machado, 2012, p. (330) 361. 
404    Bosworth-Davies, 2006, p. (289) 358; Pieth, 2004, p. 22. 






further widened, in order to preserve the efficiency of the Task Force'.406 Besides 
lacking democratic legitimation, the FATF has imposed a brand new regime of 
criminalisation, prevention and enforcement. The influence of the FATF 
Recommendations over the development of the European legal framework has been 
tremendous, in fact main changes adopted by the directives have been justified as 
necessary adaptations to the FATF updated regime. The uncritical transposition of the 
Recommendations into European law has been criticised by scholars because it does 
not allow European lawmakers to tailor legal measures on the Union's specific needs 
and patterns.407 On the other hand, it has been emphasised that the EU's growing 
autonomy in the development of a global paradigm of crime governance may lead to 
a higher protection of human rights and fundamental principles.408 
 
The analysis shows also that the criminal legal framework adopted to tackle money 
laundering has been used to address ever-new challenges, and this expansion process 
has been coupled by a rhetoric that scholars have defined the securitisation 
rhetoric.409 One of the issues to which money laundering has been mostly associated, 
especially in the initial phase of the money laundering control discourse, is organised 
crime. After the fall of the Berlin wall, when there was no longer a looming threat of 
war, new risks for society appeared on the political horizon, and organised crime was 
perceived as constituting a general thereat to security and human life. 410  In the 
beginnings of the nineties of the last century, for example, the US Senator declared 
organised crime as 'the new communism, the new monolithic threat'.411 However, the 
notion of international governance over organised crime and the idea that there was a 
right and a mechanism to impose minimum standards at global level to combat 
transnational criminal activities that developed at the end of the 1990s is not 
universally accepted.412 In this context, money laundering has been considered 'more 
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than any other, the crime that reflects and energises globalization […]'. 413  The 
discourse around it pictures money laundering as 'one of the great moral panics of our 
day', which threatens the very existence of the state. 414  Yet, also the idea that 
organised crime and money laundering represent the dark side of globalisation has 
been contested. In addition, while in the beginning the emphasis was confined on the 
utility of the money laundering offence for the purposes of confiscation, the link 
between anti-money laundering policy and confiscation has become less and less 
evident, especially since the monopoly of the fight against money laundering has 
been officially transferred from law enforcement to the private sector and thus to the 
switch from a prohibitory to a preventive approach.415 In addition, the confiscation of 
assets, due to its strong potential, should not only be attached to money laundering 
cases. In fact, once there is enough evidence to prove the serious predicate offence, 
states could attach a duty to proceed with assets forfeiture to the main offence, 
without needing the money laundering conviction.416  
 
With regard to the financing of terrorism, the logic behind the application of the anti-
money laundering discourse and standards to the new threat of terrorism has been 
'skewed'.417 By simply defining the financing of terrorism as a variation of money 
laundering and thus failed to provide a specific framework for tackling terrorists, the 
FATF missed the opportunity to give a definition of 'terrorist'. This has raised a series 
of problems, because 'in practice financial institutions have to follow concrete lists of 
names supplied by secret services, law enforcement agencies and supervisors'.418 
Moreover, the extension of anti-money laundering scope to the financing of terrorism 
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has been criticised from a technical perspective, because funds available for terrorists 
have often an illicit origin and are used for (so labelled) illicit purposes. From a 
political point of view, according to Pieth, coupling anti-money laundering 
regulations with the 'war on terror' is dangerous because it makes the first being 
perceived as an instrument of oppression, as the latter is typically perceived, instead 
of an emancipatory tool. 419  Many scholars have contested the expansion of the 
catalogue of predicate offences to include the financing of terrorism as a diversion of 
the function of anti-money laundering law. The FATF being guided mainly by the US, 
endorsed the philosophy of the 'war on terror' without undertaking an appropriate 
debate about the suitability of the regime to tackle (the phenomenon labelled as) 
terrorism. Such development was justified in front of the public, once again by the 
rhetoric of securitisation, namely by stressing the necessity to adopt special measures 
in order to protect the security of the people from the attack of terrorists.  
 
Corruption has been studied mainly from the demand side (e.g. the side of the 
corruptor), for example, passive corruption of African political leaders and senior 
public officials. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
classifies many African states as very corrupt countries and the industrialised world, 
such as Switzerland, as least corrupt.420 Pointing fingers 'at petty officials and ruling 
kleptomaniacs has resulted in insufficient attention being paid to the (largely) western 
financial intermediaries who facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of corruption 
through offshore companies, trusts and similar subterfuges'. 421  Global Financial 
Integrity estimated that approximately US$ 858 to US$ 1 trillion flows annually from 
poorer countries as proceeds of corruption, state looting and tax evasion;422 the main 
destinations being offshore jurisdictions in the western world. To make real efforts to 
stop illicit flows, it is necessary to tackle the abuse of banks and offshore 
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jurisdictions.423 Yet the anti-money laundering regime, being a product of western 
countries and thus of destinations jurisdictions, does not seem to be the best tool to 
undertake this shift. 
 
By following the developments of money laundering control policy, the analysis 
focuses in the last part at the most recent function manifestly attributed to the anti-
money laundering legal framework, that is, in short, the protection of the soundness 
of the financial system. Especially in times of financial insecurity, the tendency of 
hardening laws against economic crimes increases. Having previously deregulated 
the financial system to enhance economic liberties, legislatures resort to criminal law 
to control illegality in the economy.424 Yet, the contribution of the IMF has been 
described in a very expressive way by Alldridge as 'economists being brought in to 
add both gravitas and the appearance of impartiality' to the anti-money laundering 
regime.425 Indeed, while focussing on the protection of purely economic interests, the 
anti-money laundering regime has not enhanced individual and collective positions. 
In fact, as a response to the European financial crisis of 2007-2011, legislatures, 
instead of rethinking the approach towards the protection of the global finance, called 
for a tightening of economic crimes regulations. Due to domestic budgetary pressure, 
initiatives to tackle the abuse of the Internal Market even accelerated. The European 
Community, for example, while introducing community rules in the field of money 
laundering, aimed at protecting the creation of the Internal Market. Since the 
beginning, the European legislature tackled the phenomenon of money laundering 
primarily as economic matter: Despite mentioning the link with organised crime and 
the danger for society, the European discourse on money laundering has mostly been 
related to other threats, such as the destabilisation of the market, the abuse of capitals’ 
movement liberty, the disintegration of the internal economy. But, why was the EU 
so keen on imposing a common standard for the criminalisation of money laundering, 
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without even enjoying competence in penal matters? The introduction of a common 
anti-money laundering control policy served to a latent function, namely to the 
purposes of the creation of the 'Single Market', by way of avoiding that Member 
States would have adopted measures inconsistent with the completion of the Internal 
Market, while taking action to protect their own national economies from money 
laundering.426 This was done by avoiding that domestic regulations implemented for 
protecting national economies from the infiltration of ill-gotten capital could have 
hampered the freedom of movement of capital within the European borders. The 
tension emerges, also in the wording of the most recent EU money laundering 
Directives, due to lack of Community action against money laundering could lead 
Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt 
measures which could be inconsistent with completion of the single market.427  
There are thus conflicting interests between the claim for regulation to avoid the 
infiltration of illicit capital, and the demand for deregulation to foster the free market. 
The European legislature, however, did not declare completely this intention and 
justified, instead, the imposition of anti-money laundering rules given the threats 
posed by money laundering to the financial system and thus to society. According to 
this critical approach, the criminalisation of money laundering turns out to be more of 
a political tool aimed at achieving governance within the EU, while being presented 
to the public as an essential intervention to guarantee security and well-being. Once 
again, thus, the declared goals of the lawmakers did not correspond with the real 
intentions. It is especially in the interest of a research on the law's effectiveness to 
unveil functions that were undeclared, in order to evaluate the outcomes in a more 
critical way. 
 
 2.3  The German law-making process: Tracing legislative intents 
Germany signed the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs ad 
Psychotropic Substances on the 19th of January 1989.428 It was, therefore, bound to 
adopt the necessary legal and administrative measures to implement the UN treaty at 
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domestic level. 429  Germany, moreover, was bound by the Council Directive 
91/308/EEC of 1991 that under Article 2 required states to prohibit money 
laundering.430 In particular, Article 3 of the Vienna Convention imposed a duty to 
criminalise the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking, duty that has been fulfilled 
by the introduction of Article 261 in the German criminal code, with the law 'Act on 
Suppression of Illegal Drug Trafficking and other Manifestations of Organized 
Crime' (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und andereren 
Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität, OrgKG) that entered into force 
on the 22nd of September 1992. 431  Already in 1988, the German government 
established a working group on money laundering, with the purpose of contrasting 
the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking through the banking sector, in 
collaboration with the US government.432 The debate that preceded the approval of 
the law shows that the parliament was especially worried about the drug situation in 
West Germany between the end of the eighties’ and the beginning of the nineties’ of 
the last century. 433  Therefore, the government decided to issue a nationaler 
Rauschgiftbekämpfungsplan, a domestic policy to tackle the drug problem. 
Furthermore, the Parliament was concerned about the great annual turnover obtained 
by drug criminality in Germany, which was estimated in 1991 from two to four 
billion DM. 434  Such immense amount of money was partly reinvested in drug 
trafficking and other criminal activities, but partly was infiltrated in the legal 
economy in order to produce legitimate profit.435 Germany was considered to be 
particularly propitious for organised crime’s investments due to its strong legal 
system, to the prosperous economy and the stable currency, to the public 
infrastructure and the geographical position.436 The placement of dirty money in the 
legitimate economy was undertaken through activities that had a regular cash income 
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such as restaurants, bars, cinemas, casinos and greengrocers.437 Ill-gotten capital was 
invested also to fund or buy companies. This was considered particularly harmful 
because it would have allowed an unfair competition between illicitly and licitly 
conducted businesses. 438  Both the economy and the financial system were, thus, 
abused for purposes of money laundering. Yet, the main motive that triggered the 
legislature to criminalise money laundering was the necessity of tackling drug-related 
organised crime. In fact, the legislature defined money laundering as a phenomenon 
related to organised crime: ‘The infiltration of properties deriving from organised 
crime in the legitimate financial and economic circle for the purpose of disguising 
them’.439 The connection between organised crime and money laundering was based 
on the fact that criminal organisations were said to pursue the highest profit possible, 
so that money laundering was considered a consequence of organised criminal 
activities.440 In this context, the German government recognised the importance of 
the 'follow the money' strategy and the possibility of tracking the paper trail 
(Papierspur) as a source of information for investigators.441 The legislature hence 
was pursuing two goals with the introduction of Article 261 Gcc: A better disclosure 
of organised crime structures and the elimination of the economic incentive for 
organised crime to break the law through confiscation of ill-gotten gains and thus the 
isolation of offenders from their contexts.442  
 
The first proposals for the introduction of specific norms directed at fighting the 
illegal traffic of psychotropic substances were drafted in 1990 by the government of 
Bayern and Baden-Württemberg. 443  On the basis of those drafts, the Parliament 
formed a draft law that was contested because it contained very broad investigative 
instruments and it tightened the punishments for some offences. 444  Financial 
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institutions, 445  professionals associations and political institutions criticised 
particularly the formulation of the offence of money laundering.446 In the draft law of 
July 1991, the Parliament explained the motives that justified the adoption of the law 
by stressing the fact that criminality was alarming not only because of the increase of 
drug-related delinquency but also and especially because of the new organised way 
of acting and of the transnational dimension of the phenomenon. 447  The 
parliamentarians’ debate that accompanied the approval of the final text shows the 
complexity of the topic and the existence of conflicting interests.448 In particular, the 
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the Interior of Baden-Württemberg, highlighted that the recent development of organised crime and drug 
criminality was alarming; he reported that victims of drug consumption has increased of 50% between 
1989 and 1990. In addition, the governor pointed at the necessity of protecting victims of organised gangs 
of thieves, especially elderly people threatened by home burglary. Given organised crime's tremendous 
consequences for society, the state should take measures against it is not only in order to protect citizens' 
security, but also to enact a social policy. With the purpose of removing organised crime the financial 
basis to commit further crimes, the politician advocated the introduction of new criminal provisions, 
among others the money laundering offence. Schlee was of the opinion that organised crime represented a 
priority compared to other topics such as terrorism and asylum law. Also, threats posed by terrorism 
could be dealt together with those linked to organised crime. Dr. Stoiber (CSU), representative of the 
Bundesland Bayern motivated its cause by drawing attention on the facts that were happening in the US 
and in Italy at that time. In Italy, according to Stoiber, organised crime had contaminated the society, 
undermined the state integrity, increased taxes and threatened the personal security of every citizen. In 
addition, the politician drew attention on the immense volume of the mafia business that in the US 
amounted to 1,1 % of the GDP. With regard to money laundering, the Minister claimed that in the 
European financial centres, proceeds of crime were laundered silently by men with white collars, yet in 
Germany the media was not granting enough consideration to this topic. Finally, he described the draft 
law as a compromise, but still as a fundamental sign of engagement against organised crime that could 
not be ignored. Against these arguments, other parties reacted by highlighting the need to respect 
fundamental principles of the criminal legal system while tackling this new emergencies. Especially Dr. 
Walter, (Saarland, SPD) opposed the introduction of the draft law by saying that the new provisions 
would have left law enforcement agencies too discretion in dealing with organised crime, which would 
have infringed the rule of law. Kröning (Bremen, SPD) highlighted the conflict between the protection of 
security and the protection of the rule of law. While acknowledging the necessity of taking measures to 
combat organised crime, the politician argues that such measures should not violate constitutional 
requirements. In addition Kröning warned that because the new instruments relied on the know-how of 
law enforcement agencies, and given that such knowledge was yet not there, the effectiveness of the 
measures could be compromised. However, given the fact that a compromise was needed, and that the 
Parliament had spent the last three quarters of the year dealing with other issues, the member of the 
socialist party advocated for an agreement on the legal committee's compromise line. Dr. Hohmann-






participants can be easily divided in two groups, one composed of politicians, law 
enforcement forces, public prosecutors and judges, who advocated for the adoption of 
almost all legal novelties, the other one comprise attorneys and scholars, who, instead, 
contested the constitutional legitimation and the efficiency of the new instruments.449 
Yet, the final decision was taken more under the influence of political interests and 
the pressure from the media.450   
 
The parliament discussed this draft together with a proposal of the social-democratic 
party (SPD),451 and after a public hearing of the committee on legal affairs of the 
Parliament in January 1992, the final text was adopted.452  
                                                                                                                                                                          
investigative instruments should have been limited. With this regard, the Hessen Minister stated there 
cannot be any compromise on the rule of law. The same approach was taken by Trittin (Niedersachsen, 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), who welcomed the agreement on the draft legislation, despite the complexity of 
the issue, yet refused to endorse the new investigative rules. Last intervention is provided by the Minister 
of Justice, Dr Kinkel (FDP). The Minister confirmed the complexity of the thematic and recalled that such 
complexity was revealed also in the coalition agreement. Yet, he underlined the importance of 
introducing the money laundering offence in order to allow the confiscation of proceeds of crime and 
therefore making the commission of offences less attractive. The Minister addressed the audience by 
recalling the murder of Rohwedder by the Rote Armee (Rohwedder was the president of the governmental 
agency directed at privatising East German enterprises, the 'Treuhandstalt', and was killed on 1st April 
1991 by the Rote Armee) and the threat posed by terrorism. Yet, he argued that a constitutional state 
should not violate the rule of law while defending itself from terrorists' attack. In the fact he promised that, 
together with Schaueble, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, they were building a 'militant democracy' 
and thus they wanted to avoid a control over the citizens or groups of them. The Minister of Justice 
welcomed the introduction of the secret investigations and the Rasterfahndung (computer-based research 
of suspects), but claimed that the assembly should have not roused wrong reactions (from the public). In 
conclusion, the politician advocated for the achievement of a compromise upon the draft law, given the 
difficulty of the situation and the lack of other solutions. The exact result of the vote can be found in 
Bundesrat, Plenarprotokoll 629. Sitzung, 26/04/1991, p. 151. The new text was then drafted and proposed 
to the Parliament; see BR-Drucks. 219/91. 
449 Sotiriadis, 2010, p. 173. 
450 Sotiriadis, 2010, p. 174. 
451 BT-Drucks. 12/731. 
452 The current offence reads as follow: (1) Whosoever hides an object which is a proceed of an 
unlawful act listed in the 2nd sentence below, conceals its origin or obstructs or endangers the 
investigation of its origin, its being found, its confiscation, its deprivation or its being officially secured 
shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years. Unlawful acts within the meaning of the 
1st sentence shall be 1.  felonies; 2.  misdemeanours under (a)  Section 332 (1), also in conjunction with 
subsection (3), and section 334; (b)  Section 29 (1) 1st sentence No 1 of the Drugs Act and section 19 (1) 
No 1 of the Drug Precursors (Control) Act; 3.  misdemeanours under section 373 and under section 374 
(2) of the Fiscal Code, and also in conjunction with section 12 (1) of the Common Market Organisations 
and Direct Payments (Implementation) Act; 4.  misdemeanours (a)  under section 152a, section 181a, 
section 232 (1) and (2), section 233 (1) and (2), section 233a, section 242, section 246, section 253, 
section 259, sections 263 to 264, section 266, section 267, section 269, section 271, section 284, section 
326 (1), (2) and (4), section 328 (1), (2) and (4) and section 348; (b)  under section 96 of the Residence 
Act and section 84 of the Asylum Procedure Act and section 370 of the Fiscal Code, section 38(1) to (3) 
and (5) of the Securities Trading Act as well as sections 143, 143a and 144 of the Act on the Protection of 







The law OrgKG entered into force in 1992 and bound the Parliament to introduce the 
new offence of money laundering in the penal code by January 1993. Public 
expenditure, both at federal and state level, was expected; however, it was not 
possible to calculate them yet. In particular, due to the introduction of new offences 
and of an enhanced international cooperation, public authorities were required to 
tighten monitoring measures and activities, the costs being covered by the states or 
by the federal state.453 However, since public institutions were expected to profit 
from asset recovery measures, which should be able to bring some, not yet 
quantifiable, income, an economic burden for the public was not expected.454  
 
Money laundering was defined in the draft law of the government that implements 
the Vienna Convention as the systematic concealing of objects through the financial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Models Act, 51 and 65 of the Design Act, 142 of the Patent Act, 10 of the Semiconductor Protection Act 
and 39 of the Plant Variety Rights (Protection) Act. which were committed on a commercial basis or by a 
member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of such offences; and 5.  misdemeanours 
under section 89a and under section 129 and section 129a (3) and (5), all of which also in conjunction 
with section 129b (1), as well as misdemeanours committed by a member of a criminal or terrorist 
organisation (section 129 and section 129a, all of which also in conjunction with section 129b (1)). The 
1st sentence shall apply in cases of tax evasion committed on a commercial basis or as a gang under 
section 370 of the Fiscal Code, to expenditure saved by virtue of the tax evasion, of unlawfully acquired 
tax repayments and allowances, and in cases under the 2nd sentence no 3 the 1st sentence shall also 
apply to an object in relation to which fiscal charges have been evaded. (2) Whosoever 1.  procures an 
object indicated in subsection (1) above for himself or a third person; or 2.  keeps an object indicated in 
subsection (1) above in his custody or uses it for himself or a third person if he knew the origin of the 
object at the time of obtaining possession of it shall incur the same penalty. (3) The attempt shall be 
punishable. (4) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to ten years. 
An especially serious case typically occurs if the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a 
gang whose purpose is the continued commission of money laundering. (5) Whosoever, in cases under 
subsections (1) or (2) above is, through gross negligence, unaware of the fact that the object is a proceed 
from an unlawful act named in subsection (1) above shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than two 
years or a fine. (6) The act shall not be punishable under subsection (2) above if a third person previously 
acquired the object without having thereby committed an offence. (7) Objects to which the offence relates 
may be subject to a deprivation order. section 74a shall apply. section 73d shall apply if the offender acts 
on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of money 
laundering. (8) Objects which are proceeds from an offence listed in subsection (1) above committed 
abroad shall be equivalent to the objects indicated in subsections (1), (2) and (5) above if the offence is 
also punishable at the place of its commission. (9) Whosoever 1.  voluntarily reports the offence to the 
competent public authority or voluntarily causes such a report to be made, unless the act had already 
been discovered in whole or in part at the time and the offender knew this or could reasonably have 
known and 2.  in cases under subsections (1) or (2) above under the conditions named in No 1 above 
causes the object to which the offence relates to be officially secured shall not be liable under subsections 
(1) to (5) above. Whosoever is liable because of his participation in the antecedent act shall not be liable 
under subsections (1) to (5) above, either. 
453 BT-Drucks. 12/3533, p. 10. 






system with the purpose of avoiding access by law enforcement in order to maintain 
its economic value (systematische Tarnung von Vermögenswerten mit den Mitteln des 
Finanzmarktes, um sie dem Zugrif der Strafverfolgungsorgane zu entziehen und in 
ihrem wirtschaftlichen Wert zu erhalten). 455  The offence was included in the 
particular part of the German penal code, chapter 21, dedicated to the assistance after 
the fact and handling stolen goods and was listed among the Anschlussdelikte, the 
derivative offences, namely the offences built on the commission of other offences, 
defined as the antecedent or predicate offences. The formulation introduced with the 
law OrgKG under Article 261 Gcc reflected Article 3 b, c (I) of the Vienna 
Convention, which differentiated between the concealing-offence 
(Verschleierungstatbestand) according to Article 261 (1) Gcc and the acquisition, the 
possession and the use of the criminal property, (Erwerbs-, Besitz- und 
Verwendungstatbestand) regulated under Article 261 (2) Gcc. The first conduct, 
constituting of acts directed at ensuring the enjoyment of proceeds of crime without 
fearing law enforcement repression, was considered harmful for the administration of 
justice. The second one, instead, was directed at impeding the procurement, the use, 
and the keeping of contaminated objects also by third parties. By punishing any 
contact with the ill-gotten property, the legislator aimed at isolating perpetrators and 
thus at eliminating incentives for engaging in the predicate offences. This function 
earned the second paragraph the name of 'isolation conduct'.  The legislature aimed at 
isolating criminals by impeding them the access to the legitimate economy, and this 
was especially achieved by criminalising the providing, the storage, and the use also 
by third persons of the criminal property (Article 261 (2) Gcc). 456 
The legislature used the term 'object' (Gegenstand), instead of property, because the 
latter was not legally defined and because it was meant to cover a broad range of 
items economically valuable, regardless of the specific value. The expression 
herrühren, which means 'derived from an unlawful act', refers to the link between the 
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antecedent illegal act and the following acts. Both terms are subject of vivid 
controversies, as it will be shown in the third chapter.  
 
Article 261 (4) envisages an aggravating punishment, from six months to ten years, 
for serious cases, namely 'if the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member 
of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of money laundering'. With 
this provision, the legislature tried to include the link with organised crime and 
terrorisms. In particular, the commission in form of a gang exists also when the 
offender of the antecedent crime acted in her or his interest or belongs to a mixed 
gang that has been created for the exact purpose of laundering the proceeds of crime. 
The legislature set a low burden of proof to facilitate the prosecution of organised 
and terrorist organisations.457 
 
Article 261 (5) criminalises the reckless conduct. The decision of punishing even the 
reckless hypothesis has been long debated during the legislative process. The 
legislature declared that the introduction of the provision was necessary to avoid 
problems of evidence and thus allow a more effective fight against money 
laundering.458 The recklessness relates yet only to the illegal origin of the objects, 
while the other characteristics of the actus reo shall be covered by intention.459 Yet 
the problem arises with regard to Article 261 (2) Gcc, which requires knowledge by 
the offender of the illegitimate origin of the property. The reckless lack of knowledge 
exists already in the moment in which the actor receives the object.460 
 
The degree of evidence required in relation to the antecedent act is the existence of an 
offence belonging to the catalogue of predicate offences. This has to be demonstrated 
along general lines, there is no need to know the identity neither of the offender nor 
of the characteristics of the antecedent act.461 Previous convictions for a predicate 
offence for money laundering, decision on predicate offence can be used in the 
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money laundering proceeding. However, the judge in the money laundering case 
would have to determine the existence of the antecedent law breaking.462 
 
The declared function of the new provision was, according to an official statement of 
the Parliament, to confiscate organised crime’s ill-gotten gains in order to impede that 
proceeds of crime would constitute the 'operating capital' (Betriebskapital) for the 
commission of further offences.463 In other words, the threat of criminal liability 
linked to the introduction of 261 Gcc (1) and (2) should have kept citizens far from 
illegal profits and should have made the commission of further crimes non profitable 
and thus not worth it violating the law.464 Indeed, the German provision went beyond 
the offence set out in Article 3 that referred only to property derived from drug-
related offences of the Convention and included proceeds of other offences 
committed by a member of a criminal organisation (as defined by 129 Gcc) and 
proceeds of any crime (261 (1) 1 and 3 Gcc). Basically, three categories of predicate 
offences were included: Serious crimes, offences in violation of law on psychotropic 
substances and offences committed by a member of a criminal organisation. The 
government expressively did not opt for the all-crimes approach in order not to 
broaden the criminalisation too much.465 Yet, according to other statements published 
by the Parliament, the article ought to have impeded the infiltration of monies 
deriving from organised crime and related serious criminality in the legitimate 
economy. While this was the direct goal, the indirect purpose of the legislature would 
have been to avoid the distortion of the existing economic system.466  
 
Despite the unanimous consensus on the necessity of criminalising money laundering, 
some issues relating to the introduction of this new offence were considered 
controversial. For instance, there were conflicting opinions about the level of mens 
rea required with respect to the illegal provenance of the assets in order to punish the 
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offender.467 The SPD supported the criminalisation of the mere negligent behaviour 
in order not to reduce the efficiency of the offence of money laundering.468 On the 
contrary, it was argued that this proposal would have been cumbersome for the 
economic cycle and for the free circulation of goods, to the point that anyone taking 
part in these activities could have been prosecuted for money laundering. The debate 
reflects the underlying question whether the norm should be directed to effective law 
enforcement or to the security of the general business volume (Geschäftsverkehr). 
The solution was found in the following compromise: only the reckless money 
laundering (leichtfertige), under paragraph 5 of Article 261 Gcc (leichtfertigen 
Begehung), but not the mere negligent (fahrlässig), was criminalised. Recklessness is 
a heightened degree of negligence, by way of negative definition it constitutes a 
negligent behaviour and not an intentional one. Yet, under German law, property 
crimes and derivative crimes are always committed intentionally and not negligently. 
 
In addition, the introduction of Article 261 Gcc raised concern with regard to already 
existing provisions, such as Article 258, Article 259, Article 257 Gcc, which punished 
conducts connected to money laundering. According to the legislature, there was the 
necessity to create a new offence in order to fill the loopholes of the then current 
legal framework.469 In particular, the offence of receiving and handling stolen goods 
(Article 259 Gcc) required that the properties direct derivation from the crime and 
thereby did not cover further transactions. The offence of obstruction of punishment 
(Article 258 Gcc) covered only those cases of money laundering when the act is 
committed with the intention of avoiding prosecution or forfeiture, while the 
hypothesis of accessory after the fact (Article 257 Gcc), which was based on the 
concept of Begünstigung (aiding and abetting), criminalised only cases when the 
proceeds of the crime were still held by the offender who committed the predicate 
offence. 470  Yet, the Federal Government recognised, while answering to a query 
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posed by some members of the Parliament,471 that whether the provisions previously 
existing have served the purpose of punishing certain typologies of money laundering 
could not be inferred from the criminal statistics.472 
 
According to the declared motivations, the goal of the OrgKG law was, besides 
criminalising money laundering, to enhance confiscation of profits made by 
organised crime, to achieve a higher criminal deterrence effect through the tightening 
of penalties, and to improve the available investigative instruments and the 
programme of witnesses’ protection.473 The OrgKG law contained twelve articles that, 
besides giving birth to the offence of money laundering under German law, 
introduced novelties in substantial and procedural criminal law.474 With the goal of 
breaking through the financial flow and to put an end to the ineffectiveness of the 
previous asset forfeiture mechanism, Article 1 of OrgKG introduced a confiscatory 
expropriation order.475 With the same goal of improving the system of confiscation of 
asset, the law introduced the hypothesis of the 'extended confiscation'. At the time 
current provisions were not considered suitable to attack organised crime, since in 
case of serious crimes custodial sentences were preferred. Furthermore, the 
confiscation of property was possible, until that time, only when the property was 
                                                          
471 BT-Drucks. 12/2803. 
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473 Aepfelbach and Fülbier, 1994, p. 14. 
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balance the punishment with the seriousness of the conducts, BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 1. Article 1 of 
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475 Remmers, 1997, p. 31. According to the new article 43a, the imposition of a Vermögensstrafe 
was released by the daily rate and was estimated, instead, on the whole asset of the defendant. Currently 
article 43 a Gcc states that '(1) If the law refers to this provision the court may, in addition to 
imprisonment for life or for a fixed term of more than two years, order payment of a sum of money the 
amount of which shall be limited by the value of the offender’s assets (confiscatory expropriation order). 
Material benefits which have been confiscated shall not be taken into account when assessing the value of 
the assets. The value of the assets may be estimated. (2) Section 42 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (3) The 
court shall indicate a term of imprisonment which shall be substituted if the amount cannot be recovered 
(default imprisonment). The maximum term of default imprisonment shall be two years, its minimum one 
month'.Such penalty could be inflicted also on the basis of a mere suspect that the asset had an illegal 
provenance, every time that a custodial sentence of minimum two years was imposed and that 43 s Gcc 
was recalled. The old system was considered ineffective because of the too high burden of proof, which 
was set by article 73 (1) Gcc to allow the confiscation order. Yet, the legislature recognised immediately 







proven to be originated from crimes for which the launderer has already been 
convicted.476 In other words, the confiscation was conviction based as opposed to 
civil forfeiture. Under Article 73d, 1 (1) Gcc was, thus, introduced, a type of non-
conviction based confiscation, which allowed law enforcement to expropriate assets 
under lighter conditions in case of a high probability that they stemmed from a crime, 
without having to prove the commission of it. This provision was object of harsh 
criticism in Germany, while in other countries, such as Italy, it is considered a very 
useful instrument in the fight against mafia. Due to the ever professionalism of 
criminals and to the networked-structure of criminal organisations, new investigative 
measures were needed in order to be able to catch those acting behind the facade, 
such as financial services’ providers.477 Therefore the legislation, under Article 3 
(Änderung der Strafprozessordnung) introduced changes in the code of criminal 
procedure too. 
 
Article 261 Gcc has been modified very often, mostly to extend the list of predicate 
offences. The most recent amendment entered into force on the 26th of November 
2015. In particular, the act to fight against corruption (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Korruption) introduced two new predicate offences, namely, Article 299 Gcc, 'Taking 
and giving bribes in commercial practice', and Article 355a Gcc, which punishes the 
'[t]aking bribes meant as an incentive to violating one’s official duties' and the 
'Giving bribes as an incentive to the recipient’s violating his official duties' in relation 
to international civil servants. The most important and discussed novelty introduced 
by the act to fight against corruption is the elimination of the    exemption of 
punishment. 478  The provision excludes the criminal liability for those who 
participated in the predicate offences, out of the cases in which the offenders put in 
circulation the objects deriving from the offences, in order to conceal their 
illegitimate origin (Article 261 (9) 2 Gcc). In Germany 'self-money laundering' had 
remained unpunished for long time, despite the existence of obligation to criminalize 
it under international standards. The jurisprudence confirmed the decision of 
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excluding personal criminal liability for someone who was already involved in the 
antecedent act, also if the act was committed abroad.479 The Ministry of Justice and 
other actors took a strong position to protect the rule, yet Germany was bound both 
by the FATF Recommendations and by the EU to introduce a new criminal 
liability.480 In June of the same year, the legislature introduced in the list of predicate 
offences the crime of terrorist financing, regulated by the new Article 89 c Gcc.481 In 
2014, along with the introduction of a new provision that punished the bribing of 
members of the parliament under Article 108 e Gcc, which allowed Germany to ratify 
UNCAC,482 the scope of Article 261 Gcc was extended to include as antecedent act 
the 'bribing delegates'.483 With the act to improve the fight against money laundering 
and tax evasion of 2011 (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche 
und Steuerhinterziehung) fiscal offences were included in the list of predicate 
crimes.484 Other major amendments were introduced in 2008   through the act to 
improve the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (Gesetz zur 
Ergänzung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung, 
Geldwäschebekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz - GwBekErgG), 485  which also 
implemented the Third EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive. In 2002, with the law 
on the suppression of money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Bekämpfung 
der Finanzierung des Terrorismus, Geldwäschebekämpfungsgesetz),486 and in 1998 
                                                          
479 BGH NStZ 1995, 500. See also Schmidt and Krause, 2010, StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 50. 
480 See, in particular, Schröder, 2013. The German federal bar association published an official 
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with the act on improving measures to combat organised crime (Gesetz zur 
Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Organisierten Kriminalität).487  
 
From the beginning of the existence of Article 261 Gcc, it was clear that the provision 
was strictly linked with the regulations on the banking system. It was, indeed, 
observed, that the offence of money laundering would have been effective only if 
banks would have collected information and reported suspicious transactions to law 
enforcement agencies.488 The Federal Government in 1992 stated that an effective 
fight against money laundering was dependent on the possibility for law enforcement 
agencies to get evidence of money laundering transactions, by gaining access to 
financial documents. In fulfilment of this necessity, the money laundering act 
(Geldwäschegesetz, GwG) was adopted and entered into force on the 30th of 
November 1993, 489  also in order to give complete implementation to the EC 
Directive 91/308/EEC. The main points of the GwG were the obligation imposed to 
credit and financial institutes of identifying clients (Article 1 (1) (2) GwG) and 
detecting beneficial owners (Articles 2, 6, 8 GwG), in the public interest of law 
enforcement agencies,490 the obligation of collecting information and keeping records 
about clients (Article 9 GwG) in order to facilitate the tracking of paper-trails, and 
the last but not the least, the duty to report suspicious transactions to the designated 
authority and the eventual interruption of such transactions (Article 11 GwG). 
Especially Article 11 of the anti-money laundering act set the collaboration between 
the private sector and law enforcement agencies directed at investigating money 
laundering. In fact, financial investigations on money laundering can be triggered by 
the collection of information in the context of another proceeding, for instance, about 
the predicate offences, or by specific preliminary investigations on the basis of a STR.  
 
Most relevant changes to the anti-money laundering act are the anti-money 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Vorbereitung von schweren staatsgefährdenden Gewalttaten of 2009, which established the financing of 
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490 For a critical view on the use of such information for fiscal purposes, see Dieter and Klos, 1994, 






laundering act of 2008 491  and the act to optimise money laundering prevention 
(Geldwäscheoptimierungsgesetz).492 Since 2002, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
was established in the BKA, as an intermediary between law enforcement and 
obliged entities. The FIU's mandate is supporting the federal and state police forces 
in the prevention and prosecution of money laundering, and in particular, collecting 
and analysing suspicious transactions reports transmitted pursuant to Sections 11 and 
14 of the act by the obliged entities.493 The STRs are put in a database and monitored 
as to whether there are grounds to justify an initial suspicion of a money laundering 
offence, or an underlying offence under Article 261 Gcc, or any other criminal 
offence. The analysis results obtained in this connection are summarised in a report, 
which is then passed on to the relevant specialised office or public prosecutor's office. 
Among the cases received by the FIU, some are classified as noteworthy on the basis 
of indicators, as the amount of the transactions reported, the persons involved, other 
significant case-specific features, or to the high level of public interest (media 
coverage).494 In addition, the FIU maintains statistics on STRs received and analysed, 
follow up to those reports, cases investigated, numbers of prosecutions and 
convictions, property and assets frozen, seized or confiscated, in order to publish an 
annual report. Another relevant institution in the context of money laundering 
prevention is the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), which monitors 
the financial sector and sanctions noncompliance with the measures, according to 
articles 16 and 17(4) of the GwG. Moreover, the authority has powers to issue rules, 
regulations or other enforceable instruments with respect both to individual 
institutions and to single institutions or groups of institutions.  
 
 2.4  Considerations 
The analysis of the national law-making process is relevant to stress the divergent 
opinions and expectations relating to the criminalisation of money laundering. The 
Parliamentarians debate that took place with regard to the introduction of the money 
                                                          
491 BGBl. 2008 I, p. 1690. 
492 BGBl. 2011 I, p. 2959. 
493 According to article 11 (1) and 14 (1) obliged entities shall report suspicious transactions both to 
the FIU and to the local police criminal office (Landeskriminalamt). 






laundering offence and other instruments to tackle drug-trafficking shows that the 
discussion was deeply embedded in the political-historical context. Given that 
Germany was just reunified after a period of two dictatorial regimes, the hearing 
gives the impression that lawmakers felt the responsibility of creating a new legal 
system against such historical background. In order to balance the very different legal 
cultures, the divergent approaches had to be compromised. The introduction of a new 
crime was particularly delicate due to the discriminatory and arbitrary use of criminal 
labels by the previous dictatorial regimes. Therefore, delegates would not easily give 
up on fundamental rights for the cause of persecuting criminals. The legislation can 
be seen as an attempt to balance the need to adopt more effective measures to tackle 
crime and the necessity of respecting the rule of law and creating a 'militant 
democracy'. Yet, given the external pressure of the FATF, the EU and of the media, 
the text was less of a compromise and rather a ratification of 'internationally' 
accepted standards.495 The rule of law was not the only issue emerged in the initial 
phase of the political debate. Controversial opinions were raised also with regard to 
the questions of the mens rea and the interest protected by the new criminal provision: 
Certain political parties such as the SPD supported the broadest criminal liability to 
ensure an effective prosecution of money laundering, other parties like the CDU were 
worried that a widespread liability would have been cumbersome for the economic 
system. Diverse were also the functions attributed to the criminalisation of money 
laundering, from the fight against organised crime, which was more of a concern for 
the CDU, to the elimination for incentives for any crime, or the protection of the 
economic system and of the fair competition from the infiltration of ill-gotten gains. 
Moreover, along with the expansion of the international criminal legal framework to 
fight against money laundering, also the scope of Article 261 Gcc was extended to 
include ever-new predicate offences. The eventual impact of those controversial 
issues and of the enlargement of the money laundering offence on the legitimacy and 
thus on the acceptance of the provision by legal scholarship is analysed in the 
following chapter. The underlying hypothesis based on the reflections spelled out in 
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the first chapter is that a provision that integrates with difficulty in a legal system 
may be doomed to be dis- or mis- applied.  
 
The underlying hypothesis that describes Article 261 Gcc as an example of a 
symbolic legislation directed at compromising contrary legislative interests can be 
supported by the outcomes of this chapter, which has underlined the diverse 
expectations more or less manifested by lawmakers and the diverse functions 
attributed to the policy in the course of its development, both at a transnational and at 










'Gegen Kriminalität, deren Bekämpfung sich nicht lohnt, 
sind primär symbolische, wenig bis nichts kostende Massnahmen zu ergreifen' (Arzt, 






 3.1  Foreword 
This chapter continues the case study on the effectiveness of the money laundering 
offence under German law, by looking at one of the determining factors for a 
sociological research on the criminal law’s effectiveness listed in chapter one, 
namely the norm's reception by legal actors. After having analysed the manifest and 
latent intentions of the legislature for the criminalisation of money laundering and the 
eventual symbolic functions attributed to the law, the research proceeds with the 
examination of the legal scholarship’s reception of the provision, by looking in 
particular at the opinions of legal actors that constitute, according to Friedman, the 
internal legal culture. 497  While this chapter looks at the perception of legal 
scholarship as part of the internal legal culture, chapter five focuses on the perception 
of practitioners. Due to the enormous amount of literature existing on this topic, 
interviews with single scholars were considered redundant. 498  The underlying 
assumptions are that the level of acceptance expresses by legal scholars is a mirror of 
the level of integration in the system, and that the level of perceived legitimation of 
                                                          
496 English translation: 'Against a crime, whose repression is not worth it, it is resorted to symbolic 
measures costing few or nothing'. 
497  Friedman, 1975, p. 135. 
498  When contacted for an interview, one of the scholars suggested me to read his numerous 
publications on the topic. This made me thinking that I should have considered reading scholars’ opinions 
instead of interviewing them. 
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the law is a determining factor of effectiveness.499 In order to understand the degree 
of acceptance, the following paragraphs summarise the doctrinal debate surrounding 
the criminalisation of money laundering. The introduction of Article 261 Gcc has 
triggered controversial issues, some of which have not been settled yet; this is 
considered a symptom of the difficulty of integrating the provision in the domestic 
criminal legal system. The aim is to draw attention to those particular controversial 
challenges raised by the formulation and the further widening of the money 
laundering offence that constitute an obstacle to the effective enforcement of the law. 
Given that the national law-making process has been much influenced by the 
transnational one, controversial issues may arise also from the transposition of 
international clauses. For it is particularly in regard to criminal law that states are still 
reluctant to give up their sovereignty. It is, therefore, of crucial importance whether 
overarching anti-money laundering policies respect the principles embedded in 
national legal cultures.  
 
The expected outcome is the formulation of hypotheses on the motives of legal 
hindrances and on their potential impact on the application of the law. The following 
paragraphs discuss specifically these issues: The interests protected by Article 261 
Gcc, the broad and vague wording of Article 261 Gcc, the criminalisation of the 
reckless conduct (leichtfertige Geldwäsche); finally it concludes with a summary of 
critical opinions on the (in)adequateness of the provision to serve its goals on its 
hypothesised symbolic dimension.  This chapter analyses the opinions of legal 
scholars about Article 261 Gcc by focussing mainly on the challenges that have 
emerged so far in relation to the potential applicability of the norm and to legal 
obstacles encountered in the implementation of it. The underlying hypothesis is that 
the level of integration of a legal provision in a legal order impacts on its application 
and thus on its effectiveness. The level of acceptance expresses by legal scholarship 
is considered the mirror of the level of integration in the system. The expected 
outcome would have been the formulation of a hypothesis on the motives of such 
legal issues and on their consequences with regard to the effective application of the 
law. The chapter furthermore questions whether the offence of money laundering is 
an adequate tool to cope with money laundering from a theoretical perspective, by 
                                                          
499 In chapter one it has been argued that the perceived level of legitimacy affects the effectiveness 
of a provision. See chapter one, paragraph 1.2. 
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looking at the potentiality to achieve its goals. In particular, the chapter refers to legal 
scholarship production with regard to challenges posed by the introduction of the 
money laundering offence and with regard to the potential of the law to tackle issues, 
such as dirty money and illicit financial flows, which are embedded in the current 
deregulated financial system. The debate aims at contributing to the more general 
discussion on the suitability of criminal law to regulate economic matters. 
 
 3.2  The interests protected by the law: All interests or no interest?  
Before looking at the controversial debate about the interests protected by Article 261 
Gcc, few words are spent to contextualise the issue in the more general discussion on 
the limits and the functions of criminal law, and in particular on the legally protected 
interests. As the theoretical framework set in chapter one shows, a research on the 
effectiveness of criminal law must take into consideration some peculiar factors that 
refer to penal law; one of them is the fact that criminal law as per definition is a 
harmful tool, which in order to protect some interests, causes harm to the offenders. 
Given that the criminalisation of conducts is a question of labelling some behaviours 
as deviant in opposition to those that are compliant, it is fundamental to limit the 
labelling power between the constraints of a reasonable use of the repressive tool. In 
particular, chapter one recalls German scholar von Liszt's theory of purpose, which 
sets forth that the resort to penal law should be economised to achieve certain 
goals.500 Von Liszt, together with Birnbaum501 and Binding theorised the concept of 
legally protected interests.502 The so-called 'Rechtsguts-theory'503 was based on the 
presumption of the existence of some particularly relevant goods, whose protection 
legitimised the use of the repressive public power. The resort to criminal law ought to 
be limited to the protection of those goods. Hence, the Rechtsguts-theory ought to 
limit the borders of criminal law. 
 
The doctrinal debate is particularly vivid among Germans legal scholarship; 504 
scholars have engaged especially in trying to define the concept of Rechtsgut; a 
modern definition refers to 'the conditions and the aims needed for free development 
                                                          
500 Von Liszt, 1882. See also chapter one, paragraph 1.3. 
501 Birnbaum, 1834. 
502 Binding, 1872. 
503 The term 'Rechtsguts-theory' is used by Ambos, 2015 pp. (301) 305ss. 
504 Common law applies instead the harm principle.  
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of the individual, for realisation of his fundamental rights, and for the proper 
functioning of state institutions that are needed for these purposes'. 505  Recent 
discussions focus on the question whether the legally protected interest represents a 
'critical, liberal' border for criminal policy that limits state intervention to the 
protection of only certain qualified interests, or it is a discretional tool that 
perpetuates class inequalities through the selectivity of criminal punishment. 
According to the first approach,506 the state is allowed to punish only those conducts 
that harm or at least endanger legally protected interests. In other words, it is to say 
that there is no offence without harm to a legally protected interest (bene 
giuridico),507 and that the harm to a legally protected interest is a conditio sine qua 
non for criminalisation.508 The second viewpoint has criticised the Rechtsguts-theory 
for being imprecise, arbitrary and inconsistent, because the concept of Rechtsgut is 
still controversial,509 and thus the theory does not rely on pre-existing goods, nor it 
provides criteria to determine those goods.510 The German constitutional court, due to 
the uncertainty surrounding this concept, has so far preferred to apply the well-
established principle of proportionality while evaluating criminal provisions' 
legitimacy.511 Yet, the debate is still open, because, according to some scholars, even 
the proportionality principle has not managed to provide a foreseeable outcome.512 'In 
fact it is fair to say that the constitutional processes and value judgments have proven 
to be open enough to justify almost any outcome […]. This, in turn, shows that the 
Rechtsgut-concept is, at least compared to any constitutional standard, not as empty 
and vague as some have criticised.'513 Hassemer has defended the personal Rechtsgut-
concept (personaler Rechtsgutsbegriff), by referring to the theories of von Liszt.514 
 
                                                          
505 Definition provided by Roxin, 2010, § 2 mn. 7-9. 
506 Amelung, 1972, p. 302ss; Appel, 1998, pp. 344, 381.ss; NK-Hassemer, 2010, § 1 mn. 108ss, 
146ss; Roxin, 2006, § 2, mn. 1ss. 
507 Marinucci and Dolcini, 2006, p. 6. 
508 Paliero, 1992, p. 449. 
509 Helmers, 2009, p. 514, 515. 
510 See Amelung, 1972, pp. 261-272; Frisch, 2003, pp. 216-218; Hörnle, 2005, pp. 11 ss; Seher, 
2003, pp. 44, 46; Stratenwerth, 1998, pp. 378-381; Wohlers, 2000, pp. 213 ss., 2003, p. 281; von Hirsch, 
2003, p. 18. 
511 See, for example, BVerfG Decision 2 BvR 392/07 of 26 February 2008, para. 39, BVerfGE 120, 
224-273. About this case, see also Ambos, 2015, p. (301) 307; Roxin 2010, pp. (573) 580-582; 2006, § 2 
mn. 86-87, 89; Schünemann, 2003, pp. 142-149. 
512 For example Roxin argued that the proportionality test gives too much discretion to the legislator. 
See Roxin, 2010, pp. (573) 584-585; 2006, § 2, mn. 93. 
513 Ambos, 2015, pp. (301) 308, 309. 
514 NK-Hassemer, 2010, mn. 131-148. 
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Far from being a philosophical question, this limitation concretely affects the 
manifestation of state power because it restricts public action both in the legislative 
and in the application phase. However, it has been observed that, for example among 
European countries, there is as yet no consensus on the interests protected by the 
offence of money laundering.515 These differences reflect the fact that states have 
varying understanding of the purposes of anti-money laundering law, to the point that 
some perceive it as an anti-drug policy, some as a measure against tax evasion, and 
some as a tool to curb corruption. The European Directives justified primarily the 
criminalisation of money laundering with the necessity of protecting public 
confidence in the soundness of the financial system and secondarily with the need to 
tackle cooperatively transnational organised crime.516 Hence the offence was directed 
at protecting various interests, 'ranging from individual ones, as property, to 
collective ones as state security'.517 Given the different manifest and latent functions 
attributed to the offence of money laundering during the law-making process and 
along with the expansion process highlighted in the previous chapter, the lack of 
unanimity about the attributed goals should not surprise the reader. 
 
In Germany, the controversy surrounding the demarcation of the interests protected 
by the offence of money laundering is particularly vivid. According to Helmers the 
debate is even overwrought, since it seeks to find an element that should legitimise 
the offence and at the same time functions as yardstick for the restriction of its 
scope.518 In other words, the scholar considers the doctrinal debate bias, because it 
aims at legitimising the provision ex-post, by allocating to the offence the protection 
of an interest. This is particularly dangerous since it tends to justify any means under 
a general protecting function.519 On an even more critical note, Helmers contends that 
the legitimacy of a criminal norm should be grounded in a different way than by 
                                                          
515 See Unger et al., 2014, p. 237. For instance, in England the offence has been classified as drug-
related offence (articles 49 - 52 of the English Drug Trafficking Act of 1994). Articles 305 bis and 305 ter 
of the Swiss criminal code are listed under the offences against the administration of justice; article 301 of 
the Spanish penal code includes the offence among those against the patrimony and against the socio-
economic order; the Italian money laundering offence, regulated by article 648 bis, is included among the 
offences against property; French article 324 (1) belongs to the third book of the penal code on the 
offences against property, too. 
516 Vogel, ZStW 109, 1997, p. (335) 351. 
517 Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 105. 
518 Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 105. 
519 Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 105. 
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merely allocating any kind of function for the achievement of any type of purpose.520 
Even the German constitutional court has declared that the determination of the 
interest (Rechtsgutsbestimmung) protected by Article 261 is vague and has 
recognised how complex it is to allocate a certain interest to the offence. 
Unfortunately the court has not taken the chance to appoint one. The doctrinal 
dispute reflects the various criminal policy intentions that have been expressed in the 
different conducts criminalised under the common umbrella of Article 261 Gcc. The 
legislature, indeed, identified different interests with regard to the two conducts 
punished by paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 261 Gcc. According to the legislative 
statements, the legal interests protected by Article 261 (1) Gcc should have been the 
national administration of justice's task of eliminating the impact of crimes,521 while 
Article 261 (2) Gcc should have protected the administration of justice but also any 
interest connected to the predicate offences. 522  The German Parliament further 
specified that the money laundering offence protects the rule of law by reducing the 
commission of further crimes.523 Yet, the indications provided by the legislature did 
not satisfy scholars, because it did not limit the scope of application of the money 
laundering offence through the application of the Rechtsguts-theory. It has been 
proposed to attribute three protecting functions to the offence: Ensuring asset 
forfeiture, supporting investigations, and protecting the interests connected to the 
predicate offence.524 Yet, also this approach does not offer a ground to limit the scope 
of application. Despite the situation of legal uncertainty, the judiciary has not taken 
action to narrow the question; in fact, the supreme federal court (Bundergerichtshof) 
has stated that the provision describes a unique unlawful content (Unrechtsgehalt), 
but did not specify this concept further.525 
 
There are four main recognisable interests protected by Article 261,526 yet all of them 
have been criticised and there is no agreement among scholars. Given its nature as a 
derivative offence, the offence of money laundering is said to protect those interests 
connected with the predicate offences, which range from human life, property, the 
                                                          
520 Helmers, 2009, p. (509) 518. 
521 BT-Drucks. 12/3533, p. 11. 
522 BT-Drucks. 12/3533, p.13. 
523 BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 27. 
524 GwG-Herzog, 2014, § 261, mn. 27; Voß, 1989, pp. 13, 16.  
525 GwG-Herzog, 2014, § 261, mn. 28; BGH, NJW 1997, 3323, 3325. 
526 GwG-Herzog, 2014, § 261, mn. 22 ss. 
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social fabric and public order.527 This is acknowledged with particular reference to 
the isolation offence contained in the second paragraph, which is directed at 
preventing the commission of the predicate offences by making them less attractive, 
and by depriving criminals of their financial means. 528  Given the function of 
discouraging the commission of any offence by impeding the enjoyment of the 
proceeds, Article 261 (2) Gcc would protect all interests of the prevented predicate 
offences. 529  This potentially expands the Rechtsgut protected by the money 
laundering offence consequently to the continuous expansion of the list of predicate 
offences. As a consequence, the provision becomes a multifaceted offence that serves 
to tackle a broad range of issues, and thus protects a 'Globalrechtsgut', or a 
'Universalrechtsgut', a global or universal legal interest.530 Such a borderless offence 
is considered dangerous, since it broadens the borders of criminal action and it leads 
to the banalisation of the legally protected interest.531 This, along with the vague 
definition of the actus reus, may lead to 'an unlimited power of prosecution and 
punishment'.532 In addition, given the tight connection between the criminal provision 
and the preventive regulations, the broadening of the scope of the offence devolves 
ever-growing police duties to designated professions through the system of reporting 
suspicious transactions.533 Furthermore, from a substantial perspective, 'the threat of 
money laundering to the interests protected by the predicate offences [...] appears 
only indirect, if not tenuous'.534 Comments have been made on a more general level, 
with concern to criminal policy: If the aim of the law was to reduce the commission 
rate of the antecedent acts, the focus on the predicate offences should have not been 
ignored. Taking drug trafficking as an example, the money laundering discourse does 
not include a discussion on the appropriateness of legalising certain types of narcotics, 
in order to diminish criminal activities linked to them.535  The broadening of the 
                                                          
527 BGHSt 55, 36 (49); Eisele, 2015, § 49, mn. 1172; StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 2, 3; MüKo-
Neuheuser, 2012, § 261, mn. 12; Rengier, 2015, § 23, mn. 4; SK-Hoyer, § 261, mn. 1; Wessels and 
Hillenkamp, 2015, § 261, mn. 891. See also Althenhain, 2002, p. 402; GwG-Herzog, 2014, § 261, mn. 24; 
Oswald, 1997, p. 63. Article 261 (2) is said to intensify the protection of the predicate offences' interests, 
see Arzt, ZStW 111, 1999, p. (757) 758. 
528 See Burr, 1995, p. 25; Müko-Neuheuser, 2012, § 261, mn. 13; Salditt, StraFo, 1992, pp. (121) 
121, 122. 
529 See Leip, 1999, p. 54; Dionyssopoulou, 1999, p. 78; Hefendehl, 2001, p. (10) 14. 
530 See NK-Altenhain, 2013, § 261, mn. 11; Arzt et al., 2015, § 29, mn. 7; Sotiriadis, 2010, p. 209.  
531 Artz, 1997, p. 34. 
532 Mitsilegas, 2003, p. 12. 
533 Arzt et al., 2015, § 29, mn. 8. 
534 Mitsilegas, 2003, pp. 105, 106. 
535 A discussion about the necessity of changing the current drug policy is taking place in some 
countries and within the UN. See also Garzòn Vergara, 2014, p. (1) 2 ss. 
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catalogue of designated offences, directed at increasing the effectiveness of general 
deterrence, should not suppress local debates on the (de)criminalisation of those 
offences.536 Finally, the protection of the predicate offences' interest does not exhaust 
the interests protected by the whole provision. While it is suitable for the conduct 
listed in paragraph two, it does not seem to be appropriate for the 'concealing offence' 
listed under paragraph one.  
 
Thanks to its proximity to Article 257 Gcc, which criminalises the assistance after the 
fact (Begünstigung), the offence of money laundering is regarded as protecting the 
administration of justice (Rechtspflege), too.537 This opinion was expressed already 
during the law-making process by the parliament,538 with particular regard to the - by 
legal scholarship so called - 'real money laundering offence', which criminalises the 
integration of illegal objects in the legitimate economy pursuant to Article 261 (1) 
Gcc. In particular, by interpreting Article 261 (1) as a tool directed at avoiding 
investigations, prosecutions and forfeiture, it has been stated that it serves the 
purposes of defending the public interest in investigating, prosecuting and freezing 
and confiscating criminal assets.539 However, there is an open debate also about the 
interests protected by Article 257 Gcc. The controversy focuses on whether the 
offence defends individual or collective positions. The predominant opinion opts for 
an accumulative solution, which combines both the interest of the predicate offences 
and the administration of justice.540  Some scholars suggest that Article 257 Gcc 
safeguards the whole criminal legal system. 541  This argument is supported by 
referring to the functions attributed at least theoretically to the offence, such as the 
isolation of the offender, the enhanced risk of punishment and the reduction of the 
predicate offences' profitability. Yet, this opinion cannot be entirely translated to the 
offence of money laundering. Since the catalogue of the predicate offences is not 
unlimited under Article 261, the provision aims at making only those misdemeanours 
                                                          
536 Alldridge, 2008, p. (437) 458. 
537 Among others, see Otto, Jura, 1993, p. 331; Vogel, ZStW 109, 1997, p. (335) 349 ss. Other 
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Hefendehl, 2001, p. (10) 14. 
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and felonies contained in the catalogue less attractive. Also, the legislature in the 
beginning introduced the offence of money laundering in the context of the fight 
against organised crime and especially drug trafficking, therefore its purpose was not 
to defend the whole criminal justice system from the commission of any crime, but 
rather to protect those interests connected to those specific predicate offences.542 
Given the massive expansion of the catalogue, however, one could argue that the 
legislature in fact attributed to the money laundering offence the function of 
protecting the whole penal system. Against this argument, it has been noticed that the 
administration of justice cannot be ascribed to the conduct punished by Article 261 (2) 
Gcc, since this aims primarily at isolating offenders through impeding the use of their 
ill-gotten gains.543 Moreover, not all interests of a criminal justice system deserve to 
be protected.544 Therefore, being penal law anchored to the principle of ultima ratio, 
the legislature is supposed to balance the interests and protect only those that prevail 
to the detriment of others. Dionyssopoulou claims that it is necessary to restrain the 
concept of Rechtspflege, in order to restrict also the scope of the offence which would 
be otherwise too broad.545 The author specifies that the interest of the administration 
of justice should be understood as general deterrence, according to the legislator’s 
intent of eliminating incentives for the commission of crimes through the menace of 
punishment, specifically through the threat of investigation and confiscation. This 
function should stay in foreground, while the specific interests protected by the 
different predicate offences would remain in the background. Since all offences 
contained under chapter twenty-one of the criminal code derive from Article 258 Gcc, 
the crime of assistance in avoiding prosecution or punishment, which was introduced 
with the goal of intensifying general deterrence, also the other new offences should 
be interpreted as serving the same function. In this way the exegesis approach can be 
used to limit the scope of the money laundering offence.546 In particular, the scholar 
argues that the historical and taxonomic perspective excludes the punishment of 
common social practices and actions directed at the procurement of necessities, 
because their punishment would not lead to general deterrence, but would, instead, 
constitute a strong interference with the rights of the individuals.547 Of a completely 
                                                          
542 Burr, 1994, p. 25. 
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 130 
different opinion is another scholar, Bottke, who argues that an effective money 
laundering offence should punish every negligent conduct, among those who are 
potential gate-keepers of money laundering activities. They should have the 
responsibility of monitoring transactions and operations at risk and should therefore 
be held liable even for a negligent conduct.548  
 
Article 261 Gcc is said to protect the state’s interest in the surveillance of financial 
transactions much as the anti-money laundering preventive regulation does. 549 
According to this approach, the provision should protect the legal economy from the 
infiltration of illegal capital.550 Consequently the law defends people’s confidence in 
the soundness of the financial system. The protection of economic interests brings 
into the fore the European Directive’s considerations on the need to defend the 
soundness of the Single Market.551 This philosophy embraces the prudential strategy 
at the basis of the anti-money laundering act. However, being here in the field of 
criminal law, criticisms are raised with regard to the necessity of limiting criminal 
policy. 552  Critical scholars have contended that this interest is rather fictitious, 
'wolkig' or 'luftig', 553  because of the unexplained connection between the use of 
illegal property within the legal economy and the harm to public confidence.554 Vogel 
has further made the point that public confidence in the financial system is not 
harmed anymore when the property naturally deriving from a crime is not 
contaminated anymore, under a legal point of view, due to an in-between transaction 
with a third person in good faith.555 Another argument that has been raised against 
the determination of the 'economic order' as interest protected by the law: The 
economic order may coincide with the purpose of the policy rather than with the 
legally protected interest, and thus it does not legitimate resorting to a repressive 
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intervention. According to Hassemer and Baratta, the difference between the 
rationale of a legislation and interests it protects is fundamental; whereas the former 
coincides with the overall goal of the policy maker, the latter should limit such 
policy. 556  Yet, the protection of the financial interest may be supported by 
interpreting the notion of an economic order in a way that entails personal rights. In 
particular, this argument can be supported by interpreting property as a modern, 
dynamic concept that entails material and immaterial goods and economic relations 
aimed at human development. When the offence of money laundering is considered 
to harm property, it can be said that acts of money laundering, by distorting economic 
relations, undermine the individual’s capacity to develop economically. 557  This 
notion of property would, thus, include the economic potential of the individual to act 
in a context in which certain rules are respected. According to this approach, a 
criminal offence against the protected economic asset would consist of any act contra 
ius that would limit the economic potential of the individual, and thus also acts of 
money laundering. Following this reasoning, the gravity of the harm caused by 
money laundering should justify resorting to criminal law, to protect law-abiding 
individuals disadvantaged by the illicit economic competition carried out also 
through the laundering of illegal capitals, by anchoring the offence of money 
laundering to the protection of the individual’s rights.558 For instance, scholars have 
suggested that the offence of money laundering protects fair competition.559 This 
approach considers Hassemer´s and Baratta's image of a 'minimum criminal law'560 
as antiquate and dangerous because it results in a selective repressive tool that 
supports a class system, by reducing the scope of penal law in the field of white 
collar crimes. 561  By referring to the category of white collars criminality, 
Dionyssopoulou argues that the economic interest protected by these offences is 
double: On one hand the fair competition, on the other hand economic institutions.562 
 Fair competition is understood as the possibility of every economic actor to expect a 
fair competitive environment, in which money launderers should not be advantaged 
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by the fact that they can profit from illegality. The protection of economic institutions 
can be interpreted through the so-called game-theory, namely as the protection of the 
rules of the economic system.563 The protection of the rules of the game could be 
seen as a legal interest; still it should be clarified which rules such an enhanced need 
safeguard, whether those that regulate access or those that regulate actions. One 
option would be to limit the scope to those rules that are directed at maintaining the 
trust of money savers. Yet, once again, the protection of the confidentiality in the 
economic system does not enhance personal situations. Moreover this approach has 
also been contested, because the concept of economy is, at least in German language, 
a versatile concept that encompass different philosophical perspectives, such as the 
Volkswirtschaft (national/political economy), or the Kreditwirtschaft (credit 
economy), so that a question would raise: if the money laundering offence is said to 
protect the economic system, about which system are we talking about? Arguing 
from a prostate-interventionist perspective, but with a still critical approach towards 
the protection of economic interests through criminal law, one can say that 
'simultaneously, with the request for “less State” in the economic and social 
ordinance, “more State” is demanded to conceal and contain the destructive social 
consequences where the deterioration of social protection is also evident'.564 There is 
indeed a link between a lower degree of state intervention in the social sector and the 
use of the repressive arm. In other words: advocating for a reduction of the use of 
penal law to punish misbehaviours does not mean preventing state intervention in the 
economy. On the contrary, it means requiring that public action is directed to social 
policies rather than to repressive ones. Even if one considers penal law a necessary 
and legitimate tool, this should be directed at protecting individual or collective 
positions within the financial system, rather than at protecting the financial system's 
reputation. The goal should be the concrete protection of potential victims' rights and 
not their intangible confidence in the sector.  
 
 To protect client confidentiality in the financial system is a typical interest of the 
banking sector, as showed also in chapter two. Financial institutions aim to defend 
their name, without necessarily be willing to impede the infiltration of illegal money, 
while weaker actors aim at a more concrete safeguard of their economic potential 
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from unfair competition. A money laundering offence that aims at regulating the 
(already deregulated) economic sector cannot operate within the frame of the actual 
system. Otherwise, as underlined by Burr, the law would protect those actors who get 
corrupted through illegal capital and who are, therefore, the offenders and not the 
victims.565 This diatribe, which reflects a more general question about the use of 
criminal law to sanction economic misbehaviours and to protect financial interests, 
mirroring the even more general tension between a liberal-civil libertarian and a 
socialist approach to the role of the state in the economy, will be further tackled in 
the last chapter, through the views expressed by the interviews' partners. 
 
The last interest taken in consideration by a minor part of the legal scholarship, and 
also probably the most contested one, is the one of internal security. In particular, 
Article 261 Gcc is said to protect the security of citizens by avoiding the infiltration 
of organised crime in the society and the consequent distortion of social structures.566 
The indefiniteness of the concept of internal security, which alone constitutes a 
ground of refusal, might be restricted to the concept of internal security protected by 
any criminal law enacted against organised crime., also this determination does not 
justify the allocation of national security as an interest protected by Article 261 since 
the scope of the provision is not limited to organised crime-related offences.567 The 
German doctrinal discussion is particularly extensive on the topic of security as a 
constitutional principle and a legally protected interest. Some scholars recognise the 
subjective feature of security, and thus the risk of manipulation of the element,568 
some others elevate the feeling of insecurity to a factor justifying legal 
intervention. 569  Both approaches do not specify the specific threats, instead by 
inferring that security is a matter of perception and not an objectively quantifiable 
value, these viewpoints transform the protection of fundamental rights to a 
dangerously arbitrary question of interpretation.570 Further critics are referred to the 
use of this broad and undefined concept - the one of security- for the purposes of 
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justifying the adoption of provisions that would otherwise not be accepted, due to 
their high social costs and to their scarce efficiency. Indeed, legislatures have been 
accused of resorting to the topic of internal security while expanding the scope of the 
money laundering offence over the limits of criminal legal principles, and have 
imposed legally protected interests from 'above'. Against the securitisation rhetoric, 
scholars have also observed that conducts constituting money laundering consist of 
quite common daily actions, so that the offence has been defined an 'everyman 
misdemeanour' (Jedermannsdelikt).571 As a consequence, the harm caused by these 
conducts is not a direct harm to security, and therefore it should not legitimatise the 
resort to criminal law. Oppositely, it has been argued that certain interests are socially 
so important that they require an anticipated safeguard. Thus, criminal law should 
punish acts that put in danger those interests, although the interests are not harmed 
yet. This thought, known as the 'remote harm theory', would allow states to sanction 
conduct that represents a threat for specific interests but does not harm any of them 
directly.572 However, this would allow criminal law to be a mere tool for sanctioning 
socially dysfunctional conducts, without necessarily protecting the individual from 
materially harmful acts.573 Also, by criminalising acts that do not cause direct harm to 
legally protected interests, the latter would no longer serve to limit criminal policy.574  
 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the issue of the interests protected by Article 261, 
German scholars still define the offence of money laundering as a crime 'ohne Herz 
und Hirn' (without heart and brain), a pointless offence, whose legally protected 
interest has been trivialised. 575  Particularly critical about this issue is Arzt, who 
already in 1997 drew attention to the offence of money laundering as an example of a 
deficient criminal law in the book 'Das missglückte Gesetz',576 basing this his critic 
mostly on the trivialisation of the legally protected interests. The author thinks that 
the more the offence is enforced, the clearer it becomes that the provision has the 
goal of monitoring financial transactions. This means that the criminalisation of 
money laundering protects the same public interest in controlling the economy as the 
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preventive regulatory body does.577 As a consequence, the legally protected interest 
has lost its fundamental function of limiting criminal law. Arzt's reflections also 
shade light on the legislative intents since they show that the ultimate function of the 
offence criminalising money laundering is the one of controlling the financial system. 
As the scholar highlights, the real goal is not eliminating money laundering but rather 
classifying all money laundering acts as infringements.578 What remains to limit the 
action of the legislature is the general limit for the expansion of the offence of money 
laundering, which narrows the preventive purpose of the offence of money 
laundering that should be instead pursued by other means.579 
 
 3.3  Too broad or too narrow? 
Interestingly, charges of ineffectiveness are raised against the money laundering 
offence because the provision is considered to be both too narrow and too broad.580 
On one side a strict list of predicate offences may represent an obstacle for 
investigations and thus hamper the provision's efficacy. The catalogue of the 
predicate offences has been expanded on the assumption that the polluting capacity 
of money laundering derives not only from the proceeds of drug trafficking, but also 
from other crimes. In addition, the expansion of the catalogue of predicate crimes 
ought to have increased the effectiveness of the law, by way of facilitating the work 
of prosecutors and obliged entities. In addition, the FATF and other international 
organisations took advantage of the legal framework set out to prevent money 
laundering and decided to use it to tackle other “similar” phenomena, such as 
terrorism. The flexible wording of the money laundering offence also facilitates the 
harmonisation of national laws. In addition, the financial system evolves very quickly. 
Thanks to technological innovations, such as the cyber economy, the expansion of 
the catalogue of predicate offences can allow legislatures to take in consideration 
ever-new vehicles and subterfuges to move illicitly capital and thus to tackle ever-
new ways of laundering money. The broad catalogue of predicate offences also 
facilitates, at a domestic level, the gathering of information by public prosecutors. 
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On the other side, especially in countries with strongly embedded criminal law 
principles, the versatile use of the offence of money laundering to tackle ever-new 
emergencies has raised legal challenges that, far from being purely dogmatic, may 
hinder the effective implementation of such measures, because they undermine the 
acceptance of that law. Also the fact that the money laundering offence was designed 
very broadly, not only due to the continuous expansion of the catalogue of predicate 
offences, but also due the wording of the provision and to the decision of 
criminalising the reckless conduct, may lead to legal uncertainty, which can  cause 
de-legitimation and hence dis-application.  
 
 3.3.1 The mens rea element: Punishing reckless bakers instead of mafia bosses 
The legislative’s controversial debate that preceded the decision of criminalising the 
reckless money laundering offence under Article 261 (5) Gcc, which has been 
analysed in the previous chapter, revealed that the different parties agreed on 
including the reckless hypothesis with the goal of reducing difficulties in bringing 
evidence of the knowledge of the illegal provenience.581 Against this argument severe 
critics were raised by the doctrine, based on the fact that substantial criminal law 
should not have the function of facilitating procedures.582 Moreover, it was the first 
time that the reckless property crime was punished, and this was fostered without 
undertaking an adequate legal debate. According to legal scholar Vogel, 583  this 
decision was taken without being obliged by international duties; the Supreme Court, 
instead, has argued the opposite.584 The European Directives require intention and 
knowledge about the illicit origin of the property; on the contrary, the Strasbourg 
Convention of 2005 gave the opportunity to member states to extend the mens rea to 
negligent behaviour, by extending the criminalisation to situations when the offender 
'ought to have assumed the criminal provenience of the property'.585 The punishment 
of reckless money laundering acts may potentially infringe the principles of 
culpability (nullum crimen sine culpa) and certainty (nullum crimen sine lege) of 
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penal law.586 Yet the Supreme Court denied the possible violation of these principles, 
and declared the law constitutionally legitimate.587 Many scholars agree upon the fact 
that by punishing reckless economic misbehaviours, the provision violates the 
interests of a free economic system.588 Requiring that every single person would need 
to act with diligence when undertaking an economic transaction would weight down 
a market situation by slowing down transactions. In addition, attributing to every 
economic actor the obligation not to launder money recklessly might negatively 
affect the free movement of economic goods. This may raise problems with regard to 
the purposes of the criminal policy. In fact, the criminalisation of the reckless offence 
together with the wide formulated conducts punished under article 261 (2) Gcc, 
allows the punishment of daily professional behaviours, whose relevance for the fight 
against money laundering is very low.589 It cannot be expected that citizens would 
monitor transactions to prove their legitimacy, because this would represent a too 
high burden for the financial sector. In fact, even the preventive regulations are not a 
guarantee of complete control, since bank employees cannot be expected to identify 
all money-laundering transactions correctly.590 Moreover, the author recalls the fact 
that while money laundering is punished for reckless conducts, some of the predicate 
offences are not, this constituting a major incoherence. On the background of these 
considerations, the scholar concludes that Article 261 (5) Gcc should be abrogated.591 
This incoherence has even increased when tax offences were included in the 
catalogue of the predicate offences:  Even if the legislature considered this extension 
as to be indispensable, the inclusion of fiscal crimes in the scope of the money 
laundering offence has exacerbated the highlighted problems. Indeed, due to the fact 
that tax evasion does not create a profit but rather a saving, the assets in possession of 
a tax evader might have a legal provenience. Therefore punishing the reckless failure 
to acknowledge the criminal origin of property deriving from tax evasion, which 
might be used in daily transactions, seems to go beyond the legislative intentions.592 
                                                          
586 See among others: Hassemer, 1995, p. (1) 14; Leip, 1999, p. 146 ss; StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 
42 a. 
587 BGHSt 43, 158, 166 ss; Arzt, JR 1999, p. (75) 79. 
588 GwG-Herzog, § 261, mn. 120; StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 42 a; Arzt, 2004, p. 3 ss; Hetzer, NJW, 
1993, p. (3298) 3299. 
589 GwG-Herzog, § 261 mn. 120. 
590 Dionyssopoulou, 1999, p. 156. 
591 Dionyssopoulou, 1999, p. 157. 
592 The typical example used to clarify this absurdity is the one of the backer that sells bread to a 
notorious tax evader, who can be held liable for money laundering, only because she or he has accepted 
 138 
Yet, according to the provocative article of Bottke published in 1995, the impunity of 
property crimes for negligent behaviours was not sacrosanct.593  The scholar claims 
that only by incriminating all transactions that integrate ill-gotten gains into the legal 
economy and committed both intentionally or negligently, the law would be adequate 
to fulfil its function. In fact, Bottke acknowledges that this hypothesis would be 
cumbersome for the whole economic system. Along with this provocative statement, 
the author recognises the excessive broadness of the scope of the money laundering 
offence and specifically criticises the fact that the formulation of the offence results 
in a 'Jedermannsdelikt'. The provision instead should, punish only the so called 'gate-
keepers', namely individuals who in the exercise of their professional or economic 
duties may permit the infiltration of illegal money in the legitimate economy.594 This 
approach is recalled also by Moccia, who ideally designs the offence of money 
laundering as a 'reato d'obbligo' (a sort of a neglecting offence especially directed at 
individuals that have a guarantor position). 595  In the specific case of money 
laundering, for instance, financial services providers should have a 'security position' 
and therefore a specific criminal liability.596 However certain professions would raise 
a conflict of interests between the interest to properly to exercise their profession and 
the public interest of persecuting a crime.597 In recalling the parliamentarian debate, it 
should not be forgotten, that one of the functions attributed to the creation of the 
money laundering offence was the isolation of criminals through the criminalisation 
of any actions of third parties dealing with the incriminated object, pursuant to article 
261 (2) Gcc. In other words, the legislator aimed at hitting gate-keepers, although this 
was not expressively stated. 
 
In order to stop the drifting of such an offence, the courts have intervened and 
determined the borders of the reckless money laundering offence. The jurisprudence 
has anchored the case to the civil law culpable negligence. 598  It has interpreted 
recklessness closer to intent, so that it coincides with particular negligence or gross 
                                                                                                                                                                          
money that could derive from tax evasion. As a consequence, someone charged for tax evasion would not 
be able to purchase commodities.  
593 Bottke, wistra 1995, p.  (87) 89. 
594 Bottke, wistra 1995, p.  (87) 89. 
595 Actually money laundering can be committed also through omission. The guarantor position is 
set for competent authorities (e.g. law enforcement and customs) and witnesses. See See NK-Altenhain, 
2013, § 261, mn. 93; Leip, 1999, p. 138; Müko-Neuhauser, 2012, § 261, mn. 92.  
596 Moccia, 1995, p. (728) 747. 
597 Müko-Neuheuser, 2012, § 261, mn. 77.  
598 BGHSt 43, 158, 168; BGH NJW 2008, 2516, 2517. 
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carelessness. The mens rea required was a particular degree of negligence or gross 
recklessness.599 The latter hypothesis is also given when the defendant did not have 
the chance to acquire knowledge about the provenience of the property. 600  The 
inclusion of the reckless case and the extension of the scope of the offence to 
commercial and organised tax evasion mostly impacts the categories of designated 
businesses and professions who are required to take particular care when receiving 
fees from clients, such as defence attorneys. In order to impede that some exposed 
categories become victim of the prejudice of being used for the purposes of 
laundering proceeds of crime, specific duties have been imposed to detect suspicious 
transactions.601 
 
 3.3.2  Defence attorneys under threat 
Within this scenario, the situation of defence attorneys is particularly critical due to 
the attorney-client privilege, namely the need to protect confidentiality in the 
relationship on one side, and the public interest in the persecution of crimes on the 
other side. The matter can be summarised as such: When a client is suspected to have 
committed one of the predicate offences for money laundering and to have gained 
some profit out of it, the defence attorney must ask her or himself whether the fee 
that she or he receives from the client is derived from that offence. In the case of 
receiving stolen goods, the question can be answered by looking at whether the 
attorney knew at the moment of receiving the fee that it was stolen. The peculiarity of 
money laundering is also derived from the fact that gross negligence is punished 
under the law. With respect to the lawyer-client relationship, issues linked to the 
peculiarity of the relationship could be raised. On one side, lawyers might be held 
liable, as many other professions, if they receive fees derived from predicate offences, 
on the other side, everyone should be granted legal counsel, even money launderers. 
In Germany there is abundant jurisprudence on the topic. Legal scholars have largely 
engaged in the discussion too. One of the breakthrough cases dealt with a defence 
attorney who allegedly received drug money from a gangster, and who could have 
suspected the illegal provenance of the money, thanks to previous experiences with 
                                                          
599 GwG-Herzog, § 261, mn. 122. 
600 BGHSt 43, 158, 169; BGH NJW 2008, 2516, 2517. 
601 StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 44. 
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gangsters belonging to the same group.602 The higher regional court of Hamburg 
(Oberlandesgericht) ruled on the matter by interpreting the provision according to 
the constitution, and thus by stating that defence attorneys may not be liable when 
receiving fees, besides in particular cases. The three exceptions are: Firstly, if the 
lawyer's actions hinder law enforcement activities, secondly if the attorney receives 
money that should have been given back to victims, finally if the attorney and the 
client has a 'kick-back' deal, so that the offender would have received back the 
money.603 The constitutional court was called to express its opinion on this topic, 
with reference to a cases ruled by the Supreme Court, which convicted an attorney 
for money laundering, having received a fee of 200.000 DM (Deutsche Mark, the 
German currency) cash from a client suspected of fraud committed on commercial 
and organised basis.604 The Supreme Court inferred the liability of the attorney from 
the unusual high fee, from the fact that the fee was paid in cash carried in suitcases, 
from the circumstance that there was no written documents regulating the transaction, 
and from the fact that the alleged offence was a predicate offence for money 
laundering. In particular the court motivated the decision by proclaiming that 
attorneys should have not been exempted by the money laundering provision, since 
the legislator did not provide exceptions for Article 261 (2), which had the goal of 
isolating offenders. The constitutional court overruled the case and decided that in the 
particular case of the defence attorney the mens rea should consist a certain level of 
certainty about the illegal origin of the object. Therefore the court established an 
exception for defence attorneys, who cannot be held liable for gross negligence. 
Instead it is required evidence of knowledge (dolus eventualis).605 
 
This decision raised a vivid doctrinal debate. Some scholars supported the privileged 
situation provided for defence attorneys, while others severely contested it. 
Arguments brought up in support for the privilege are: The right of the suspect to 
freely choose a defence attorney, the confidentiality between attorney and client, the 
exclusivity of the perceived interests of the lawyer towards the suspect, the harm to 
the offender's rights caused by resignation or refusal of defence attorneys, the 
                                                          
602 OLG Hamburg, Decision of 6 January 2000 - 2Ws185/99, NJW 2000. 673 = StV 2000, 140. 
603 Fernandez and Heinrich, ZStW 126, 2014, p. (382) 417. 
604 BGH, Decision of 4 July 2001 - 2 StR 513/00, BGHSt 47, 68 = NJW 2001, 2891 = JR 2002, 27= 
JZ 2002, 102. 
605 Fernandez and Heinrich, ZStW 126, 2014, p. (382) 419. 
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absence of discriminatory treatment for serious offenders, the possible violation of 
the presumption of innocence, the professional freedom of defence attorneys, the 
eventual violation of the fair trial principle, the need to protect professional secrecy, 
the possible manipulations by public prosecutors.606 
The last argument refers to criminal policy goals of the money laundering offence. In 
particular scholars argue that the law was enacted to fight organised crime, while the 
receiving of a fee by a defence attorney does not represent a typical conduct related 
to organised criminal activities. Through the payment of a fee, indeed, money 
launderers are not able to integrate ill-gotten gains in the legal economy, in fact they 
do not receive back anything from the lawyer. Moreover, hindering the payment of 
attorneys' fees does not make the commission of predicate offences less attractive. 
Offenders do not engage in crime to pay a more qualified defence; without 
committing the predicate offence, they would not need any defence.607 Yet, criminal 
organisations might be interested in getting a very qualified lawyer in order to receive 
counsel for other serious crimes. They would engage in predicate offences in order to 
accumulate the money to pay a qualified defence counsellor. In addition, even though 
the payment of an attorney fee does not represent a typical organised crime activity, 
nor a way to integrate illicit funds in the legitimate economy, it does represent an 
action that, if impeded, would isolate offenders and thus demotivate them from the 
commission of crimes, in accordance with the legislative intents related to Article 
261 (2) Gcc. The opinion against the attorney privilege is sustained with the 
following arguments: The equal validity and application of criminal law for lawyers, 
the inclusion of defence attorneys as part of the administration of justice, and thus the 
inappropriateness of consciously receiving illegal money, the risk of advantaging 
offenders who committed predicate offences and who therefore could pay for a better 
qualified defence attorney, the possibility for the lawyer to ask to be recognised as 
public defender.608 
 
For the purposes of the research, this discussion is relevant to the extent that shows 
the controversial matters arising from the criminalisation of money laundering. It is 
interesting to see that there is still strong resistance in accepting this 'Fremdkörper'609 
                                                          
606 Fernandez and Heinrich, ZStW 126, 2014, pp. (382) 421-436. 
607 Fernandez and Heinrich, ZStW 126, 2014, p. (382) 436. 
608 Fernandez and Heinrich, ZStW  126, 2014, pp. (382) 436-441. 
609 Vogel, ZStW 109, 1997, p. (335) 346. 
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within the criminal legal system, due to the clear inconsistencies existing between the 
offence and the principles, among them even some constitutional ones, embedded in 
the national legal culture. Another relevant question connected to this discussion 
concerns the functions assigned to the offence, if on one side the isolating function is 
regarded as serving the purpose of fighting organised crime and thus prevailing on 
the confidentiality principle, on the other side, the client-attorney privilege is 
perceived as deserving more importance than public interest in prosecuting crimes. 
The defence attorney doctrinal debate is important in relation to the effectiveness 
question because it is a discussion triggered by the implementation of the law. 
Therefore it shows that the law creates challenges not only 'in the books' but also in 
the praxis.  
 
 3.3.3  Definitions of 'Gegenstand' and of 'herrührt' 
Since the offence of money laundering was created to close the loopholes left by the 
other derivative offences that required a strict link between the commission of the 
predicate offence and the main conduct, the legislature adopted the term 'herrühren' 
(deriving) in order to soften that link. Moreover, given that the offence of handling 
stolen goods (Article 259 Gcc) refers only to goods, leaving money out of the scope, 
the legislature chose to use the undefined term 'Gegenstand' (object) in order to 
comprehend any type of object having an economic value. Thanks to the broad 
interpretation of these terms, actions undertaken on the original criminal asset that 
changed its nature but maintained the economic value are considered to be liable. The 
aim was to have access to those surrogate assets that are not connected with the 
commission of the antecedent act. 
 
The Parliament specified that the object in possession of the offender or of third 
persons was supposed to derive from a predicate offence.610 However, this causality 
relation was criticised by legal scholars since it could have been perpetuated to any 
act of contamination with the illegal property.611 The legislature left the concept of 
herrühren without further clarifications; the only guideline provided was the wide 
                                                          
610 BT-Drucks. 12/3533, p. 12.  
611 NK-Altenhain, 2013, § 261, mn. 52; GwG-Herzog, § 261 mn. 50; Leip, 1999, p. 71; StGB-
Schönke, § 261, mn. 8. 
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criminalisation.612 Also the declared legislative intents do not provide information to 
restrain the field since, according to the follow the money strategy, any action linked 
to the paper trail is relevant. The legislature indeed opted for such a large 
criminalisation in order not to lose the link with the illegitimate conduct due to 
laundering process.613 On the other side, the legislature recognised the risk of too 
wide criminalisation and posed a restriction, which should have not transformed the 
legitimate economy in a place full of somehow incriminated assets.614 Yet, it has 
been observed that this restriction does not reply to the question about how to define 
the provenience of a property from a predicate crime. Scholars have also tried to 
anchor the determination of the provenience of the object to the rules provided for the 
forfeiture. Yet, those rules apply only for assets of the offenders, while the money 
laundering offence relates only to predicate offences committed by third parties.615 
Dionyssopoulou considers the term herrühren as an important element to determine 
the scope of the money laundering offence because it constitutes the link between the 
predicate offences and the object;616 one could even see it as the link between the 
antecedent act and the main act. Yet, the vague definition of the interests protected by 
the law does not serve the purposes of limiting the scope of the offence and thus does 
not help to narrow the meaning of the term herrühren.617 As concerns the burden of 
proof, law enforcement is required not only to prove that the object stems from any 
of the offences of the catalogue, or that the object does not have a legitimate origin, it 
has, instead, to bring evidence of the concrete situation of the antecedent act. This 
higher burden of proof is required in order not to violate the principles of in dubio 
pro reo and of culpability, and the rights of the offender. Due to the strictness of this 
doctrine, it seems not possible, therefore, to introduce a mechanism that, for example 
in Italy, has been very successful in this field, which is the inversion of the burden of 
proof.618 
                                                          
612 On this topic see, among others, critics from Wohlers, StV 2001, p. (420) 425; Hefendehl, FS 
Roxin 2001, p. 145, 163; GwG-Herzog, § 261, mn. 48. 
613 BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 27. 
614 BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 27. See also NK-Altenhain, 2013, § 261, mn. 55. 
615 GwG-Herzog, § 261, mn. 52; Arzt, JZ 1993, p. 914; NK-Altenhain, § 261, mn. 58; Vest, FS-
Schmid 2001, p. 417; Leip, p. 76; Voß, p. 40. 
616 Dionyssopoulou, 1999, p. 171. 
617 GwG-Herzog, § 261, mn. 49. 
618 The rule is contained in article 12 sexies of law 356/92. According to Italian scholars and 
practitioners the inversion of the burden of proof is a very useful tool for the purposes of tackling 
economic power of organised crime. However, the institution is still much debated due to the 
infringement of the constitutional in dubio pro reo principle. For a detailed debate about the issue, see 
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Section 261 Gcc does not refer to the term property; it refers instead to the term 
object (Gegenstand), which is not defined under German law. The legislature chose 
the term precisely because it was not legally defined, with the goal of including the 
whole chain of uses and substitutions of the original property.619 Indeed the term was 
meant to cover a broad range of things and even surrogates of the original asset 
involving some kind of economic value, including for instance movable and 
immovable property, money, securities and accounts receivables.620 A classification 
has been proposed, which refers to the economic nature of the money laundering 
offence and considers only those objects that economically substitute the laundered 
value. Yet, in the literature there is, (as of now) no consensus on the definition of the 
term. The decision to adopt a broad concept may be related to the European 
Directives approach, which also adopted the broadest definition possible of proceeds 
of crime: 'Assets of every kind whether corporal or incorporeal, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing 
title or interests in such assets'.621 
 
 3.3.4  The catalogue of the predicate offences: A wide scope for a limited 
application 
Despite the declared goal of the 1992 legislature of fighting organised crime, the 
catalogue of the predicate offences does not comprehend only offences linked to 
organised crime activities. For example since the beginning it included the cultivation 
and the production of psychotropic substances for personal use.622 As it was already 
observed in chapter two, by looking at the wording of the offence, the provision does 
not refer only to those typical conducts that are commonly understood as money 
laundering, but also to any action that is in contact with the incriminated object.623 
Arzt describes the expansion of the scope of the money laundering as a fruitless 
attempt of the legislature to improve the effectiveness of the money laundering 
offence.624 The scholar speaks of a legislature's 'Flucht nach vorne'625  and warns 
about the introduction in the catalogue of dubious offences.626 
                                                          
619 BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 27; BT-Drucks. 12/3533, p. 12. 
620 Leip, p. 116, Altenhain, 2002, p. 419; FATF, Mutual Evaluation report of Germany, 2010, p. 50. 
621 Article 1 (8) Directive 2005/60/EC. 
622 Burr, 1995, p. 30. 
623 Burr, 1995, p. 32; StGB-Fischer, § 261, mn. 4c. 
624 Arzt et al., 2015, § 29, mn. 8. 
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There is quite a vast consensus on the fact that the scope of the liability under Article 
261 Gcc is, at least theoretically, too broad.627 Given the borderless formulation of 
the offence and the various and vague functions attributed to the law, it can be 
concluded that Article 261 aims at penalising as many conducts as possible.628 This 
would collide with the neutral character of money expressed in the well-known 
sentence 'pecunia non olet', since it would make every transactions suspicious. 
According to Barton and Bottke ,different theories have been proposed with the goal 
of limiting the scope of application of the money laundering offence, with reference 
to the concept of the 'Sozialadäquanz' of Welzel, 629  or through the use of the 
Rechtsgut as a limiting factor. 630  Barton claims that the function of isolating 
criminals should limit the liability under Article 261 by eliminating the 
criminalisation of actions directed at the procurement of necessities. These, indeed, 
do not put in danger national security. Once again, national security is considered a 
too vague concept to limit the applicability of the money laundering offence.631 
Bottke, instead, argues that if one accepts the financial market as the legally protected 
interest, minor misbehaviours (Bagatellen) should not be included because they do 
not threaten it.632  
 
One of the main controversies is the question whether Article 261 Gcc shall also 
punish socially conventional acts. On one side the legislature aimed at punishing any 
act linked to the illicitly gained property in order not to miss the link with the 
predicate offence due to laundering schemes, on the other side it tried to limit the 
potential criminalisation of widespread economic activities to avoid a too high 
burden for the economy.633 The Supreme Court decided that Article 261 Gcc should 
also have been applied to actions undertaken to cover life needs.634 This thesis is 
based on the legislative declared intent of isolating lawbreakers which can be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
625 The sentence can be translated with the saying: 'The best defence is offence'. 
626 Arzt et al., 2015, § 29, mn. 8. 
627 For a complete overview on the different opinions, see Dionyssopuolou, 1999, pp. 119 ss. 
628 Dionyssopuolou, 1999, p. 118. 
629 Welzel, ZStW 58 (1939), p. (491) 517. 
630 Barton, StV, 1993, p. 156 (160); Bottke, wistra 1995, p. (121) 124. 
631 Dionyssopuolou, 1999, p. 125. 
632 Bottke, wistra 1995, p. (121) 124. 
633 BT-Drucks. 12/989, p. 27. 
634 BGH StV 2001 506, 507.  
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fulfilled also by impeding the satisfaction of primary necessities. 635  The offence 
indeed tends to target unobtrusive actions, such as the exchange of cash money in a 
bank.636 Despite a clause of social adequacy (Sozialadaequanzklause) to limit the 
criminal liability of activities linked to fundamental needs was not provided, in the 
praxis the purchase of food or clothes is not seen as a potential act of money 
laundering.637 On the other hand it has to be observed that the elimination of some 
bagatelle types of actions from the scope of the money laundering offence would 
allow money launderers to exploit those activities.638  
 
 3.4   Doctrinal opinions on the (symbolic) effectiveness of the money laundering 
offence 
After one year of its entry into force, the law criminalising money laundering was the 
focus of a speech about symbolic legislation in the field of organised crime held by 
Pieth at the German defence attorney`s conference in Münster.639 The scholar deals 
with the new anti-money laundering regime in the context of the then current 
engagement against drug criminality and criticises fundamentally the fact that drug 
policy, by way of being a prohibition tool, notoriously causes the opposite effect of 
increasing criminal proceeds derived from the illegal drug market. At the same time, 
the money laundering offence, which is part of the drug policy, aims at confiscating 
the proceeds of drug-related crimes. On one hand the state provokes the accumulation 
of illegal capitals and on the other hand it confiscates it, so that it seems that 'the left 
hand does not know what the right hand does'. The author considers the hypothesis of 
complicity as well.640 The symbolic dimension of the money laundering offence has 
been re-evoked by legal scholarship. On the basis of a reflection about the legislator's 
intent of using the offence to overcome investigative challenges and on the better 
suitability of other measures to tackle organised crime rather than the criminalisation 
of money laundering, Kilchling defines the law as 'symbolic policy'. 641  Also 
Dionyssopoulou draws attention on the latent functions of the money laundering 
offence. The scholar observes that behind the introduction of this crime one can feel 
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the intention of overcoming procedural difficulties in proving money laundering facts 
during a trial. 642  Yet, according to the researcher, the use of criminal law for 
procedural purposes violates the principles of culpability and of presumption of 
innocence and therefore the offence should be deleted. Bottke in his Article of 1995 
expresses a quite provocative opinion, by stating that the money laundering offence 
as it is formulated consists of symbolic paper, excitement and lip service.643 In his 
opinion, a money laundering offence that would slow down the flow of money across 
the globe, would be an effective hindrance of the infiltration of illegal money into the 
legitimate economy, despite being a heavy burden for the private sector. Such 
offence would require that not only citizens, desk personnel, and subordinates but 
also managers would not be able to discharge their preventive duties.644 Such an 
offence, concludes the scholar, would be harmful for the whole society.  
 
Dionyssopoulou interestingly recognises a symbolic dimension of the norm, in 
relation to the function of tackling organised crime.645 The author contextualises his 
reflections in the framework of the law against organised crime (OrgKG) and infers 
the symbolic effectiveness of the money laundering offence from its ineffectiveness 
proved in the praxis. The scholar believes that the OrgKG had a symbolic function.646 
However, the non-application of the law frustrates even the symbolic function 
because the addresses would not be threaten by the menace of prosecution and could 
count on impunity. Therefore the scarce effectiveness of the criminalisation of money 
laundering can be related on one side to the fact that this measure can tackle only 
subsidiary issues, and on the other side to the symbolic effectiveness attributed to the 
crime within the context of the fight against organised crime. By assuming that 
organised crimes do not represent a threat in Germany, the scholar suggests to 
consider the money laundering offence as a new form of handling stolen goods, so 
that it can really overcome legal loopholes and have, thus, an instrumental 
efficacy.647 
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Quite a vast body of literature has been criticising the law for not being suitable to 
achieve the declared goals. Adopting a very critical approach towards the basis of 
criminal policy behind the criminalisation of money laundering, namely the fight 
against organised crime, Arzt raised a very strong critic in 1997, saying that the 
offence of money laundering was a conceptual failure, because criminal control is not 
a conflict that the state can won, therefore it should not aim at winning, but rather at 
finding a bearable balance.648 In other words, a society without criminality is not 
realistic, and thus also a society without organised crime, therefore the goal of the 
criminal justice system should not be the 'fight against organised crime', but rather 
diminishing the crime rates. The same scholar adds that the system has so far 
managed to create only a form of new professionalism.649 Also other scholars have 
raised their voices against tight approach in the field of organised crime. Hassemer, 
for example, theorised that social fear of organised crime was exploited to introduce 
new repressive measures.650 Along with this critical approach, other scholars have 
empathised the use of organised crime to expand criminal law, by adopting the 
securitisation rhetoric of the enemy. This philosophy, which refuses the idea of a 
criminal law against the enemy (Feindstrafrecht), regards the threat of organised 
crime as an excuse to introduce preventive regulations.651 More specific concerns 
were raised with regard to the money laundering offence’s suitability to tackle 
organised crime. Since the risk posed by organised crime was not unanimously 
recognised,652 the introduction of the offence of money laundering for the purposes 
of dealing with it was not considered as a necessity. Some scholars, in fact, believed 
that the commission of crimes in an organised and collective way was the normality 
and that therefore organised crime was not posing a particular threat. In addition, 
Article 261 was not considered suitable to tackle gangster criminality.653 
 
                                                          
648 The scholar quotes the 'Gesetzgebungslehre' by Noll, where the author states that criminal law 
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Another critical issue that has been raised is the incapacity of the money laundering 
offence to tackle the grey area, namely the fine line between legality and illegality, 
due to the proximity of money laundering conducts and legitimate financial 
transactions. Already in 1999 in his PhD thesis, Dionyssopoulou underlines that it is 
quite impossible to find out about the origin of sums of money used for financial 
transactions without disturbing the market. 654  Investigations on customers, on 
juridical entities, or on businesses are cumbersome for the functioning of a free 
economy. Given the neutral nature of money as a universal payment method and the 
ability of criminals of exploiting all legal loopholes, the scholar is very sceptical 
about the efficacy of the anti-money laundering regulations. In addition the scholar 
highlights that some countries, without naming which ones, profit from financial 
flows and are thus not interested in restricting liberties of this lucrative business 
through public control.655 In other words, the scholar reveals a deep truth about the 
anti-money laundering regime, which is still very actual, namely the fact that the 
regulation of the financial sector through public interference to monitor transactions 
is not seen in a very good way from those who profit from the 'laissez faire' 
philosophy.  
 
On the same lines Pieth underlines that the financial system often profits of the flow 
of dirty money, deriving from fiscal crimes, or currency export laws violations.656 
The scholar distinguishes between proceeds of organised crime and capital flight. 
While the first is perceived as more serious due to human rights allegedly involved, 
the second type of illegal money appears less harmful. The distinction between the 
two is what especially interests those countries that profit from financial flows. 
Switzerland, for instance, was, according to Pieth, very much concerned about its 
reputation as banking centre. Therefore the country would not want to be known for 
being an offshore centre where criminals launder their profits, still without 
renouncing to carry on its financial business behind the veil of bank secrecy.657 
  
                                                          
654 Dionyssopoulou, 1999, pp. 168 ss.  
655 Dionyssopoulou, 1999, p. 168. 
656 Pieth, 1993 p. 105.  
657 Pieth, 1993 p. 105.  
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 3.5  Considerations 
This chapter has showed that the wording of Article 261 Gcc has the potential of 
frustrating some of the intentions expressed by the legislature in occasion of the 
adoption of the provision. For instance, while the vague wording of the money 
laundering offence was thought to tackle ever-new emergencies and has been 
justified by legislatures as necessary to ensure a more effective fight against money 
laundering, it has also raised issues that, far from being purely dogmatic, have 
undermined the acceptance of such law. If law makers have designed the offence in a 
broad way to allow the criminalisation of conducts that could not have been 
prosecuted by the existing offences before, the large discretion left to prosecutors, 
has resulted in a cumbersome element for the prosecution of money laundering. In 
addition, criminalising the reckless conduct without envisaging a specific criminal 
liability for security positions has widened the scope of the offence to the point that 
the law has missed its function of isolating criminals by criminalising gate-keepers’ 
activities.  
 
In addition, the chapter has revealed underlying controversies, for example the 
interests protected by Article 261 Gcc, which may, if not solved, affect its 
implementation. For instance, if on one side a state intervention is considered 
necessary to contain the impact of economic misbehaviours to protect citizens, on the 
other side it is important to limit the resort to criminal law only for safeguarding 
individual or collective situations and not for defending an existing economic 
structure. The economic system may, in fact, not be considered as a collective 
interest that needs protection. Also, safeguards provided by penal law need to be 
substantial and not symbolic, because they urge to change a given situation of 
inequality, where criminals can profit from illegal practices while legitimate 
economic actors undergo unfair competition. From the doctrinal analysis it has 
instead emerged that the legislator seemed to be more interested in drafting a 
symbolic legislation that can be hardly integrated in the legal system and that raise 
strong challenges. Lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-
money laundering in order to improve its effectiveness, yet without providing 
legitimacy for such expansion. While the European discourse on money laundering 
stresses the absolute urgency of protecting the soundness of the financial system from 
the infiltration of ill-gotten capitals, in practice the vague formulation and the further 
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expansion of the money laundering offence, which contrasts with domestic legal 
principles of EU countries, results in a cumbersome implementation of these anti-
money laundering law. The fact that the criminalisation of money laundering causes 
so much uncertainty at a domestic level should be taken into account when 
evaluating how it is enforced; therefore instead of perpetuating the process of 
expanding the reach of anti-money laundering, legislators should clarify the goals of 
such a cumbersome policy.658  
 
On the background of the analysis conducted in this chapter it can be said that the 
hypothesised symbolic nature of Article 261 Gcc can be generally supported by the 
study of legal scholarship. Legal scholars have revealed technical hindrances that 
hinder the provision's legitimacy and thus hamper a positive integration of the act in 
the criminal legal system. In addition, given that most controversial issues are caused 
by the wording of the offence, the chapter seems to uphold the idea of an intentional 















                                                          
658 Zoppei, 2015, p. 130, 144.  
 152 
 4 CHAPTER 
'The implementation of the law: A qualitative analysis of criminal statistics 





'Now all the criminals in their coats and their ties 
Are free to drink martinis and watch the sun rise 
While Rubin sits like Buddha in a ten-foot cell 
An innocent man in a living hell'. 







 4.1  Foreword 
Illicit globalisation operates in the gap between the authority to create laws and the 
ability to enforce such laws.659 In order to disclose the impact that the legislation has 
had in the past twenty-three years of being in force in order to compare this with the 
previously highlighted intents of the legislature, this chapter deals with the second 
factor, identified in the first chapter, for the empirical research on the effectiveness of 
law, namely the implementation of law. In particular, the chapter looks at the effects 
of the criminalisation of money laundering and the application of the GwG by 
analysing official statistics, and thus by looking at the implementation of law from 
the point of view of the authorities providing the figures. The chapter does not aim at 
assessing either the phenomenon of money laundering or the effectiveness of norms 
through the official figures. It would rather imply assuming that the effectiveness of a 
law depends merely on its implementation, and that the implementation could be 
                                                          
659 Andreas, 2015, pp. 52-53. 
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assessed through statistics on compliance, deviance and punished deviance. This 
research, instead, is based on the assumption that the (in)effectiveness of a norm may 
also depend on different factors and that, in order to assess the implementation of a 
law, it is necessary to look at all effects caused by the law, including those that are 
not registered by the official statistics. In addition, this work takes the view that a 
high convictions rate does not always correspond to a high level of effectiveness of 
the criminal law. As argued in the first chapter, compliance might not be enough to 
fulfil the indirect functions of a norm,660 while a high degree of disobedience does 
not mean that the norm has no effect.661 Moreover, for interpreting statistics on the 
implementation of a law, it is fundamental to understand legal practices and legal 
actors’ opinions on such law. Therefore, the results of this chapter will contribute to 
the evaluation of the effectiveness together with the considerations deriving from the 
interviews conducted with law enforcement personnel presented in the following 
chapter five. These should provide some insight to help interpret figures in a more 
critical way. Due to the great amount of reports that provide statistics on law 
enforcement, the research is purely directed at a qualitative understanding of the issue 
since e it does not gather primary data. The figures on the criminal justice system 
activities relating to money laundering and on the preventive regime are provided by 
public authorities and are therefore official sources. There is a certain degree of 
approximation, though. On the one hand it is due to the fact that Germany is a federal 
state and that figures are firstly collected at a state level and then rounded up at a 
federal level, and on the other hand it is because every authority has its own 
methodology to collect the information. Yet, they both constitute a basis on which 
further qualitative reflections can be developed. The official statistics are analysed 
with a qualitative approach, on the basis of hypotheses built on the outcomes of 
previous researches and on the study conducted in the previous chapters, with the 
goal of understanding both the causes and the effects of the described outcomes. 
 
Given the abundant literature that summarises and analyses the data and thanks to the 
results of an empirical research conducted shortly after the introduction of the policy, 
this work approaches the outcome of the statistics with an already critical perspective. 
                                                          
660 Full compliance with article 261 Gcc might not impede the infiltration of illicit financial flows, 
as much as the law that imposes a driving speed limit is not effective if car accidents take place despite 
obedience. See Rottleuthner, 1983, p. 90. 
661 Aubert, 1974, p. (85) 86. 
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Specifically, figures are studied on the basis of factors identified as relevant, such as 
the number of investigations initiated and the number of cases that reached a final 
decision, the number of convictions inflicted to the relatively different conducts 
punished by Article 261 Gcc, the type of punishment attached, the amount of assets 
effectively confiscated in relation to money laundering convictions, the nationality of 
the individuals and the headquarters of the companies reported.  Furthermore, the 
typology of Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) filed will be also taken into 
consideration, in order to reveal which offences suspicious transactions are normally 
linked to. Moreover, despite being aware that economic estimates have a low degree 
of objectivity and that the flow of illicit capitals in the country might be influenced 
by several different factors, the chapter also presents estimates of the volume held by 
illegal economy in Germany. The German anti-money laundering regime was 
assessed by the FATF in 2010. A follow-up report was published in 2014.662 Both 
reports provide relevant information that complete the analysis conducted on the 
statistics. Given the fact that money laundering is a transnational phenomenon that, 
for instance, takes advantages of the liberty of movement among the European Union, 
the chapter tries to give an overview of the results of international cooperation for the 
purpose of prosecuting money laundering. The research makes also use of a case 
study conducted by the BKA on money laundering in the real estate sector. A vast 
amount of publications, especially in the recent years, have focussed on an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering legislations by adopting different 
methods.663 Some of these studies provide relevant information for this research. For 
                                                          
662 The implementation of the Recommendations is, in fact, rigorously assessed through Mutual 
Evaluation processes, and through the assessments conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB). After such mutual evaluations are conducted, Mutual Evaluation Reports are 
compiled, and countries which are found to be non-compliant with the standards are called upon to 
address the deficiencies. A follow-up report is thereafter published, the idea being to keep the countries 
on their toes. Jurisdictions which are found to be clearly non-compliant could be sanctioned. The FATF’s 
persuasiveness stems from the fact that it has the enormous ability to influence whether or not a country 
can be seen as a viable business partner or an investment destination. The FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Report (MER) on Germany of 2010 is available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Germany%20full.pdf, while the FATF 3rd Follow-up 
Report of Germany of 2014 is is available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/FUR-Germany-2014.pdf, last accessed on 16/07/2015. 
663 See, among others, FATF, 2013, Methodology for assessing technical compliance with the 
FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems; Ferwerda, 2009; Geiger and 
Wuensch, 2007; Global Witness, 'How can FATF measure and promote an effective anti-money 
laundering system', 2012, available at 
https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/How%20FATF%20can%20measure%20and%20
promote%20an%20effective%20anti-money%20laundering%20system.pdf, last accessed on 16/07/2015; 
Harvey, 2008; IMF, 2011, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT). Report on the Review of the Effectiveness of the Program 
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instance, the chapter takes notice of a cost-benefit analysis conducted on the specific 
provision concerning the disclosure of Beneficial Ownerships (BOs). Furthermore, 
the chapter draws attention on a recently published cost-benefit analysis of the 
European anti-money laundering policy, which compares the burden imposed by the 
money laundering regime and the outcomes in terms of prevention or repression. The 
chapter concludes with speculations on potential effet pervers caused by the 
implementation of the policy and with considerations on the probable reasons of the 
revealed hindrances.   
 
 4.2  General information on statistics provided by the federal statistical office, the 
police and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
The chapter makes use of statistics provided by the federal statistical office 
(statististiches Bundesamt, Destatis), by the federal police (the police criminal 
statistic report, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, PKS) and by the FIU (FIU reports). All 
statistics are official, since they are published annually by national institutions, 
respectively the federal statistical office of Wiesbaden, the Ministry of the Interior 
and the BKA. PKS statistics take the perspective of the police. Therefore, just the 
cases known by the police are taken into consideration, also including attempts and 
drug criminality dealt by customs.664 In relation to the criminal cases, the outcomes 
are thus different from those provided in the Destatis statistics, which are the results 
of the cases processed by public prosecution and judges. The figures are collected by 
the BKA and from the police authorities in the sixteen state departments (LKAs).665 
PKS statistics also provide a clearance quote, which shows to what extent offences 
have been cleared by the criminal justice system, irrespective of conviction rates. As 
the report drafters highlight, there is an intrinsic limit in the collection of such figures, 
namely the fact that there is always a dark number in the crime field, which cannot be 
tackled by the statistics.666 Another limitation recognised by the drafters is that such 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/051111.pdf, last accessed on 16/07/2015; Levi, 2002; Levi et 
al. (ed.), 2004; Savon and Riccardi (ed.), 2015; Unger et al., 2013; Kemal, 2014. 
664 Tax crimes and financial crimes are, for example excluded by these surveys. See PKS, 2014, p. 4. 
665 The PKS statistics give information on the volume of cases processed by the police in relation to 
every offence. They aim at acquiring a general overview on criminality and a specific overview of the 
types of offences committed, the volume and the structure of the suspects as the changes in criminal rates. 
They also have the function of acquiring knowledge for planning, organising and deciding about the 
prevention and repression of criminality. In addition they may be used for criminological and sociological 
researches and criminal policies. See PKS, 2014, p. 4. 
666 PKS, 2014, p. 4. 
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numbers do not provide explanations for the motives of the deviance. Therefore, not 
only they do not represent the reality of the criminal world, but also they do not take 
into consideration factors that might influence criminals’ behaviour. However, this 
also applies to other two statistics. The Destatis statistics published by the Ministry of 
Interior takes the perspective of the judiciary and of the public prosecutors offices. 
They give information on justice administration, by presenting the decision-making 
praxis of criminal courts and the criminality registered and evaluated by criminal 
courts.667 This pursues the goal of serving the planning of criminal policy and the 
development of legislations in the field of criminal substantial and procedural law.668 
The statistics are based on the crime category with the most serious punishment 
available, thus the figures do not provide the real total number of convictions 
pursuant to Article 261 Gcc. The Destatis statistics provide a wide range of 
information. The following paragraphs will focus only on relevant data for this 
research, though.669 Even though an in-depth analysis is conducted on the most recent 
statistics dating back 2013 and 2014, the chapter provides a compared analysis with 
some figures from the previous years, in order to give an overview of the eventual 
differences and to allow a research on the causes of such differences. Statistics on the 
administration of justice are available starting from 2002. The FIU annual report 
provides very detailed information not only on the typologies of suspicious 
transactions reports (STRs) received and on the processed cases, but also on the 
feedbacks received by law enforcement agencies. Especially the latter element is 
relevant to assess the effectiveness of the cooperation between the private sector and 
the criminal justice system through the mediation of the FIU.670 Yet, an analysis of 
such cases cannot be held as representative of all cases dealt with by the prosecutors, 
since it relies on proceedings forwarded to the FIU. For this reason, besides not 
including cases that are not transmitted, it does not include money laundering 
                                                          
667 Destatis statistics are mainly produced for the use of law enforcement departments, policy 
makers, legal actors and scholars; media and other information providers can use them too. Federal 
statistical office, Series 10, volume 3, 2013, p. 6. 
668 Federal statistical office, Series 10, volume 3, 2013, p. 6. 
669 The Destatis statistics differentiate between decisions based on the general criminal code and 
decisions taken in the context of other legislations, such as in the field of youth criminal responsibility; 
however the research focuses on figures referring to the criminal code. Moreover, the statistics provide 
for any number a gender quote, which will not be take in consideration for the purposes of this research. 
670 Yet, in the 2013 Report, the FIU complains about the fact that follow-up responses do not 
contain enough qualified information in order to be able to undergo typological evaluation. It states 'in 
many reports, the predicate offences are often the triggering factor for filing a suspicious transactions 
report, whereas mostly no information is provided on the actual money laundering activities'. See FIU, 
2013 Report, pp. 26, 33. 
 157 
dependent investigations either. 671  From the comparative analysis of FIU reports 
referring to the period between 2002 and 2014 some trends can be observed with 
respect to the filing of STRs and the elaboration of such information by the law 
enforcement, in order to understand the functioning of the preventive system. 
 
 4.3  Oswald’s research of 1996: A starting point for a further theorisation 
Figures about the implementation of the anti-money laundering policy in the unified 
Germany are available from the beginning of this century. Therefore, data on the first 
years of the law enforcement are gained from an empirical research conducted 
between 1994 and 1996 by Oswald at the Max Planck Institute of Freiburg as a 
doctoral research.672 The goal of the research was to analyse the implementation and 
thus the application and the execution of article 261 Gcc in connection with the GwG 
in the legal praxis, a few years after the regulations entered into force. The focus was 
put specifically on the cooperation between the private sector and law enforcement 
authorities, since this link represented a novelty at that time. The outcomes of that 
research provide an important starting point for the present work. Oswald opted for 
an implementation-focussed type of research, which observes the process of 
application of a law rather than an evaluation type of study that instead assesses the 
effectiveness and the outcome of a policy. This is due to the fact that the legislation 
was very recent at that time and that the outcome of a policy largely depends on the 
implementation of such policy.673 Given the limited existence time of the provisions, 
the research could not come to an exclusive outcome, but it rather aimed at providing 
an overview of the first implementation phase, in order to identify hindering factors. 
The empirical research consisted of a combination of three sources: an analysis of 
380 law enforcement acts,674 oral interviews with sixteen public prosecutors675 and 
                                                          
671 Money laundering cases can be differentiated between independent and integrated investigations; 
the first are commenced due to a suspicion of money laundering, as the typical case of a suspicious 
transaction report filed according to articles 11 and 13 of the GwG, while the latter are initiated in the 
context of another case relating to another offence. 
672 Oswald, 1997. 
673 Oswald, 1997, p. 110. According to this approach, which has been described in the first chapter 
as 'Implementationsforschung' typology, the ineffectiveness of a law depends mainly on the 
implementation. 
674 For the purpose of understanding the functioning system of the STRs and the consequent 
investigative developments, criminal records were analysed in order to build a survey about the 
transactions reported and the subsequent law enforcement activities. The scholar aimed at shedding light 
on the link between the criminalisation of money laundering and the cooperation with the private sector 
and therefore focussed her research on investigations commenced on the basis of a filed suspicious 
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written questionnaires submitted to 75 financial institutions.676 The scholar identified 
three factors that influenced the implementation of the policy, namely the 
characteristics of the executive programme,677 the characteristics of the executing 
authorities (Normakteuren) 678  and the characteristics of the norm addressees 
(Normadressaten).679 Being an 'Implementationsforschung', the legislative intents are 
not considered a relevant factor.680 The main outcomes of the empirical research are 
hereafter summarised to the extent that they are relevant for the current study. It is 
particularly interesting to verify whether cumbersome issues emerged in the first 
years of implementation have been solved in the meanwhile or whether they still 
represent an obstacle for an effective implementation. This will be verified by 
comparing Oswald's outcomes with the implementation of the anti-money laundering 
policy in the recent years. Most of the information collected by the author through 
the interviews can be currently found in the official reports published by the FIU, the 
federal police office and the federal statistical office. 
 
The empirical research was based on eight hypotheses,681 which has been confirmed 
or proved wrong by the empirical research.682 Outcomes of Oswald's study will be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
transaction, without taking in consideration cases where the allegations of money laundering was 
triggered by a previous investigation on a predicate offence. 
675 Due to the limited number of statistics on the implementation at that time, the research was 
conducted through extensive interviews of experts, with the goal of investigating not only the opinions 
and approaches toward the law, but also to compile surveys on the legal practice. Thanks to the fact that 
one prosecutor of every Bundesländer was interviewed, the sample was considered representative for 
describing legal practices in the different Bundesländer. The scholar chose to use semi-structured 
interviews in order to access perceptions, direct experiences and evaluations of the Normakteuren about 
the fight against money laundering. 
676 Written questionnaires were submitted to financial institutions with the goal of investigating 
which impact the GwG has had with respect to the burden imposed. Specifically the scholar was 
interested in revealing problems of application and difficulties in the cooperation with the law 
enforcement. This method was adopted because of time and costs convenience but also to assure the 
anonymity of the speakers. Oswald, 1997, pp. 120, 164. 
677 Oswald listed for example possible problems of application deriving from the incompatibility 
between criminal and administrative law or from legal loopholes or inconsistencies caused by the 
formulation of the provisions. 
678 The second factor consisted of authorities devoted to implement the law, who can influence its 
implementation to the extent that they can interpret the content with a certain degree of discretion; they 
might have different degrees of acceptance of the law and therefore be more or less willing to cooperate, 
for example with private actors, for the purpose of preventing money laundering. 
679 Addressees of the law are considered to be, for instance, money launderers who may not accept 
the prohibition and find subterfuges to elude it. 
680 Oswald, 1997, p. 111. 
681 The hypotheses are to be found in Oswald, 1997, pp. 113-119. 
682 The results of the interviews with public prosecutors that are here discussed are to be found in 
Oswald, 1997, pp. 147-162. The results of the questionnaires submitted to credit institutions that are here 
discussed are to be found in Oswald, 1997, pp. 163-210. The results of the analysis of criminal records 
are to be found in Oswald, 1997, pp. 267, 268. 
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compared to the current state of affairs resulting from the analysis of criminal 
statistics. 
1) Due to the vagueness of the wording with respect to what the law considers to be a 
suspicious transaction, the filing of STRs may be influenced by discretionary and 
biased elements such as the social class or nationality of the customer. This was 
confirmed by the analysis of the 380 records of relevant money laundering 
proceedings, where almost two thirds of the suspected individuals reported were non-
German nationals, and 80 % were non-regular customs or relatively unknown new 
customs. Approximately half of the reported suspicions transactions included in the 
study of the criminal records were conducted with cash money, because there was a 
general suspicion on it. Another confirming result was that the nationality of the 
individual or the country of origin of the money was a factor influencing the filing of 
STRs. For instance, a relevant number of transactions were filed, related to high 
amounts of money by asylum seekers or transactions with countries in conflict or 
with countries with a high organised crime rate, or unexplainable deposits of 
unknown foreign currency from African states.683 
2) Due to the threat posed by Article 261 (5) on professions and businesses, the 
amount of STRs filed should be very high in order to prevent criminal liability. The 
author reported that illegal transactions could not be easily differentiated from legal 
ones by bank employees, who could not, for instance, discern a 'mere' tax evasion 
operation from a money laundering one.684 With regard to the wording of the GwG, 
the interviews partners lamented the difficulty faced by employees without a legal 
education to understand the provisions of the GwG. Due to this lack of understanding 
and to the threat posed by Article 261 (5), many employees had been signalling daily 
transactions. For example the 67 interviewed credit institutions underwent internal 
examinations of 2.697 reports, but only 857 were considered relevant to be filed. 
3) The burden imposed on private sector to prevent money laundering transactions 
may be too high with respect to the actual effectiveness of the mechanism. According 
to figures provided by the government in 1994, a total of 3.282 STRs were filed in 
1994. In 3,3 billion cases they had to record information about customers, however in 
only 0,001 % cases public prosecutors required the recorded information.685 On the 
                                                          
683 Oswald, 1997, p. 195. 
684 Oswald, 1997, p. 287. 
685 FIU, Jahresbericht 2002, p. 27; Oswald, 1997, pp. 286, 287. 
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background of this situation, the central Credit monitoring authority refused the 
proposal of the SPD to lower the threshold value of 30.000 DM to 15.000DM.686 This 
was argued by asseverating that keeping a higher threshold would have diminished of 
50 % the bureaucratic duties, without reducing effectiveness and efficiency of the 
regulation.687 
4) Due to the vagueness of the concept of 'deriving', criminalising every act related to 
the object that is the proceed of a predicate offence, the offence may have a too broad 
scope, despite the restrictive interpretation of Article 261 Gcc. Instead of causing a 
widespread criminalisation of money laundering, it results in a very low conviction 
rate. According to the empirical research conducted on the criminal records, out of 
the 379 proceedings, in 83,7 % of the cases, it was not possible to proceed with an 
indictment for money laundering. In 3,4 % of the cases the closed proceedings were 
continued, pursuant to Article 11 (6) GwG.688 This was also confirmed by the 66 
prosecutors interviewed, according to whom 88,5 % of the 1203 money laundering 
cases they had dealt with in 1994 were closed and in none of the cases the proceeding 
resulted in a conviction for money laundering. However, the reason was not the 
quality of the STRs filed, but rather the impossibility of proving the link between one 
of the predicate offences listed in the catalogue and the objects. Despite having a high 
suspicion that the objects had an illegal origin, the prosecutors could not bring 
sufficient evidence to prove the derivation from one of the antecedent acts.689 The 
'doppelter Anfangsverdacht' 690  was considered too high for the purposes of 
indictment pursuant to Article 152 (2) German Code of Criminal Procedure.691 As a 
solution, the prosecutors suggested to broaden the catalogue of the predicate offences 
and to introduce the possibility of criminalising also those who acted as perpetrators 
                                                          
686 BT-Drucksache 12/6784, p. 7. 
687 Oswald, 1997, p. 288. 
688 Oswald, 1997, p. 288. 
689 Oswald, 1997, p. 289. 
690 The 'doppel Anfangsverdacht', double initial evidence, was required in relation both to the 
laundering of proceeds of crimes and to the predicate offence. 
691 In a meeting held in 1994, therefore, the prosecutors agreed to link the possibility of opening an 
investigation with the existence of a suspicion that the asset derives from one of the designated predicate 
offences according to the criminological practice. Yet, the standard of proof required by article 111 bff. 
German code of criminal procedure, for the purpose of seizing criminal assets in relation to article 261 
Gcc, namely the necessity of proving the origin of the assets from one of the listed predicate offences, 
was considered still too high to fulfil the goal of confiscating criminal assets. Also, the introduction of the 
extended confiscation regulated by article 73d German code of criminal procedure was not considered to 
be effective in the practice, because even when prosecutors had suspicion about the illegal provenience of 
the goods but the defendant was able to prove at least any legitimate income, this would have been 
enough to discharge the suspicion. Oswald, 1997, p. 155. 
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of the predicate offences. A complete inversion of the burden of proof was though 
not advocated, since it would have been constitutionally illegitimate, according to the 
respondents. The author added that the effectiveness of the inversion of the burden of 
proof, as adopted in the US, was overestimated. 692 
5) Article 11 (1) of the GwG, which allows suspicious transactions to be nevertheless 
completed in order to facilitate money laundering investigations, might have opened 
a legal loophole. This was proved neither by the practice at that time nor by the 
current empirical research. 
6) The rules contained in the GwG may not be well accepted by the banking sector 
since they are too complicated and they do not legitimise the burden imposed. In 
particular, the scholar observes that private sector employees, who do not have a 
legal education, may find it very difficult to recognise a money laundering operation. 
A further difficulty arises since banks need to explain customers about the preventive 
regulation and the necessity of collecting data and reporting suspected operations. 
More than one third of the fifty credit institutions that replied to the questionnaire 
highlighted the fact that anti-money laundering laws had caused insecurity and loss 
of confidence by the customs, thus confirming Oswald’s third hypothesis. 693  In 
particular regular customers did not easily accept the imposition of sharing so much 
personal information. The clients were generally concerned about the recording of 
private information by the institutions.694 Yet, credit institutions generally accepted 
the duties imposed by the new regulations, and, despite being of the opinion that 
some of them were not practicable, the majority agreed on the necessity of such 
provisions. 
7) The lack of existence of a central authority that receives the STRs (the current FIU) 
may cause a chaotic situation where information is scattered. One of the main 
problems raised by the financial sector with respect to the cooperation with the law 
enforcement agencies was the lack of feedback about the further developments 
triggered by the filing of STR. The respondents complained about the discretional 
approach of different prosecutors’ offices while dealing with the signalled cases and 
the lack of personnel engaged in the elaboration of the STRs. In addition, they 
lamented the unclear division of duties within the different law enforcement 
                                                          
692 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 50. 
693 Oswald, 1997, p. 179. 
694 Oswald, 1997, p. 179. 
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authorities.695 However, according to the opinion of the respondents, the level of 
cooperation between public prosecutors offices and credit institutions was considered 
to be sufficiently good, despite some problems of communication, mainly identified 
in the first months after the introduction of the new rules. 
8) The last hypothesis consists of a prediction regarding the possibility that law 
enforcement authorities may recall the failing cooperation with other states for the 
prosecution of transnational money laundering cases, with specific reference to 
offshore centres. Investigators, indeed, claimed that the transnational nature of 
organised crime and the limited availability of instruments to investigate abroad 
impeded the successful prosecution of money laundering, so that the eighth 
hypothesis was positively verified. 
 
The research also focussed on the sanctions imposed for money laundering cases, 
particularly on the volume of confiscated assets. Out of the 380 researched cases, 
none of them resulted in a conviction for money laundering. Not a single D-Mark 
could be confiscated. In three cases, assets were seized but the seizure order was 
cancelled afterwards. 87 % of the proceedings were dismissed pursuant to Article 170 
(2) German code of criminal procedure, mostly because of the impossibility of 
proving the origin of the object from one of the listed predicate offences. Only 3,4 % 
of the proceedings were dismissed and continued for another offence.696 
 
 4.4  (Preliminary) investigations, type of charges, convictions and penalties697 
The following paragraphs describe the application of the laws and the effects of the 
more recent years of implementation through the lenses of the law enforcement 
agencies and of the FIU, with a particular focus on the issues already raised by 
Oswald in 1997 and on the eventual emerging challenges. In 2013, in 789 cases out 
of the 935 money-laundering cases, on which a sentence was passed on (abgeurteilt), 
individuals were convicted (verurteilt) and 112 proceedings were closed. The 
                                                          
695 On two extreme cases, the private institutions observed a lack of interest and indifference from 
the offices, which did not reply to written requests nor to arranged telephone calls for investigative 
purposes. Oswald, 1997, p. 182. 
696 BKA, Organisierte Kriminalität Bundeslagebild 2013, pp. 6, 7, available at 
http://www.bka.de/DE/ThemenABisZ/Deliktsbereiche/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/Lagebilder/lagebilder__
node.html?__nnn=true, last accessed on 13/11/2015. 
697 Figures are provided by the Federal statistical office, Series 10 on the administration of justice, 
volume 3, from the year 2002 to 2013. The year 2003 is missing because there are no statistics available 
for that year. 
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Destatis statistic offers information on the number of convictions for the four 
different conducts criminalised by Article 261 Gcc, namely the 'concealing offence' 
under paragraph one, 'the isolation conduct' under paragraph two, the aggravated 
conducts under paragraph four, and finally the reckless liability disciplined under 
paragraph five. In 2013, out of a total of 828 individuals convicted for money 
laundering, a great majority (510 individuals) was convicted under Article 261 (5) 
Gcc, which corresponds to the 61 % of total convictions for money laundering. Very 
few individuals were convicted under paragraphs two and four (respectively 31 and 
33), while the rest was convicted under Article 261 (1) Gcc, namely 30,6 % of the 
total convictions for money laundering.  This trend was started to being observed 
only from 2005 on. In the years between 2002 and 2004 the majority of convictions 
was pursuant to Article 261 (1). Since 2005 the number of persons convicted under 
Article 261 (5) Gcc increased consistently and kept on increasing in the following 
years to the point that, by 2007, the number of convicted persons under Article 261 
(5) Gcc was higher than those convicted under Article 261 (1). It increased from 14 
cases in 2002 to 512 cases in 2012, with a small decrease in 2013 (510 cases). The 
number of convictions under paragraph two has always been much lower with 
respect to the convictions for paragraph one. However, it can be noted that there has 
been a growing trend since 2006. By looking at the total number of sentences passed 
and at the number of individuals convicted pursuant to Article 261 Gcc, one can 
observe that there was a general increase between 2002 and 2013. 
 
This trend was also registered by the FATF assessors in 2010.698 Yet, it is impossible 
to establish the reasons that lead to this development, since it may be related to the 
growth of the phenomenon of money laundering in the country or to an improvement 
of law enforcement techniques. According to the FATF Report of 2010, the general 
growth of money laundering cases from the year 2006 can be partly ascribed to a 
technical factor, namely to the fact that only since that year statistics comprehend all 
Bundesländer while before that they were referring only to Germany prior to 
reunification, including greater Berlin. 699  The FATF assessors could not receive 
                                                          
698 FATF, MER Germany 2010. p. 61. 
699 In particular, the report specifies that data for the entire Federal Republic, i.e. including the 
Länder of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, have 
only been recorded since 2007. See FATF, MER Germany 2010. p. 61. 
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explanation by German authorities for the identified increase, though.700Especially 
with regard to the convictions relating to the reckless conduct, the growth is very 
evident. Thus, in the recent years the Article 261 Gcc has been mostly adopted 
against those who act with recklessness. Consequently, if paragraph five had not been 
added, a large part of the convictions for Article 261 Gcc would have not been 
inflicted. 
 
Article 261 has been used rather rarely to punish organised criminal groups or 
activities committed on a commercial basis. In fact, only 33 convictions out of the 
828 inflicted in 2013 were related to paragraph four. Between 2002 and 2012, 229 
individuals have been convicted for the aggravated conducts, while a total of 2.373 
persons have been convicted pursuant to Article 261 (5) Gcc. Out of the 124.842 
completed proceedings in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic 
crimes recorded by public prosecutors offices in 2013, 2.163 were categorised as 
organised crime proceedings, namely 1,7 % of the total.701 According to the same 
source, only 18 % of the proceedings involved more than one person.702 The BKA 
also offers figures on the economic aspect of criminal cases included under the 
technical definition of 'organised crime' provided by the same authority. 703  In 
particular, in 2013 the BKA registered 580 ongoing-cases of organised crime, of 
which 35 % included money laundering activities, but in only 2,9 % of the cases 
money laundering was the main conduct.704 From these figures one can hypothesise 
that Article 261 (4) Gcc is not used often to persecute money laundering committed 
by organised criminal groups. Yet, the outcome might also be interpreted as a 
symptom of an effective deterrent effect of the law. Also, individuals convicted for 
                                                          
700 FATF, MER Germany 2010. p. 61. 
701 Federal Statistical Office, series 10 on the administration of justice by the state’s prosecution, 
volume 2.6, 2013, p. 96. 
702 The number of convictions for illicit possession of narcotics, pursuant to article 29 (1) 1, 3 of the 
Narcotics Act (Betäubungsmittelgesetz) is for example much higher (22.702 in 2013) than the number of 
convictions under article 261 Gcc (828 in 2013) according to the Federal statistical office, Series 10, 
volume 3, 2013, pp. 37, 51. 
703 According to this definition, organised crime is 'the planned violation of the law for profit or to 
acquire power, which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are carried out by more 
than two participants who co-operate within a division of labor for a long or undetermined time span 
using a) commercial or commercial-like structures, or b) violence or other means of intimidation, or c) 
influence on politics, media, public administration, justice and the legitimate economy', see Küstler, 1991, 
p. 60. 
704 BKA, Organisierte Kriminalität Bundeslagebild 2013, pp. 6, 7, available at 
http://www.bka.de/DE/ThemenABisZ/Deliktsbereiche/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/Lagebilder/lagebilder__
node.html?__nnn=true, last accessed on 13/11/2015. 
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Article 261 (4) might not result in the official statistics due to a cumulative 
conviction for an offence with a higher punishment. According to the FATF report of 
2010, German authorities persecuted profit-oriented crimes under other offences. In 
fact, interrogated authorities stated that the offence of money laundering, due to 
various factors, is not used for this purpose. First of all, the impossibility of charging 
the offender of the predicate offence causes the drop of the allegation for money 
laundering and the indictment for the predicate offence. In addition, the weak range 
of sanctions available for the punishment of money laundering conducts and the 
possibility of suspension of the punishment execution make prosecutors decide to 
change the charge to pursue a higher punishment.705 Moreover, money-laundering 
conducts would be prosecuted as participation in the predicate offence, in the event 
that the perpetrator is different than the one of the predicate offence. This is due to 
the fast that predicate offences are usually easier to prove and carry a higher 
punishment than the ones envisaged for money laundering.706 
 
Another relevant index concerns criminal records of individuals convicted pursuant 
to Article 216 Gcc. Assuming that pre-trial custody is imposed to rather dangerous 
offenders, one can infer that individuals convicted for money laundering are less 
dangerous, due to the fact that a very low number was subject to pre-trial custody, as 
disciplined by Article 112 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (a total of 45). 
Another factor highlighted by the Destatis statistics is whether convicted individuals 
had been punished before and if so with which penalty. It can be observed that with 
respect to Article 261 (1) Gcc, the number of persons with previous convictions is 
almost equal to the one of those without (109 without and 105 with). 41 out of the 
105, who had already been convicted, had received five or more convictions, yet 
most of them consisted of monetary fines (49). For convictions under Article 261 (5) 
Gcc, though, only a minority was subject to previous convictions before (171 out of 
497).707 Given that habitual offenders might be considered more dangerous, it can be 
inferred that individuals convicted pursuant to Article 261 (5) are not considered 
socially dangerous. However, these data might also depend on other factors, such as 
the fact that prosecutors find it easier to proceed with a money laundering charge if 
                                                          
705 FATF, MER 2010. p. 63. 
706 FATF, MER 2010. p. 64. 
707 Federal statistical office, Series 10 on the administration of justice, volume 3, 2013, pp. 1438, 
439. 
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the suspect was previously convicted for a predicate offence. The situation described 
from the point of view of law enforcement seems to prove wrong the idea of money 
launderers threatening the security of the whole society. Detected money launderers 
do not correspond, in fact, with the description of habitual offenders that pose a risk 
to the integrity of the social fabric. 
 
As regards the penalties inflicted, in the vast majority of cases, the sentence inflicted 
is a Geldstrafe, a monetary fine (about 81 % of the total). This is not the case for 
sentences regarding Article 261 (4) Gcc, which indeed prescribes a higher 
punishment. 708  However, given the low-end range of penalties, the fact that the 
majority of sanctions imposed do not involve prison sentences and that the vast 
majority of sanctions involving prison sentences are suspended, the FATF assessors 
concluded in 2010 that Article 261 (1) Gcc is not subject to effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive sanctions.709 In the follow-up report published by the FATF in 2014, 
German authorities have commented on this criticism by underlying that the range of 
punishment of imprisonment (from three months to five years) is broader than the 
average (imprisonment of up to 5 years or fine) for similar offences as 'fraud' (Article 
263 Gcc), 'theft' (Article 242 Gcc), 'receiving stolen goods' (Article 259 Gcc) and 
'accessory after the fact' (Article 257 Gcc). According to the authorities, the 
implementation of sanctions for article 261 Gcc is also higher than the average, while 
the share of sentences imposed for money laundering and involving a term of 
imprisonment is 19,6 %, and the average is 17,64 %. However, the FATF assessors 
replied that the share of sentences involving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 
year was lower than the average: 4 % for money laundering against 9 % the average 
share. A very little number of convictions is referred to attempted conducts.710 This 
may put in question the deterrent effect and the capability of preventing the 
commission of money laundering of the current legislation. However, the low 
number might be explained recalling Article 1 (1) second sentence of the GwG, 
which states that specific transactions shall not be reported when the reporting 
hinders the prosecution of money laundering.  A positive element is the fact that most 
convictions under Articles 261 (1) and (5) are referred to the acts committed in the 
                                                          
708 Federal statistical office, Series 10 on the administration of justice, volume 3, 2013, pp. 214, 215. 
709 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 60. 
710 Federal statistical office, Series 10 on the administration of justice, volume 3, 2013, pp. 136, 137. 
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year before the conviction (387 out of 764). This may mean that the cooperation 
between the private sector and the law enforcement could ensure a rapid repressive 
action. However, this has not been the case for conducts listed under paragraphs two 
and four, which happened before the previous year. An explanation for this 
difference may lie in the difficulty of providing enough evidence to prove the 
commercial basis or the commission in form of a gang or the conducts of third 
persons listed under paragraph two. 
 
Another relevant factor that can be inferred from the criminal justice system’s 
statistics is the comparison between the number of preliminary investigations and the 
number of convictions. The statistic of 2013, for example, shows that public 
prosecutors - including federal and state prosecutors - counted 24.624 completed 
investigations on money laundering cases.711 This number is quite high if compared 
to the total amount of money laundering cases on which a sentence was passed on 
(935, data provided by the Destatis statistic of 2013). Between the years 2004 and 
2008712 a total amount of 45.462 preliminary investigations have been conducted, but 
only 2006 charges have been ascribed.713 In fact, the vast majority of investigations 
concerning money laundering are suspended or discontinued and new proceedings 
are initiated for the predicate offence.714 These figures confirm the fact that, while the 
number of STRs filed to law enforcement is very high, and therefore also the cases 
dealt by the prosecutors, few of the suspicions are confirmed by the preliminary 
investigations. However, as previously noted, the statistics do not provide figures on 
all convictions for money laundering. In addition, in the perspective of the authorities 
these outcomes are not a sign of inefficiency. On the contrary, they are considered to 
be consistent with the goal of clarifying cases. As already mentioned money 
laundering cases might have been finally charged for other offences. Therefore, 
according to the police, cases have been cleared, even without a conviction pursuant 
to Article 261 Gcc. The clearance rate for money laundering cases provided by the 
                                                          
711 Federal Statistical Office, series 10 on the administration of justice by the state’s prosecution, 
volume 2.6, 2013, p. 22. 
712 The figures for the period 2004-2007 refer to the entire area of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Yet, the year 2004 does not include figures on Schleswig-Holstein. 
713 Figures derive from the Federal Statistical Office, series 10 on the administration of justice by 
the state’s prosecution, volume 2.6, 2005-2008. 
714 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 60. 
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police is, indeed, very high.715 Yet, one can also argue that Article 261 Gcc seems to 
have the function of facilitating investigations, while is not used to convict 
individuals. On the one hand, it looks like Article 261 Gcc helps investigators 
initiating criminal cases and collecting information thanks to the access to recorded 
data provided by the GwG. On the other hand, it is abandoned by prosecutors in 
favour of other indictments, which provide a higher sanction but a lower burden of 
proof. It may, thus, have a procedural rather than a substantial function. In the 
minority of the cases, when investigators find enough evidence to proceed with an 
indictment and trials for money laundering do take place, the percentage of acquittals 
of charges laid is very low. Between 2004 and 2008, the percentage has never been 
higher than 6 %.716 This may be an indicator that the degree of evidence acquired by 
the prosecutors is very founded, so that it very often leads to a conviction. 
 
With regard to the nationality of the convicted individuals, it can be observed that the 
majority of individuals convicted under paragraphs one, two and five had German 
nationality, whereas 57 % of those convicted for the aggravated hypotheses were 
non-German nationals. 
 
Given the transnational nature of money laundering, figures referring only to the 
national criminal justice system may not give a complete overview of the activity 
undertaken by law enforcement agencies through international cooperation. Germany 
is, for instance, a member of Eurojust.717  According to the Eurojust Report of 2014, 
Eurojust dealt with 220 cases of money laundering, among them 84 were connected 
to fraud and 52 to participation in criminal organisation, while 71 were dealt as 
stand-alone crime. In this context, Germany was the second most requested country 
                                                          
715 In 2014 it amounted to 92,6 % and in 2013 it amounted to 90,6 %. See PKS statistic 2014, p. 88. 
716 See Federal statistical office, Series 10 on the administration of justice, volume 3, from 2004 to 
2008. 
717 'Eurojust stimulates and improves the coordination of investigations and prosecutions between 
the competent authorities in the Member States and improves the cooperation between the competent 
authorities of the Member States, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal 
assistance and the implementation of extradition requests. Eurojust supports in any way possible the 
competent authorities of the Member States to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective 
when dealing with cross-border crime. [...] Eurojust's competence covers the same types of crime and 
offences for which Europol has competence, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human 
beings, counterfeiting, money laundering, computer crime, crime against property or public goods 
including fraud and corruption, criminal offences affecting the European Community's financial interests, 
environmental crime and participation in a criminal organisation', Eurojust, The European Union's 
Judicial Cooperation Unit, available at http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/mission-
tasks.aspx, last accessed on 16/07/2015. 
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for international cooperation.718 The legal framework provided by the Framework 
Decision 2005/214/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition of 
financial penalties approved in 2005719 offers the possibility to Members States to ask 
for the execution of financial penalties in another Member State. According to a 
report published by the Max Planck Institute for foreign and international criminal 
law and the European Commission, in 2012, European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
Germany received 6.095 (in 2011 have been 2.869) decisions from other Member 
States as executing state.720 In 2011, the Federal Office of Justice - an authority 
within the remit of the Federal Ministry of Justice - received 1802 decisions from the 
public prosecutor’s offices and other German authorities. In 2012, 4.035 decisions 
were registered. Not all decisions have been transmitted to other Member States yet. 
In particular the translation of certificates is costly and time-consuming. Yet, no 
information is provided on the offences to which such decisions are related.  
According to the Council of Europe, 'Europe is a major stakeholder in global money 
laundering as being both a source and a destination of criminal proceeds, and through 
its financial markets as an actor in different stages of the money laundering process. 
In 2004, the number of suspicious transaction reports received by financial 
intelligence units continued to grow in most countries, such as in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Ukraine and the United Kingdom'.721 
 
 4.5  The cooperation between FIU and law enforcement agencies 
Figures on the typologies of money laundering convictions are partially provided by 
the FIU reports.722 However, the FIU can provide statistics only with regard to the 
                                                          
718 Eurojust, Report 2014, p. 38, available at 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%
202014/Annual-Report-2014-EN.pdf, last accessed on 30/07/2015. In January 2015, for example, a police 
action took place against a network of money launderers operating in France and Spain. It was a carousel 
fraud case: laundered funds were alleged to have been obtained from the sale of vehicles bought in 
Germany and in other countries, on which the value added tax was not paid. See Eurojust, VAT fraud and 
money laundering network disrupted, 2015, available at 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2015/2015-01-30.aspx, last accessed on 
30/07/2015. 
719 Framework decision 2005/214/JHA (OJ L 76, 22.3.2005, pp. 16-30), transposed in Germany by 
the Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2005/214/JI des Rates vom 24. Februar 2005 über die 
Anwendung des Grundsatzes der gegenseitigen Anerkennung von Geldstrafen und Geldbußen (BGBl. 
2005 I, p. 1408). 
720 Sieber (ed.), 2013, pp. 65-68.   
721 Council of Europe, Organised Crime Situation Report 2005, p. 8. 
722 Figures are provided by FIU, 2002-2014 reports on Germany. Reports are available both in 
German and English languages, the reports quoted here are the English versions, while the 2014 report 
available at the time of writing is in German.   
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proceedings, about which they receive information by the prosecutors’ offices, 
through the follow-up reports mechanism. In 2014, the FIU received 24.054 STRs 
and 15.789 follow-up reactions from public prosecutors. According to the FIU report 
of 2013, 11.868 follow-up responses were received by the FIU from the public 
prosecutors' offices, pursuant to Article 11 (8) of the GwG, against the total of the 
19,095 STRs filed. Thus, there has been an increase of around 26 % of total STRs 
and about 33 % of follow-up responses received. Out of the 15.789 (in 2013 11,688) 
follow-up responses, only 414 (in 2013 374) referred to judgments, penalty orders or 
indictments, which corresponds to nearly 3 %.723 The main outcome is, however, the 
number of dismissal orders received by the FIU among the total of follow-up 
responses. This amounts to 14.368 (in 2013 10,771), nearly 91 % of the total. From 
the public prosecutors’ perspective, in 2013, out of 124.842 completed proceedings 
in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic crimes, 39.322 have been 
terminated due to insufficient reasons to prosecute, pursuant to Article 170 (2) 
German code of criminal procedure, namely one third of the total.724 According to the 
2013 FIU Report, 'the large number of dismissals is an indication that the threshold 
of suspicion for filing a report is very low and the suspicion of an offence - compared 
to the large number of reports - can be verified in a few cases only'. 725  This 
conclusion reflects and confirms the issue debated by the doctrine and emerged in 
Oswald's research about the standard of proof required by the wording of Article 261 
Gcc. Despite the formulation of the offence may cover a very broad range of 
conducts, it is in the end very hard to provide the necessary evidence for the 
indictment. At the same time, the number of follow-up reports sent by public 
prosecutors offices also increased from 13 in 2002 to 8.468 in 2012 and 11.868 in 
2013. Despite the increasing number of information collected, however, the 
percentage of dismissals rose, thus inverting what looked like a positive trend of 
cooperation between the reporting actors and the law enforcement. In 2005 only 77 % 
of the follow-up reports consist of a dismissal, whereas in 2012 the percentage grew 
to 89 % and in 2013 to nearly 91 %. There has been a little growth in the number of 
judgements, penal orders or indictments deriving from STRs, while this corresponded 
to 4,9 % in 2007, and to 5,9 % in 2012. As a first conclusion, it can be said that the 
                                                          
723 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 11. 
724 Federal Statistical Office, series 10 on the administration of justice by the state’s prosecution, 
volume 2.6, 2013, p. 96. 
725 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 26. 
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situation observed by Oswald between 1992 and 1996 was confirmed and that 
information filed to law enforcement through STRs did not result in a number of 
court decision such to legitimise the existence of the whole reporting mechanism. 
However, STRs filed to the FIU may trigger several convictions. Moreover, 
proceedings for money laundering might take long time so that an STR filed might 
triggered a conviction only some years later. Convictions registered in the same year 
might depend on STRs filed the previous years. In addition, it should be taken in 
consideration that STRs filed in Germany might trigger a proceeding in another 
country, thanks to the international cooperation among FIUs. Convictions in 
Germany can be likewise triggered by offence notices gathered abroad. 
 
As already mentioned, the FIU reports provide partial information on criminal 
proceedings initiated by the filing of a STR. The 2014 report shows that in 59 % of 
the 304 cases dealt by public prosecutors and communicated to the FIU, concerned 
convictions of the so-called 'financial agents'726 with (computer-) fraud as predicate 
offence.  This phenomenon is not new to the FIU, so that the report refers to the 'so 
called financial agents phenomenon', by referring to money laundering transactions 
undergone by individuals recruited from criminals, who act under the vests of clients 
interested in investing opportunities. According to the FIU, such facilitators might be 
recruited by using new methods, such as professional job offers. 'When designing 
such job offers, the perpetrators attempt to prevent critical analysis by the potential 
financial agents through numerous variations'.727 The 'financial agents' phenomenon 
has been registered since 2009. In the previous years, especially between 2005 and 
2007, a quite high number of phishing cases were registered. In 2013, 290 of the 
11.868 follow-up reports regarded penalty orders and judgements, whereas 77 % of 
them related to fraud, including a large number of computer fraud (166). Other 
offences, to which court orders refer, are document forgery, bankruptcy, handling 
stolen goods, violation of the payment service supervisory act, drug crime, robbery, 
misappropriation, market manipulation, and theft. Only two orders were connected to 
drug offences, which consists of the 2 % of the total. Since 2002 the percentage of 
                                                          
726 A definition of the 'financial agent' strategy is given by the FATF: the organised criminal group 
persuades third parties (the 'financial agents') to lend their accounts to receive the ill-gotten funds, in 
return for a commission. The funds are then withdrawn in cash by the agent, who subsequently uses the 
services of licensed money remitters to transfer the proceeds to individuals or accounts outside Germany. 
See FATF, MER 2010, p. 170. 
727 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 29. 
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drug crimes, to which the courts orders refer to, has always been very low, namely 
between 6 and 1 %.728 These data may yet be completed by the cases dismissed by 
prosecutors for money laundering and prosecuted for one of the predicate offences. 
The most frequently mentioned predicate offences were fraud, including computer 
fraud, document forgery, while in some years tax offences represented the 2 to 5 %. 
At least for the cases forwarded to the FIU, these data may indicate that money 
laundering independent investigations were not directed to proceeds of drug 
criminality. No follow-up responses relating to cases of suspected terrorist financing 
have been received by the FIU so far. 
 
 4.6  Typologies of STRs filed to the FIU 
Data provided by the FIU report are also relevant with regard to the assessment of the 
application of Article 261 Gcc in cooperation with the GwG. Such statistics show, for 
example, from which sources the STRs come and thus which attitude the designated 
businesses and professions have toward the preventive mechanism of reporting. 
There has been an increasing trend of STRs filed to the FIU since 1995. In 1995 they 
amounted to 2.759, reaching 14.361 in 2012, 19.095 in 2013 and 24.054 in 2014.729 
Most of the STRs were filed by credit institutions, around 87 % of the total of STRS 
received in 2014 (the same percentage was registered in 2013). The non-financial 
sector contributed only to a very small extent to the filing of STRs, which means only 
1 % (in 2013 0,9 %). This number confirms a trend that has been observed since 
2003. According to the FIU, the number of reports filed by the non-financial sector is 
too small compared to the large number of designated business and professions and 
to their economic significance. Persons commercially trading in goods filed only 100 
STRs and real estate brokers only filed 14 STRs, despite the awareness raising 
measures taken by the competent Land supervisory authorities. Individuals in 
independent occupations filed 12 STRs. According to the report, this was due to the 
special protection of the client relationship.730 The vast majority of STRs has been 
filed by credit institutions and among them by banking institutions. The financial 
sector has never contributed for less than 79,5 % of the total STRs, according to the 
                                                          
728 Data are provided by FIU, 2002-2014 reports. The FIU reports are available both in German and 
English, the reports quoted here are the English versions, besides the 2014 report for which there is at the 
moment of writing only the German available. 
729 Data are provided by FIU, 2002-2014 reports. 
730 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 11. 
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data collected since 2002.731 While the constant engagement of credit and banking 
institutions cannot be blamed, it can be still claimed that, on the other side, attorneys 
have been reluctant in filing STRs, never representing more than 2 % of the total 
number, corresponding to a range of three to seventeen STRs in a year. Between 
2004 and 2014, for instance, a total of 126 lawyers filed STRs.732 Despite an increase 
of around 50 % of STRs filed by lawyers between 2013 and 2014, the number is still 
considered too low (23 in 2014 and 10 in 2013). 
 
The FIU report provides some information also on the nationality of the individuals 
and about the headquarters of the company reported. In particular, 38.084 persons 
were mentioned (in 2013 34.502), and among them, 23.960 (in 2013 20.802) were 
provided information on the nationality. 14.359 (in 2013 12.577) persons had 
German nationality, which corresponds to 61 % of the total. 1.153 (in 2013 943) 
were Turkish, 611 (in 2013 519) were Romanian nationals and 561 (in 2013 581) 
Russians. The hypothesis spelled out by Oswald in 1996 about a possible bias of the 
STRs linked to the nationality of the suspects, which was confirmed by her empirical 
research, seems to find confirmation in the more recent statistics, on the rough 
confrontation between the percentage of non-German nationals among the whole 
population (around 10 %) and the percentage of non-German nationals object of 
STRs. Yet the numbers processed by the FIU do not offer a general view on the cases 
dealt by the prosecutors since they just analyse proceedings to the FIU and triggered 
by a STR or pursuant to Section 31 b of the fiscal code. German nationals have 
represented the majority of individuals subject of STRs since 2002; Russian and 
Turkish nationals have been always very represented among the foreign nationalities, 
while other nationalities have been changing such as Rumanian, Italian, Chinese, 
Iranian, Kazakh and Nigerian. A particular high number of Arab nationals have been 
reported in 2002, in particular from Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This 
might be linked to the terrorism fear after the 9/11 facts. 
 
The FIU report provides data about the 'nationality' of companies too. A total of 
5.670 (in 2013 11.224) companies were recorded in the suspicious transaction reports, 
and for almost a half of them the headquarters were mentioned. Around 70 % of the 
                                                          
731 Data referred to the previous years are provided by the FIU, 2002-2014 Reports. 
732 Data are provided by the FIU, 2002-2014 Reports. 
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companies whose headquarters was communicated were based in Germany (in 2013 
62 %), 136 (in 2013 113) in the UK, 95 (in 2013 133) in Cyprus, 81 (in 2013 197) 
had headquarters in Switzerland and 75 (in 2013 124) in the British Virgin Islands.733 
During the examined period, the companies object of STRs were mostly 
headquartered in Germany. Only in 2009 the majority of them were based abroad. 
The most recurrent headquarters have been the United Kingdom, Cyprus, 
Switzerland, Russia and the Virgin Islands. These figures could be interpreted as a 
symptom of the fact that it is easier to launder money through tax havens and 
offshore centres, such as the British Virgin Islands or Cyprus, or through jurisdictions 
with a strong bank secrecy, as for instance Switzerland, or through countries with lax 
company laws - listed by the tax justice network as a secrecy jurisdictions - such as 
the UK, the Netherlands and the US.734 Another interesting data revealed by the FIU 
report of 2013 with regard to the typology of involved individuals is that 101 STRs 
referred to fraud to the detriment of senior citizens. Indexes about senior citizens 
targeted by money launderers appear mostly in the recent years. However, the FIU 
assumes that there is a very high volume of unreported and unrecorded crime here. 
For this reason no exact statements can be provided about the different modi 
operandi. Between 2004 and 2005, instead, the FIU draws attention on the high 
number of low income individuals reported, namely students, pensioners, 
unemployed and housewives, constituting 19 % of the people reported in 2005 and 
17 % in 2004. However, no explanations were provided for this trend. The year 2009 
was signed by a peculiar phenomenon, namely the relevant number of cases of CO2 
emission allowance trading.735 According to the FIU, in 2009 an increasing number 
of STRs have been filed in Germany by credit institutions and energy trading 
companies based on offers or money transfers in connection with emission allowance 
trading, in relation to suspected VAT frauds.736 
 
                                                          
733 FIU, 2014 Report, p. 15; FIU, 2013 Report, p. 18. 
734 Index available at http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2013-results, last 
accessed on 14/07/2015. 
735 FIU, 2009 Report, p. 30. 
736 'The CO2 emission allowances are sold in a chain of suppliers by circumventing VAT 
obligations and involving several companies seated in different member states of the EU', see FIU, 2009 
Report, p. 30. 
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 4.7  Critical issues 
Issues highlighted by the FATF report of 2010 about the statistics provided by the 
FIU concern the low number of STRs, the subjects filing STRs and the number of 
dismissals. The FATF firstly considers the volume of transactions reported too low 
for an economy with a highly developed financial services sector, which has near-
universal access to such services for its resident population.737 Secondly, only few 
cases against the high number of STRs filed to public prosecutors’ offices reach a 
judgement or a criminal order or an indictment. The percentage is even decreasing if 
compared to the previous years, while the great majority is dismissed because of the 
impossibility of collecting enough evidence for starting a criminal case.738In addition, 
reports are filed mostly from one typology of designated businesses and professions, 
namely banks and financial services providers. The majority of suspicions are related 
to one category of activity, namely the 'phishing' and the use of financial agents. 
According to the 2013 report of the FIU, in 211 cases contracting partners did not 
disclose the fact that they were acting on behalf of beneficial owners.739 In fact there 
was suspicion that the contracting partners had not complied with their disclosure 
obligations when arranging a business relationship or a transaction. This issue had 
already emerged in 2012, however the number of cases more than doubled in 2013. 
Another noted grey area is considered to be the groups of the legal advisors and of 
the persons trading in goods. Here the suspicion of a large number of unreported or 
unrecorded cases rises because of the very small volume of STRs filed by such 
categories. According to the FIU, the non-financial sector is 'definitely in a position 
to recognise and report money-laundering activities'. Therefore, the lack of specific 
know-how or expertise of these groups would not be an excuse.740 The high potential 
of these groups being used for money laundering purposes on the one hand and the 
very low reporting rate on the other hand are considered one of the two main 
challenges faced by the FIU in the prevention of money laundering. The BKA 
published a report in 2010 with specific regard to the real estate sector and its role in 
(preventing) money laundering. 741  The necessity of compiling such a report was 
                                                          
737 FATF, MER Germany, 2010, p. 170. 
738 FIU, Report 2013, p. 46. 
739 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 31. 
740 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 33. 
741 The research was conducted through questionnaires and interviews submitted in 2010 by the 
Referat SO 32 of the FIU. See FIU 'Managementfassung zur Fachstudie. Geldwäsche im 
Immobiliensektor in Deutschland' (money laundering in the real estate sector in Germany), 2010. 
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triggered by the assumption that the real estate sector was not much aware of the 
money laundering risks and did not show much interest in complying with the GwG 
regulations. Against the volume of real estate transactions in 2011 amounting to 22 
Billion Euros, only 292 STRs were filed to the FIU by this sector, representing a 
mere 2,6 % of the total. From these numbers it was inferred that there was a great 
dark number of unreported money laundering transactions, due to the low level of 
awareness. This assumption was confirmed by the outcomes of the research 
conducted by the BKA. In fact, only 94 out of 2.410 contacted partners completely 
replied to the questionnaire, meaning 3,9 % of the total. Respondents had different 
perception about the threats posed by money laundering and the role of the GwG. A 
lack of knowledge and of awareness about the issue and the related policies was 
generally perceived. Most of the respondents did not recognise the specific risk 
existing in the real estate sector. In addition, the predicate crimes were often confused 
with the offence of money laundering and the latter was mostly identified with cash 
transactions. A general prejudice against the category of real estate agents was 
registered by the questionnaires, while, according to the FIU, also other categories 
were used for the purpose of money laundering operations. On the contrary, 
according to the FATF report of 2010, real estate agents generally consider to be 
unlikely involved in suspicious transactions, since they do not accept client payments 
and since notaries and banks would be involved in any transactions. For this reason 
they would not be expected to undertake regular due diligence on clients.742 With 
regard to the content of the regulations, it has been emphasised that there is a missing 
cooperation with law enforcement agencies not sending follow-up reports on the 
STRs filed. It was strongly recommended that the legislature should introduce the 
inversion of the burden of proof, namely it should impose a duty to bring evidence of 
a legitimate source of assets, on which there is a strong suspicion of illegal origin. 
Furthermore, it was suggested to introduce a central register on real estate properties, 
in order to facilitate the exchange of information and to increase transparency in the 
sector. Finally, the questionnaires highlighted the necessity of adapting the GwG 
regulations to the peculiarities of the real estate sector. According to the FATF report, 
real estate agents were aware of being subject to the GwG regulations, yet they did 
do not appear to be taking systematic steps to comply. This was due both to the fact 
that the requirements did not fit within their customary business practices and to the 
                                                          
742 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 213. 
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fact that supervisory arrangements to promote compliance were underdeveloped.743 
From the FATF assessors’ point of view, especially real estate agents’ approach fall 
short of the FATF standards. 744 
 
 4.8  The volume of the phenomenon of money laundering in Germany: Economic 
estimates 
The most useful figure to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-money laundering policy 
to impede the infiltration of illicit financial flows in Germany would be the volume 
of such flows. In fact, despite it may not depend only on the (in)effectiveness of the 
law, such number could reveal at least whether the efforts undertaken have been 
worth the beard burden or not. Unfortunately, as now, there is no availability of this 
figure, rather only estimates produced by different international organisations. 
According to the FATF report of 2010, proceeds of crime generated in the country 
are estimated to amount between 43 and 57 billion Euros, inclusive of tax evasion 
annually equivalent to between 1,2 % and 1.6 % of national GDP. Having said that 
Germany has one of the biggest GDP in the world, it can be easily inferred that this 
number exceeds the GDP of numerous countries and that it represents a large 
contribution to global illicit financial flows. Yet, these estimates could not be 
confirmed by the German authorities.745  According to the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report of 2009 of the US Government, Germany is a major money 
laundering country.746 Figures provided by the federal criminal police office, instead, 
picture a lower criminal turnover originated in the country. The 2007 Situation 
Report on Economic Crime in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, 
reported a total loss or damage from economic crimes at approximately 4,12 billion 
Euros.. The same office publishes regularly reports on organised crime activities in 
Germany, and according to the 2008 report, the profits of organised crime amounted 
to 0,66 billion Euros. According to the FATF assessors, these figures seem relatively 
                                                          
743 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 221. 
744 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 213. 
745 FATF, MER 2010 p. 24. 
746 A major money laundering country is defined by U.S. statute as one 'whose financial institutions 
engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics 
trafficking.' However, the complex nature of money laundering transactions today makes it difficult in 
many cases to distinguish the proceeds of narcotics trafficking from the proceeds of other serious crime. 
Moreover, financial institutions engaging in transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds of 
other serious crime are vulnerable to narcotics-related money laundering. Report released by the Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in March 2009, 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol2/116550.htm, last accessed on 18/07/2015. 
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low.  They conclude that this might be due to the fact that such statistics do not 
address the amount of proceeds generated from evasion of taxes and excise duties.747 
As claimed by a very recent report on organised crime in Europe, the magnitude of 
criminal revenues from a selected number of illicit markets748 amount approximately 
to at least 110 billion Euros per year. The rough proxy corresponds on average to 0,9 % 
of the GDP of European countries in 2010.749 As far as Germany is concerned, the 
amount of criminal revenues that could be potentially laundered is estimated in 
17.645 million Euros, corresponding to the 0,7% of national GDP.750 A research 
commissioned by the European Commission in 2013 estimated the amount of 
revenues laundered in Germany to 29.381 Euros, equivalent to 1,27 % of the total 
GDP.751 
On the background of estimates on the volume of money laundered in Germany, it is 
interesting to look at figures on the seized and confiscated assets. Recent statistics on 
the volume of seized and confiscated assets are provided by the FIU and by the 
FATF report of 2010. Exact figures on the amount of seized and confiscated assets 
respectively to each offence are not provided. The FIU estimates for the offence of 
money laundering a net value of 28.393.765 Euros seized in 2013. The figure is 
obtained by subtracting the volume of cancellation from the total seizure of cash, 
movable property, claims and titles, and immovable property seized in the context of 
a proceedings resulting directly or indirectly from information obtained by the law 
enforcement authorities from suspicious transaction reports pursuant to the GwG752 
As reported by the FATF in 2010, the total volume of assets forfeited or confiscated 
in 2007 in relation to Article 261 Gcc amounted to 15.074.378 Euros, in 2004 to 
23.710.160 Euros, in 2003 to 65.453.313 Euros and in 2002 to 32.948.160 Euros.753 
There is no information to interpret the varying trend. Also the BKA provides 
                                                          
747 FATF, MER 2010 p. 22. 
748 The selected illicit markets are: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, ecstasy, amphetamines, illicit trade in 
tobacco products, counterfeiting, missing trader intra-community fraud and cargo theft. The overall 
figures on illicit revenues may be very conservative. Some important illicit markets, such as trafficking in 
human beings, both for sexual and labour exploitation purposes, or extortion, illegal gambling and other 
types of fraud different from missing trader intra-community fraud, lack estimates for most of the 28 EU 
member states, and thus are not included in this calculation, see Savona and Riccardi (ed.), 2015, p. 35. 
749 Savona and Riccardi (ed.), 2015, p. 35. 
750 According to the report, for example Italian organised criminal groups are investing in Germany 
especially in the following sectors: construction; bars and restaurants; hotels and other tourist 
accommodations; agriculture and fishing; wholesale and retail traders. Savona and Riccardi (ed.), 2015, 
pp. 36, 160. 
751 Unger et. al., 2013, p. 39. 
752 FIU, 2013 Report, p. 22. 
753 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 82. 
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estimates on the volume of the proceeds of crime and on the seized and confiscated 
assets in Germany. The total amount of loss deriving from organised crime was 
estimated by the BKA to 720 million Euros in 2013, and the proceeds of crime 
generated and proved amounted to 630 million Euros. Assets were provisionally 
forfeited in 28 % of the ongoing cases, representing a total amount of temporarily 
forfeited assets of 85 million Euros.754 
 4.9  Cost-benefit analyses 
The effectiveness of the anti-money laundering policy has been assessed through 
cost-benefits analyses. The results of two of these researches are here summarised.755 
The research institute 'Transcrime'756 conducted a quantitative research on the costs 
and benefits of the disclosure system of beneficial owners (BO) in the context of the 
prevention of money laundering. 757  The beneficial ownership disclosure is the 
process of making information of a company beneficial owner available outside the 
company. The process implies collecting, verifying, analysing and elaborating this 
information and then communicating it. The goal of the study was comparing two 
beneficial ownership disclosure systems758 in terms of the costs and benefits that may 
arise from their implementation in the 27 EU countries.  The outcome of both types 
of measuring methods utilised for assessing the cost-benefit effectiveness of the 
German system of BOs disclosure were negative. In the first case, the value of 
benefit at the net of costs was -1.323.853.000 Euros, while in the second case it was -
13.481.000 Euros. In both cases indirect net benefits were positive, though, 
                                                          
754 BKA, Organisierte Kriminalität Bundeslagebild 2013, pp. 6, 7, available at 
http://www.bka.de/DE/ThemenABisZ/Deliktsbereiche/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/Lagebilder/lagebilder__
node.html?__nnn=true, last accessed on 13/11/2015. 
755 The European Parliament commissioned a study on the impact of organised crime in Europe. 
However, money laundering was excluded, despite it was considered an important enabler, due to the fact 
that its costs would have doubled the costs already counted for the predicate crimes, since it was assumed 
that the offence of money laundering itself did not generate victims costs. Costs of organised crime data 
in Europe are measured on the basis of the financial and welfare impacts upon European victims and on 
Europeans who are not direct victims. They are not measured on the basis of the benefits to European 
offenders from crime. Nor are they consider the amounts of benefit from crime that are typically available 
from confiscation. Levi et al. (ed.), 2013, pp. 15, 20. 
756 Transcrime is a Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime, Università di Trento/Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano (Italy). 
757 Savona et al., 2007, pp. 13, 153. 
758 'Model 0 is an intermediary-based BO disclosure system embodied in the Third EU Anti Money 
Laundering Directive (Directive 2005/60/EC). This disclosure system foresees a primary reliance on 
financial and business intermediaries in order to obtain company beneficial ownership and control 
information using a risk based approach. On the other hand, Model 1 is a new upfront and ongoing BO 
disclosure system where the duty to disclose beneficial ownership of public and private unlisted 
companies is placed on the same beneficial owner, who should notify the company of his ownership 
details. The company should collect this information and file it in a Central National Registry available 
on-line to law enforcement agencies and to the wider public'. Savona et al., 2007, p. 13. 
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amounting respectively to 274.977.000 and 295.395.000 Euros, so that one could 
infer that the system produces relevant effects in the long term rather than in the short 
term. However, since it is a cost-intense process, long-run effects might not convince 
policy makers of the utility of the system. In 2014 the outcomes of a European 
research on the economic and legal effectiveness of the European anti-money 
laundering policy in the 27 Member States were published.759 The study aims at 
evaluating the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes, by comparing the 
implementation of policies with the purpose of identifying best practices. 760  The 
authors explain as follows the reasons why such an assessment was particularly 
needed at that point, after two Conventions and three Directives were already enacted. 
'Many actors have been involved, many efforts have been made and much money has 
been invested in this policy area. It seems time to stand still for a moment and to 
investigate whether all these efforts achieved their intended goals? And has the 
investment in police, public prosecution, reporting system and supervision had a 
positive impact on combating laundering and terrorist financing?’761 For the purpose 
of the study, the effectiveness is measured through different legal and economic 
factors, such as the level of international cooperation, the numbers of STRs filed, 
prosecutions and convictions, the structure and the definition of the anti-money 
laundering policy, and the authorities involved. 762  In particular, the economic 
effectiveness is considered to be the achievement of the policy goal, namely the 
reduction and prevention of money laundering or of crime in general, while the legal 
effectiveness is understood as whether the norms are meaningful for the achievement 
of the policy goal, and they are applied and obeyed. Furthermore, with legal 
effectiveness, the authors of the study intend to reveal whether there are legal 
hindrances, such as horizontal or vertical conflicts between norms or loopholes, or 
                                                          
759 See Unger et. al., 2013. 
760 One consideration needs to be made on the premises of the ECOLEF project. In order to assess 
the threat of money laundering, the authors have assumed that 'money launderers are economic actors, 
and [...] they follow the law of economics, which dictate that they should maximize profits and minimize 
risks'. This has been showed not to be valid for the Italian mafia, for example, since mafia bosses may 
decide to invest and launder their money in a low profit business for the purpose of establishing their 
power on the territoryAlso, if this was the case, there would be much less drug criminality, due to the 
high imprisonment rate in the field, which would lower the economics of the crime. Unger et. al., 2013, p. 
12. 
761 Unger et al., 2014, p. vii. 
762 The study starts from money laundering threat-analysis and carries on by looking at the legal 
implementation of the policies, at the execution of such policies, at the enforcement and international 
cooperation and it ends with a final evaluation of the effectiveness, which is the result of a cost-benefit 
analysis. Unger et al., 2014, p. 2. 
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other factors, such as insufficient resources or awareness, that negatively influence 
the application of the law.763 The research is the result of a combination of a technical 
assessment, carried out through the use of quantitative data, and of a qualitative 
evaluation of the 'law in action', conducted through interviews in the Member States. 
As far as Germany in concerned, quantitative data are mainly provided by the FIU 
annual reports and by the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report of 2010. The European 
research is based on the assumption that the (in)effectiveness of a policy depends on 
the implementation of it764 and it assumes that the policy’s goal is the reduction or 
prevention of money laundering or other crimes, without contemplating eventual 
latent or symbolic functions of the law. The study takes a neutral approach, directed 
at evaluating objectively the implementation of policies through a cost-benefit 
analysis. With specific regard to the assessment of the effectiveness of criminal law, 
the book takes the view that a criminal justice system is effective if deviance is 
punished such that criminal behaviour is deterred.765 The results of the European 
study relevant for this research are hereafter summarised. According to the study, 
Germany had the lowest score of estimated threat in 2009 as percentage of the GDP 
(4,7 %, while the highest was registered in Estonia, with 207,7 %). The study has 
created a score of effective repression, based on the assumptions that an effective 
repression ensures that the sanctions are high enough and frequent enough.766The 
suggested equation is calculated as the result of detected deviance in relation to the 
punished deviance. If the expected punishment is higher than the benefits yielded by 
the commission of money laundering, that individuals will probably not commit the 
crime. Based on this calculation, Germany has a medium-high score of effective 
repression. The economic and legal effectiveness is calculated on the basis of some 
indicators which are identified in the FATF compliance score, the legal effectiveness 
of preventing money laundering, the third EU money laundering implementation 
                                                          
763 Unger et al., 2014, p. 6. 
764 The European research seems to belong to the 'Implementationsforschung', implementation-
based researches theorised by Blankenburg, see chapter one, paragraph 1.2. 
765 Unger et al., 2014, p. 125. The European study takes a different approach respect to this research. 
This work considers effective a criminal justice system that limits the use of criminal law on the basis of 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. In addition, this thesis takes in consideration the 
possibility that an ineffective criminalisation creates de facto impunity and that this 'process of 
decriminalisation' might have been a latent intent or at least an accepted consequence. Furthermore, 
according to this work, a high rate of conviction might not be a symptom of effectiveness. The fact that an 
increase of convictions rate may be due to an increase of money laundering and not of the effectiveness of 
the criminal justice system is recognised also in another chapter of the book, see Unger et al., 2014, p. 
170. For the discussion on the two different approaches, see chapter 1, paragraph 1.3. 
766 Unger et al., 2014, p. 140. 
 182 
timelines, the international cooperation score, the information flow score, the number 
of money laundering convictions and the FIU policy response.767 According to these 
indicators, the German policy scores a standard level of effectiveness compared to 
the other Member States, without being considered under-proportional for any of the 
elements.768 The cost-benefit analysis is based on factors identified as costs of the 
policy and benefits of the policy response. The analysis is calculated on the basis of 
which costs a hypothetical country that has standard scores among the EU Member 
States would save without a money laundering policy in action, and what benefits it 
would lose consequently.769 The total costs of anti-money laundering policy for the 
EU has been estimated to 2 billion Euros, with an undetermined reduction of privacy 
and social inefficiency.770 Unfortunately, it has been possible 'to estimate most of the 
costs, but hardly any of the benefits.'771  However, the research has produced an 
estimate of the costs and of benefits for every country: Germany performed the 
higher scores with 378.177.540 Euros of estimated costs and 4.063,254 Euros of 
estimated benefits.772 The book concludes that 'the cost-benefit dilemma for AML 
policy is reduced to the question: are we willing to spend almost 44 million Euros, 
with a reduction in privacy and efficiency costs for unknown benefits?' 773  The 
question could be answered with another question, namely: Are we willing to give up 
on the fight against money laundering? Whitehouse has answered this dilemma by 
stating that 'it would be a brave person who steps up to say that it is too high price to 
pay for countering terrorism and serious crime'.774 The securitisation rhetoric has so 
far supported the extreme importance of such measures, and anti-money laundering 
policy has been growing. Yet, the question could be inverted: Do we really want to 
fight money laundering and, by doing so, are we also willing to threaten the financial 
system as we know it today? A certain amount of illicit financial flows may be 
considered an acceptable price to pay for a market where free mobility of capital is 
guaranteed. 
                                                          
767 The indicators are explained in Unger et al., 2014, pp. 188-199. 
768 Results are showed through a table, see Unger et al., 2014, pp. 202, 203. 
769 Costs are considered to be on-going policy making, sanction costs, FIU, supervision, aw 
enforcement and judiciary, duties of the private sector, reduction in privacy, efficiency costs for society 
and the financial system. Benefits components taken in consideration are fines, confiscated proceeds, 
reduction in the amount of money laundering and of predicate offences, reduction of the damages on the 
real economy and of the risks in the financial sector. Unger et al., 2014, p. 207. 
770 Unger et al., 2014, p. 235. 
771 Unger et al., 2014, p. 218. 
772 Unger et al., 2014, p. 220. 
773 Unger et al., 2014, p.218. 
774 Whitehouse, 2003, p. (138) 140. 
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 4.10  Considerations 
The results exposed in the previous paragraphs about the effects of the 
implementation of the anti-money laundering policy are summarised here in order to 
be further discussed. The eight hypothesis set by Oswald in 1997 are compared to the 
outcomes emerging from the current research: 1) The hypothesised relevance of 
nationality or social class of the persons, whose transactions are reported as 
suspicious, has been confirmed by the recent FIU reports. Although these contain a 
majority of German nationals object of STRs, on the basis of a rough confrontation 
with the percentage of non-German nationals among the whole population (around 
10 %), the percentage of non-German nationals object of STRs is higher (40 %). 
Moreover, 57 % of those convicted for the aggravated money laundering have been 
non-German nationals. However, in Berlin for instance, a study has revealed that 
refugees are often refused to open a bank account due to lack of identification papers, 
so that there has been a discriminatory exclusion to financial services based on 
nationality.775 In addition, the FIU draws attention on the high number of low income 
individuals reported: namely students, pensioners, unemployed and housewives, 
constituting 19 % of the reported in 2005 and 17 % in 2004. However, no 
explanations were provided for this trend. 
2) The most recent situation described by the FIU reports has confirmed the high 
number of STRs filed to the FIU, yet the FATF assessors claimed that the number 
was not sufficient if compared to the volume of the national economic sector.776 
3) According to two cost-benefit analyses conducted recently by private researcher, 
the costs of implementation of the current anti-money laundering policy - and in 
                                                          
775 See, for example a study conducted in Berlin in 2013 by the NGO Antidiskriminierungsberatung 
Brandenburg, 'Geldinstitute verweigern Flüchtlingen die Eröffnung von Bankkonten', available at 
http://www.antidiskriminierungsberatung-
brandenburg.de/sites/default/files/attachements/Hintergrundpapier%20Banken%20verweigern%20Konten
_ADB%202013_1.pdf, last accessed on 17/07/2015. A similar research that lead to parallel conclusion 
has been conducted in Switzerland by Killias and Nunes. The authors denounce that anti-money 
laundering regulations lead to the discrimination of foreign citizens because they are not allowed to open 
bank accounts; see Killias and Nunes, Diskriminierung. 
 Nebeneffekte der Geldwäscherei-Bekämpfung. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21/05/2012, available at 
http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/debatte/nebeneffekte-der-geldwaescherei-bekaempfung-1.16973351, last 
accessed on 17/11/2015. 
776 FATF, MER Germany, 2010, p. 170. 
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particular of the mechanisms to disclose beneficial ownerships - were too high with 
respect to the estimated benefits.777 
4) Prosecutors interviewed by the FATF assessors in Germany in 2010 explained that 
in practice 'while it may not be a statutory requirement, it is easier to prosecute and 
convict a person for money laundering under section 261 Gcc when there is a prior 
conviction for the predicate offense, as prosecutors always need to establish a 'link' or 
'connection' between the money laundering conduct and the predicate offence 
involved (i.e. the court must be convinced of the existence of the predicate offense). 
This means that the prosecutor will have to prove the specifics of the predicate 
offence, e.g. that the conduct amounted to a designated offense, the perpetrator, and 
the types of assets that originated from the predicate offence, which is a rather high 
standard of proof.' 778  The praxis has therefore replied to the question about the 
standard of proof required to start a money laundering case. Interviews conducted by 
the FATF assessors in 2010 have confirmed that proceedings are closed because of 
the impossibility of bringing concrete evidence of a predicate offence. Therefore, the 
standard of proof is one of the main obstacles for obtaining a conviction under 261 
Gcc in Germany.779 
5) Oswald hypothesised that Article 11 (1) of the GwG, which allowed suspicious 
transactions to be completed in order not to hinder the pursuing of beneficiaries of a 
money laundering operation, would have opened a legal loophole. This was not 
proved by the current empirical research, though. 
6) Until now, regulations for the designated financial and non-financial businesses 
and professions have rather increased and become even more complicated since then. 
On the other side, some categories of designated businesses and professions are still 
reluctant to undertake compliance with anti-money laundering standards, due to the 
complexity and the costs of the measures. 
7) In the meanwhile, a FIU has been established at the federal criminal police office, 
which receives all STRs and forwards them to the competent law enforcement unity 
for investigations, so that the system of filing suspected operations has been 
regulated and is not a chaotic mechanism anymore as it was in the second half of the 
nineties. The FIU reports show that a high number of follow-up reports are now filed 
                                                          
777 For more details on the cost-benefit assessments, see paragraph 4.9. 
778 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 50. 
779 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 50. 
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to the FIU with information on the proceedings initiated on the basis of STRs. The 
centralised system created in 2002 at the BKA has indeed notably increased the 
communication between the two parties. This development negatively confirmed 
Oswald’s eighth hypothesis. However, the FIU in the last published report of 2013 
still complains about the too low amount of information provided by public 
prosecutors offices on the mentioned cases.780 
8) Difficulties deriving from international cooperation still represent an obstacle for 
money laundering investigations. Despite the existing legal framework of 
international cooperation and the possibilities of asking and providing mutual legal 
assistance, the complexity of financial operations, the involvement of offshore 
jurisdictions and the demolition of borders between the EU have exacerbated. This 
problem is confirmed by the interviews presented in the following chapter (5). In a 
globalised economy, as long as some jurisdictions do not engage - or if so, only 
symbolically - to impede the laundering of proceeds of crime, the effectiveness of 
other compliant legal systems will be frustrated. The fact that, as stated in the FIU 
reports relating to the years between 2002 and 2014, the most frequent headquarters 
of companies reported have been tax havens or lax or secrecy jurisdictions mirrors 
exactly this situation. 781  However, reducing the problem to an issue of lack of 
international cooperation would be reductive. 
 
One of the most meaningful fact observed is that organised crime and 'gross money 
laundering' are not persecuted through Article 261 Gcc. This fact can be inferred by 
the low number of convictions pursuant to Article 261 (4), by the low number of 
money laundering proceedings categorised as organised crime and by the low 
number of investigations in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic 
crimes recorded by public prosecutors offices in 2013, where more than one person 
was involved (18 %). Yet, this does not mean that the criminal justice system does 
not act against them, but rather that it uses other tools to achieve the goal. While the 
low conviction rate for serious money laundering cases could be also a symptom of a 
high degree of deterrence of the provision, it seems that law enforcement uses the 
money laundering charge as a fallback for authorities who are unable to acquire 
sufficient evidence in a preliminary phase for the predicate crime and necessitate 
                                                          
780 See FIU, 2013 report, p. 46. 
781 For more detailed figures, see paragraph 4.6. 
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further information otherwise not accessible. The charge of money laundering allows 
investigators to access the vast amount of information recorded pursuant to the GwG, 
which would not be otherwise accessible. Yet, after the investigative phase, 
prosecutors seem to prefer to modify the charge and opt for indictment for predicate 
offences instead. The law seems to be effective to the extent that it facilitates the 
initial investigations, while it does not serve directly the function of punishing money 
launderers. Besides having a substantial nature, the provisions seem to have a 
procedural function. It can be inferred that prosecutors find particularly difficult to 
bring evidence against organised money launderers also due to the fact that 
professional offenders do not leave traces, as already highlighted by Oswald's 
research. From the scarce use of Article 261 Gcc for tackling organised criminality, it 
can be inferred that the measure is not serving for one of the purposes declared by the 
legislature when introducing the offence. In addition, it can be hypothesised that 
other measures may be more suitable to tackle 'gross money laundering'. Already in 
1997, Oswald positively assessed the introduction of anti-money laundering 
regulations by acknowledging the positive effects triggered by the information 
provided by the designated business and professions to law enforcement agencies for 
the purpose of conducting financial investigations. 
 
Given the high number of STRs filed and the low number of money laundering 
charges and of convictions deriving from the STRs since the introduction of the laws, 
it can be assumed that the system has been anyway maintained because it still 
provides some sort of benefits. It can be hypothesised that one benefit is the number 
of information provided to law enforcement agencies, which can be used for other 
causes pursuant to Article 11 (6) GwG, even in case of dismissal. This amount of 
recorded information is helpful not only to support further indictments, but also to 
increase the personnel awareness about the ever-changing money laundering 
techniques and schemes. Therefore, the law is used, as already revealed by the 
prosecutors interviewed by Oswald, to gather information rather than to confiscate 
criminal assets. Again the effect of the 'law in action' differs in respect to the declared 
legislative intentions, which justified the criminalisation of money laundering with 
the necessity of tackling organised crime's economic power. By spelling out this 
function, the assessment on the effectiveness of the law - as the possibility of 
collecting information - can be positive. Yet, this effect could be considered a social 
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cost rather than a benefit. On a theoretical side, many scholars see the recording of 
personal information by private actors as an infringement of the right to privacy.782 
On a more practical side such mechanism imposes significant costs on the designated 
businesses and professions that are in charge of collecting the data. 783  When 
compared to the effective outcomes of the preventive regulations, in terms of law 
enforcement results, this aspect does not seem to win a cost-benefit analysis, as 
showed in the quoted researches. If one considers the advantages in terms of 
information collected, the policy may be considered worth the burden imposed, 
instead. However, the fact that the laws would have an effective impact on the long 
run on the fight against money laundering and organised crime may be seen as a 
diminished deterrence effect, because perpetrators would have the time to adapt to 
the new laws and find new ways of circumventing them. A collateral effect of the 
long-run effectiveness of the policy hypothesised on the basis of the outcomes of the 
research on the implementation is the fact that perpetrators could take advantage of 
the initiated but not completed cases, by acquiring knowledge about law enforcement 
strategies and thus develop subterfuges to elude them. On the contrary, it seems that 
the legislature is always running after to cope with the offenders’ ever-new strategies. 
In fact, regulations about a new sector are updated when there is evidence that there 
is a risk of money laundering in that specific sector. Yet, offenders might have 
already moved their laundering activities to another sector. This hypothesis will be 
further debated in the last chapter. 
 
On the assumption that the inclusion of the reckless conduct would have potentially 
criminalised daily activities, a focus was posed on the number of convictions related 
to Article 261 (5) Gcc to verify the target of the criminal provision. Since 2005 a 
high number of convictions have been actually referring to reckless money 
laundering. This shows that the offence is used to punish primarily 'petty money 
laundering'. This fact can also be inferred from the relevant number of money 
laundering cases to the detriment of senior citizens, signalled by the FIU in the recent 
years. Also the fact that a significant number of STRs is filed in relation to the 
'financial agents’ phenomenon' is a symptom that the preventive mechanism targets 
                                                          
782 See, among other, the essay of Hassemer and Starzacher, who argue that data protection should 
be considered a fundamental right, Hassemer and Starzacher, 1993, pp. 16 ss. 
783 The research calculates the costs of the policy to 44 million Euros. See Unger et al., 2014, p. 218. 
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more 'small fishes' rather than big perpetrators. Individuals convicted for the reckless 
conduct may be even victims of a fraud perpetrated by criminal networks. However, 
the criminal network acting behind the offender remains undetected. If on the one 
side it cannot be claimed that such offenders, given the lower degree of culpability 
should not be punished at all, on the other side this effect of the law involves a 
change of paradigm. The money laundering offence was initially introduced with the 
goal of tackling serious crimes. The observed effect, however, changes the function 
and the nature of the law, so that Article 261 Gcc could be considered rather a 'blue 
collar crime' more than a 'white collar crime'. 
 
The spill-over effect of repressive and preventive regulations has been confirmed by 
the FIU as well. From the analysis of the reports published from 2002 to 2013, with 
regard to the quality of STRs filed to the FIU, it can be inferred that certain 
designated professions and businesses are very reluctant in filing STRs, despite their 
notably exposure to money laundering risks. The list of designated professions and 
businesses has been amplified over the years exactly with the goal of facing this 
transfer of crime from one area to the other. Yet some professionals, such as legal 
advisors, do not report them, although they possess the capacity of recognising illicit 
transactions. The fact that some sectors do not actively participate in the effort of 
preventing money laundering, by allowing criminal proceedings to enter the 
legitimate economy, may lead to a general ineffectiveness of the system, because it 
can significantly hinder the capacity of the whole anti-money laundering system to 
respond to the ability of offenders to move their field of activity there where the law 
is lax. 
 
This chapter seems to support only partly the underlying hypotheses of a symbolic 
effectiveness and of an intended ineffectiveness of the money laundering offence. In 
fact it has showed that the provision does generate some instrumental effects by 
punishing offenders and by triggering a cooperation directed at signalling suspicious 
transactions between the obliged entities and law enforcement. However, some of the 
effects do not seem to completely fulfil the legislature's declared goals. For example 
the chapter seems to prove wrong the legislature's expectation of tackling the grey 
area by punishing gate-keepers or the attributed function of eliminating organised 
and serious crime. Given the high costs of implementation highlighted by the cost-
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benefits analyses, the rather low outcomes seem to be insufficient to fulfil the 
legislature's goals. Since it is sufficient that without latent functions it would be 
impossible to explain the adoption and maintenance of a legal act, 784  it can be 
concluded that the intents declared by lawmakers do not satisfy the reasons why the 
provision was introduced. This opens up the hypothesis that Article 266 Gcc is an 
example of a symbolic legislation, which has been enacted with the purpose of 
compromising a complex parliamentarian debate.
                                                          









'La politica, l'eterna madre dell'accadere umano, 
è rimasta inceppata nell'economia e nel mercato […]' 







 5.1  Foreword 
This chapter presents the outcome of the interviews conducted on eight experts and 
twenty-two legal actors in Berlin between 2013 and 2015 with, with the goal of 
contributing to the assessment of the anti-money laundering law's effectiveness. In 
particular, the eight experts interviewed are, in chronological order, Uecker, a policy 
advisor for the German Parliament for the socialist party (SPD); Korte and Busch, a 
former and a current deputy director general, heads of the economic, computer, 
corruption related and environmental crime divisions of the Ministry of Justice (BMJ), 
Findeisen, the head of section VII A£ payment, transactions, money laundering 
prevention of the Ministry of Finance (BMF), a representative of the Ministry of Interior 
(BMI), Schneider and Rech, civil servants from the division I 18, public security and 
order of the State department of Hessen, and a policy officer Henn of the NGO WEED 
(World Economy, Ecology & Development). The twenty-two legal actors are composed 
of ten attorneys, among them some defence attorneys and some lawyers specialised in 
commercial law and compliance, six police officers, two public accountants and four 
public prosecutors. Those who accepted to be named are, among the attorneys, Lubitz, 
Gutman, and Diergarten, the representative of the Chamber of public accountants 
Reiher and Goltz, the prosecutor Hagemann, Finger the former Berlin State criminal 
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Police head of department three on organised crime and the Berlin State criminal Police 
chief superintendents Pietsch and Kunitsch.785 The chapter aims to provide an insight on 
the experts and legal actors' opinions and perception of the law. In particular, the 
interviews focus on the respondents' perception of the money laundering phenomenon 
in Germany, on the technical appropriateness of the policy, on the perceived conflicting 
interests related to the introduction or the implementation of the legislation and finally 
on the interviewees' perceived effectiveness of the policy.786 I choose to give voice to 
the interview partners and to quote direct conversations -translated into English- in 
order to highlight their expertise. In addition, given that many topics that have been 
dealt with had a strong political nature, I did not want it to interfere with my perspective. 
Along with the interviews, official declarations of intent and opinions released by 
representing organisations and other official documents will be used to obtain an insight 
into legal practice. Given the transnational nature of money laundering and of the anti-
money laundering regulations, this chapter, despite focussing on a national legal system, 
re-opens the perspective on to the global level. Some of the challenges faced at this 
global level to tackle money laundering, in fact, have an impact on the domestic 
dimension. At the same time, issues that are raised in the national context can be further 
theorised in a widespread context. 
 
 5.2  Is Germany an Eldorado for money launderers? 
As shown in the previous chapter, estimates on the volume of money laundered in 
Germany are not consistent. It is therefore not surprising that also perceptions on the 
size of the phenomenon in Germany differ among individuals. Between 2012 and 2013 
the media have recurrently reported that the country is a preferential place for money 
launderers.787 This assumption was based, among other factors, on the declaration of a 
notorious senior public prosecutor from Palermo (Italy), who said that 'if he was a 
money launderer he would have invested in Germany' ('Wenn ich Mafiosi wäre, würde 
                                                          
785 The interview sample consists of a majority of male respondents. Yet, given that gender is not 
considered a relevant variable for the purpose of this research, this element is not taken into account. 
786 For a more detailed description of the methodology used see paragraph 1.5, chapter one. 
787 Among others, see 'OECD: Deutschland ist Geldwäsche-Paradies' in Deutsche Wirtschafts 
Nachrichten, 18.01.13; Dick W, Germany, a safe haven for money laundering. Deutsche Welle, 
30/10/2012; Rimpel K, Geldwäsche-Paradies Deutschland. Nummer acht unter den Steueroasen. Tz-
online, 07/11/2013.; Ramthum C, OECD: Deutschland versagt im Kampf gegen Geldwäsche. 
Wirtschaftswoche, 26/04/2014.; Deutsche Presse Agentur, Steueroase Deutschland ist Eldorado für 
Geldwäsche. Handelsblatt, 07/11/2013; 'Deutschland ein "Eldorado für Geldwäsche"?' In Deutsche Welle, 
07.11.2013; Netzwerk Steuergerechtigkeit „Deutschland ist ein Eldorado für Geldwäsche'' In Frankfurter 
Allgemein, 07.11.2013. 
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ich meine Gelder in Deutschland anlagen').788 In 2013 five non-profit organisations 
published a report that drew attention to the alarming estimates provided by the IMF 
about the volume of money laundered in Germany, being equivalent to 1,3 % to 1,7 % 
of the German GDP.789 On the basis of such estimates the authors defined Germany as a 
'Schattenfinanzzentrum' (an offshore financial centre). However, 'there is no evidence 
that in Germany more money is laundered in comparison to Italy, France or the USA, 
therefore I would not call only Germany 'the paradise for money launderers', observes 
Korte from the Ministry of Justice.790  To the question as to whether it is true that 
Germany is an Eldorado for money laundering, as described by the newspapers, one of 
the respondents replies: 'this question clearly has a yes/no (Jain) answer.791 Nobody can 
tell the truth, because what we possess are only estimates'. The attorney Diergarten also 
replies ambiguously: 'On one hand yes. On the other hand I do not agree with the 
statement of the FATF that Germany does too few to tackle money laundering'.792 The 
last argument is also shared by other respondents. Busch asserts: 'even if this would be 
the case [that Germany is an Eldorado for money launderers], the reason would not be a 
lax legislation, because Germany has the necessary laws to tackle money laundering'.793 
Pietsch and Kunisch, detective chief superintendents from the financial investigations 
group of Berlin LKA 311GFG (Gemeinsame Finanzermittlungs Gruppe) do not agree 
with the statement that Germany is an Eldorado for money launderers, and add that 'if 
one says that Germany is a paradise for money launderers it would mean that the 
criminal justice system does not function. According to the two investigators this cannot 
be true because the financial investigations groups have already been in existence for 
twenty years within the local criminal police office (LKA)'. 794  Schneider, a 
representative of Hessen, one of the states that has been most engaged in anti-money 
laundering prevention, believes that 'thanks to public awareness and thanks to the 
involvement of non-financial institutions the laundering of proceeds of crime has 
recently become more difficult in Germany. Thus Germany is on the right track to 
                                                          
788 The statement was recalled in various sources; among them a judges association in Hamburg 
(Hamburgerishce Richterverein) invited the senior prosecutor to give a speech and quoted the statement 
in the report of the meeting. See Kaufmann 'Mafia, Ein Parasit befällt Europa', 27.09.2011, available at 
http://www.richterverein.de/index.htm?/mhr/mhr114/m11415.htm, last visited on 12/07/2015. 
789 Henn et al. 'Schattenfinanzzentrum Deutschland', 2013, pp. 4-6. 
790 Annex I, p. iv. 
791 Annex I, p. I. 
792 Annex I, p. xxiv. 
793 Annex I, p. iv. 
794 Annex I, p. xxx. 
 194 
eliminate the existing volume of money laundering'.795 The respondent thinks 'Germany 
is on the right track to eliminate the existing volume of money laundering. In the past, it 
was also recognized on an international level, that the amount of money laundered in 
Germany was very high, but thanks to the intense commitment with a focus on the non-
banking sector, it is likely to decline'. Finger from the state criminal police of Berlin, 
instead, confirms the possibility that 'Germany is a favoured country in Europe for the 
laundering of proceeds of crimes', but at the same time he considers 'the term 'Eldorado' 
exaggerated, because it does not acknowledge the efforts made to prevent money 
laundering, which have successfully diminished the phenomenon'.796 
 
The respondents point out that the media influences the social perception of the size of 
the phenomenon. From Busch's point of view, 'the fact that the media has recently 
started reporting more about economic crimes can be related to the fact that the criminal 
justice system only started dealing with crimes such as corruption and money 
laundering thirty years ago, and currently there are very specialised agencies that are 
responsible for law enforcement in this field, so therefore many more offences are 
detected and more information is provided to the public'.797 According to his colleague 
from the Ministry of Justice Korte, 'the media has an interest in presenting big scandals 
to the public, they prioritise hot topics and money laundering is a phenomenon that 
attracts public attention. Actually, the fact that big  money laundering cases are reported, 
can be also interpreted as a success of the criminal justice system, which proves the fact 
that law enforcement has detected and persecuted the crime. Moreover, showing the 
public how these crimes are seriously persecuted has a deterrent effect'.798 Yet, 'the 
media, while drawing attention to the estimated volume of illicit financial flows in 
Germany, does not report  the legal steps undertaken to tackle them, so  the picture 
presented to the public is biased', complains Uecker.799 Finger considers the work of 
professional investigative journalists a factor that has contributed to raise people’s 
awareness. He believes that 'public perception and politicians sensitivity to the topic are 
increasing, thanks to the public work of the law enforcement agencies that have in 
recent years drawn the attention of political institutions to these topics, and thanks to 
                                                          
795 Annex I, p. xiii. 
796 Annex I, p. xxx. 
797 Annex I, p. vi. 
798 Annex I, p. vi. 
799 Annex I, p. i. 
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investigative journalists who have been reporting the huge increasing level of organised 
crime's infiltration in Germany'.800 Schneider also thinks that people's awareness of the 
topic has improved in the last years.801 Yet, according to Findeisen from the Ministry of 
Finance, the image of money laundering presented by the media is distorted: 'The media 
provides an image of money laundering as primarily connected to red light crime and 
criminal activities committed by foreigners and refugees. Many people are against 
money laundering, but they have the idea that money launderers are gypsies or those 
coming from the former Eastern-block. These ideas are not proven through proper 
investigations, in fact they do not mirror reality. Journalists sit in their offices and use 
secondary material and are therefore not able to provide a real picture of what money 
laundering is. This plays a big role in the phenomenon's inaccurate perception in 
Germany'.802 
 
 5.2.1 How much money is laundered in Germany? 
The problem can be effectively summarised in a respondent's answer: 'nobody knows 
exactly how much money is washed'.803 Given the lack of objective figures on the 
volume of money laundered emerged in the fourth chapter, the reader will not be 
surprised that almost all of the respondents share this opinion. In the Ministry of the 
Interior it is confirmed that 'we do not possess enough data to produce a correct estimate 
of the volume of money laundered since part of the data is dealt with by the Länders 
and we do not collect it'. Also Korte acknowledges the impossibility of providing 
figures on the volume of money laundered due to the fact that 'the Länder that are 
entitled to deal with these issues and do not have the duty to report their work in the 
field of anti-money laundering to the BMJ '.804 Yet, neither on a state-level, according to 
Schneider, institutions possess solid statistics about the amount of money laundered in 
Germany, 'therefore it is not possible to evaluate the phenomenon objectively'. 805 
'However, the fact that Germany is a federal State and therefore is more complicated to 
coordinate, it is not only a matter that concerns money laundering control', adds the civil 
servant. Findeisen confirms that 'we do not possess reliable statistical data on the 
volume of money laundered, neither about the organised criminal activities. What we 
                                                          
800 Annex I, p. xxviii. 
801 Annex I, p. xiii. 
802 Annex I, p. xi. 
803 Annex I, p. i 
804 Annex I, p. v. 
805 Annex I, p. xiii. 
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actually need is empirical research on the real amount of laundering money and reliable 
data of law enforcement activities in the states.'806 There is, thus a consensus among the 
representatives of the Ministries, relating to the lack of reliable figures on the 
phenomenon of money laundering. Henn from the NGO 'WEED' interprets this lack/ as 
a missed chance for the institutions to effectively tackle the problem. The respondent 
believes that 'the lack of reliable figures on money laundering hinders the effective fight 
against it. If there were statistics that objectively showed how much money is laundered 
in Germany, they would support the argument that there is the necessity to do more. 
Currently, there is not enough evidence of the volume of money laundered in Germany. 
Facts, statistics and cut-cases are missing, the real amount could be much lower or much 
higher than the estimate that we have of 50 Billion Euros'.23 Indeed, according to senior 
prosecutor Hagemann, 'the dark number in this field [of money laundering] is much 
higher than in other fields. What emerges through the legal prevention and repression is 
only the tip of the iceberg'.24 This is confirmed also by other police officers, who say 
'organised criminal groups have been active in Germany since before the fall of the wall, 
however, their structures are not visible'. Henn continues, by arguing 'even the estimates 
produced by the OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] on 
the amount of money laundered in Germany are biased because they are only based on 
cases dealt with in the country, while proceeds of crimes committed abroad can be also 
laundered here. For instance, with these estimates, they do not take into account the 
money invested by the Italian Mafia, because they would also need to compare Italian 
statistics. […] Even Fiedler, 25 who is an expert in the casino sector, does not provide 
evidence of the phenomenon based on reliable estimates or clear-cut cases. Also, in the 
context of derivatives, attempts have been made to measure the volume of money 
laundering transactions but so far they have been unsuccessful. For the first time, the 
Ministry of Finance has recently commissioned a study to collect information about 
money laundering in the non-banking sector. However, from my point of view, the 
absence of reliable data and the fact that such a study has only just been commissioned 
are elements from which we can interpret that there has not been enough involvement. 
If even people in the Ministries, who have been working in the field for a very long time, 
cannot evaluate the estimates of the volume of money laundered in Germany, it seems 
that there is a lack of interest in providing such figures. However, the law is no longer 
young it has been in force for twenty years and it should show its results'.26 The policy 
                                                          
806 Annex I, p. xi. 
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officer thinks that on the other hand 'the lack of statistics undermines the credibility of 
those who advocate for a more effective response from the State based on the estimated 
threat of money laundering in the country'. In his opinion 'many authors argue that the 
regime is not effective, yet, the lack of reliable figures makes it hard to criticise the 
system. Even those who say that the anti-money laundering regime has not yet helped to 
tackle illicit financial flows do not possess data that objectively shows this failure, since 
the failure might have been triggered by other factors'. The lack of reliable figures, 
which has already emerged from the FATF assessment in 2010, was confirmed by the 
follow-up report in 2014.807 
 
The representative of the BMI draws our attention to another relevant issue connected to 
the compilation of statistics. By specifying that the BMI interprets the phenomenon of 
money laundering and organised crime using the data provided by the sixteen states, the 
BKA and the FIU, he stresses that the BKA’s definition of organised crime is too 
restrictive and does not comprehend many activities that are typical of criminal 
networks.808 According to the respondent, for example, 'the biggest problem linked to 
organised crime in Germany is corruption, but this is not included in the definition of 
organised crime provided by the BKA and therefore does not contribute to the statistics 
on organised crime in the country'.  In addition 'the FIU’s perspective is only  focussed  
on the offence of money laundering, but does not take into consideration the predicate 
offences, so that the image provided by FIU reports does not mirror the whole 
phenomenon of money laundering and of the counteraction'. 
 
                                                          
807 FATF, Mutual Evaluation of Germany: 3rd Follow-up Report, 2014, p. 25. This has prevented 
the assessors formulating a judgement on the implementation of specific provisions relating to money 
laundering. In particular, comprehensive annual statistics were missing or not available, or both in 
relation to, for instance, sanctions imposed for convictions pursuant to Article 261 Gcc to legal persons; 
the value of transactions associated with STRs; the provisional measures applied. Already in 2010, the 
FATF assessors observed that 'Nevertheless, given the high value of forfeitures and confiscations, 
assessors have no reason to doubt the authorities‘ claim that provisional measures were being applied in 
Germany. There is the possibility, however, that the use of provisional measures could be improved to 
help increase the level of assets confiscated and forfeited compared to the total claim made by the State 
for confiscation and forfeiture'. FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 85 
808 Annex I, p. xxxix. 'Organised crime is the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire 
power, which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are carried out by more than two 
participants who co-operate within a division of labour for a long or undetermined time span using a) 
commercial or commercial-like structures, or b) violence or other means of intimidation, or c) influence 
on politics, media, public administration, justice and the legitimate economy' BKA, 1999, translation of 
Levi, 1998, p. 335. 
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 5.2.2 What is the impact of money laundering? 
The respondents were asked for their opinion on what the consequences of money 
laundering are on the German society and economy and thus why the state should 
impede the infiltration of illicit money into the country. Practitioners and experts 
express similar opinions, the most recurrent answer is that it is in the interest of the state 
to persecute money laundering, due to the dangers posed on society and on the 
economy'. Korte asserts 'it has often been observed that money laundering undermines 
the economy of a country'; however, 'we do not have the facts and numbers to answer 
this question [about the impact of money laundering on the German society and 
economy]'.809 In the Ministry of Interior it has been confirmed that 'the biggest threat 
posed by money laundering in Germany is the infiltration of illegal structures in the 
legitimate economy'; yet even the report published by the BMF on the risks of money 
laundering to the financial sector, is based on assumptions and not on proven data, 
therefore I cannot assess the risk to the whole Germany'. Korte adds 'within the FATF 
meetings, it has often been said that money laundering was one of the main causes of 
the financial crisis. However, nobody could explain to us how money laundering has 
played a role in the financial crises. 810  According to Findeisen money laundering 
negatively impacts economic competition: 'Entrepreneurs that launder and invest their 
ill-gotten money in the legal economic sector undermine economic competition, and 
through their economic power they can indirectly influence politics and thus undermine 
the whole democracy and civil society'. 811  Investigators perceive the fight against 
money laundering as a duty. Pietsch and Kunisch confirm 'all actors have an interest in 
combating money laundering, from the banks to the government, but among the police 
there is a particularly strict engagement in the fight against crime, because the police 
perceives the infiltration of any type of money deriving from a criminal action as a 
threat'.812 Finger adds that the interest in tackling money laundering generally relies in 
the goal of 'not letting the economy be distorted by illegal capital. Since market 
capitalism is the dominant economic structure, law-abiding individuals have an interest 
in not being put out of competition by those who are favoured through the infiltration of 
criminal assets. The legally protected interest is the interest of the law-abiding 
professionals, businesses and industries. Indirectly this has also had an impact on the 
                                                          
809 Annex I, p. v. 
810 Annex I, p. vi. 
811 Annex I, p. ix. 
812 Annex I, p. xxx. 
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whole society, through the impact on the labour market, and especially on the 
employees whose life depends on those businesses, commercial and industrial activities 
that might be infiltrated or contaminated by the infiltration of illegal capital'.813 It is 
indeed a common perception that 'money laundering can affect the real economy, by 
distorting consumption, savings, investments, inflation, competition, trade and 
employment. [...] It can affect the financial sector with an increased risk for the 
insolvency, liquidity, reputation and integrity of the sector'.814 Yet, in literature there is 
the idea that money laundering could also be good for the economy, for example 
because it increases profits and the availability of credit. 815 
 
 5.2.3 Economic stability, rule of law: A fertile or hostile environment for money 
launderers? 
Interestingly, some characteristics of the German legal, political and economic system 
are perceived by the respondents as both enabling and obstructing money laundering. In 
particular, some factors are considered to be connected, either as enablers or as 
obstacles, to the threat of money laundering. Among them, the most recurrent is the 
level of corruption, the rule of law, the transparency of the administrative apparatus and 
the integrity of public officials, the soundness of the economic system. The respondents 
express differing opinions on these relations; again, the lack of empirical data on the 
matter impedes reaching a univocal conclusion. According to a respondent from the 
Ministry of the Interior, 'the fact that Germany has a secure banking sector and a strong 
financial centre attracts money launderers'.    Findeisen states 'Germany due to its stable 
economy is a relevant country of investment of illegal monies generated in thirds 
countries'.816 Henn specifies 'in the report ['Schattenfinanzzentrum Deutschland'] we 
argue that the fact that Germany has a stable economic and political system, is an 
attracting factor for money launderers who are willing to invest their money.'817 The 
report infers from the size of the financial centre, the volume of the banking sector, and 
from the high amount of cash transactions, the fact that Germany is a preferential 
                                                          
813 Annex I, pp. xxvii, xxviii. 
814 Unger et al., 2014, pp. 217, 218. 
815 Unger et al., 2014, pp. 217, 218. 
816 Annex I, p. ix. 
817 Annex I, p. xviii. 
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country for money launderers.818 Also the FATF report of 2010 identifies some factors 
making Germany a country susceptible to money laundering: 'the large economy and 
financial centre, as well as the strategic location in Europe, the strong international links, 
the large informal sector (more than 400 billion Euros), and the diffused use of cash'. 819 
The link between the size of the economy and the amount of revenue from illicit 
markets is confirmed by a report dealing with illicit markets too. 820  In particular, 
drafters state 'it is not surprising that the four biggest European economies (Germany, 
Italy, France and the UK) are those that produce the highest revenues from illicit 
markets.821 Lawyers agree with the assumption that the fact that Germany has a great 
economy is attractive for money launderers.822 However, not all respondents share this 
assumption. Korte admits 'the great dimension of the German financial centre might be 
connected to the volume of money laundered'. In his opinion it 'is not only organised 
crime that invests a lot of money in the country, in fact German total tax revenue is very 
high. Since the whole volume of the financial sector, and thus of the legal economy is 
big, the volume of the illegal sector is proportional to it'.823 According to Finger there 
are objective factors that favour criminals against law enforcement, which are, however, 
not a peculiarity of Germany, such as the speed of the financial system and the 
globalisation of the economic and financial structures.824  Another factor facilitating 
money laundering is said to be the widespread use of cash, which is supposed to 
complicate the tracing of ill-gotten gains. According to Busch, 'people say that in 
Germany there is the highest number of 100 € notes circulating, and it is true that in 
Germany there is still a high number of cash transactions. [...] Therefore, I would not 
agree with the statement that money launderers come to Germany because our legal 
system has loopholes that favour the laundering of money'.825 Also Korte does not agree 
with the idea of the high amount of cash transactions inferring a high volume of money 
                                                          
818 According to the authors, the fact that the big banking sector attracts money launderers was 
particularly after the Arab spring, when it was revealed that almost all political leaders and /or their 
relatives have had financial relations with Germany. See Henn et al., 2013, pp. 5, 7. 
819 Germany is the largest national economy in Europe, and the fourth largest by nominal GDP in 
the world. Frankfurt is a major financial centre, being the seat of the European Central Bank. See World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators Database of 2010-2014, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/1W?order=wbapi_data_value_2014%
20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc&display=default, last accessed on 06/09/2015. 
820   Savona and Riccardi (ed.), 2015, p. 37. 
821   Savona and Riccardi (ed.), 2015, p. 37. 
822 Annex I, pp. Xliii; xlv. 
823 The respondent actually confirms in this way the theory that links the size of the legitimate 
economy to the size of the illegitimate economy. Annex I, pp. iv, v. 
824 Annex I, p. xxvii. 
825 Annex I, p. iv. 
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laundering: 'Even though cash transactions hinder the tracing of dirty money, it is not 
enough to describe the country as a paradise for money launderers. It is true that in 
Germany organised criminal groups are active, especially foreign ones, but their 
activities are persecuted by law enforcement; of course there are some cases that remain 
unresolved but this happens in every legal system'.826 Uecker contests the link between 
the size of the financial centre and the amount of illicit financial flows, too. In his 
opinion, 'if one builds the estimates in relation to the volume of the economy, since 
Germany has a big economy, the number would be high. Yet, even those who infer that 
Frankfurt is a big centre for money laundering due to the fact that is a big financial 
centre, do not have evidence of this relationship. On the other hand Germany has a 
long-standing tradition of rule of law that makes it more difficult to infiltrate proceeds 
of crime in the country.'827 The strong rule of law and the transparent administration is a 
contra-argument also raised by another respondent.828 The low level of corruption is 
interpreted as a deterrent factor by the former senior policeman Finger, who states that 
'corruption is not deeply rooted in society and in the economy; it does not affect the 
daily life of citizens. There are often cases of corruption, but it is not in the nature of the 
people to procure themselves privileges through corruption, in fact there is a massive 
refusal of corruptive practices amongst the population'. 829  Moreover, the legal and 
regulative frameworks provide 'firewalls', namely specific compliance departments that 
impede corruption and money laundering both in the private and in the public sector, the 
possibility of reporting corruption cases anonymously, and protection for whistle-
blowers'. These assumptions have been used in the NGO report of 2013, too. The 
document states that the rule of law and the low level of corruption, inferred by the 
Transparency International Index,830 are factors that make the laundering of proceeds of 
crime more difficult in Germany.831 Also the 2010 FATF report identifies the long-
standing legal tradition of the rule of law, the political environment, and the integrity of 
                                                          
826 Annex I, pp. iv, v. 
827 Annex I, p. I. 
828 Annex I, p. xxvii. 
829 Annex I, p. xxvii. 
830 At the time of the report, Germany was listed the 13th position out of 174 countries assessed by 
the Transparency International Perception Corruption Index. See www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results, 
last accessed on 30/06/2015. The most recently published index is available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table, last accessed on 16/01/2016. 
831 According to the authors, the fact that the big banking sector attracts money launderers was 
particularly after the Arab spring, when it was revealed that almost all political leaders and/or their 
relatives have had financial relations with Germany. Henn et al., 2013, pp. 5, 7. 
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the law enforcement personnel and of the judiciary as strength factors. 832  Another 
attorney holds a different opinion relating to the degree of corruption in Germany and 
on the impact of corruption on law enforcement activities. He thinks 'Germany is a very 
corrupt country, especially the state and the economic sector. The most corrupt state is 
Bayern, therefore I do not believe that there will be any further investigation [with 
regards to the Hoeneß case833]. This would destabilise the equilibrium between the fans, 
the sponsors, like Siemens, and the whole community'. 
 
 5.2.4 Considerations 
There are three issues upon which the respondents agree, those are the lack of reliable 
statistics about the volume of money laundering in the country, the role played by the 
media in influencing the public’s opinion and the fact that money laundering, at least 
indirectly, has a negative impact on society. These assumptions are however interpreted 
in different ways and thus cannot be used as independent variables. Some respondents 
are of the opinion that since estimates could also be much lower, lawmakers cannot rely 
on them in order to design new policies. Others interpret the fact that the responsible 
authorities have not yet found a way to provide more reliable figures due to a lack of 
involvement. The role of the media is also perceived differently among interview 
partners. While some accuse them of providing a biased representation of the 
phenomenon, others believe that their contribution has increased people's awareness. 
Finally, with respect to the impact of money laundering on the German society 
interviewees seem to no have doubts that the laundering of proceeds of crime through 
the legitimate economy is a distorting factor of economic competition, which has an 
indirect negative impact on the whole society.834 However, given the lack of reliable 
figures on the real volume of money laundered in the country, even this element cannot 
be used as common ground to assess the policy's effectiveness. 
                                                          
832 FATF, MER 2010 p. 9. The assessors report: 'the excellence of the prosecutors from the public 
prosecution offices of the German Bundesländer, of the judges at the courts and the lawyers within the 
Ministry of Justice, their remarkable knowledge of the law, and their dedication to the responsibility that 
they have been entrusted with, confirms the solid foundation upon which the German system is 
established'. FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 115. 
833 Hoeneß, President of Bayern Munich football team, was convicted on 13th March 2014 for tax 
evasion committed on speculative business in Switzerland. Rehle M, Hoeneß spekulierte Mithilfe 
mehrerer Banken. Die Zeit online, 26/03/2014. 
834 Yet some respondents are sceptical for example about attributing the European financial crisis of 
2008/2009 to money laundering. In particular Korte highlights that at FATF meetings money laundering 
was signalled as one of the causes of the European financial crisis; yet without providing concrete facts. 
Annex I, p. viii. 
 203 
 
 5.3  Is the current policy appropriate to tackle money laundering? What are the 
legal hindrances and technical strengths of the policy? 
The respondents are asked to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
policy. Some of the issues are particularly related to the wording of the piece of criminal 
legislation and of the preventive regulations. Other technical factors refer to the criminal 
justice system and thus cannot only be ascribed to the formulation of the anti-money 
laundering legislation. The aim of the interviews on the perceived appropriateness is to 
highlight the existing differing perceptions in order to stress the complexity of the topic. 
The interviews are not directed at evaluating the effectiveness of the whole legislation 
on the basis of technical challenges and advantages. 
 
 5.3.1 Legal hindrances 
Issues already revealed in Oswald's research, as for instance the high burden of proof 
required by Article 261 Gcc, are still perceived as hindering the capacity of prosecuting 
money laundering through this law. According to a defence attorney, 'the high burden of 
proof lowers the possibility of prosecutions of successfully dealing with money 
laundering cases.' Also three of the public prosecutors interviewed confirm that 'the 
burden of proof of the illegitimate origin of the assets is very high, therefore only a few 
charges are preferred on the basis of the information received through STRs'. In order to 
further facilitate the work of the prosecutors and to lower the burden of proof, there is a 
discussion about the possibility of introducing the reversal of the burden of proof. 
According to Henn the criticism raised by the Italian senior prosecutor Dr Scarpinato 
has quite a strong impact the German national debate.835 Therefore, adds the respondent, 
'I can imagine that this might be changed at some point. However, I doubt that Germany 
will ever enact a system similar to the Italian one [with regards to the reversal of the 
                                                          
835 Annex I, p. xix. Scarpinato has already been interviews in 2011 and heard by different sources 
in Germany about the presence of organised crime and the consequent need for legal reforms. The 
prosecutor advocated specifically for the introduction of the crime of participation in a criminal 
organisation, a broader use of telephone tapping instruments and the reversal of the burden of proof. See 
Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter, Interview mit Generalstaatsanwalt Roberto Scarpinato. 
Blickpunkt 4, Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 11/10/2012.; Meyer U, Mafia-Jäger warnt in Hamburg vor 
sizilianischen Verhältnissen. Hamburger Abendblatt, 27/09/2011; Lüke U, Tagung in Köln über das 
organisierte Verbrechen. General Anzeiger Bonn, 15/10/2012; Stoldt T-R, Wie stark ist die Mafia in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen? Die Welt, 20/10/2012; Kreikenbaum U, Die Mafia kann relativ frei arbeiten. 
Kölner-stadt Anzeiger, 10/09/2015. 
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burden of proof], because of the specificities of our legal culture.836 Also because one 
can argue that, despite the efficient asset recovery system, Italy has not yet managed to 
defeat the Mafia. It is thus controversial whether this instrument is effective; however 
one can say that without having it, the situation would be much worse'. According to 
prosecutors 'the inversion of the burden of proof would help us overcome these 
obstacles [of bringing evidence of the elements if the crime]. If we could infer the 
illegal origin of assets from circumstances and then require the offenders to prove the 
contrary, this would enormously contribute to the prosecution of money laundering 
cases'. Diergarten would personally welcome the introduction of the reversal of the 
burden of proof in the field of money laundering. He explains that ' at the moment there 
is a debate, and I believe that with specific regards to the fight against money laundering, 
this provision would play a significant role.837 In order not to violate constitutional 
principles, the measure should be authorised by a judge and not by the police and should 
be limited to cases of serious criminality'. Yet, the introduction of this criminal 
procedural mechanism would not be welcomed by all respondents. The Berlin detective 
chief superintendents are convinced that 'it will not be possible to introduce the 
inversion of the burden of proof in Germany because this concept goes against the 
fundamental principles of criminal law and against the rule of law. In Germany nobody 
is supposed to defend themselves -nemo tenetur se detegere- the law grants the right to 
silence of the accused, according to Article 136 (1) of the German code of criminal 
procedure'. In addition, the investigators claim that they are 'used to working without 
this instrument, so we would not feel comfortable to introduce it in the practice of 
criminal proceedings'. By putting herself into the shoes of potential offenders, Kunisch 
emphasises that 'as an individual I would not like to be subject to this burden when 
dealing with public prosecutions'.838 
 
As regards to the exemption of punishment regulated under Article 261(9) Gcc, there 
are different opinions about whether this provision hinders an effective implementation 
of the law or not. At the time of the interviews, Article 261 (9) was still excluding 
                                                          
836 The judge Scarpinato is famous for having also stated, indeed: 'Es ist erstaunlich, dass in 
Deutschland die Angst vor dem Staat größer ist, als die vor der Mafia'. English translation: It is 
astonishing that in Germany the fear of the State is greater than the fear of the Mafia. See Kaufmann, 
2011, p. 45. 
837 Annex I, p. xxvi. 
838 Annex I, p. xxxi. 
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punishment for the perpetrators of the predicate offence.839 The exclusion was provided 
in accordance with the constitutional principle of freedom from self-incrimination 
(Selbstbelastungsfreiheit).840 Legal scholars have produced a lot of literature about the 
topic. The issue is controversial because on one hand it is an obvious limitation of 
criminal action towards the offenders, on the other hand exactly this limitation is 
emphasised as a fundamental guarantee for defenders. According to Diergarten 
'offenders should only be punished for the predicate offences and not also for money 
laundering, otherwise it would be a double punishment for the same conduct'.841 The 
attorney adds that the private sector does not discern whether the individual who carried 
out the suspicious transaction could have been the same who committed the predicate 
offence'. The defence attorney thinks 'the provision would collide with the criminal 
legal system and the constitutional principle of freedom from self-incrimination, and 
that therefore ‘the introduction of the liability for the perpetrators of the predicate 
offences would not be an appropriate solution'.  Attorney Gutman.is of the same opinion  
842  In the Ministry of the Interior the introduction of criminal liability for money 
laundering under Article 261 Gcc in case of the so called  'self- money laundering' is not 
considered as a possible step to take in order  to improve the effectiveness of the 
provision. The Ministry of Justice has even commissioned a study on the issue to argue 
against the criminalisation of self-money laundering,  triggered by the fact that the 
FATF declared that Germany should introduce self-money laundering.843 In particular 
Busch believes that 'the introduction of a general self-money laundering offence could 
mean that even a thief who steals something and hides it would be liable for money 
laundering because of the act of hiding the proceeds of the theft, and this is not in line 
                                                          
839 The provision excludes the criminal liability for those who participated in the predicate offences, 
out of the cases in which the offenders put in circulation the objects deriving from the offences, in order 
to conceal their illegitimate origin, under Article 261 (9) 2 Gcc. Article 1, BGBl. 2015 I, p. 2025. 
840 The principle derives from the application of Articles 1 (1) and 2 (1) of the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz, GG) on criminal proceedings. Article 1(1) GG states that Die Würde des Menschen ist 
unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt (Human dignity 
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority); Article 2 (1) GG 
declares that Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte 
anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt (Every 
person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights 
of others or offend the constitutional order or the moral law). 
841 Annex I, p. xxiv. 
842 Annex I, p. xxiii. 
843 'The investigation reaches the conclusion that self-laundering must remain exempt from separate 
punishment.  The text is based on an expert report, which was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of 
Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was particularly caused by the 'Mutual Evaluation Report' 
of 19 February 2010 that was written on Germany by the international anti-money laundering and 
terrorism funding body 'Financial Action Task Force' (FATF).' See Schröder, 2013. 
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with the fundamental principles of our criminal legal system'. 844  According to 
Hagemann, 'self-money laundering should be criminally liable under the criminal code 
and Article 261 (9) should be deleted'. 845  Also Henn believes that 'this is a legal 
loophole that should be filled. Even though this would not entirely solve the problem, at 
least it would not be wrong to have it in the criminal code, because otherwise it is not 
possible to prosecute someone for money laundering if it is suspected that she/he was 
also involved in the predicate offence. The Parliament has in fact announced that this 
might be introduced in the next future'.846 Finger states that the Parliament is indeed 
obliged by the fourth money laundering directive to eliminate Article 261(9) Gcc.847 
This provision affects the filing of STRs too, according to the BMF, given the 
exemption of punishment provided by Article 261 (9) 2), it cannot be required that 
STRs are filled in cases in which it is clear that the perpetrator of the main offence is the 
same has also committed money laundering.848 
 
The attorney also recalls the long-debated issue of the legally protected goods. In her 
opinion one of the problems of Article 261 Gcc is 'that is not clear which are the legally 
protected goods.' The conflict that has emerged during the law-making process with 
regards to the interests protected by Article 261 Gcc has had an impact on the 
application of the norm. This is also recognised by the BMF, which declares that the 
determination of the Rechtsgut, far from being a merely doctrinal issue, impacts the 
practical implementation of the law. The BMF advocates a change of paradigm and for 
the identification of the Rechtsgut with the protection of the financial system in 
opposition to the protection of the administration of justice, since the latter is not 
considered by any of the EU Member States and does not reflect the nature of the 
offence. With respect to the identification of the interests protected by Article 261 Gcc, 
a representative of the BMJ, Busch, acknowledges that the BMF approach, that supports 
the idea that the law should protect the financial system and not the administration of 
justice. According to him 'there has been a switch, if at the beginning the crime of 
money laundering was created to fight organised crime, there is a tendency in Germany 
                                                          
844 Annex I, p. v. 
845 Annex I, p. xxxv. 
846 Annex I, p. xviii. 
847 Annex I, p. xxviii. 
848 BMF Stellungnahme des BMF zum Änderungsbedarf bei § 261 Gcc und Defiziten in der 
Rechtspraxis aufgrund des Strafausschließungsgrundes des § 261 Abs. 9 S. 2 Gcc bei der 
Selbstgeldwäsche. VII A 3-VK 5160/06/0002:005, 2013, p. 1 (non published). 
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to consider it as a tool to protect the legal economy from the infiltration of illegal money. 
In fact at the beginning the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for drafting the law, 
at the moment the duty lies in the hands of the Ministry of Finance'.849   
 
Another issue that has emerged from the empirical research is the approach taken by 
Germany, from the beginning, about the catalogue of the predicate offences for money 
laundering. International lawmakers did not impose any particular approach, therefore 
certain jurisdictions have opted for the 'all crimes approach', thus considering all crimes 
as predicate crimes for money laundering, others have limited the list to certain offences, 
hence adopting the 'threshold approach',850 others provided a list of offences. Germany 
chose a combination of a 'threshold approach’ and the compilation of a catalogue, which 
is continuously being expanded by the legislator. According to the interview conducted 
in the Ministry of the Interior, the introduction of the 'all crime approach' would be a 
necessary step in facilitating prosecutors' work and thus improving the law's 
effectiveness. Also Busch believes that 'the 'all crimes approach' might result in an 
advantage for the prosecution that needs to bring evidence of a money laundering 
offence, in case prosecutors would no longer need to prove one of the predicate offences 
listed in the catalogue, but rather only the general criminal origin of the proceeds'.851 
This change might finally release prosecutors from the so-called “doppel 
Anfangsverdacht”, namely from the duty of providing evidence not only of the 
laundering conduct and of the illicit origin of the property, but also of the specific 
commission of an antecedent act. 
 
Another issue that refers to the German criminal legal system is the seizure of criminal 
assets. The problem is summarised in the words of two anonymous policemen: 'at the 
end of the proceedings, prosecutors manage to confiscate only the half of what they 
seized'. The criminalisation of money laundering was directed at the confiscation of 
criminal assets to deprive drug traffickers of their ill-gotten gains in order to eliminate 
the incentive for engaging in crime852 and to undermine organised crime's financial 
                                                          
849 Annex I, p. vii. 
850 The fourth money laundering directive under Article 3 lists a number of predicate crimes that 
have to be included by member states. 
851 Annex I, p. vii. 
852 Opinion expressively stated by the Parliament. Confiscation should have impeded the proceeds 
of crime would constituting as the 'operating capital' (Betriebskapital) for the commission of further 
offences. See BT-Drucks. 12/2720, p. 2. 
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power. The opinions of the respondents regarding this issue partly describes it as a 
hindrance and   an advantage and partly as not even corresponding to the policy's 
purpose. Confiscation can be a very useful preventive tool according to the interview 
partner of the BMI, yet the goal of the law enforcement is not to confiscate the assets, 
but rather to imprison the offenders.853 According to the attorney, 'the law [regulating 
asset forfeiture] is quite reasonable and there are no main hindrances'. One prosecutor 
expresses the opinion that 'the confiscation of criminal asset is a much more effective 
punishment for money launderers than one year of imprisonment'. The implementation 
of the law does not seem to satisfy Henn, who has the feeling that asset recovery is not 
considered very effective and thus is not often used by law enforcement. 'Authorities 
seem not to rely on this tool much, they do not invest resources on it. I have the 
impression that it is a very complicated system that requires specific knowledge and it is 
time consuming. I believe that Germany is not very good at asset recovery because our 
system considers the convictions of individuals more effective. I know that, for instance, 
the Italian system has much higher figures on asset recovery compared to Germany. Yet, 
in the German BMF they argue that most of the seized assets have to be cancelled'.854 
The chief investigator Kunisch explains that in Germany, up to 10.000 Euros of 
confiscated assets can be kept by the prosecuting State.  Usually, the confiscated assets 
are devolved to the victims. In the case of economic crimes, which are victimless, the 
assets go to the public budget of the Bundesland and not to the federal State, nor to the 
police offices'855. There should be thus an interest to improve confiscation procedures at 
the state level in order to be able to face the costs of investigations, for instance as also 
suggested by the draft bill.856  In order to effectively confiscate proceeds of crime, 
without leaving the possibility that perpetrators invest them in legal activity that 
produces legitimate profit or sells the objects to good faith-third parties or stashes the 
money away to offshore jurisdictions or through complex schemes that make the tracing 
of the ill-gotten gains complicated, prosecutors should be able to rapidly freeze the 
assets. According to the FATF report of 2010, the authorities noted that measures are 
generally taken as early as possible to seize the assets held by a party charged with a 
crime, at the beginning of the criminal investigation procedures, in order to prevent the 
assets from being removed illicitly. However, some prosecutors also indicated that 
                                                          
853 Annex I, p. xli. 
854 Annex I, p. xx. 
855 Annex I, p. xxxii. 
856 BT-Drucks. 12/3533, 1992, p. 11. 
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seizures were typically used to the extent that they can support the evidence in a 
criminal investigation and not as a means to prevent the dealing, transfer or disposal of 
property subject to forfeiture or confiscation.857 
 
One of the most discussed topics in the field of the prevention of money laundering is 
the disclosure of beneficial ownerships 858  through the establishment of a national 
register.859 At the moment, in Germany there are sixteen different state registers, which 
are not integrated on a federal level, therefore there is a debate about the possibility of 
introducing a national register of beneficial owners. With regards to this question 
respondents' opinions differ. On one hand prosecutors and the BMJ advocate for the 
introduction of a federal beneficial owners' register; this would, in their opinions, 
hugely facilitate investigations. On the other hand the representatives of the Ministries 
of Finance and of the Interior oppose this change. For example, according to one 
prosecutor 'when criminals use relatives to launder their money, and the relatives have a 
legal source of income, it is difficult to provide evidence of the illegal origin of that 
specific asset, since money has a neutral nature. While it is easier to catch the nominees 
                                                          
857 FATF, MER Germany 2010, p. 85. 
858 Under European law a beneficial owner is 'any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls 
the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted and 
includes at least' a series of natural persons. Article 3 of the Directive (EU) 2015/849, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, 
p. 73–117. (a) in the case of corporate entities: (i) the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a 
legal entity through direct or indirect ownership of a sufficient percentage of the shares or voting rights or 
ownership interest in that entity, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other 
means, other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements 
consistent with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards which ensure adequate 
transparency of ownership information. A shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest 
of more than 25 % in the customer held by a natural person shall be an indication of direct ownership. A 
shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25 % in the customer held by a 
corporate entity, which is under the control of a natural person(s), or by multiple corporate entities, which 
are under the control of the same natural person(s), shall be an indication of indirect ownership. This 
applies without prejudice to the right of Member States to decide that a lower percentage may be an 
indication of ownership or control. Control through other means may be determined, inter alia, in 
accordance with the criteria in Article 22(1) to (5) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council;(ii) if, after having exhausted all possible means and provided there are no grounds for 
suspicion, no person under point (i) is identified, or if there is any doubt that the person(s) identified are 
the beneficial owner(s), the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s), the 
obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken in order to identify the beneficial ownership under 
point (i) and this point; (b) in the case of trusts: (i) the settlor; (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector, if any; 
(iv) the beneficiaries, or where the individuals benefiting from the legal arrangement or entity have yet to 
be determined, the class of persons in whose main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or 
operates; (v) any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the trust by means of direct or 
indirect ownership or by other means; (c) in the case of legal entities such as foundations, and legal 
arrangements similar to trusts, the natural person(s) holding equivalent or similar positions to those 
referred to in point (b). 
859 Given the most recent developments in European law, soon there will be a European central 
register of beneficial owners of companies. The details of this novelty are explained in the second chapter. 
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of dummy companies, it is much harder to catch those who act behind them [the 
beneficial owners]. Most often, indeed, nominees do not actually know who manages 
and profits from the business. Unfortunately, there are plenty of individuals willing to 
act as nominees, in exchange for some profit'. Also Schneider and Rech think that shell 
companies play a significant role [in the laundering of proceeds of crime]; nevertheless 
it is very difficult now to trace the complete paper trail in these cases.860 The lack of 
transparency in the field of corporations plays an important role for the abuse of 
companies for money laundering purposes, according to the NGOs report of 2013.861 
The authors believe that German companies are only partially required to comply with 
transparency standards. On the contrary Findeisen argues that law enforcement can 
already access a high quantity of information and that company registers are held at 
state level.862 Therefore, according to him, there is no necessity of introducing a federal 
register on beneficial owners. A respondent from the BMI explains that 'the BMJ has 
published a report on the beneficial owners issue, where they state that there is a need of 
a public national register of beneficial owners, not only for companies and legal entities 
but also for boats and real estate property, and other types of properties, in order to 
improve the implementation of the anti-money laundering regime. At the BMI we do 
not agree with this opinion, since we do already have these kinds of registries and we 
could use them better, without creating new ones. Citizens, whose data is collected in a 
public registry, would see the creation of such a register as a danger'.863 According to 
Diergarten in the banking sector 'there is a remarkable focus on the disclosure of 
beneficial owners. However, I personally think that this system is not effective. The 
legislator and also the FATF have assumed that for example Mafia bosses acting behind 
the nominees would actually provide their identity. In reality I believe that they lie and 
conceal their identity, so that even by tracing back the beneficial owners of a company it 
would not be possible to detect them. The burden is very high: companies need to 
provide the data of the BOs and we need to verify it. If the beneficial owner of a 
company is another legal person we also need to trace back the BOs of the latter, and 
this process can go back five or six layers. I have never experienced that through this 
                                                          
860 Annex I, p. xv. 
861 Henn et al., 2013, pp. 33-40. 
862 A report commissioned by the EU Commission on the effectiveness of asset recovery 
mechanism states that the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has access to a 
database for basic data of account details of naturalised persons and legal entities in Germany, which is 
made available on request to law enforcement authorities in the process of investigation. Irvin and Levi 
(ed.), 2009, p. 51. 
863 Annex I, p. xl. 
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system a money launderer has actually provided his/her identity to the bank. Why would 
he/she? She/he would be weary of life or crazy if she/he were to say that she/he works 
for the Mafia. Nobody would do it, yet all believe so'.864 The use of complex cross-
border schemes of corporate vehicles with a 'Chinese box' structure to conceal identities 
and hide illegal proceeds is considered to be an 'enabler'865 of money laundering also 
according to a report published by the Global Agenda Council on Organized Crime.866 
According to the report, particularly the possibility of hiding offenders’ identity behind 
the veil of beneficial ownerships is essential to give an appearance of legality and thus 
avoid prosecution and confiscation. The FATF assessors in 2010 expressed particular 
concern with regards to the issue of beneficial ownerships of companies and other legal 
entities, because German businesses and professions inquired during the mutual 
evaluation they were found non-compliant with the FATF requirements of verification 
of beneficial ownership. Assessors figured out that the designated businesses and 
professionals had different understandings of the related law.867 According to the report 
published by the NGOs in 2013, since 2005 every state has had a bank account register, 
where banks have to register all bank accounts, which have frequently been used in the 
last years by law enforcement authorities and tax authorities also for the purpose of 
mutual legal assistance.868 Yet, the authors believe that the real utility of the register for 
international cooperation can only be estimated because there are no statistics; moreover, 
given the cumbersome procedures required to access those registers for the purpose of 
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sharing information with foreign authorities, the report concludes that the system might 
even diminish the effectiveness of several bilateral agreements between Germany and 
other countries in the exchange of information. In addition, the document draws 
attention to the European law-making process and to the role played by the German 
government. Authors complain about the fact that the German State together with other 
member countries is blocking the process of establishing a common European register, 
which is advocated by other countries.869 
The international community has recently gone through a change of paradigm, 
according to Busch also the EU, the G20 and the FATF discuss the requirement of a 
public registry of the Beneficial Owners, in order to facilitate the access to this 
information.870 In fact in the meantime the fourth anti-money laundering directive has 
introduced a European wide public register of beneficial owners.871 Yet, according to 
Busch 'with the introduction of the BO policy, the responsibility is put on the clients, 
who now have the duty to disclose information'.872 
 
Another controversial matter concerning the preventive part of the anti-money 
laundering policy is the one regarding Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). Henn 
doubts 'that this system would ever work because it is a very political matter that could 
create diplomatic problems between countries. For example, if we look at the Arab 
spring, and at the relations between Germany and Egypt, they were good until 2011, 
when Mubarak was delegitimised by his own people and by the international 
community. Only then Mubarak was named as a dictator, however, at that point the 
preventive purpose of the anti-money laundering law was no longer fulfilled. What was, 
applied, however was the asset recovery mechanism, which is indeed very effective. On 
the other hand, it would have been a highly political issue had German banks seized his 
assets while he was ruling the country. There is too much discretion in this field, which 
might be abused for political reasons. On the other hand, providing official lists of PEPs 
would still not be a solution. Such lists would always need to be updated, and they 
could potentially ignite diplomatic disputes between states. This has already been 
experienced on an international level, for instance in the field of tax havens.  
Blacklisting also raises a lot of human right issues. The alternative to providing an index 
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of a persons or a countries potential  risk would not solve the problem either, because in 
a legal context it is necessary to be able to differentiate between black and white, and 
not to have a gradual evaluation'. Diergarten is also very sceptical about these 
regulations: 'Also in this case the banking sector bears a high burden. Every year we 
spend 60.000 Euros in order to buy the lists of PEPs. For every transaction we need to 
verify whether the individuals involved are on the list. What would happen if we found 
a person listed on that list? We would need to undergo enhanced due diligence. Yet as 
long as the person carries out only normal transactions we would not intervene.  We 
would need to intervene only when the transactions are suspicious, but such operations 
would emerge anyway through the normal monitoring system. This is again a useless 
provision. If such lists would be public they would reduce our burden, yet I do not see 
the point as to why we need to do enhanced due diligence for PEPs'.873 
 
 5.3.2 Systematic hindrances 
Currently, secrecy covers not only banking activities, but also a whole range of financial 
transactions. Regulations that provide secrecy include laws that allow a low degree of 
transparency in the establishment and accounting by corporate entities, the creation of 
trusts whose real beneficiaries remain anonymous, zero or low tax rates and minimal 
exchange of tax information with other tax jurisdictions, banking secrecy, and barriers 
for the exchange of information relating to criminal matters. Secrecy is a controversial 
topic. The right to privacy is a fundamental right of any individual,874 and secrecy can, 
in fact, serve licit and valid purposes.875 Yet, secrecy can be exploited for unlawful 
purposes, such as violations of national tax or anti-money laundering laws, through the 
concealing of financial transactions. Banking secrecy had been used as a ground to 
refuse mutual legal assistance and cooperation in criminal matters, thus impeding or 
hindering criminal investigations or other legal proceedings. 876  In this scenario, 
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professionals can misuse the absence of direct supervision to launder funds or act as 
intermediaries in helping others to launder. In addition, money launderers, can 
beneficially own brokerages or firm of accountants and lawyers. 877  According to 
Diergarten there is a particular area in which secrecy has not yet been regulated which 
is banks deposit boxes. 'Preventive regulations that impose the duty to collect 
information about clients and to share them with law enforcement agencies on request 
are not applicable to deposit boxes. While prosecutors may receive information about a 
suspect's transactions carried out on a bank account in the last two years, they cannot 
access the same information about deposit boxes. For example, in the Hoeneß case, he 
might still even have millions of Euros hidden in thirty deposit boxes in Germany. 
Assets hidden in deposit boxes in the form of gold or security papers do not result in 
any bank accounts and Germany has no central register for them, therefore investigators 
would never have access to this information. The Mafia could also have such deposit 
boxes in Germany and nobody would know. Why? Because the State for years has 
refused to create a so called central register. It would actually be very easy for the banks 
to communicate the required information because they collect it for internal purposes. 
Yet, the legislator has decided not to regulate this sector and I do not understand why. It 
could hugely help investigators. I actually believe that disclosing information about 
deposit boxes would help more than filing STRs, I would reduce the number of STRs 
and improve this other aspect. This would also reduce the burden for banks and would 
improve the effectiveness of the system'.878 
 
Another issue raised by quite a number of interview partners is the lack of knowledge. 
The research started from the assumption that interviewees would have had a great 
familiarity with the wording of Article 261 Gcc. However, this assumption has been 
proven wrong by empirical research. In fact, according to the interview partners, the low 
level of expertise can be either due to the lack of specific legal training in the public and 
private sectors, or on the vague formulation of the law. In the Ministry of the Interior, 
for example, it is advocated that the wording of Article 261 Gcc should be formulated in 
a clearer way. According to Gutman, 'even many of the lawyers have never read the 
provisions of the GwG, and without sounding arrogant, if they were to do so, they 
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would not understand the details straightaway after the first reading.' 879  Neither 
prosecutors nor judges seem to be familiar with the law. According to senior prosecutor 
Hagemann, 'prosecutors who do not work in this department have never even read it and 
there is no judge that has ever read the whole legislation, this is the reason why most of 
them do not understand how the law is drafted.'880 The prosecutor believes that the lack 
of knowledge is related to unclear formulation but also in the lack of proper training: 
'the provision is not part of legal education and is not part of the state exam for the legal 
professions in Berlin. Also in the university Article 261 Gcc is not part of the 
examinations, what is usually explained to the students are the requirements of a money 
laundering case. Therefore, those who start a legal career have no know-how in this 
field. The lack of legal training leads to the fact that, often when we bring forward a 
charge for money laundering, the courts are very surprised and do not know how to 
react'. Findeisen furthers the perspective about legal actors’ knowledge by commenting 
on the legal education system. In his opinion 'there is the necessity to update the legal 
training since criminal law professors in Germany still adopt a reluctant approach 
towards economic crime regulations.  A deep and scientific knowledge of about the 
matter is missing. In the past, at least some critical studies were undertaken and legal 
schools had a critical approach towards the law. What is currently being taught in law 
schools is even more conservative than at the times when I studied. The private sector, 
and especially industries, fund big parts of the legal education, and therefore there is 
even less critical thinking'.881 Neither the courts have tried to improve the law through a 
better interpretation, in fact even the jurisprudence has not managed to clarify the legal 
framework, adds an anonymous respondent. In fact 'decisions taken by the upper state 
courts or by the Supreme Court are confusing and do not set clear guidelines; despite 
there being quite a lot of jurisprudence about the topic, whether such jurisprudence is 
useful to direct criminal action is another matter. For example, decisions that have 
recently been published are not tackling fundamental issues, they rather deal with cases 
of standard economic activities'.882 
 
Yet, the perceived situation of the Berlin investigators is actually different since they do 
possess a specific knowledge in the field of financial investigations. According to 
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Pietsch 'Investigators working in this field receive a special training that is conducted at 
a federal level, so that it is the same for the whole country. Young professionals who are 
currently involved in financial investigations are experts and must keep on updating 
their knowledge. In Berlin there are fourteen offices exclusively devoted to financial 
investigations for money laundering cases'.883 This, however, if it is true it’s speaks for 
the state of Berlin, however it does not seem to reflect the situation in the whole country. 
According to Finger, in fact, the police is not provided in all sixteen states with 
specialised personnel.884 Also within the supervisory authorities 'there is the necessity of 
specific training in the field. For all fields of work there is the possibility for employees 
to follow  special training and I hope that there will soon be such opportunities also in 
the field of anti-money laundering law as well', states Schneider.885 The public official 
from Hesse stresses that 'the GwG is a law that has been frequently modified, therefore 
for us it is an ongoing process of updating and improving. When I started working in 
this field I had to learn from the very basics what money laundering was because before 
I was working in a different field. The anti-money laundering policy implies an ongoing 
learning process that requires professionals to always be up-to-date. One of the reasons 
why the process [of improvement of the policy] takes so long is because while applying 
new rules, issues and problems may arise. Sometimes, we can solve those issues by 
looking at some precedent examples but in other cases the challenges are completely 
new so that we need to figure out a solution on our own. Sometimes we pose questions 
to the State Ministry of Internal Affairs in Hesse and if they do not have an answer then 
they direct our query to the Federal Ministry of Finance in Berlin'. Schneider and Rech 
report an example of a problematic issue: 'at what time should a real estate agent 
identify the client of a contract? Every particular profession and business has different 
problems when applying the GwG and there are approximately 66.000 obligated 
businesses and individuals in our district that should be supervised, and we do not 
“know” them. There is no register that lists companies obliged to observe the GwG 
rules. We do not have adequate knowledge of their professions, of their way of working 
or their special risks, still we have to supervise them. It is therefore difficult for the 
authorities to provide answers in this context. Obviously we need to apply a “risk-based 
approach” that allows us to focus on those activities where the risk of money laundering 
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is higher.'886 However, thanks to the introduction of the GwG, employees' awareness of 
the threats of money laundering in the private sector has increased. This has already 
been observed by credit institutions taking part in Oswald's empirical research. The 
credit institutions that took part in the survey with regards to the suitability of the -at 
that time current- regulation to prevent and repress organised crime considered the law 
necessary because it helped employees to understand the risks of money laundering.887 
The law was hence considered suitable for the purpose of making the private sector 
aware of the risks of money laundering. This, in the long term, would have been a 
prerogative for the effective prevention of the infiltration of criminal assets through 
credit institutions. Important steps have been made also with regards to the exchange of 
information between the supervisory authorities at the state level. Given that anti-money 
laundering regulations have been in force for more than twenty years, one can expect 
that the law instigators are indeed sensitised to the issue. Indeed, according to Schneider 
there is currently a much higher perception of the problem than fifteen years ago.888 In 
addition, in order to favour the exchange of information between local authorities, 'the 
Federal Ministry of Finance organizes a meeting several times a year where 
representatives of all the German states participate and exchange information, in order 
to coordinate actions at all levels. This does not work for all topics but it allows them to 
reach agreements on the most important issues'. The foundation stone for good 
cooperation has been laid: 'since 2011 -adds the public official -I have been every year 
to the police academy to show and report our work as a supervisory authority. And the 
Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt invites representatives of police departments, the state 
office of criminal investigation (Landeskriminalamt), tax offices, the customs office, 
public prosecution and the German Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to our annual 
congress. So they receive information about our administrative responsibilities and 
sometimes we receive information in return'. 
 
'Even if there were to be only one jurisdiction that does not enforce anti-money 
laundering standards, the problem could not be solved completely'. 889  One of the 
cumbersome matters pointed out by prosecutors interviewed by Oswald was the fact 
that some countries had not yet implemented adequate rules and thus it was not possible 
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to receive mutual legal assistance.890  This is still perceived quite unanimously by 
respondents as one of the main factors hindering the effectiveness of money laundering 
investigations and prosecutions. In particular, one respondent mentions the example of 
economic operations conducted by foreign criminal organisations: 'When money comes 
from a foreign country, first of all it is very difficult to prove the illegal origin; secondly 
there is not much interest in investigating these cases. For instance, it is quite well 
known that Russian and Italian criminal networks operate in Germany, but it is very 
difficult to prove the illegal origin of the money invested. Let us say if, for example, 
money invested in the real estate sector derives from an illegitimate privatisation in 
Russia committed in the last century, it would be very hard to provide evidence of such 
an illegal act. Information on the operation would be difficult to trace and it would be 
necessary to translate it and to verify whether the act constituted as an offence in the 
country at the time of commission, since the high degree of suspicion is not enough, 
prosecutors have to prove the illegal provenience and the commission of the predicate 
offence'. According to public prosecutors 'international cooperation works very well at 
least on paper, because the law provides all the instruments. However, in practice, this 
mostly depends on the countries with which one wants to cooperate. The problem is that 
money laundering is a transnational phenomenon, so as soon as the money has crossed 
several countries, it becomes very difficult to trace back the paper trail and to conduct 
financial investigations finalising in the confiscation of assets. In addition, offshore 
centres and secrecy jurisdictions, where companies with limited responsibility are 
registered, do not provide information on real and beneficial owners. When moneys 
reaches Germany, it has an appearance of cleanliness. International cooperation might 
represent a problem, especially when dealing with some jurisdictions (e.g. we have been 
waiting for four months to cooperate with law enforcement agencies based in Rome). 
Also foreign banks -if they do not belong to the same group as a national one- are 
reluctant to provide help for money laundering investigations. In these cases we are 
forced to deal with the public authorities of the foreign states, but they require a higher 
burden of proof to cooperate'.891 Also according to Finger international cooperation is 
cumbersome because ‘it is often influenced by economic purposes. In addition, there are 
still main differences between the 28 member states. There are countries that have a 
great interest in integrating dirty money in their economies, in order to foster their GDP.  
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Therefore, the German authorities have limited possibilities of identifying and detecting 
money laundering transactions undertaken in those jurisdictions'.892 However, adds the 
prosecutor 'issues relating to mutual legal assistance and the possible problems deriving 
from the necessity of making sure that the predicate offence -if committed abroad- 
constitutes a crime under foreign law, do not even appear in practice. Frequently the 
cases do not even reach the investigation stage, because of the lack of evidence for 
starting investigations'. With regards to international cooperation as a factor that 
influences the effectiveness of a law, European research conducted recently looks at 
whether Member States have signed, ratified and implemented the main international 
and European instruments dealing with money laundering.893 The non-ratification or 
non-implementation of international measures, according to the research project, might 
negatively influence the effectiveness of the policy, particularly in the field of 
international cooperation. 894  Besides being a missed opportunity for international 
cooperation, the fact of not ratifying international instruments might also be interpreted 
as an unwillingness, on the part of the legislator, to comply with international standards, 
or as an incompatibility between such standards and the domestic legal system. As 
regards to Germany, the country has recently ratified the UN Convention Against 
Corruption, 895  while it has not yet ratified the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 2005. 
 
A further problematic issue raised by the respondents is the inappropriateness of 
resources allocated to the prevention and repression of money laundering. Credit 
institutions interviewed by Oswald between 1993 and 1996 were already very sceptical 
about the capability of public prosecutors to seize the suspicious assets by the deadline 
fixed by the law of two working days. In addition, institutions predicted that prosecutors 
would never have been able to deal with the large amount of information deriving from 
the STRs.896 the criticism was practically argued because financial transactions were 
mostly happening electronically, while public prosecutors offices did not dispose of the 
technical tools to follow the money electronically, but were still anchored to the 'paper 
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trail'. Instruments available for financial investigations have been updated, so that 
nowadays prosecutors no longer face the problems highlighted in Oswald's research. 
Yet, the lack of resources understood as insufficient public expenditure for law 
enforcement personnel, is still perceived as one of the main issues impeding an effective 
repression of money laundering. 'Investigations on the structure of organised crime are 
too expensive and time consuming; they take four to five years and they require one 
person to be permanently devoted to those proceedings, with the risk that the process 
might not reach to a satisfactory conclusion', this is due to the resources issue connected 
to money laundering investigations according to two exponents of the police forces. 
'Designing a broad offence and limiting public expenditure for law enforcement does 
not seem to me an effective solution', comments Lubitz.897 Another attorney agrees with 
this criticism and points out the fact that 'trials in the field of economic crimes that last 
between three to five years are absurd and very ineffective. Law enforcement authorities 
are not able to deal with offence notices in due course, due to the lack of personnel. The 
defence attorney recalls the example of the eight proceedings in which he was involved 
that have been closed pursuant to Article 170 (2) of the German code of criminal 
procedure',898 because prosecutors could not prove the elements of the offence. [...] 
Sometimes attorneys can also allow proceedings to 'die' on their own. One can be sure 
that the longer a proceeding lasts, the harder it would be for investigators to provide 
evidence of the facts'. Another attorney adds 'when I realise, as in the two on-going 
cases, that the prosecutors have not conducted any further investigation for more than a 
year, I am happy for my clients. After two or three years, for example, witnesses are no 
longer able to remember the circumstances that they assisted to, records are difficult to 
provide after years, so the insecurity of a public prosecutor’s office will grow bigger 
and bigger'. Trials for money laundering are costly- and time-consuming. In fact, 
according to the attorney 'the risk for prosecutors is very high, if they prefer charges and 
seek for conviction, they face 20-30 hearings, up to fifty witnesses, and someone has to 
pay for it'. 'My clients', continues the attorney 'have not an interest in a conviction but 
neither in an acquittal. We aim to close the proceeding through the payment of a 
financial penalty (Bußgeld) pursuant to Article 153a of the German code of criminal 
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procedure. The longer the proceedings take, the higher the chance of the prosecution 
accepting such a deal'. However, the lack of personnel is connected to a general 
reduction of the public budget, due to the financial crisis. The only difference between 
Greece and Germany is, according to the respondent, that 'Germany still receives credit, 
while Greece does not. Germany has a functioning economy, yet it has also a high 
public debt and nobody knows how to get out of the crisis. Therefore, in the last 20/30 
years there has been a cut of public expenditure, for example in Berlin there were 90 
tribunals, while nowadays there are only 35. When a judge retires, she/he will be not 
replaced, but rather her/his duties will be shared between the remaining colleagues. This 
is one of the causes of the long preliminary investigations and proceedings. Yet, no 
politician would admit it'.899 Also the attorney Diergarten states 'the police do not have 
enough resources in order to deal with all of this information. The personnel in the 
police has even been reduced in the last years, therefore they are not able to cope with 
the work imposed by the anti-money laundering policy'.900  Indeed, while telephone 
tapping would be a great instrument to get more information on the networks, it is not 
possible to record the number of a telephone, and this would help the investigations 
significantly. Telephone tapping requires a lot of personnel, but there is a lack of human 
resources. According to Uecker, 'it is easy to say that Germany should invest more 
resources in this field, this is an issue that can be questioned in every government; 
however in the field of money laundering the responsibility of the State ends with its 
borders and the German government cannot prosecute offences committed across 
borders. I would not agree 100 % with this statement that Germany does not do enough 
to cope with money laundering'. 901  According to Gutman the lack of resources is 
especially cumbersome for the conduction of telephone tapping.902 'Telephone tapping 
is time-consuming and very costly. It requires a lot of personnel who are only focussed 
on the task, and as soon as there is the suspicion that the predicate offence is a serious 
offence, more personnel are then required. In addition, the recorded phone calls may 
need to be translated and this is also very costly. With organised crime being perceived 
as a great threat from a policy perspective, the Ministry of Justice could also require 
more resources to devolve for telephone tapping investigations. Public authorities often 
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have the necessity of receiving more resources'.903 Uecker recognises that 'the State 
must set priorities where to invest its resources, this is a question that every state faces. 
Therefore, firstly the State must assess the risk and the threat posed by the issue and 
secondly it must verify which possibilities the existing legal framework offers to tackle 
the problem'.904 In this context, two anonymous policemen confirmed that 'the priority 
of investigative personnel since 2001 has been terrorism’. With regards to the question 
that links the effectiveness of the policy to the disposal of resources, according to a 
respondent the criticism has been raised against Germany by Frank. Yet quantity does 
not mean quality, and that the philosophy adopted by the BMI considers qualified 
personnel more effective than a high number of employees.905 
 
 5.3.3 Considerations 
In conclusion, it can be summarised that respondents have focussed on the following 
issues: The exclusion of punishment of the predicate offender; the high level of burden 
of proof required and the absence of a reversal of the burden of proof; the uncertainty 
surrounding the legally protected interest and the limitative catalogue of predicate 
offences. With respect to the preventive regulations, respondents perceive rules, 
specifically relating to beneficial owners and to politically exposed persons, as obstacles 
for an effective implementation of the policy. Systematic challenges that have emerged 
from the interviews are: The degree of knowledge and expertise of practitioners, the 
difficulties linked to international cooperation in criminal matters, and (scarce) public 
expenditure in the sector. The perception about whether such issues hinder the effective 
implementation of the policy are neutral or rather improves varies. The possibility of 
introducing the reversal of the burden of proof has been addressed for instance both as 
positively and (potentially if introduced) negatively impacting the effectiveness of the 
policy, because of the incompatibility with the domestic criminal system. The reader 
will have noticed that some of the obstacles pointed out by the respondents are in the 
focus of critical legal scholarship, too, and have in fact already been dealt with in the 
third chapter. Given that the respondents do not always agree on those matters, one can 
infer that they have not yet been solved, and thus the discussion still remains open. In 
addition, certain challenges have already been mentioned in Oswald' research. This 
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shows that despite almost twenty years of enforcement since analysis was conducted in 
1996, practitioners face similar obstacles. From studying previous analysis the fact that 
certain problematics are still perceived as unresolved is an element from which it can be 
hypothesised that amendments approved in the meantime have not effectively improved 
the legislation on such issues. 
 
However, it seems that finally some of the hindrances that have emerged through the 
interviews conducted will be tackled, according to Finger, by the Parliament in the 
process of conversion of the fourth anti-money laundering directive. In particular, 'the 
most important changes that will be introduced concern the introduction of a 
constitutionally legitimate inversion of the burden of proof, as it has already been 
mentioned in the Koalitionsvertrag (coalition agreement); the adoption of the 'all 
serious-crimes approach', and the criminal liability of the perpetrator of the predicate 
offence', which has recently been introduced. In addition, the interviewee claims that 
'there is currently a debate about the possibility of introducing a mechanism that 
interrupts the transmission of the legal property when the first object was procured from 
a criminal action'.906 This would avoid  interception of a third person in good faith, who 
buys an object that was procured through illegal money and then sells it on, interrupting 
the 'illegal derivation' of that object. Yet the directive, given the differences existing 
among member states with regards to the regulation of corporate liability, does not 
tackle one of the fundamental matters relating to money laundering control. In Germany 
criminal liability is only attributed to natural persons. This, according to Findeisen of 
the BMF, 'is an important area in which Germany needs to make some progress. It is 
almost impossible to tackle economic crimes with the same legal tools used for 
addressing other crimes such as bodily injury, because economic crimes are often 
undertaken by legal entities and not by natural persons. Yet criminal liability for legal 
persons has not been recognised and no political party is really fighting for this'.907 
 
 5.4  Perceived conflicting interests 
The critical approach in the analysis of the law discloses conflicting interests that, have 
either existed since the introduction of the policy or that have emerged during the course 
                                                          
906 The institute proposed would be similar to the one regulated by Article 935 BGB, Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, which regulates the 'No good faith acquisition of lost property'. Annex I, p. xxviii. 
907 Annex I, p. xi. 
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of its application. Through the analysis of the law-making process, chapter two has 
revealed the existence of different expectations attributed to the introduction of Article 
261 Gcc. The contrasting expectations and intents connected to the criminalisation of 
money laundering reveal the conflicting interests surrounding the genesis of the anti-
money laundering policy. Expectations that were conflicting with each other had to be 
negotiated and were compromised through the formulation of a vague offence that 
allowed different interpretations. Yet, the implementation of the law has led to the re-
emersion of some of the conflicting situations. In addition, given that the policy 
regulates a complex and multifaceted issue new conflicts have emerged through its 
enforcement. The effects triggered by the norm can be indeed perceived positively or 
negatively by the different actors involved. By using Aubert's words, the 
implementation of the policy has displayed simultaneously eu-functions and dis-
functions.908 Again, the analysis of the conflicts is aimed at highlighting the perspective 
of legal actors representing the different points of view of practitioners and experts 
representing the divergent views of institutions. 
 
 5.4.1 The law-making process 
'The problem [the fact that Article 261 Gcc is so badly formulated] relies on the law-
making process. The offence derives from a complex international and European law-
making process that has been influenced especially by the US',909 exclaims Hagemann. 
This is true for the preventive regime too, continues the prosecutor: 'the introduction of 
the FIU for the collection of information on suspicious transactions was based on the 
US American system'. External actors, as also shown in chapter two, influenced the way 
the offence was designed under German law. This, according to some of the 
respondents, has negatively impacted the formulation of the law and thus on its 
implementation. In particular, Korte explains that 'the creation of the crime was not a 
specific necessity of Germany. Actually, the offence punishes acts that were already 
considered as crimes under other existing provisions, such as Hehlerei (Receiving of 
stolen goods); Begünstigung (Assistance after the fact), Strafvereitelung (Assistance in 
avoiding prosecution or punishment)'. This has also been confirmed by two more 
respondents who state that Germany introduced the offence in order to comply with 
                                                          
908 Aubert, 1965, p. (313) 311. 
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international standards.910 Korte attributes the unclearness of the law to the fact that the 
law does not completely fit in the German criminal legal system: 'The formulation of 
the offence as created under international law was constructed on the basis of the 
Anglo-American system, which do not have the duty to prosecute, and thus designed the 
law in a broad way to allow more cases to be dealt with. Actually for the German 
criminal system, in which prosecutors have the duty to start an investigation for any 
offence notice, such an undetermined offence creates problems of interpretation. 
Prosecutors sometimes do not know whether a case can be subsumed under the money 
laundering definition or not. In these cases, prosecutors usually prefer to indict for 
another offence'.911 The respondent adds that 'if the law had  been drafted without 
having to comply with the FATF Recommendations and with the EU Directives, it 
would have been formulated in a much clearer way, so that it would not have have 
resulted so undetermined'. Not only the design of the norm was influenced by external 
actors, but also the fact that the offence was categorised in the first place as a measure to 
tackle drug trafficking. In fact, according to Findeisen, 'the setting up of anti-money 
laundering instruments including the money laundering offence was created in the first 
place to counter drug trafficking under the strong influence of the US, which missed the 
opportunity to solve the drug issue with political and economic instruments on its 
own'.912 The fact that money laundering was dealt with in the same way as the war on 
drugs, and was thus part of a prohibition policy, does not reflect the European approach, 
in the opinion of the interview partner. In fact, 'in Europe we should use these 
regulations in order to tackle more compelling issues than drug trafficking, such as the 
infiltration of illegal money from white collar crimes or corruption in the legal 
economy.' Also the subsequent expansion of the scope of the policy to deal with 
terrorist financing is criticised as not being perfectly in line with the European approach. 
'The necessity of expanding the scope of the offence was linked to the need of tackling 
any type of illicit financial flow and to the expansion of organised criminal activities. 
However, the introduction of the crime of the financing of terrorism under the umbrella 
of the anti-money laundering regime seems to be odd. In fact, the financing of terrorism 
is the opposite phenomenon, because it consists of taking money with a legitimate 
origin in order to use it for illicit purposes. Yet, the anti-money laundering regime deals 
with illicit financial flows and therefore the financing of terrorism is considered to be 
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part of it'.913 As a consequence of the ambiguous formulation, prosecutor Hagemann 
stresses that the criminal definition of money laundering differs radically among 
European states, while the only common point of the different legislations is the fact 
that the proceeds of crime should not stay with the perpetrators and these differences 
hamper cooperation between the law enforcement authorities.914 On the other hand, 
Uecker, while admitting the important role played by the FATF in the law-making 
process and thanks to the first round of mutual evaluation process, does not agree with 
the statement that Germany did not need the offence of money laundering. In fact, 
'notwithstanding the influencing capacity of the FATF -which is more effective than 
soft law produced by the UN-' he believes 'that there was the necessity of criminalising 
the laundering of proceeds of crime.915 In addition, despite the fact that Germany was 
bound by the first European Directive to introduce the money laundering offence, this 
was not an external imposition because Germany did take part in the European decision-
making process and it had a strong interest in the fight against organised crime'. Yet, 
such representation is not perceived to be in existence within the other bodies at the core 
of the money laundering control legislation, namely the FATF and the OECD, which 
according to Busch to a certain extent lack democratic representation.916 Also a recent 
publication of the European anti-money laundering regime contests the significance of 
the role played by the FATF in shaping the anti-money laundering policy. 917  In 
particular the authors advocate taking back the ownership of the policy at the European 
level. This in order to avoid the uncritical transposition of FATF standards in EU law, 
and to however take a more suitable approach to the different European legal cultures. 
Otherwise, there would be the risk that countries would inflate their policy outcomes to 
appear compliant on paper, without actually putting the standards into practice. 
 
 5.4.2 Dirty money vs. capital flight 
In the early days of the policy, a question emerged as to whether money laundering 
should have been linked to tax crimes by adding tax-related offences as predicate 
offences for money laundering or as to whether the offences should have been restricted 
to only tackle serious crimes, namely those crimes that, in the common understanding 
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916 Annex I, p. vii, 
917 Unger et al., 2014, pp. 240-241. 
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were perceived as to be seriously harming society. It is well-known that white collar 
crimes are perceived as less dangerous than other crimes also because they are 
victimless offences since they cause only indirect harm to individuals.918 In fact, the 
credit institutions interviewed by Oswald between 1993 and 1996 expressed the opinion 
that organised crime was more serious due to the alleged violations of human rights 
connected, instead capital flight was perceived as less harmful. 919  In addition, the 
financial system is partially based on illicit flows of money deriving from fiscal-, 
currency or export laws violations, so that financial centres are not interested in 
excluding these revenues from their business.920 Yet, in wake of the growing awareness 
of the negative effects of offshore jurisdiction and tax evasion, questions relating to 
money laundering and tax matters have yet again been linked together as from the 
beginning of 2000. The anti-money laundering regime was considered an effective 
measure to counteract tax offences. 921  However, this change is still considered 
controversial. Also Henn from the NGO WEED highlights the link between tax evasion 
and money laundering. The NGO, indeed, have come  across the topic of money 
laundering by dealing with the issue of illicit financial flows: 'We were trying to 
understand where does the money goes that is stashed away through for example high 
corruption, and capital flight in developing countries . Money laundering is part of the 
problem'.922  The report published by the NGO in 2013, indeed, focuses on money 
laundering in the context of autocrats’ grand-corruption, tax evasion conducted by 
                                                          
918 Proceeds of crime are usually considered properties deriving from the commission of a criminal 
offence; for example, money obtained from drug smuggling is ab initio criminal. Monies deriving from 
tax evasion, are, instead, lawfully earned, but may become tainted, for example, when not declared or 
when retained due to fraudulent tax deductions. This has raised criticism, on the basis that the proceeds of 
tax evasion are different in nature from profits of conventional criminality; yet, even though the 
underlying conduct which generates the proceeds may be legal, it is the retention of the money that 
should be paid over as tax which constitutes the criminal conduct. It might be argued that proceeds of 
crime are monies 'derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence' 
(Article 2 of UNCAC), and therefore monies retained are not included. However, it is the evasion of taxes 
that generates the illicit profits. It can be, thus, argued that those profits derive from an offence. Another 
controversial issue is related to tax evasion committed abroad. The traditional approach is, in fact, that 
countries are not supposed to enforce other countries' revenue laws. Some jurisdictions, therefore, do not 
consider tax offences predicate crimes if committed abroad. See Implementation Review Group of the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2011, p. 7. 
919 This was, for instance, revealed through the questionnaires submitted to credit institutions by 
Oswald in which employees lamented the fact that they were not able to discern proceeds of predicate 
offences to money laundering from capital flight. See Oswald, 1996, p. 144. 
920 Pieth, 1993, pp. 102 ss. 
921 Alldridge, 2001, p. 350. Serious tax crimes were thus introduced in the FATF Recommendations 
revised in February 2012 under the definition of predicate offences provided in the Glossary, See FATF 
Recommendations, 2012, p. 12. 
922 Annex I, p. xviii. 
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multinational companies, and mis-invoicing.923 Also Uecker believes that 'the problem 
of money laundering is also hugely linked to tax evasion. According to criminal 
statistics, money laundering offences are mostly committed in relation to economic 
crimes (Wirtschaftskriminalität), such as fraud'; and that 'the field in which there is the 
highest volume of prominent white-collar crimes is high likely to be the financial sector; 
employees of banks have been involved in tax evasion especially committed through 
missing trader fraud (Umsatzsteuerkarussell). According to the respondent, tackling tax 
evasion was one of the goals for which the policy was enacted, yet he observes that 'tax 
crimes have only been added recently’. 924  Oppositely Busch believes that the two 
phenomena should be tackled separately: 'there is a common misunderstanding between 
the concepts of money laundering and black money, meaning tax evasion. While tax 
evasion is a problem in Germany, that one can experiences in daily life, the same cannot 
be said for money laundering. According to the BMF -he adds- there is a lot of black 
money in Germany, but this does not mean that there is a lot of money laundering, 
too'.925 In his opinion it is important to discern the two phenomena in order not to 
confuse them, and thus have a biased perception of their size. Given that the money 
saved through tax evasion is intermingled with legitimately originated profits and that 
tax evasion is a predicate crime for money laundering, and from a theoretical 
perspective, there is the potential of broad contamination, and thus of a widespread 
commission of money laundering. Indeed the interviewed practitioner observes 'the fact 
that tax evasion is a predicate offence for money laundering, leads to the contamination 
of quite a lot of capital'. The potential widespread contamination of properties that has 
been intermingled with ill-gotten gains has also been pointed out by legal scholarship.926 
On the other hand, from an official point of view, the BMF supports the idea that tax-
related crimes are offences connected to money laundering, because this helps to 
overcome the fact that tax havens refuse requests for mutual legal assistance based on 
tax evasion offences, raising sovereignty issues, since such requests could be grounded 
on the basis of money laundering .Such a refusal has already been opposed for example 
against a request from a foreign state by the BMJ. The Ministry argued that since the tax 
                                                          
923 Henn et al., 2013. 
924 Annex I, p. ii. 
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evader could not be liable for having laundered his/her money, mutual legal assistance 
could not be granted.927 The suspicion for money laundering would force jurisdictions 
to provide mutual legal assistance. 
 
 5.4.3 Conducting business vs. persecuting and preventing crime 
From the interviews with the prosecutors and with the three respondents who are in 
contact with businesses and professionals obliged by the GwG, it emerges that there 
seems to be a conflict between the necessity of accessing information to conduct 
investigations and prosecute money laundering and the necessity of protecting the right 
to privacy. If on one hand, as we have seen, one of the perceived advantages of the 
policy is the availability of information provided by the designated financial and non-
financial businesses and professions to investigators, on the other hand, the collection 
and the recording of such a vast amount of information can be considered a reduction (if 
not a violation) of  privacy. It seems thus that there is a perceived conflict between the 
necessity of law enforcement to access personal information in the course of money 
laundering investigations and the right to data protection. However, the interview 
partners do not relate the right of privacy with the protection of fundamental civil rights. 
The perspective adopted is rather that of the private sector, which is reluctant to file 
STRs and share information with law enforcement authorities in order not to interfere 
with private relations with customers. In addition, subjects obliged by the GwG are 
diffident towards taking over law enforcement duties, such as the search of offence 
notices. In summary, if investigators advocate for more transparency in the field of 
corporate and banking services, on the other hand private actors are concerned with not 
hindering the conduction of the business or of the profession. Investigators, on the other 
hand, welcome information provided in order to be able to support their work. Senior 
prosecutor Hagemann, for instance, believes that the state interest in tackling organised 
criminality should prevail on the interest of not breaking the privacy of the suspects. 
The reason being not a balance of interests, but rather a matter of practicability. If 
investigators had to discern between the private life of suspected members of organised 
criminal networks and their criminal activities they would not be able to conduct 
investigations; 'we cannot say that what concerns the private life of perpetrators is not 
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relevant for the investigations.' Also prosecutors agree on the necessity of more 
transparency in the field of corporate and banking services; yet the prosecutors do not 
consider banking secrecy an obstacle for financial investigations. Also according to the 
two chief detective superintendents 'the main advantages introduced by the GwG are the 
possibility of requiring recorded information about customers from the private sector, 
and the possibility of exchanging information with the BAFIN. This represents a great 
advantage in terms of the speed of the investigation and of availability of data'. On the 
other hand, 'lots of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP) 
have difficulties with their clients in explaining why they need to collect and verify 
personal information about customers, also because of privacy issues', according to 
Schneider.928 For this reason, the regional council of Darmstadt in Hesse has designed a 
flyer with explanations that companies can use and show to their clients, reports 
Schneider, who continues: 'You can imagine a real estate agent who asks for 
identification of his clients at the first meeting would have huge difficulty in doing 
business with them (in Germany real estate agents are usually not involved in the 
classical financial transaction, they just mediate between seller and buyer). While banks 
have time to collect information about clients during the business relationship, this is 
not the case of many professions that have rather short relationships with their 
customers. Especially in these cases the extensive system of anti-money laundering 
rules often represents a burden. The obligation to report a money laundering suspicion is 
difficult to communicate especially to individuals and small firms, because they fear 
retaliation'.929  The lawyer Gutman agrees on the fact that private actors, especially 
companies, are afraid of hampering their relationships with clients when reporting 
suspicious operations: 'From the criminal investigations it emerges who has filed the 
STRs, therefore, even if the criminal proceeding triggered by the filing of a STR ends 
with a closure, the relationship between the suspected client and the filing institution is 
spoilt. For this reason, we suggest to our corporate clients, when dealing with good 
customers, that it is necessary to evaluate the situation, in order not to compromise the 
relations between the company and the customer'.930 Also accountants and auditors, 
according to the federal chamber, do not file many STRs (only twelve in the last three 
years), because they are not interested in investigating the criminal connections of their 
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customers or related third persons.931 From the perspective of professionals, the duties 
imposed by the law in order to monitor operations to detect money launderers are not 
commensurate. 'The businesses and professions to whom we relate, as a supervisory 
authority, are not investigators, they only aim to conduct their own business in a clear 
way. Many of them do not possess adequate knowledge of how to tackle the 
phenomenon of offshore finance and of shell companies. Therefore, it is very hard for 
normal businesses to even recognize such cases', claim Schneider and Rech. 932 
According to Goltz and Geithner, representatives of the chamber of accountants and 
auditors, the supervisory body that receives and checks the STRs from the financial 
auditors and certified general accountants and send them to the BKA and to the public 
prosecutors offices, 'these professions take the obligations imposed by the GwG very 
seriously. In particular, financial auditors and certified general accountants belong to the 
designated professions that are obliged, pursuant to Article 2(1)8 GwG, to undergo anti-
money laundering prevention according to Article 3 GwG. In fact we do not know of  
any cases in which financial auditors and certified general accountants have violated 
their obligations to file STRs pursuant to Article 11 GwG'. However, the two 
respondents consider the obligations too complex for the sector. In fact, they believe 
that 'the [low] number of STRs received by the authority confirms the opinion that 
obligations imposed by the GwG are problematic with regard to the professions, from a 
proportionality viewpoint. The uncovering of criminal schemes among clients or other 
third parties is not the main activity neither of those professions nor of other business 
accountants, nor is something that frequently recurs or that can easily be detected by 
those professions'. Also banks are overloaded with bureaucratic duties imposed by the 
anti-money laundering policy, comments Diergarten: 'For example in the bank where I 
work, there are seven people involved in the prevention of money laundering. Out of 
them, three are responsible for tracking the beneficial owners, while there time could be 
better spent something more useful to detect money laundering transactions'.933 The 
respondent adds 'when we file the STRs after having conducted this research, the police 
cannot use the results of our research to start investigations, they need to undergo their 
own investigations. The research that we have conducted is totally useless, because the 
police has to do it again anyway '. In his opinion also in the real estate sector the burden 
imposed is too high: 'agents, for example, need to ask for the identity of clients, from 
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the very beginning of the business relationship. This means that in cities where the real 
estate sector is booming such as in  Munich, for a flat there might be a hundred 
interested buyers and the agent needs to verify the identity of each of them even though 
only one will be able to buy the flat'. In conclusion, Diergarten summarises the 
conflicting situation with the following statement: 'This should actually be the duty of 
the police to investigate the identity of those who conduct suspicious transactions. The 
private sector should not carry out duties that actually belong to the public sector, 
namely to the criminal justice system'.934 
 
 
 5.4.4 Expanding criminal law vs. ultima ratio 
This conflict can be summarised with the words of a respondent, who says that 'the 
problem is due to the fact that Article 261 is tightly connected to the GwG, and 
therefore, although it is a criminal law, it has been drafted by the Ministry of Finance. 
The Ministry of Justice can only approve the drafted text. The whole money laundering 
legislation is a matter of financial policy'.935 The problem is obviously referred by the 
respondent not as a pure matter of competence but rather as something affecting the true 
meaning of the policy. This is due to the fact that 'there was a trend in the whole of 
Europe, and in the globalised world to deregulate the financial sector […]. The State 
however needs to take a clear position and to persecute financial misbehaviours.936 
Within the German debate on anti-money laundering law, the two interests are 
represented by the Ministry of Finance, which advocates for a stricter control of 
economic violations through criminal law, and the Ministry of Justice, which tries to put 
brakes on the continuous expansion of criminal law. According to Korte, indeed, 'there 
is a recent tendency in Germany, but not only here, to harden criminal law. In the 
seventies there was the idea that the resort to criminal law should have been limited, it 
was a time of decriminalisation. Nowadays, public opinion finds it easier to resort to 
criminal law than to tackle social problems. Therefore, the duty of the BMJ is to slow 
down this tendency and to keep penal law as an ultima ratio tool, otherwise the whole 
society would be put under the control of criminal law'. 937  Also, according to 
Diergarten 'hardening the law is not effective to catch big organised criminals, because 
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they always find a way to overcome the new regulations'. 938  On the other hand,   
Findeisen of the BMF recognises that 'for a criminal lawyer to say that a criminal law is 
made to protect the economic sector is shocking, but economic crimes also need to be 
tackled by criminal law, since they affect the economy and thus society, especially 
because the society does not have proper instruments to protect itself, more than drug 
criminality'.939 The use of criminal law to punish money laundering for the purpose of 
protecting the soundness of the global financial system or, respectively of the European 
internal market, corresponds to the FATF and to the EU approaches too. In fact, 
according to Busch from the BMJ, 'these bodies do not always adequately take into 
consideration the necessity of balancing the persecution of money laundering, 
corruption and other related offences, and the necessity for a State to respect the 
principle of proportionality, the privacy of its citizens, the personal and civil rights. 
Sometimes it is only Germany, within these bodies’ meetings, that raises these issues. 
The problem is that States often send professionals of the anti-money laundering sector 
to these meetings who are convinced of the necessity of fighting crime, but take into 
account only to a lesser extent the need to balance this interest with the rule of law and 
the respect of fundamental rights. Some delegates think of the FATF as an instrument to 
put pressure on their governments and to politically push forward their expert agenda. I 
find this approach highly problematic, since I believe that it is important to maintain the 
law within the limits of our basic legal principles, therefore I highlight the need to 
respect for example the proportionality principle and data protection.' 940  Korte 
complains that at FATF meetings, 'when one tries to raise these issues, the others 
immediately think that he/she does not want to fight money laundering and wants to 
protect organised crime'.941 On the contrary, it is argued that the peculiarity of economic 
crimes and the massive impact that these have on society, however, requires a new 
approach that might collide with the traditional principles of criminal law. 'It is not 
possible to deal with economic crimes in the same way as one would deal with offences 
against the person, therefore it does not make sense to focus on the rule of law and other 
fundamental principles in this field'.942 As a matter of fact, in Germany 'there has been a 
switch: if at the beginning the crime of money laundering was created to fight organised 
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crime, lately there has been a tendency to consider it a tool to protect the legal economy 
from the infiltration of illegal money. In fact if in the beginning the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior was responsible for the anti-money laundering law, currently is the Ministry 
of Finance that drafts the bills'.943 'If one looks at the formulation of Article 261 Gcc one 
can sees that it mirrors these  two contrary approaches, on one hand the expansion of 
criminal law and on the other hand, the resistance towards criminalizing too broadly. 
The legislative debate shows the difficulty of mediating between the need of 
formulating a law in accordance with German rule of law and fundamental principles 
and the necessity of protecting the financial and the economic system from the 
infiltration of ill-gotten gains. The problem is summarised by a public prosecutor as 
follows: 'there is the necessity of protecting the financial system from the infiltration of 
illegal money, however criminal law should not be the only instrument to do it'. In fact, 
according to Korte, 'the prevention of money laundering is much more important than 
its repression. However, it costs more. In addition, the GwG, despite requiring strict 
compliance from banks and other financial institutions, does not manage to completely 
prevent the infiltration of illegal money'. 944  Those advocating for a reduced use of 
criminal law do not actually underestimate the fight against money laundering, neither 
do they support the abstention of state control in the economy. They somehow ask to 
diminish the expectations raised by lawmakers about criminal law, because alone 
'criminal law is not enough to deal with illicit financial flows, since money flows are per 
se not criminal'.945 The debate might find a compromise in the idea of tackling financial 
misbehaviours within a separate part of the criminal code that imposes administrative 
sanctions, as suggested by Findeisen: 'We believe that these reforms should not be 
undertaken within the criminal law code, but rather in the administrative law. There 
should be a division between crimes against the person and economic crimes. The latter 
should be tackled in a separate part of the criminal code, which applies administrative 
sanctions'.946 
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 5.4.5 Is it possible to tackle illicit financial flows without conflicting with the 
interests of a free market? 
Findeisen of the Ministry of Finance is convinced that 'through the financial crisis we 
have learned that the deregulation and the 'laissez faire' strategy have caused many 
problems, because they let finance reach the point where everything is allowed. This is 
why we need clear distinction between illegality and legality'.947 In his opinion the 
criminalisation of money laundering should serve the purpose of reducing those 
situations of illegality that have consequently emerged due to the deregulation of the 
financial sector. Yet, given that from the banks perspective, the deposit of money 
deriving from a crime on a bank account does not harm the bank itself, a conflict 
emerges between the interest of stopping illicit financial flows and the interest of 
allowing flows of money; indeed as everyone knows 'pecunia non olet', money has a 
neutral nature, observes the interviewer.948 In addition, there are jurisdictions that do not 
mind receiving dirty money, 'for example those countries whose economies are based 
on foreign investment do not differentiate between licit or illicit in-flows', states 
Finger. 949  By providing secrecy services such as jurisdictions, attract international 
investments and thus foster their economies. The interviewee claims that the interest of 
some jurisdictions of stopping these flows of ill-gotten gains contrast with the concern 
of other countries of taking advantage of such flows. By carrying on the argument even 
further, the attorney claims that 'the law regulates problems when the necessity of 
criminalising a conduct emerges. In the GDR, for example, there was no need to 
criminalise prostitution or drug criminality, since these crimes were not committed. 
There was no need for Individuals to steal because existence and work were guaranteed. 
I believe that in order to reduce economic crimes, something in society should be 
modified rather than using criminal law. I personally think that abolishing the capitalist 
system would help reduce money laundering, because the capitalist economy aggravates 
the impact of illicit financial flows'. The capitalist system, from the point of view of the 
respondent is thus an environment that favours money laundering. This clash between 
the claim for regulation and the demand for deregulation has already been highlighted in 
the second chapter, with regards to the European law-making process. The tension 
emerged in the wording of the first money laundering Directive, which states that 'the 
lack of Community action against money laundering could lead Member States, for the 
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purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt measures which could be 
inconsistent with completion of the single market'. The European Community before 
and after the Union were particularly concerned about the issue of money launderers 
taking special advantage of the freedom of capital movement and of the freedom of 
supplying financial services in the single market. Yet, the Community was concerned 
with the possible tendency of Member States implementing too restrictive measures 
limiting the free movement of capitals. Thus, the common anti-money laundering 
control policy was introduced by way of avoiding that Member States -while taking 
action to protect their own national economies from money laundering- would have 
adopted measures inconsistent with the completion of the Internal Market. The 
European legislator seemed to have found a compromise while drafting the anti-money 
laundering policies. However, in the perception of the respondents the tension seems not 
to have been solved yet. 
 
 5.4.6 Considerations 
Five principal conflicting situations have surfaced from the interviews. The first issue is 
the role played by external actors in the law-making process and the constant influence 
exercised by those actors in the process of updating the policy. The imposition of a US 
American approach to money laundering control through the role of the FATF has also 
been highlighted in the second chapter. Specifically, some scholars see the development 
of a global prohibition regime fostered by the US in the diffusion of anti-money 
laundering law. According to this literature, the powerful state creates an international 
regime focussed on achieving its own goals through global acceptance triggered by the 
securitisation rhetoric and compliance processes imposed through the menace of 
exclusion by international business relations.950 The second conflict that emanates from 
the words of the respondents is the one of the demand for criminal law to face financial 
misbehaviours and the necessity of limiting the tendency of expanding criminal law on 
the background of a situation of financial instability. Given the previous deregulation of 
the market, policy makers need to control and sanction economic abuse in order to 
protect fair competition and law-abiding individuals. On the other hand, the state needs 
to respect fundamental principles, such as the rule of law and the principle of ultima 
ratio that imposes a restriction of the use of criminal law in situations in which no other 
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measures are suitable. This conflict has already been raised along the formulation of the 
money laundering offence with regards to the question of the interests protected by the 
law. Despite the legislator tying to limit the scope of the offence by attributing to Article 
261 Gcc the protection of the administration of justice and of the interests protected by 
the predicate offences, this explanation was not considered suitable to the peculiarity of 
the offence. Indeed, shortly after the enactment, legal scholarship and the judiciary 
entered in a vivid debate in order to identify more suitable interests protected by the law, 
among them the financial and economic system under different perspectives. However, 
as chapter three shows, no solution could be found. In fact, the question concerning the 
suitability of criminal law to tackle illicit financial flows is perceived in the current 
research as still unsolved. The matter does not only concern money laundering control. 
On the contrary, it is a fairly widespread issue that has recently emerged due to the 
tendency of hardening economic crimes on the background of a situation of financial 
instability. The third conflict can be summarised as the following: on the one hand the 
policy being required to interfere with the personal sphere of suspected money 
launderers; on the other hand private institutions being interested in protecting their 
relations with loyal and trusted customers. Therefore, they are reluctant to give law 
enforcement the possibility to interfere too much in their business. The interest 
manifested by the private sector involved in the prevention of money laundering seems 
thus to collide with the legislative intent of preventing the infiltration of dirty money by 
way of preventing gate-keepers to help money launderers.951 The clash emerges at a 
micro-economic level and is triggered by the fact that the anti-money laundering policy 
demands an active participation by private sector in the detection of suspects. Private 
actors, are not appropriate to bear the burden of detecting offenders, moreover they need 
to protect the relationships with customers by avoiding unnecessary interferences. At 
the same time, the privatisation of crime control is questionable also from a governance 
point of view. It seems therefore that the public interest in persecuting crimes through 
having access to personal information from the private sector only marginally collides 
with the interest of protecting the right to privacy. Businesses and professions are 
predominantly interested in not interfering with their clients and in not bearing the 
burden of detecting offenders. The issue was also addressed during the national 
Parliamentarian debate, with regards to the degree of mens rea required for money 
laundering criminal liability. While the socialist party was advocating for the 
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criminalisation of gross negligence, the other parties opposed this proposal by 
motivating the refusal on the basis of the assumption that punishing gross negligent 
economic misbehaviours would have violated the interests of a free economic system. It 
was argued that the SPD proposal would have been cumbersome for the ordinary 
business and for the movement of goods and capitals. Making everybody takie part in 
economic or financial activities actively participating in the monitoring of the economic 
system under the threat of criminal liability for negligent money laundering was 
considered harmful for the business market. The same debate has been picked up by 
legal scholarship too. 952  Yet, it seems that, despite the law being the result of 
negotiations, the question is still open. The fourth issue consists of discording opinions 
with regards to the opportunity of including tax evasion as predicate offence for money 
laundering. On one hand there is the interest of tackling tax evasion through the anti-
money laundering regime, on the hand the concern of keeping the two phenomena 
distinct in order to avoid an overrating of money laundering. Since the genesis of the 
anti-money laundering policy, some actors taking part in the international law-making 
process, opposed the labelling of 'black money', naming money deriving from tax 
violations, as 'dirty money', indicating all proceeds of crime typically committed by 
organised crime. This distinction was based on the perception that tax-related offences 
were less serious and less harmful than capital flight and were advocated by financial 
centres in order to maintain a good reputation while still granting peculiar financial 
services, such as bank secrecy. This issue is a good example of the labelling theory, to 
the extent that it shows how a practice that was firstly not considered criminal enough to 
amount to a predicate offence for money laundering, has become part of the scope of the 
anti-money laundering regime on the basis of a political decision of labelling it as such. 
Respondents of the current research show to have different perceptions of the degree of 
the seriousness of tax laws violations and thus about the appropriateness and necessity 
of tackling them under the umbrella of the anti-money laundering policy. Again, the 
matter, which seemed to have been resolved through the negotiations on an international 
and European level, is still being debated at national level. The last conflict reflects the 
previous two on a macro-economic level. The two contrasting interests are the necessity 
of regulating the flows of money and the free movements of capitals in a neoliberal 
economy. The question is intrinsic in the nature of money laundering, which is a 
phenomenon that happens at the interface between legality and illegality. Regulations 
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that facilitate the licit exchange of goods, capitals and services do also facilitate the flow 
of ill-gotten gains; there are thus conflicting interests between the public interest of 
persecuting crime and the claims for less regulation in a free market economy. 
 
 5.5  Perspectives on the effectiveness of the law 
The respondents were asked to assess the effectiveness of the policy in tackling money 
laundering and organised crime. The goal of the analysis of the interviews is to present 
legal actors and experts ideas on the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering policy. 
Therefore, the interviewees were not given a pre-determined definition of effectiveness 
neither of symbolic effectiveness. Given that the policy has been enforced for more than 
twenty years, respondents' assessment is not to be interpreted as the potential 
effectiveness but rather as a displayed effectiveness of the laws. The reader will not be 
surprised that the respondents have different perceptions about whether the anti-money 
laundering policy is effective or not. As previously mentioned, they have also dissimilar 
approaches to define whether a criminal legal policy is effective, and about the goals 
considered or the elements of the policy examined. 
 
 5.5.1 Is the anti-money laundering (law) effective? 
Some interesting data that has emerged from the interviews is that, while defence 
attorneys dealing with economic crimes have rather few cases in which Article 261 Gcc 
is involved, investigators, prosecutors and public officials working in the specialised 
units daily have to deal with the provision. For example, from the lawyers' perspective,   
Lubitz states that 'despite the several years of experience in the economic and criminal 
legal practice, I have never had a client who had been accused of money laundering. 
Accusations of prosecutors are in practice very vague, thus making the offence difficult 
to prove. Also, the range of sentences is so low (for the basic conduct between three 
months and five years) that it would not even make sense to try to get a deal'. The 
attorney has had ten cases in the last two and half years, while Gutman has had only one 
case in which he was acting as an attorney providing legal counsel for an individual 
accused of money laundering. On the other hand, Hagemann exclaims that, on the day 
of the interview he had dealt with twenty-five STRs, and that the standard is between 
ten to twenty cases a day.953 This is confirmed by the other prosecutors too. 'This means 
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that every day I work on new money laundering cases and on on-going cases. This is 
because department 241 that I direct has exclusively been responsible for money 
laundering since 2000; only phishing cases are excluded. Phishing is considered 
standard criminality and when we receive such cases we forward them to the 
appropriate department. The STRs that arrive simultaneously at the FIU and at the 
public prosecutor’s office, trigger a preliminary investigation that has to be brought to a 
first clearance. After these preliminary investigations, which in the case of legal persons 
consist of a search in the company register, the cases arrive on my desk and I distribute 
them to the competent prosecutors. If there is enough evidence that further 
investigations would reveal more information about the alleged offence, the case 
proceeds, in the opposite case, the procedure is closed and the case is considered solved. 
In the case that the suspect has an on-going proceeding, we need to clarify whether the 
two proceedings can be dealt with together'. This represents quite a different situation if 
compared to the one described previously by the attorneys. The fact that from a law 
enforcement perspective the offence fills the daily work and from the side of the 
lawyers, however, the Article represents an exceptional situation, impacts on the actors' 
perception of the effectiveness of the norm as it will be showed in the next paragraphs. 
A defence attorney in her political role believes that the law is not effective. Also 
Diergarten thinks that the anti-money laundering system is not effective.954 The same 
opinion is shared by two other attorneys and by Henn.955 However, as the attorney 
observes, the fact that the law is ineffective in repressing money laundering cannot be a 
motive to complain for a defence attorney, whose work is actually facilitated by such an 
ineffective law. In fact, the attorney cynically comments 'As a defence attorney I am not 
unhappy about it'. One defence attorney understands for effectiveness the capacity of 
the norm to detect expert offenders, and thus grounds her negative assessment on the 
assumption that professional criminals will devise subterfuges in order not to be 
detected through the preventive regulations and thus not to be prosecuted under Article 
261 Gcc. The attorney considers the ineffectiveness of Article 261 Gcc as the inability 
of the overloaded criminal justice system to investigate and prosecute complex cases. 
Both respondents acknowledge the fact that many proceedings are initiated on the basis 
of money laundering offence notices. However, they evaluate such cases as not 
fulfilling the indirect goal of the policy, which is, according to them, the conviction of 
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professional criminals involved in complex money laundering schemes and not the 
prosecution of petty crimes. Also Diergarten argues that the legislation’s aim is to 
detect serious criminality and not petty criminals. He reports that 'in this year, out of the 
18.000 STRs filed, only five cases involved big organised criminal activities. Ten years 
ago there was also only five cases. This shows that the effectiveness of the policy to 
detect organised crime has not improved despite the growing number of information 
collected. The rest of the cases concerned petty criminals, yet the goal of the policy was 
to detect serious criminality. On the other hand, I know that there is the tendency to not 
report a client in case of the suspicion of minor offences. However, also from 
investigations of a minor offence prosecutors can detect bigger cases. Therefore it is 
important that the law imposes the duty to file STRs also in cases of smaller offences. I 
believe that a reduction in the filing of STRs and thus a reduction in the number of 
money laundering cases would actually improve the effectiveness of the anti-money 
laundering policy'.956 'Although there have only been a handful of trials for money 
launderers in which the defendants were bankers, the provision should not be deleted', 
states Findeisen.957 'As far as I can judge, STRs filed due to the suspected terroristic 
purpose are mostly proved wrong', thus the policy is not effective in preventing terrorist 
financing'.958 Given that under Article 261 Gcc only minor offences are investigated, 
one can say that the indirect purpose of the norm has not been accomplished. It can be 
thus inferred that both defence attorneys rely on a concept of effectiveness that is 
equivalent to the achievement of the indirect goals of the policy. 
 
Senior prosecutor Hagemann, who is in charge of directing all of the money laundering 
investigations in Berlin, is equally critical of this ineffectiveness. The respondent, 
indeed, states that Article 261 Gcc is 'one of the unhappiest offences that the legislator 
ever added in the criminal code'.959 From the way he further explains the difficulty that 
he faces working with this provision one can tell that he is definitely not happy with it. 
Yet, he has never thought about how as to improve Article 261 of the German criminal 
code. I have rather focussed on the understanding of the categorisation of the provision, 
in order to improve the prosecutions work'. In fact he can be satisfied. He has found his 
way through the complex provision and has managed to motivate the prosecutors 
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working in his departments, who actually seem to have figured out how to cope with 
this odd piece of legislation. Therefore, his evaluation on the work conducted by the 
personnel in his department is rather positive: 'we have obtained very successful results'. 
Indeed the number of indictments, which is the factor that prosecutors usually take into 
consideration when measuring the effectiveness of a legal measure, is high. Against a 
badly drafted law, practitioners have thus managed to develop a strategy in order to 
comply with the existing framework in their daily work. The fact that most cases 
involve less serious offences, as also proven by the prosecutors, while 'most serious 
cases remain in the dark', while not fulfilling the indirect goals of the policy as claimed 
by the attorneys, is not inconsistent with the wording of the norm. Therefore, it 
legitimises the positive perception of the prosecutors with respect to their role. By 
refraining from any judgment on the formulation of the policy, the prosecutors can 
comply with the law so that Article 261 Gcc results to be effectively implemented with 
respect to its direct function. 
 
A positive assessment of the law's effectiveness is provided by investigators of the 
police department of Berlin. According to the police, the effectiveness of a provision 
corresponds to the clearance rate, which, as chapter four has shown, is very high for the 
money laundering offence. Therefore, 'the low number of convictions pursuant to 
Article 261 Gcc is not a symptom of a bad functioning criminal justice system. On the 
contrary, offenders are convicted for other crimes. The type of conviction does not play 
any role, what is relevant is the fact that the case has been cleared and that the assets can 
be confiscated. The goal of the German criminal justice system is [according to the 
police's perspective] to reach a high clearing rate (Aufklärungsquote), which is based on 
conviction for any offence and confiscation'.960 The Federal Ministry of the Interior sees 
the situation from the point of view of the federal police, and also confirms this 
approach. The interviewee states 'according to the police, effectiveness corresponds to 
putting the orders and the law into practice in the best way possible. Even though 
individuals are convicted for another offence, maybe the predicate offence, instead of 
for money laundering, the result does not change. The important factor is to solve the 
case, while the type of charge is irrelevant. The goal is sanctioning perpetrators'.961 Yet, 
according to the BMF the difficulties that prosecutors face in bringing evidence of 
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money laundering, accentuated by the complexity of financial transactions and by the 
fact that prosecutors are supposed to track the money back to the antecedent act, have an 
impact on the effectiveness of the law enforcement activities.962 Despite prosecutors 
frequently handling money laundering cases and receiving a high number of STRs, only 
a few investigations are conducted on the basis of the information contained in the 
STRs.963 For example, according to the prosecutors 'the mere suspicion of the illegal 
provenience of a high sum of cash suddenly deposited in the bank account of a low-
income person (e.g. Hartz-IV-Empfänger), would not suffice in order to receive 
authorisation to undergo a search of the person’s.. Even though we could carry out the 
search, it would be very difficult to find evidence of the commission of a predicate 
offence and of the link between that offence and the suspicious transaction'. Therefore, 
proceedings are closed, without that the investigations have managed to lead to a charge 
for money laundering. However, proceedings for the predicate offences might be 
initiated on the basis of the information collected. Yet, Henn believes that 'it is absurd 
that proceedings often start with a charge for money laundering, because it allows the 
use of more investigative instruments, but afterwards the charge is dismissed and the 
suspect is convicted for the predicate crime, which usually provides a higher sanction. I 
wonder whether this is actually legal'.964 Findeisen justifies the crime also in this sense, 
by saying that 'from a law enforcement perspective the offence is absolutely necessary, 
because it allows the use of fundamental procedural tools in this field'.965 'Even though 
it does not seem a completely legitimate mechanism, it is indeed very efficient' 
continues Henn.966 
 
With specific regards to the Ministry of the Interior's perspective on the assessment of 
the effectiveness of money laundering policy the approach can be summarised as 
follows: 'The police has a different idea of efficiency than the one of political 
effectiveness. The process of assessment of the effectiveness of the anti-money 
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laundering regime goes from bottom up. Instead of making an assessment at the federal 
level, every state reports problems of application and proposes improvements. There is 
no evaluation process but rather a debate about possible improvements. The question is 
not whether the law is effective or whether the goals have been achieved, the question is 
rather how law enforcement can improve the implementation of the law and overcome 
the hindering issues'. 967  This approach assumes the correctness of the policy. This 
notion of effectiveness can be compared to the concept developed by German 
scholarship of the 'Zielunabhängige Effizienz'.968 The point of view of the sixteen states 
and of the Ministry implies that the policy is directed at its implementation, without 
verifying whether it has any indirect functions. It is indeed one of the duties of the 
policymakers to design a policy that, if correctly applied, would lead to the desired 
indirect consequences. It cannot be expected that law enforcement, and in particular 
police forces, would question the suitability of the law. Their task is completely fulfilled 
through compliance. This does not exclude the possibility of improving the way the 
policy is implemented, however this is limited to technicalities. It is therefore an 
approach that reduces the question of effectiveness to a technical matter. 
Yet, the question is not as simple as it looks. Indeed, as chapter two has highlighted, the 
debate about the functions attributed to the policy was very clear and from the 
reconstruction of the law-making process it could not be possible to establish with 
certainty which the indirect functions were. Most probably the policy has several 
indirect functions. One of them is to punish predicate offences. In the words of a 
respondent 'the fight against money laundering is not a self-fulfilling mission, it has 
instead an indirect function that is the elimination of predicate offences'. This goal has 
actually been achieved through Article 261 Gcc. Investigations are initiated on the basis 
of a suspicion of money laundering and are afterwards continued for the predicate 
offences, because of the reasons presented in the previous chapters. This makes the anti-
money laundering policy actually a great instrument for the purpose of persecuting 
predicate offences because it facilitates the initial phase of the investigations by 
providing access to a range of information that would otherwise not be available. The 
Berlin investigators share this approach. In particular Kunisch states that 'the purpose of 
the introduction of Article 261 Gcc and of the GwG was to facilitate the clearing of the 
predicate offences listed in Article 261 (1) Gcc. Proceedings are triggered by STRs and 
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start with an allegation of money laundering. However, during the investigations, the 
charge is modified usually in favour of a charge for one of the predicate offences, 
because of the prohibition to prosecute self-money laundering and because penalties for 
the other offences are higher than those provided by Article 261 Gcc. In this way the 
purpose of the law is fulfilled: the money laundering offence has triggered 
investigations, which, thanks to the “follow the money “strategy, have led prosecutors 
to clarify the predicate offences. The scheme is the following: from the illegal money – 
signalled through STRs to law enforcement agencies – investigators follow the paper 
trail to finally prosecute the predicate offence'.969 
The respondents have expressed rather positive opinions with regards to the 
effectiveness of the preventive regulations.  It seems that even in this case the law's 
addresses have developed practices that help the application of a rather complex 
legislation. Again, those who are called to apply the law on a daily basis find ways of 
coping with it in order to reduce the haze of the regulations. Thus, they result to be 
compliant. As a consequence, if one considers effectiveness equivalent to a high degree 
of compliance, the regulatory body would score a high level of effectiveness. Pietsch 
and Kunitsch put forward an interesting example: The investigators say 'in the 
beginning banks were afraid of reporting suspicious transactions, because they feared a 
loss of reputation. Currently, instead, they file many STRs, because they are afraid of 
becoming victims of a money laundering scheme and thus of being accused of not being 
compliant with anti-money laundering regulations by the newspapers'.970 The interest in 
protecting banking institutions’ reputations has come to coincide with the interest of the 
preventive anti-money laundering regulations, at least to the extent of compliance. 
According to Schneider also 'companies perceive the threat that the offence poses and 
are willing to prevent damage to one’s reputation. The result is the same: The 
prevention of money-laundering'. 971  Whether the private sector is interested in 
complying not only in order not to be labelled as non-compliant and thus undermine its 
reputation or whether they actually share the legislator's intents of preventing the 
infiltration of ill-gotten gains in the economy remains an open question.  As a matter of 
fact, medium and big financial institutions that are concerned with their prestige comply 
with the regulations. The policy has thus found a way of being effective, at least with 
regards to the fulfilment of its direct function, namely compliance with the regulations. 
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The conclusion reached by the respondent assumes that private actors by correctly 
implementing the provisions of the GwG achieve the goal of preventing money 
laundering. Yet this has not always been shown to be true. Absolute compliance does 
not assure the accomplishment of the indirect functions of the policy. However, it is a 
political matter to verify this correlation. The law is effective because it can adapt to 
situations, refers Gutman, an attorney providing consultancy for companies in the field 
of anti-money laundering compliance. The attorney explains 'on one hand the law is far 
too complex and imposes a high burden on the industrial sector, so that the requirements 
cannot be completely fulfilled. […] On the other hand, the supervisory authorities are 
aware of the difficulties in this sector, therefore the monitoring process is less stringent'. 
In this sense the GwG is perceived by the respondent as effective, because it 
compromises the two opposing necessities. Indeed, 'if the law were less demanding and 
controls were more rigorous, the system would not have a deterrent effect'. In the 
opinion of the lawyer, the policy is effective because it manages to foster compliance 
among professions and businesses involved, despite being perceived by the latter as a 
burden. In this sense the law has managed to partially solve the clash between the 
private interest of conducting business and the public interest of detecting money 
laundering activities through the private sector. 
Yet, Diergarten warns us of a too high level of compliance that could even frustrate the 
functions of the policy. In particular he observes that 'this year the BKA has received 
about 18.000 STRs and that they would like to reach the 30.000 STRs per year in order 
to effectively implement the law. Also, increasing the number of STRs would actually 
lead to the consequence that the police would not be able to focus on those STRs that 
contain relevant information, because they would have to deal with the rest of STRs'.972 
 
The effectiveness of the legislation is also evaluated from a more general perspective, as 
a policy embedded in a broader system. By considering the anti-money laundering 
legislation as a policy that involves different elements and that develops in time, 
respondents' assessment is scalable. In particular from a dynamic perspective, a 
legislation's degree of effectiveness may vary during the course of its application. In 
fact, according to Schneider, 'changes do not happen overnight, they require rather a 
long time'. In addition, according to the respondent, 'the public does not perceive the 
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dangers of money-laundering, people rather perceive anti-money laundering regulations 
as a burden and as a measure sweeping distrust from cash payments, which are actually 
not forbidden or limited in Germany'.973 In this context policymakers play an important 
role in assessing and reviewing it. Yet the legislator does not have the duty to review the 
implementation of the policy. Indeed, once the states have identified areas in which they 
can pursue improvements, they need to undertake this process on their own since there 
is no feedback from the federal level. The interviewee from the BMI declares that the 
Ministry cannot say whether the anti-money laundering regime is effective or not, 
because it does not possess the figures to assess the policy974. Also according to the 
FATF report of 2010, the legislator does not review the implementation of the anti-
money laundering regime, and there is no evidence that overall reviews of effectiveness 
of the anti-money laundering system have been undertaken.975 The FATF assessors have 
found out that authorities have no duty to report anti-money laundering matters to the 
Parliament, and none of the main policy ministries reported these matters in their annual 
report. According to the FATF report and to the report commissioned by the EU 
commission in 2009, the German review mechanism constitutes mainly of periodical 
meetings. 976  Meetings held are for example among the heads of the financial 
investigation offices, the heads of the asset recovery offices.977 For instance, there are 
meetings between the authorities and financial and non-financial bodies (Verbände und 
Kammervertretungen) to discuss the potential difficulties in applying existing legal 
provisions, which have led to improvements in procedures. There are also regular 
meetings of the German delegation to the FATF, which have also been heard on 
proposals to amend legislation on the subject of money laundering. These meetings 
have the purpose of discussing and sharing information about emerging trends, best 
practices, effective techniques and experiences about how to successful approach 
needs.978  Actually, Article 44 (1) of the fourth-money laundering directive requires 
Member States to 'ensure that they are able to review the effectiveness of their systems 
to combat money laundering […] by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters 
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relevant to the effectiveness of such systems'.979 Yet, the directive does not define the 
concept of effectiveness. National legislation in general does not provide a definition 
either.980 Uecker affirms that the policy's effectiveness can be inferred from the fact that 
there are many different public authorities that are involved in the prevention and 
repression of money laundering and organised crime.981 This shows that the state is 
committed to money laundering control. Yet, in the opinion of Henn, setting the legal 
framework is not enough. The WEED representative believes that a policy's 
effectiveness can only be assessed through complete enforcement. In this context, the 
respondent asserts 'one cannot even assess the effectiveness of the law, since it has not 
been implemented yet'.982 Henn believes that the main problem lies on the enforcement 
side: 'I believe that there is a political will to tackle money laundering and that 
organised crime has so far not managed to infiltrate politics or other institutions such as 
the police, at least according to the research that we have conducted for this report', adds 
Henn.983 'Since the law has never really been tested in Germany it is impossible to 
assess its effectiveness. In fact, in the USA, where cases like the one of the HSBC bank, 
which was sentenced to pay a high fine, the policy seems to be very effective. It is not 
the first time that this bank has been sued, and these facts might have a deterrent effect 
in the long term. It could be that, for example, in the next ten years drug cartels would 
no longer know where to launder their money', concludes the respondent.984 
 
 5.5.2 Is the policy effective to deter organised crime?  
One of the functions that has been attributed to the criminalisation of money laundering 
since the very beginning of its history has been fighting organised crime by making the 
commission of serious crimes less attractive through the menace of confiscation. It is 
thus interesting to verify whether legal actors and privileged observers perceive the law 
as being able to fulfil this function. Answers are sometimes ambiguous with respect to 
the deterrent capacity of the money laundering policy to tackle organised criminal 
activities. In the research conducted by Oswald between 1993 and 1996 both 
prosecutors and credit institutions questioned the potential suitability of the policy 
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infiltrated in the structure of organised criminal networks or to deprive them of 
economic power. None of these goals were considered achievable by the majority (97 %) 
of the interviewees through the legal framework provided by the law. In particular, 56 % 
of the respondents considered the law only marginally suitable to impede the infiltration 
of illicit money in the licit economy or to diminish organised crime economic power; 
38,7 % of the respondents stated the law was completely ineffective for this purpose. 
Prosecutors even questioned the very deep suitability of the two instruments to fight 
organised crime by preventing the infiltration of ill-gotten gains into the economy, 
given the fact that organised criminals do not leave traces of their illicit activities. 
According to the interview partners, in fact, professional criminals did not leave 
incriminating material, so the investigations were very often in vain. Therefore, aiming 
to fight organised crime through the implementation of anti-money laundering measures 
was considered a theoretical failure. In only 15 % of the 380 analysed proceedings, 
further investigations were undertaken in order to gather more information of the 
contextual elements, and thus on the eventual criminal network acting behind offenders 
of the main conducts. 985  Respondents as for the current research have divergent 
opinions. According to Findeisen 'since most complex cases that are filed as suspicious 
transactions to the FIU are afterwards dismissed and do not reach the conviction phase, 
it results that Article 261 Gcc is primarily applied in trials related to “dis-organised 
crime” and in very low-level criminal cases'.986 Indeed, according to prosecutors 'most 
money laundering cases are connected to fraud and tax crimes. Typical examples of 
frauds are: phishing, the “nephew fraud”, the “Romeo scam”, and the “Nigeria 
connection”. The first one consists of elderly people living in the USA or in Australia 
with polish surnames, contacted by a fictitious nephew, who would ask for financial 
help through a pretext, the amount of money would be received by a “financial agent”, 
who t would then transfer it forward to the beneficial. The “Romeo scam” functions in a 
similar way, but the victim is contacted for a dating purpose. The last example consists 
of individuals who, for instance, pretend to be American soldiers in Afghanistan and 
have found a treasure or have an inheritance to share, and would then ask to transfer 
some money as advanced fees in order to be able to receive a share of the alleged 
treasure or inheritance sum. Also in these cases the “fees” paid by the victims are 
received by “financial agents” or in fake bank accounts. In all these cases, individuals 
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who accept to make their bank accounts available are at the same time perpetrators and 
victims of a greater money laundering scheme. However, the criminal proceedings are 
directed to punish reckless conduct, namely those who knew or could have known the 
illegal origin of the money. Investigations do not manage to reveal the whole organised 
network behind the scheme.' Public prosecutors warn that even though in their 
department organised crime cases do not occur often, 'there are money laundering cases 
dealt with in other departments [e.g. the organised crime department] of the public 
prosecutors offices that are related to drug smuggling and trafficking, human trafficking, 
cigarette smuggling and tax evasion perpetrated through the sale of gold. In these cases, 
adds Hagemann, telephone tapping is very useful to catch the suspects. 'Trials are 
initiated for allegations of other crimes and in the course of the proceedings the 
suspicion of money laundering raises. The money laundering charge would be added to 
the other charges, in order to confiscate the proceeds of crime after conviction. Also 
behind missing trader frauds (Steuerkarruselen) there is often organised crime.  In case 
of a suspected commission on a commercial basis or in an organised form we also have 
the possibility of using for instance telephone tapping. However these cases do not 
happen very often, in this year for instance we have not had any case relating to Article 
261 (4) Gcc, while last year only one,' explains the prosecutor.987 
 
Pietsch argues however that 'the combination of Article 261 Gcc and the GwG has 
introduced a great change in the practice of persecuting organised crime: If before the 
laws were introduced investigators would have started from the predicate offence in 
order to trace the money back for the purpose of confiscation, now investigations are 
initiated on the suspicion of money with illegal origin and then trace back the predicate 
offences. This novelty has made the fight against organised crime more effective'.988 
This opinion is also shared by Schneider, who thinks 'the GwG is one of many tools in 
the fight against organized crime. Its rules provide the investigating authorities with 
useful and important paper-trails'.989  However, the two investigators emphasise that 
Article 129 Gcc, which criminalises the criminal association, is according to the 
statistics applied in very few cases and it has never been applied with respect to a 
money laundering case. According to them 'the BKA definition of organised crime is 
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also too restrictive, and there is no interest in classifying cases under this notion'. In fact 
Findeisen believes that the problem is also due to the definition, since 'even criminal 
law professors do not take a position to dismantle prejudices [about organised crime]; 
nobody has the courage to speak up and talk about the real situation of organised crime 
in Germany. The concept of organised crime has been contaminated by historical issues 
and people use it in a very cautious way'.990 Lawyers are rather sceptical about the 
effectiveness of the law to tackle organised crime. The attorney, despite not being able 
to support his assertion with figures, believes that Article 261 Gcc has no impact on 
organised criminal networks. Similarly another defence attorney interviewed believes in 
the deterrent effect of the criminal provision: 'Nobody who acts in an organised criminal 
group would come to the idea not to commit a crime so as not to be liable for money 
laundering'. 991  She does not recognise a preventive capacity of the administrative 
regulations neither, because 'organised criminal groups invest their ill-gotten gains in a 
way so it would not be detected through the GwG'. In the BMI it is confirmed that 
especially the preventive regulations provided by the FATF aim to control the financial 
sector rather than at tackling organised crime.992 There is, thus not even the intention of 
tackling organised crime through the anti-money laundering regime. However, he adds, 
'through the control of financial transactions, the goal is identifying suspicion activities, 
among them there are also organised crime operations'. 
 
The scarce use of the law for the purpose of tackling organised crime was a concern of 
the FATF assessors as well. According to the report of 2010 'authorities have generally 
indicated that not much emphasis is being placed on prosecuting serious money 
laundering as an effective tool to tackle serious organized crime'. 993  Subsequently, 
assessors concluded, 'more efforts need to be put on raising awareness of the 
opportunity that money laundering investigations and convictions represent to the 
general fight against organized crime'.994 One of the obstacles that has emerged in the 
report was the impossibility of using some of the more intrusive special techniques of 
investigation due to the fact that the offence was categorised as a 'less serious 
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offence.995 In addition, the report confirms that there are relatively 'few investigations 
conducted on more complex structures, where professional money launderers may be 
acting separately from the people involved in the commission of the predicate offence, 
which is often the modus operandi for organized crime'.996 
Finally, according to two respondents, the fact that Article 261 Gcc is not used to tackle 
organised crime is not a problem. In fact according to Findeisen, 'the fight against 
organised crime is not a priority, therefore the law should not serve the purpose of 
tackling organised crime or drug criminality. These were priorities of other countries, 
such the USA. In Europe, however, anti-money laundering provisions are primarily 
directed at protecting the financial and economic system and its legally acting market 
participants. In this context fighting organised crime with repressive instruments only 
partially serves this task. German civil society is at the moment not severely threatened 
by organised crime related to drug trafficking or trafficking of human beings. These 
aspects of economic crime distort the public discussion about the real dimensions of 
money laundering and organised crime that impacts on the economy'.997 Uecker takes 
the same approach and believes that the fact that money laundering cases are not related 
to organised crime is due to the fact that most of the time they are not committed by 
criminal groups. He states that 'according to criminal statistics, money laundering 
offences are mostly committed in relation to economic crimes (Wirtschaftskriminalität), 
such as fraud. In these cases the perpetrators are rather single or few individuals and not 
organised criminal groups in the traditional understanding of organised crime. The 
reason is often not because prosecutors cannot prove the existence of the criminal 
network, but rather because they are often not committed by larger organised groups, 
nor are the cases per se indicators of organised crime, indeed they can also be 
committed by single offenders'.998 According to the respondent, 'most economic crimes 
are not committed by organised criminals. Having said that, of course, this doesn’t mean 
in any way to deny that there actually is a connection between organised crime and 
money laundering, as some spectacular cases show.' 
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 5.5.3 Is Article 261 Gcc an example of a symbolic legislation? 
The respondents are asked to express an opinion about the hypothesis that pictures the 
anti-money laundering policy as a symbolic legislation. Again, perceptions differ in 
relation to which functions respondents attribute to the policy. Also, while the answers 
provided are sometimes univocal (yes or no), the argumentations show that the 
interviewees have rather scalable opinions. The concept of symbolic legislation is 
perceived by all respondents as negatively, a positive answer, thus, would have 
expressed a negative assessment of the policy. 
 
Two respondents strongly oppose the idea that the policy is symbolic legislation by 
arguing that its importance consists in demarcating licit and illicit conducts. According 
to Findeisen, 'it would be a catastrophe to delete Article 261 Gcc, because at least it is 
very useful to describe what is legal and what is not, what people are allowed to do and 
what they are not'.999 Also the GwG is fundamental in the respondent’s opinion because 
'it defines clear red lines between legal and illegal economic activities'. In addition, 
'There is a real need to explain what is organised crime and what is money laundering, 
[...] we need a clear distinction between legality and illegality'.1000 Finger adopts the 
same argument: 'the law is not symbolic because it is a boundary between lawful and 
unlawful activities; the question about the symbolic nature of the policy is a purely 
rhetoric scientific question, while Article 261 Gcc is an important and necessary 
landmark for the purpose of tackling money laundering'.1001 Especially because 'the 
motor of organised crime, that is the maximisation of profit with illegal means, is not 
much different than what drives any profit oriented corporation, Article 261 Gcc is an 
indispensable clear distinction between illegality and legality; the provision is 
fundamental because it states that anyone can make a profit but only in a legitimate way' 
adds Findeisen.1002 The interview partner grounds his arguments by pointing out the fact 
that the law creates a new paradigm that is supposed to prevent economic and financial 
activities conducted by non-criminal actors through subterfuges similar to those adopted 
by money launderers, which pose a danger to the economic system and thus to society. 
This is supported by the previously mentioned reflection of the necessity to avoid the 
spread of illegality within the financial sector which has been made possible by the 
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process of market deregulation undertaken in the last thirty years.1003 By summarising 
the argument, the respondent claims that the law has a deterrent function that cannot be 
defined as symbolic. 
 
A second counterargument raised by several respondents is the fact that the anti-money 
laundering policy has triggered substantial actions in terms of the creation of expertise, 
specialised authorities and routines, both within the public and the private sectors. 
According to the respondents’ perception this argument shows that the policy has had a 
strong instrumental impact and thus cannot be defined as symbolic. From a criminal 
justice system perspective, Finger recalls the efforts made by law enforcement to detect, 
investigate and prosecute money laundering cases.1004 A whole new legal apparatus has 
been created to comply with the policy. The police department of Berlin, for instance, 
has a great expertise employed in this field and practitioners who work on a daily basis 
with the money laundering policy. This exercise cannot be simply symbolic. The same 
can be said for the actors involved in the prevention of money laundering according to 
the GwG. In particular, the BMF representative stresses that the Geldwäschegesetz 
(GwG) has substantial consequences: 'the whole preventive regulation that requires 
financial institutions to comply has a great impact on business. Banks have been 
convicted and have had to pay very high fines, and this cannot be called symbolic 
politics, because it has practical consequences'. Thus, the burden placed on credit 
institutions to comply with anti-money laundering regulations is perceived as an 
instrumental effect of the policy. In addition, the respondent states that also 'sanctions 
imposed on non-compliant institutions in case of violations of the regulations are 
instrumental'. Due to his long experience in the field – he has been working in money 
laundering control  from when Germany introduced the crime in 1992- Findeisen has 
witnessed the development of the system and hence strongly argues that the policy does 
not only have a symbolic effectiveness. Furthermore, 'other anti-money laundering 
measures of the multidisciplinary policy, e.g. the sophisticated rules of the Banking Act, 
the Insurance Supervision Act etc. are not only an appendix of Article 261 Gcc, but 
rather impact  the whole economic and financial sector, and thus are far from being 
symbolic legislations'.1005  Also other respondents raise the argument relating to the 
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actual instrumental consequences of the policy in terms of compliance. Schneider 
highlights the commitment of those who are obliged by the GwG to actively participate 
in the prevention of money laundering and of the local supervisory authorities. The 
respondent acknowledges the shortcomings of the legislation, yet does not agree with 
the idea of defining the laws as symbolic, due to the satisfying level of instrumental 
compliance to the GwG regulations, which has created an operating structure.1006 
 
The creation of specialised units and of new expertise in order to comply with the 
money laundering control standards is perceived differently however by respondents. 
The representative of the Ministry of Finance thinks that 'the prevention of money 
laundering has become a business sector in itself. Companies and financial institutions 
have specific departments that undergo due diligence, and there is, thus, a new 
professionalism that has been created'. The creation of a new professionalism was an 
element observed by the respondents taking part in Oswald's interviews. This was seen, 
at the dawn of the new policy, as a positive note to the extent that it would have 
increased law enforcement capability to 'follow the paper trail'. A defence attorney 
interprets the creation of specific apparatus and the specialisation of personnel to tackle 
money laundering from a critical point of view, as a symptom of a symbolic legislation. 
The attorney believes that the anti-money laundering policy, and specially the FATF, 
has generated the possibility of creating new remunerative professionalism and job 
positions. Also scholars have interpreted this effect of the policy as an attempt to give 
the appearance that something has been achieved, while the practical declared effects 
have not. 
 
Pietsch and Kunisch disagree with the hypothesis of a symbolic legislation by saying 
that 'the effort that has been undertaken so far to prevent and repress money laundering 
cannot be defined as symbolic, because Article 261 Gcc facilitates investigations for the 
predicate offences. Therefore the law is not symbolic it has at least the instrumental 
function of facilitating investigations.1007 Given that reducing the predicate offences rate 
was also one of the legislative intents, respondents have a point in stating that the law 
leads to instrumental desired effects. Other respondents adopt this perspective too. In 
fact, according to them, the anti-money laundering policy is primarily directed at 
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reducing predicate crimes. This idea has already been presented in the previous 
paragraph with regards to the perceptions on the policy' effectiveness. Yet, the function 
of facilitating the detection of predicate offences does not seem to fully explain the 
burden imposed by the policy, as previously observed. In addition, attributing 
investigative functions to a criminal substantial provision seems not to be legitimate, as 
acknowledged by Henn and by legal scholarship.1008   
 
Also in the Ministry of Justice two respondents disapprove with the idea that the policy 
is an example of a symbolic legislation. In particular, Korte believes that the law was 
the result of a compromise in a positive sense. According to the interviewee 'the policy 
is the result of the compromise among members of the parliament who represent the 
different interests of society, and this is a characteristic of a functioning democracy. It is 
the result of  political compromise, as much as for example another criminal law, 
Article 100a of the code of criminal procedure that regulates telephone tapping'.1009 For 
this reason 'the law might not be 100 % coherent, it might even be a bit contradictory 
and may have some loopholes that make its application difficult' yet only because it was 
the result of a parliamentary compromise, I would not call it symbolic', explains 
Korte.1010  The respondent does not interpret the policy as a compromise-legislation 
enacted with the goal of pacifying a parliamentarian internal conflict without aiming to 
trigger substantial effects but rather as an example of a democratic exercise. 
 
A symbolic effectiveness of a specific authority devoted to preventing money 
laundering, that is the FIU, is spotted by the FATF report of 2010. In particular 
assessors argue that it seems that the FIU has been established to perform some rather 
symbolic functions, as analytical ones, the elaboration of guidelines, and the publishing 
of reports, while 'it does not lead the process of analysis of STRs for the purpose of 
substantiation of suspicions. It makes only a modest contribution to the substantiation of 
suspicions of money laundering or TF by Länder Police units [...].'1011 These factors 
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lower the effectiveness of the FIU, despite the fact that the amount of resources 
devolved to the agency has increased lately.1012 
 
 5.5.4 Considerations 
What has emerged from the interviews is that not only opinions on the effectiveness of 
the law differ, but the very concept of effectiveness is perceived differently among the 
interview partners. This, far from being a pure ontological matter impacts the 
implementation of the law. Given that legal actors have diverse perceptions on when a 
law can be defined effective, they would direct their actions in different ways to achieve 
this effectiveness. Perceptions about how effective the anti- money laundering policy is 
appear to be similar among respondents belonging to the same experts’ group. In 
particular, given the fact that the policy triggers many preliminary investigations, 
investigators work on a daily basis with the provision. This led to their opinion on the 
implementation of the legislation being rather positive. Positive opinions have common 
ground: they assert that the policy is not a simple one to implement, however, they 
believe that the legal practice has found its way through. On the contrary, defence 
attorneys specialised in economic crimes do not receive a significant amount of clients 
suspected for money laundering. For this reason they tend to have a rather negative 
opinion on the policy’s effectiveness, also driven by the perception that the policy is not 
able to achieve the indirect goals. 
 
The diverse concepts of effectiveness provided by disciplines close to the sociology of 
law and the different definitions of effectiveness given by sociologists of law, which 
were illustrated in the first chapter, turn out to be useful here. Particularly the notions of 
'efficiency' and of 'efficiency regardless of the goals' are proved very useful to interpret 
the respondents' opinions. Efficiency, is according to the administrative legal approach, 
the optimal relation between the goals achieved and the instruments used. A 
subcategory of this concept is the efficiency calculated through a cost-benefit analysis, 
of which some examples have been presented in the fourth chapter, which defines 
efficiency as the functioning of a legal order without assessing the goals achieved. This 
type of analysis focuses on the correctness of the operating system since the purpose of 
the system is its own existence. It refers to a whole legal order rather than to a specific 
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single provision. Given that the anti-money laundering policy constitutes a legal order, 
due to the diverse regulations involved and the competent authorities created in order to 
achieve the goals of the policy, this notion can be applied. In the field of administrative 
legal theories, the first chapter has focussed on the approach that considers the 
(in)effectiveness of a law depending on its (failing) enforcement. In particular, Bettini's 
philosophy attributes the ineffectiveness of a law to a problem of inefficiency of the 
administrative apparatus. This is argued on the background of the assumption that states 
are undertaking a process of transformation from a legislative status to an administrative 
one.1013 Thus issues connected to policies implementation are to be attributed to an 
administration in default (säumig)1014 rather than to latent legislative intents. The latter 
is the approach adopted by sociologists who explain human phenomena according to a 
functional analysis. In particular, scholars supporting Merton’s theory, study legal 
actions by investigating their functions in society. The functional analysis, far from 
taking a functionalist approach that legitimatizes the social order, aims at disclosing 
social conflicts through the detection of different functions attributed to the same action 
from different actors. In particular when lawmakers agree on the introduction of a new 
legal act, they pursue a direct function which, especially in the field of behavioural 
norms, corresponds with the obedience of the norm's addressees to the wording of the 
provision. In addition, they might pursue an indirect goal which should be caused by the 
achievement of the direct function. If citizens did not exceed speed limits, the direct 
function of the traffic law would be accomplished. Yet, if citizens, despite respecting 
the speed limit cause car accidents, the indirect function of the rule, which is the 
prevention of car accidents, would not be achieved. This difference is particularly 
relevant for the analysis of the interviews, given that respondents take different 
approaches. In fact, a high degree of compliance of the anti-money laundering 
legislation might correspond to a high level of effectiveness of the policy with respect to 
its direct function, but at the same time to a rather low level of effectiveness with 
regards to its indirect purposes. The way to evaluate the degree of effectiveness is 
therefore also different. While compliance with legal provisions is calculated through a 
quantitative assessment of the processes in force and of the functioning of the system, 
the achievement of the indirect functions is measured on the impact of the policy. 
Interview partners have different perceptions about the indirect functions of the 
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legislation too. This reflects, once again, the fact that the policy was a result of a 
compromise between different expectations and that the legislator was not able to limit 
the scope of its application to a particular goal. The different expectations and intents, 
which already emerged in the doctrinal debate about the legally protected interests, 
appears again in the different perceptions of the interviewees. The respondents were 
asked about the legislation's effectiveness with regards to one of the indirect functions, 
namely the capacity to deter organised crime. The legislator enacted the money 
laundering offence in the context of the fight against drug trafficking and other forms of 
organised crime, thus Article 261 Gcc's expressed rationale is the prevention and 
repression of organised crime. 
 
The respondents are finally asked about the eventuality that the policy has a latent 
symbolic function, besides the declared one of preventing and repressing money 
laundering. Attitudes are different. Some of them agree with this. Others strongly 
oppose the hypothesis. They argue instead that the policy has instrumental effects on 
their daily practice, which cannot be defined as purely symbolic. According to most 
respondents, the law cannot be defined as symbolic, because it has led to instrumental 
effects. In the first place information gathered thanks to the GwG is used to start 
preliminary investigations under Article 261 Gcc. Secondly, the structure enacted to 
comply with the anti-money laundering policy is attainable and is visible and cannot be 
denied. Thirdly, the law is considered necessary because it labels a deviant behaviour. 
In particular, despite the fact that investigations do not lead to a conviction for money 
laundering they allow investigators to collect information in support of criminal cases 
for the predicate offences or to start a preliminary investigation for a predicate offence. 
In this sense, the function of the 'law in action', despite being questionable, is 
objectively instrumental. However, the fact that the law serves the purpose of tackling 
predicate offences through the support of investigations does not exclude the hypothesis 
that the law was enacted to pursue latent functions too. According to the sociologist 
Aubert, it is not necessary that the latent goal is the only one that plays a role, but it is 
necessary that the other purposes would not explain the analysed phenomenon 
completely.1015 Indeed, in the opinions of those who exclude the symbolic function, yet 
the results achieved through compliance do not legitimate the burden imposed by the 
legislation. In other words, it seems that they recognise that the purpose of compliance 
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cannot completely explain the policy makers' motivation, which re-opens the doors for 
the hypothesis of the existence of latent functions. In fact, such a demanding policy 
cannot be accepted for the sole purpose of re-enforcing the action of the criminal justice 
system in tackling predicate offences. On the other hand, compliance with the policy in 
terms of building of a structure and of expertise does not automatically mean fulfilling 
the policy’s purpose. Particularly the creation of new professionalism, has been 
interpreted by scholars as a sign given to the public that the policy has produced certain 
effects. Finally, arguments stressing the fact that the law is a necessary landmark 
between what is licit and what is illicit can be interpreted also as supporting the 
hypothesis of a symbolic legislation by taking a positive connotation of the concept. 
According to this perspective, for example constitutional laws can have a strong 
positive symbolic effectiveness of setting values and principles. However, in order for 
such principles to be put into practice and to really enhance people's rights, they need to 
be substantiate, otherwise they would remain empty promises; therefore regulations that 
implement principles should have a rather instrumental effectiveness. 
 
 5.6  General considerations 
Given the abundant literature on the ineffectiveness of the anti-money laundering 
regime to eliminate its target, the underlying hypothesis of this research was that 
especially the money laundering offence as drafted by the German legislature, was a 
purely symbolic provision, whose function was to compromise political parties, to 
publicly declare the laundering of proceeds of crime as wrong, and to provide an 
appearance to the public that something had been done. The hypothesis was built on the 
basis of socio-legal theories on the symbolic effectiveness of the law, and on the 
literature criticising the current anti-money laundering system. In particular the socio-
legal concept of symbolic legislation was adopted to explain why the law might not be 
an adequate tool to impede the infiltration of illicit financial flows, while it has been so 
often modified and improved. The discovery process, which started from the 
assumption that anti-money laundering law is necessary to protect fair competition 
among economic actors, also revealed that whether money laundering is good or bad 
depends on the perspective of those who evaluate it. The diverse opinions on the 
phenomenon influence the functions attributed to the measures adopted to deter and 
punish money laundering. In other words, social actors have different expectations from 
the introduction and the implementation of the offence. Moreover, some hindrances 
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deriving from the formulation of the offence, which does not explicit the legally 
protected goods, which is way too broad in its wording and in its scope, and which does 
not integrate smoothly in the existing legal framework, actually obstruct a complete 
acceptance of the new provision by legal scholarship and by legal actors and thus hinder 
an effective application. In particular, given the diverse and sometime conflicting 
opinions expressed manifestly or latently by lawmakers and presented in the second 
chapter, it has been hypothesised that the legislation was the result of many 
compromises. Due to the strong pressure on national legislatures due to the international, 
transnational and European legal frameworks that were binding states to adopt such 
measures, and on the background of the literature on the emergency attitude of criminal 
legislatures in recent years, with special regards to laws tackling organised crime, it was 
hypothesised that the offence was formulated under urgency conditions, and thus to 
accomplish a rather symbolic function. In addition, given the securitisation rhetoric 
surrounding money laundering, which attached the worst scenarios and the most 
challenging issues relating to the economic and financial system to the practice, and the 
fast widespread of the regime across the world, the thesis assumed that the 
criminalisation of such conduct could have served other policy goals of international 
governance. 
 
Yet the case study has partially proved the initial hypothesis wrong. In fact the 
provision, besides accomplishing the symbolic functions, does impact instrumentally on 
the reality. In particular the qualitative analysis of criminal statistics and economic 
figures show that Article 261 Gcc has been applied quite often in criminal cases and 
thus cannot be described as having a purely symbolic effectiveness. From the interviews 
it emerges that the provision has a massive impact on the daily work of some legal 
actors, and that there are instrumental effects that cannot be overlooked, as for example 
the facilitated collection of information for the purpose of preliminary investigations. In 
addition, the combination of the offence with the preventive regulations may display a 
deterrent effect and thus positively impacts the effectiveness of the criminal provision 
too. In the perception of respondents, the existence of a complex apparatus to prevent 
money laundering is a sign that the legislation is not purely symbolic and that it is 
actually efficient. Given the extreme complexity of the standards, once compliance is 
achieved, the perception of actors involved is that the goal is fulfilled. Thus, compliance 
becomes the goal. The question is not about the effectiveness of the regulations but 
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rather about the efficiency of the structure. The goal of the structure becomes its 
existence. The ultimate purpose is not impeding the laundering of proceeds of crime but 
rather making any suspicious transaction (customer) traceable and thus under control. 
Even though investigations do not manage to reveal the networks or the single 
perpetrators operating behind those who are caught as money launderers, suspects are 
identified, charged and convicted. Cases are indeed cleared. In addition information 
gathered through the anti-money laundering regime are used in other proceedings. This 
further supports the idea that the law triggers instrumental effects. However, as long as 
the offence is used to prosecute 'Bauernopfer' (farmer victims)1016 it does not seem to be 
able to fulfil its indirect purpose. 
 
Given that the conduct was not considered a crime before the seventies, one can infer 
that there was indeed the need to clarify that the further use of unlawfully originated 
gains was no longer allowed. The provision, indeed according to respondents, 
introduces a novelty in the way of making profits, which is not only directed at 
punishing criminals infiltrating dirty money in the legal economy, but it aims at tackling 
the illegality that has spread in the economic sector due to the deregulation carried out 
in the last thirty years. The interviewees especially point out corporations that, while 
seeking profit, behave not dissimilarly to criminals. Yet, the offence of money 
laundering relies on what has been already labelled by the criminal justice system as 
illicit. In fact, the provision punishes actions conducted on objects that are the proceeds 
of unlawful acts, namely of acts that are already listed as offences under the German 
legal order. Article 261 Gcc does not regulate the process of making profits; it impedes 
that unlawfully made profits entering the legitimate economy in order to produce further 
licit gains. Therefore, it does not introduce a criminal label for certain ways in which 
profits are made immorally or unfairly. Hence the goal of reducing illegality in the 
financial sector is limited to the boundaries of acts already labelled under the German 
law as deviant. An example can be provided by a corporation aggressively avoiding 
taxes to the point of managing not to pay taxes despite having made a great gain. While 
the conduct sounds immoral, it does not amount to a crime given that tax avoidance is 
legal. In this context the anti-money laundering policy cannot intervene, because it 
                                                          
1016 Term used by Münch to describe the phenomenon of innocent private persons’ bank accounts used by 
offenders to launder money through ‘financial agents’. See Münch T, Bauernopfer. Wie Privatleute zur 
Geldwäsche missbraucht werden. Sächsische zeitung, 20/02/2016. 
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cannot create new areas of criminal behaviour.1017 The scope of action of the offence is 
thus limited to what national governments already labelled as illicit. 
 
Thus, the policy has generated compliance in the twenty-three years of implementation, 
and has therefore fulfilled its direct function. However, it has not impeded the 
infiltration of illicit financial flows in the country, and therefore it has not achieved its 
indirect purpose. The impossibility of eliminating the infiltration of illegal capitals in 
the licit economy might have been caused by other factors other than the ineffectiveness 
of the law. It can be hypothesised that those who designed the law have known since the 
beginning that it was not possible to completely impede ill-gotten gains entering the 
country through the criminalisation of money laundering. Having said this, the purpose 















                                                          
1017 The example is described in a report published by Action Aid on ‘aggressive tax avoidance’ 
carried out by the second biggest brewery in the world, SAB Miller. The multinational corporation, 
through a system of misinvoicing managed not to pay taxes on the profits made between in Ghana, by 
declaring a profit equivalent to zero. This was showed not to be true by the report that reveals that, while 
the company based in Ghana registered no profit, the sisters based in tax havens did. Actually, the 
Ghanaian sister managed to move almost all its profits to those countries through mis-invoicing. This 
scheme is about tax avoidance and not evasion. Yet, while being perfectly legal, it does not seem very fair. 
See Action Aid 'Calling Time', available at 












'In einer Gesellschaft deren Selbstverständnis sich in der Gewinnmaximierung 
erschöpft, 
ist die Organisierte Kriminalität mindestens latent'.  







Is the money laundering offence effective? This research has showed that the money 
laundering offence is very little effective from a socio-legal perspective. Giving the 
'elastic' approach, the evaluation is scalable. On the basis of the outcomes emerging 
from this research, the answer could also be, yes. There are different interpretations 
about which functions the offence should have, and according to some perspectives, 
the provision is actually effective. Why is the offence scarcely effective, according to 
this research? The assessment reveals that there are various elements that hinder the 
legal effectiveness of the provision. While technical hindrances can (and perhaps) 
will be removed through legal reforms, 1018  the inherent political economic and 
financial conflicting interests that impede a higher level of effectiveness are more 
difficult to solve. This research presents the controversial nature of money laundering 
and its policing. The creation of the offence was, according to some lawmakers, 
                                                          
1018  On 28 January 2016, Germany signed the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198). 
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directed at impeding that proceeds of crime are infiltrated in the so-called 'legitimate 
economy'. Yet, since the very beginning, determining the boundary between an area 
defined as 'criminal' and the space of 'legality' has been controversial. In fact, money 
has a neutral nature, pecunia non olet, making profit, irrespective of the monies' 
origin, is a very strong interest for both private and public entities, which collides 
with the one of eliminating illicit financial flows. In other words criminal policy 
goals diverge from purely economic interests.  
 
How can the effectiveness of the money laundering offence be improved? Besides 
eliminating technical inconsistencies of the overall anti-money laundering policy, the 
question is a matter of global financial governance. In contemporary industrialised 
economies there is a complicated and sometimes shifting boundary between 
legitimate and illegitimate transactions. This is particularly exacerbated in the context 
of financial capitalism, which 'subordinates the capitalist productive process to the 
circulation of money and monetary assets and hence to the accumulation of money 
profits'.  From a Marxist perspective, economic liberalisation can be interpreted as a 
process of subordination of states to capital, in which states have increasingly 
competed to attract investments and promote their economic and financial interests.  
It has been said that for example the offshore financial system owes much to the 
tolerance, collusion and support of regulatory authorities in the leading countries, 
while some countries at the margins of the global economy have markets niches in 
laundering and sheltering illicit financial flows. While one can assume the justice and 
correctness of the current financial system, and thus describes money laundering as 
harmful because it interferes with the existing economic order, one can also assume 
that the capitalist system leads per se to injustice and inequality, and that money 
laundering is actually embedded in this profit-oriented system and represents just the 
darker side of the capitalist economy. A compromised viewpoint is the one that 
describes money laundering as an accepted collateral effect of the capitalist system, 
that is to say 'a certain amount of illicit financial flows may be considered an 
acceptable price to pay for a market where free mobility of capital is guaranteed'.  
That is to say that a financial system in which the free circulation of capitals is 
guaranteed, and there is a competition between financial systems to attract new 
investments and make profit -which often consists of a 'race to the bottom' with 
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regard to regulations- is a perfect environment for money launderers. In other words, 
money laundering is intrinsic in or at least exacerbated by the capitalist system. 
 
A key-element of the money laundering control strategy that ought to impede the 
infiltration of ill-gotten gains in the economic and financial sector, is the cooperation 
between gate-keepers and investigative authorities. However, the research has 
revealed that also improving anti-money laundering preventive mechanisms means 
dealing with conflicting interests between private entities, such as the banking sectors, 
firms, other financial and non-financial institutions, and public actors, namely law 
enforcement agencies. The shifting boundary between private and public spheres and 
interests affects not only money laundering control. In fact the central paradox of 
global finance is that while a sound and stable economic and financial system is a 
public good, banking and finance has been always treated as a private sphere.  In the 
period since 1973 often described as financial deregulation, in which there has been 
major transformations such as the liberalisation of financial capital, and a growth of 
the financial sector and its profitability along with the development of offshore 
systems, such changes have been facilitated by formalised regulations of financial 
institutions.  In this context finance has become less regulated by public rules but 
more regulated in form of private self-regulation, generated by and among market 
participants themselves'.  This switch has led to the fact that regulations have 
followed private interests rather than public ones. New regulatory institutions, which 
have widespread to respond to regulatory failure,  in fact support controlling the 
forces leading to financialisation and speculation, and thus have generated new forms 
of risk and instability.   
 
Given that tightening and expanding domestic laws may just move criminality to less 
regulated sectors or geographical areas, regulations in the field of money laundering 
control have been enacted through transnational policy-making processes. However, 
transnational anti-money laundering policy is an example of a regime that has been 
imposed across the world through an ad hoc body whose binding capacity has 
showed to be stronger than other international institutions, but whose democratic 
legitimation is rather controversial. Indeed, the established framework mirrors current 
controversial patterns of transnational soft law-making processes: In the international 
system there has been a shift from formal law to 'quasi-legal forms', which are 
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typically referred to as 'soft law', in opposition to 'hard law'.  The research has indeed 
highlighted that through the use of 'soft law' the anti-money laundering regime has 
been used to impose priorities on the international political agenda boosted by 
governments belonging to the 'club of rich countries'. In this way the most powerful 
states typically determine which flows are illicit and which of the illicit flows are at 
the top of the political agenda.  Money laundering and the policies to tackle it reflect 
hence broader power asymmetries in the international system. 
 
In order to stop the 'race to the bottom' by harmonising regulations within the Union, 
the EU has adopted common policies in the field of money laundering. However, 
while the growth of the EU in the post-war is often seen as a cooperation with the 
purpose of social solidarity, but contrary to such expectations, the European example 
has rather focused on 'economic unity'. In fact, while aiming at harmonising anti-
money laundering legislation within the Union, European lawmakers have made sure 
that such legislation would have not been cumbersome for the creation of the free 
Single Market. If it is true that 'there are certainly inherent limits to how much states 
can deter and forbid illegal cross-border economic activities, especially if they wish 
to maintain open borders and societies',  it is also true that today borders have been 
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